Demographic aspects of abortion in Eastern Europe : a study with special reference to the Czech Republic and Slovakia by Stloukal, Libor
Demographie aspects of abortion 
in Eastern Europe: 
a study with special reference 
to the Czech Republic and Slovakia
by
Libor Stloukal
A thesis submitted for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
at The Australian National University
June 1995
Declaration
Except where otherwise indicated this thesis is my own work 
carried out during my PhD scholarship in the Demography 
Program, Division of Demography and Sociology, Research 
School of Social Sciences, at The Australian National University 
from June 1992 to June 1995.
June 1995
[a 'Av v
Libor Stloukal
ii
Acknowledgments
Many people have contributed to the completion of this thesis. To all of them I 
owe my deepest gratitude, but I first wish to acknowledge the assistance and 
patience of those who were, for varying periods of time, members of my 
supervision panel. These include, in alphabetical order, Dr. Gordon A. 
Carmichael, Dr. Lincoln H. Day, Professor Geoffrey McNicoll, and Dr. Christabel 
Young. Each one made a unique contribution, and collectively they provided me 
with the benefit of their critical intelligence and encouraged me to be clear, 
consistent, and accurate in my thinking and writing. To Gordon, who was my 
supervisor from beginning to end, I owe special thanks for his perceptive 
remarks, careful and prompt reading of drafts, and insightful suggestions which 
helped clarify many issues.
I owe a sincere debt of gratitude to Dr. Lado T. Ruzicka, who not only had 
assisted me in my efforts to pursue doctoral studies in Australia, but also 
provided a permanent support during my stay in Canberra which proved truly 
invaluable. With his integrity and kindness, Lado buttressed me personally, and 
with his far-ranging knowledge and expertise in social science, he inspired me 
professionally.
Special thanks are due also to the following people who have read the 
manuscript for this thesis, in whole or in part, at one or another stage of 
completion, and offered their candid advice: Dr. Mariah Evans, Dr. Alan Gray, 
Ms. Yvonne E. Pittelkow, Dr. Mirka Prazak, Professor Harry Rigby, and Dr. 
Vladimir Srb. I greatly appreciate the painstaking work of Ms. Wendy H. Cosford 
who edited drafts of the thesis chapters. Wendy was extremely helpful in putting 
my Czech English into English English and also offered some highly appreciated 
moral support.
I wish to acknowledge the inspiration and constructive comments provided by 
my co-students in the Demography Program at the ANU, on whom I tested 
some of the ideas that have gone into this work; and the immeasurable support 
of my wife Zuzana, who offered much-needed comfort and encouragement 
through numerous twists and turns in the history of the manuscript. To be 
acknowledged, too, are the mentors and colleagues who contributed to my 
graduate training at the Charles University in Prague during 1982-87. I am
iii
particularly grateful to Professor Zdenek Pavlik, for education, consistent 
support, intellectual stimulation, and an example in excellence.
I thank The Australian National University for the hospitality and postgraduate 
scholarship which have enabled me to produce this work. I am grateful to all the 
staff in the Demography Program of the ANU for their teaching, supervision, and 
all kinds of assistance which made my stay in Australia enjoyable and 
memorable. I also wish to express my appreciation for support from the following 
institutions: Demography Department at the Charles University in Prague; Czech 
Statistical Office; Czech Family Planning Association; Hungarian Central 
Statistical Office in Budapest; and Social Science Data Archive at the ANU.
It is customary for the author to assume sole responsibility for errors and 
shortcomings in his or her work. With so much good advice from so many wise 
people, I might be tempted to refrain from such a statement had there not been 
several instances when I did not follow the advice I was given. Therefore, any 
mistakes of fact or judgment must, alas, be considered my responsibility entirely.
iv
Abstract
During the post-World War II period, widespread resort to induced abortion 
became a well-known peculiarity of the demographic situation in Eastern 
European countries. The generally high East European abortion levels resulted 
from the interplay of several determinants. This study focuses first on population 
policies and the broader socio-economic and demographic conditions that 
characterized Eastern Europe during the period 1950-90. It is demonstrated that 
the emergence of the high-abortion regime coincided demographically with the 
final stage of secular fertility decline in the region, and politically with the 
establishment of Soviet-style socialism — a system typified by egalitarian social 
policies, low material standards of living, limited availability of contraceptives, 
and policies suppressing personal autonomy and perpetuating inequality 
between the sexes. Despite the many similarities of the countries under 
consideration, however, abortion levels differed regionally as well as temporally, 
reflecting local mores and the effects of country-specific policies related to family 
and birth control.
With this in mind, using data from official registration sources, the study goes 
onto examine levels, trends, and selected demographic aspects of abortion in 
the Czech and Slovak populations, applying both period- and cohort-specific 
modes of analysis. The findings show that the dominant force behind the resort 
to abortion was the desire to prevent second and higher-order births in families, 
whereas its use to space childbearing or avoid it altogether was much less 
typical. Changes in abortion legislation generated some transitory behavioural 
responses, but had only limited effect on abortion patterns in the long term. 
There were substantial differences in the resort to abortion between Czech and 
Slovak women; this indicates that factors such as socio-economic status, 
religion, respect for certain social norms, and attitudes to contraception were 
powerful determinants of reproductive and birth-preventing behaviour. Overall 
fertility levels were not unaffected by changes in abortion legislation, but the net 
effects were less dramatic than a simple trend analysis would suggest because 
the observed fertility declines were partly produced by differences in 
childbearing patterns between cohorts.
The study concludes by speculating about the broader institutional and socio- 
psychological correlates of abortion in the formerly communist-ruled countries of 
Eastern Europe, and by suggesting an agenda for future research.
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTORY OVERVIEW
1.1 The main theme
Dramatic political and social changes that have been taking place in Eastern 
European societies since 1989 necessitate updating of information and 
interpretation of the region's past social developments. The present and the 
future of the former communist bloc have never ceased to depend on a depth of 
understanding of the region's communist past. Only now, as the newly 
independent societies in Eastern Europe struggle with serious political, 
economic, and social troubles, is the so-called 'black box' of Soviet-style 
communism being opened. In this important sense, Eastern Europe's 
experience with communism is far from being a topic for historians.
The characteristics of populations are very often at the heart of social issues, 
and demographic change has always been a fundamental element of the 
evolution of nation states. This thesis is about trends, patterns, and differentials 
in abortion, a phenomenon of considerable demographic importance in the 
former Soviet-bloc countries. It is essentially a descriptive study: its emphasis is 
on investigating what has been occurring during the period 1950-90. As such, 
the study should sharpen understanding of why abortion trends occurred in 
Eastern Europe the way they did. The study is meant primarily to provide 
summary quantitative information on abortion patterns and trends in Eastern 
European countries, with special reference to the Czech and Slovak 
populations, and to identify major political, socio-demographic, and cultural 
covariates of abortion-seeking behaviour. It analyses overall trends and 
reversals, periodic setbacks, and unequal participation by various groups of 
women in those trends, and discusses motives that might have been behind the 
resort to abortion and the links between abortion and other demographic 
phenomena. Therefore, it contains extensive data compilations as well as 
explanations of what those data seem to mean. The study does not seek to 
prescribe solutions to the numerous non-demographic questions surrounding 
abortion in Eastern Europe. Rather, it is premised on a belief that consideration 
of Eastern Europe's demographic experience during the communist period will 
help to identify the issues at stake, and suggest productive ways of thinking 
about them.
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Certainly Eastern Europe could not be viewed merely as an evenly coloured 
region on the world political map. Cultural, historical, and social contrasts have 
always been enormous. Throughout this study it becomes clear that there have 
also been substantial demographic differences between the former Soviet 
societies and those of neighbouring countries, as well as between the non- 
Soviet populations in Eastern Europe themselves. For many Western observers, 
the massive divergences between people living in this region have become fully 
apparent only after the end of communist rule, and one of the aims of this work 
is therefore to correct the erroneous assumption of 'sameness'.
The choice of questions considered has been limited by the availability of 
relevant information (hence the phrase 'aspects of' in the thesis title). The study 
relies predominantly on aggregate data and its focus is mainly on the Czech and 
Slovak populations. Had it been possible to include comparatively detailed 
analyses for other populations of the region or to examine abortion behaviour 
using individual-level data, this would have been done, but very little appropriate 
information was available. In this context it is important to note that in the 
communist regimes of Eastern Europe statistical information was regarded not 
only as practically important but also as politically highly sensitive. 
Consequently, all published information was carefully censored to serve the 
official viewpoint. Inability to prevent unplanned conceptions and unwillingness 
to carry such pregnancies to term typically were seen by the political authorities 
as inappropriate forms of behaviour, and were therefore not much publicized. 
For students of social change wishing to look at issues such as differential 
abortion or individual abortion histories, there were officially erected barriers that 
prevented or discouraged work which was perceived to be politically sensitive. 
The massive political upheavals in 1989 opened the doors to change in all the 
formerly Soviet-type countries, yet it is doubtful whether the reformed statistical 
services will be able retrospectively to redress the numerous gaps in historical 
data series. It is to be hoped that more studies will be undertaken on specific 
aspects of abortion in particular Eastern European countries which will add 
depth to comparative work in this field.
The aim of this chapter is to give an introductory overview on the issues relevant 
to the demographic study of abortion in Eastern Europe. In the initial part, 
attention is devoted to the definitions of basic geographic and demographic 
terms used in this study. At the core of the discussion are the questions of what 
precisely is (and is not) to be understood by the expressions 'Eastern Europe'
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and 'abortion'. Because abortion as a social phenomenon and an object of 
public policies has a remarkable history, which is important if one seeks to 
comprehend the role it plays in the contemporary world, the next section of this 
chapter briefly summarises what is known about the development of the 
ideological, legal and demographic aspects of abortion since ancient times. The 
following portion of this chapter is a preliminary overview of the demographic 
literature that has contributed most significantly to the study of abortion in 
Eastern Europe in the period since the 1950s. The last section identifies topics 
that deserve more detailed consideration and presents the organization of the 
thesis.
1.2 Defining Eastern Europe
Geographic terms attempting to embrace subcontinents or groups of countries 
often fail to command universal acceptance in demographic writings. The 
present study investigates abortion and selected related aspects of reproductive 
behaviour in the former communist-ruled countries of Europe: Albania, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia 
(Figure 1.1a). Of course, the USSR cannot be struck from the list, for it played a 
crucial role in political and social developments in the eastern part of Europe 
from the mid-1940s. These nine countries are treated here as one region, but 
they were at all times very different from one another in their demographic 
histories, as well as in many aspects of their societies and cultures. Although 
these countries shared after World War II a similar political fate which has 
caused deep, far-reaching changes, they never constituted what could be called 
a true geographic entity (Turnock, 1989). The Soviet Union itself was extremely 
heterogeneous in every respect; but even within Eastern Europe proper the 
ethnic and cultural diversity was great.* 1 Perhaps this is why it has always been 
difficult to give the area comprising these nine countries a simple title.
1 The countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have always been diverse in 
terms of demographic and economic characteristics and likewise in terms of physical size. The 
former USSR alone occupied over one-sixth of the Earth's land area, while Albania was less than
1 per cent of the Soviet Union's size. The USSR was one of the most diverse industrialized 
countries. Its 15 union republics were each at different stages of economic development. 
Ethnically and culturally, they also were dissimilar: the European republics were made up of 
mostly Christian Slavonic nationalities (with the exception of the Moldovans who are ethnically 
similar to Romanians, and Estonians who are similar to Finns), while the Transcaucasus region 
and the former Central Asian republics were populated predominantly by non-Slavonic Muslim 
populations (Katz, 1975). Compared to the former Soviet Union, the remaining Eastern European 
countries were less diverse. With the exception of Albania, Hungary, and Romania, they are 
inhabited primarily by Slavonic ethnic groups. The predominant religions are Roman Catholic (the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia), Protestant (East Germany, part of the Czech 
Republic), and Greek or Eastern Orthodox (Bulgaria, Romania, parts of Slovakia, and the former
3
According to United Nations terminology (UN, 1991a), the family of European 
communist states was broken into three parts. The USSR was recognized as a 
separate entity; six countries, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, 
Hungary, Poland, and Romania, were labelled 'Eastern Europe'; and Albania 
and Yugoslavia were held to be parts of 'Southern Europe'. In order to draw 
attention to the geo-political realities of the period of communist regimes, some 
scholars have named the whole region (often excluding the USSR) in slightly 
different ways: 'Eastern Europe' (Hecht, 1986; Blayo, 1991a), 'East Central 
Europe' (Kosinski, 1977; Batt, 1991), or 'Central and Eastern Europe' (David and 
McIntyre, 1981); often, however, without offering a clear explanation of what led 
them to choose a particular term. A critique of these terms is offered by Ash 
(1989: 250), who argues that the expression East Central Europe, and the like, 
confuse the notions of post-1945 Eastern Europe and pre-1914 Central Europe, 
and therefore should be avoided:
By post-1945 Eastern Europe one means the formally independent 
member states of the Warsaw Pact... The term Central Europe ... for the 
period before 1914 ... may be taken to mean those countries that, while 
subsumed in one of the great multinational empires (Austro-Hungarian, 
Prussian-German, or Russian), nonetheless preserved major elements of 
Western traditions: for example, Western Christianity, the rule of law, 
some separation of powers, a measure of constitutional government and 
something that could be called a civil society. The western Ukraine and 
the Baltic states are thus excluded by the first criterion, while Bulgaria is 
excluded by the second. Romania is a borderline case.
Following 1989, as a result of the fall of communist governments in the Soviet 
bloc, re-unification of Germany, disintegration of the Soviet Union, territorial 
division of certain other states, and the subsequent establishment of several 
new nation states, the 45-years-old division of Europe has disappeared and 
much of the former political geography has lost its previous meaning (Figure 
1.1b). These days, there is less agreement than ever about what groups of 
countries are to be called 'Central Europe', 'Eastern Europe', or 'Southern 
Europe'. The use of these labels continues to reflect more the desire to 
differentiate between socio-political systems than to refer to actual geographic or 
cultural facts (Batt, 1991; Tismaneanu, 1992; Xiang, 1992). This applies in 
particular to the expressions 'Central Europe' and 'Eastern Europe', which never
Yugoslavia). Albania is the only country in the former socialist Europe whose population is 
predominantly Muslim, although parts of Bulgaria and the former Yugoslavia (e.g., Bosnia- 
Hercegovina, Kosovo) have a historical orientation to the East and large numbers of Muslims, too, 
as a result of centuries of Turkish occupation.
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represented phenomena of geography but rather spiritual notions more or less 
synonymous with the words 'West' and 'East' in their old ideological senses 
(Kundera, 1984).
In selecting the title for this study, various geographic terms were considered, 
and for the sake of brevity the term 'Eastern Europe' was finally adopted as the 
general heading for all the European countries under examination. Thus, in 
contrast to the terminology used by the United Nations, Albania, the former 
Yugoslavia, and the former USSR are considered to have been parts of Eastern 
Europe, because of being higher-fertility, less developed, non-free-market 
countries. The collapse of the communist bloc after 1989 and the following 
territorial changes are largely ignored for the purpose of this analysis as they do 
not materially affect the major arguments. It cannot be overstressed, however, 
that the term 'Eastern Europe' is used here in relation to a territory which is full 
of inequities and contradictions, resulting from the divergent historical 
experiences of the particular national populations.
1.3 Defining abortion
The events in human experience that are most important for demographic 
research are essentially the facts of life with which people generally are familiar. 
What the student of demographic change needs, however, is not only a general 
familiarity with the events that constitute the process of demographic change 
but also a knowledge of their exact definitions. In the case of induced abortion, 
moreover, the choice and use of terms are often revealing of societal attitudes 
(Roe, 1989). That is why the terminology used in discussing abortion is so 
confused, is slow in changing, and varies from country to country as well as 
among disciplines dealing with the issue. Broad agreement has yet to be 
reached on nomenclature, so it is vital to examine briefly the range of abortion- 
related terms in use.
The lack of uniformity in the usage of terms related to prenatal and perinatal 
phases of human life is an old problem. The independent development of 
registration systems in different countries has resulted in a variety of types of 
organization and method, and this variety has been an obstacle to uniform 
demographic terminology. Efforts to standardize the definitions of such terms as 
'abortion', 'live birth', and 'stillbirth' first developed in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries as a result of the activities of the International
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Statistical Institute and the Health Organization of the League of Nations. 
However, the standards internationally recommended by these institutions were 
seldom widely accepted, and many countries preferred their own definitions of 
vital events for legal and registration purposes (UN, 1954).
In 1950, the Third World Health Assembly adopted the recommendation of a 
World Health Organization Expert Committee on Health Statistics that the 
definition of 'foetal death' should be the reverse of 'live birth'. These two 
definitions are still valid and continue to be the only internationally 
recommended standards in this area of demographic terminology (WHO, 1950: 
12):
Live birth is the complete expulsion or extraction from its mother of a 
product of conception, irrespective of the duration of pregnancy, which, 
after such separation, breathes or shows any other evidence of life, such 
as beating of the heart, pulsation of the umbilical cord, or definite 
movement of voluntary muscles, whether or not the umbilical cord has 
been cut or placenta is attached; each product of such a birth is 
considered live born.
Foetal death is death prior to the complete expulsion or extraction from 
its mother of a product of conception, irrespective of the duration of 
pregnancy; the death is indicated by the fact that after such separation 
the foetus does not breathe or show any other evidence of life, such as 
beating of the heart, pulsation of the umbilical cord, or definite movement 
of voluntary muscles.
Unfortunately, the 1950 World Health Assembly did not define the term abortion. 
It merely recommended dividing foetal deaths into three major categories: early 
foetal deaths at less than 20 completed weeks of gestation, intermediate foetal 
deaths at 20 weeks but less than 28 weeks, and late foetal deaths at 28 weeks 
or more. The Assembly also stated that the last group should be regarded as 
synonymous with the older and widely accepted concept of stillbirth (WHO, 
1950).
The key criterion for distinguishing between various types of foetal deaths — 
duration of the pregnancy — has been defined as the interval between the 
onset of the woman's last menses and the expulsion or removal of the foetus 
(WHO, 1950, 1970; Santee and Henshaw, 1992). In practice, duration of 
pregnancy is stated in weeks or lunar months. The latter practice, however, 
involves difficulties of comparison, owing to the differences between completed
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months, nearest month, or ordinal month of pregnancy.2 To avoid these 
inconsistencies, the use of completed weeks rather than months is generally 
regarded as the preferable measurement. As an alternative to the 'conventional 
duration of pregnancy' in menstrual weeks, a counting of the 'true duration of 
pregnancy' in weeks from the date of conception would also be possible. This 
method, however, is seldom employed, since the exact beginning of pregnancy 
—  the date of fertilization of an ovum by a sperm cell — is usually difficult to 
determine; in most cases, it can only be estimated as 10-14 days after the 
beginning of the last menstruation (UN, 1954).
How does the term 'abortion' fit into this terminology of foetal deaths? The word 
comes from the Latin aboriri — to disappear, pass away, perish by untimely 
birth (Lewis, 1980). Etymology itself, however, does not reveal much in this 
case. Over the centuries of its use, the term 'abortion' has assumed a variety of 
meanings, as well as a number of specific connotations that are dependent on 
its context. Medical tradition, for instance, bases the definition of abortion on the 
absence of 'viability' in the foetus. Thus, in strictly medical usage, the word 
designates the ending of an intra-uterine pregnancy after the implantation of the 
fertilized ovum in the endometrium and before the foetus has become capable 
of surviving, with appropriate life support, and eventually maintaining an 
independent extra-uterine life (Llewellyn-Jones, 1982). For many years, it was 
believed that viability is reached at roughly 28 weeks of gestation, 
corresponding to a foetal weight of approximately 1,000 grams and a foetal 
length about 35 cm (WHO, 1969, 1970; IUSSP, 1982).
However, there is a difficulty in using the traditional criteria of viability, since they 
were based merely on the observation that infants born before 28 weeks of 
pregnancy, or weighing less than 1,000 grams, had little chance of survival (UN, 
1954; Pressat, 1985). Owing to advances in obstetric technologies and methods 
of resuscitation from the 1950s onwards the traditional definition of viability has 
become debatable, because increasing numbers of infants delivered at fewer 
than 24 weeks of gestation or weighing less than 600 grams at birth have been 
reported to have survived (WHO, 1970; Tietze, 1983). The resulting disparity in 
definitions of abortion was revealed by an inquiry made in 1969 by the World 
Health Organization. Among the 66 countries which answered that they had a
2 For instance, in terms of completed lunar months a pregnancy of three months' duration 
corresponds to 12-15 completed weeks; in terms of the nearest month, to 10-13 completed 
weeks; and in terms of ordinal months, an abortion during the third month of gestation has been 
preceded by 8-11 completed weeks of pregnancy (WHO, 1970).
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definition for statistical purposes, the majority (45) used a criterion of duration of 
pregnancy; but another eight referred simply to 'viability' without any detailed 
definition of that term; five countries claimed to use 'the WHO definition' or 'the 
UN definition' of abortion, neither of which existed in those days; and the 
remaining eight countries defined abortion by the weight or length of the foetus 
or by other criteria. In summary, the replies to the WHO survey indicated that 
'when countries state that they collect information on abortion, they do so 
irrespective of whether the country has a definition of the term' (WHO, 1969: 
40).3
Because the understanding of viability remains a matter for disagreement, the 
most suitable way to define an abortion seems to be to use the arbitrary 
criterion of a dead foetus expelled at less than 28 completed weeks of 
gestation, measured from the beginning of the last menstruation.4 This definition 
is used by most of the countries that have adopted a definition of abortion; in 
addition, it complements the definition of a stillbirth recommended by WHO, and 
corresponds to definitions used in the International Classification of Diseases 
since 1938 (WHO, 1970, 1978). Some may argue that even the application of 
the definition of abortion based on menstrual weeks is not free of obstacles. 
There are well-known difficulties in determining gestational age in cases where 
a woman does not remember the date of the beginning of her last menstrual 
period; never menstruated after a previous pregnancy; or experienced bleeding 
episodes after pregnancy had been established (WHO, 1969, 1970). Apart from 
these difficulties of physiological circumstance, there is also a whole set of 
problems related to social and individual perceptions of abortion. For instance, if 
a woman undergoes an abortion procedure without really knowing whether a 
pregnancy has begun, should she be counted as an aborter? These days, in 
the field of demographic statistics, the term abortion relates to cases where 
pregnancy has been verified or is at least suspected (Tietze, 1983). Yet some 
psychologists and gynaecologists tend to view any abortion procedure, even 
when performed on a non-pregnant woman, as an abortion (Moore-Cavar, 
1974). No wonder, then, that discussion about the general definition of abortion 
itself has a very long, and still continuing, genesis. It remains to be seen 
whether any new definition, widely acceptable, practically relevant, and better 
than that using criterion of (estimated) menstrual weeks, will ever be introduced 
into statistical practice.
3 The report does not include information about what definitions were used in individual countries.
4 It is obvious that when specified in this way, the term abortion is in fact synonymous with early 
and intermediate foetal deaths as defined by WHO in 1950.
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The two major categories of abortion are induced and spontaneous. Induced 
abortions are those initiated by deliberate action undertaken with the intention of 
terminating pregnancy. Abortions not intentionally induced, by contrast, are 
called spontaneous, even if an external factor such as a trauma or 
communicable disease is involved. Induced abortions carried out according to 
the law of a particular country are legal abortions. Procedures induced contrary 
to law are called illegal or criminal abortions; they may be performed under 
unsafe, unsanitary conditions, or may be as safe as legal abortions, especially 
when performed by trained physicians operating outside the law. Legally 
induced abortions are often classified according to the legal grounds on which 
they were performed. Those procedures undertaken for medical reasons, when 
pregnancy is regarded as a condition the cure for which is abortion, are 
conventionally described as therapeutic abortions. According to the technique 
used, there are abortions induced by curettage, abortions by vacuum aspiration, 
abortions by dilatation and evacuation, hysterectomies, and abortions by 
medical induction procedures.5
In this study, the term 'abortion1, unless otherwise noted, refers to legally 
induced abortions. The word 'miscarriage', often used by the lay public as 
equivalent to spontaneous or accidental terminations of foetal life, is rather 
obsolete in the scientific context and is avoided for that reason, except in 
quotations. Definitions of the main abortion-related terms used in this study are 
shown in Table 1.1.
1.4 Abortion in historical context
Abortion is a subject which has long been clouded by secrecy and 
misunderstanding. It has been only during the twentieth century that abortion 
has moved from the fringes of public concern to the central stage of open 
discussion in many countries over the world. As a topic of public and scientific 
concern and debate, then, abortion is a relatively recent phenomenon. But as a 
very real and private matter, and a component of demographic behaviour, it has 
merely continued its ever-present existence. Historians and anthropologists
5 To be sure, there are many other definitions and terms employed by doctors, lawyers, and other 
professionals who deal with specific problems surrounding foetal mortality; overviews of the juristic 
and medical nomenclature on abortion are presented, for instance, by Danforth (1977), Llewellyn- 
Jones (1982), Stedman (1982), Frankowski and Cole (1987), and Glendon (1987). However, since 
the narrower legal and medicinal aspects of abortion are of limited importance demographically, 
demographers can manage quite well without such specialized terminology.
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Table 1.1: Definitions of the main demographic terms related to abortion
Term_____
Conception
Foetus
Pregnancy, gestation 
Duration of pregnancy
Abortion
induced
legal
illegal, criminal
therapeutic
spontaneous
Definition_______________________________________
Result of fertilization of an ovum by a sperm cell.
Product of conception developing in the mother's body, 
until its expulsion or removal. If death occurred before 
delivery, the term 'foetus' is used even after delivery. 
Condition of having a developing foetus in the body, 
normally in the uterus, following conception.
Length of time a woman spends pregnant measured 
conventionally as the interval between the onset of the 
woman's last menstrual period and the expulsion or 
removal of the foetus.
Termination of pregnancy resulting in a dead foetus by 
less than 28 completed weeks of gestation.
Abortion initiated by deliberate action with the intention to 
terminate the pregnancy.
Induced abortion performed within the limits of the law. 
Induced abortion performed contrary to the law.
Legal abortion undertaken for medical reasons.
Abortion occurring without deliberation or intent.
Sources: Grebenik and Hill (1974), Moore-Cavar (1974), IUSSP (1977, 1982), Tietze (1982, 
1983), Petersen and Petersen (1986).
remind us that 'every known culture, whether literate or preliterate, primitive or 
modern, has engaged in abortion' (Mall, 1983: 1). However, the extent of 
abortion practice has varied substantially over time, and has been affected by 
evolving religious, medical, and philosophical preoccupations, as well as by 
wide social and economic differentials between particular communities, 
geographic areas, or historical periods. This section presents a short overview 
of the history of abortion from pre-Christian times, with the emphasis on 
developments in Europe.
Abortion may be assumed to be one of the oldest and commonest forms of 
fertility control. Records of folk-medicine techniques of producing abortion 
constitute the oldest evidence about the practice of terminating a pregnancy at 
will. There are indications of the use of abortives under a variety of 
circumstances in many primitive societies.6 Contemporary doctors would 
probably remark that ancient abortifacients could hardly be effective; what has 
to be recognized, however, is that these recipes had both a practical and a 
symbolic value, and that they demonstrated a serious intent to exercise control 
over procreation.
6 See, for instance, Himes (1970 [1936]), Devereux (1955), Carrick (1985).
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The early history of abortion is frequently linked to the study of ethics, theology 
and law. This is relatively well documented by written sources of both religious 
and secular origin, and may be traced to ancient times. Particularly for the 
broader Mediterranean area, where Christianity together with Jewish, Greek and 
Roman traditions shaped the principles of Western culture, such sources are not 
scanty, although their completeness and authenticity are often debatable. Given 
the lack of what could be called the quantitative dimension, the direct 
demographic relevance of these materials is usually not high. Moreover, 
demographers would prefer an approach viewing abortion in the context of 
reproductive behaviour and social life, rather than placed within philosophical 
and theological disputation. Nevertheless, the continuing attention given to 
abortion can at the very least be taken as evidence of the employment of such 
practices. The religious and legal proscriptive and repressive measures known 
from this period tell the story, just as 'stop' signs imply the existence of traffic in 
the modern world.
In ancient Greece, the control of fertility was clearly desired and believed to be 
possible. The general view was that a foetus was never more than potentially a 
human being; therefore abortion was not condemned. Plato (c.429-347 BC) 
viewed the termination of unwanted pregnancies as a part of state eugenic 
policy (Carrick, 1985). Aristotle (c.384-322 BC) recommended that couples 
practise induced abortion as a means of maintaining the family at an optimum 
size:
The proper thing to do is to limit the size of each family, and if children 
are then conceived in excess of the limit so fixed, to have miscarriage 
induced before sense and life have begun in the embryo (quoted by 
McLaren, 1990: 18).
Aristotle also maintained that man has a succession of souls: vegetable, animal, 
and rational; and that animation of the foetus occurred in the male 40 days and 
in females 80 days after conception (Sheeran, 1987). His theory of delayed 
ensoulment had a fundamental influence on Christian thinking on abortion for 
many centuries to come.
Yet Hellenic Greece saw arguments against abortion as well. Hippocrates 
(c.469-399 BC) has long been regarded as a classical opponent of abortion 
practices, since the medical oath associated with his name contained the 
famous injunction that doctors forswear abortion:
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I will neither give a deadly drug to anybody if asked for it, nor will I make 
a suggestion to this effect. Similarly I will not give to a woman an 
abortive remedy. In purity and holiness I will guard my life and my art 
(quoted by Carrick, 1985: 69).
However, there has always been some vagueness about what the Hippocratic 
oath actually represented. It is often speculated that much of it reflected merely 
the conviction that doctors should leave both births and abortions to midwives, 
as well as the hostility to surgery, which obviously influenced the medical theory 
and practice of ancient Greece (McLaren, 1990). The uncertainty about the 
meaning of the Hippocratic oath is augmented by another work ascribed to 
Hippocrates which contains a remarkably detailed description of an abortive 
technique (Potts, Diggory and Peel, 1977).
Most Romans shared the prevailing viewpoint of the Greeks that the foetus had 
no independent existence, and considered it a part of the mother right up to the 
birth. A typically liberal approval of abortion can be attributed to Stoics like 
Seneca (4 BC - AD 65) who associated life with breath and held that the foetus 
did not come alive until it began to breathe (Carrick, 1985). It is true that some 
Roman physicians, such as Soranus of Ephesus (AD 98-138), Rome's greatest 
writer on gynaecology, restricted abortions to narrowly medical indications; but 
such views apparently represented a small segment of general opinion (Himes, 
1970). In the Roman mind, a woman was usually considered competent to 
request a termination of her pregnancy, and abortion was not as distinctly 
separate from contraception as it would be in later societies.
The ancient Greeks' and Romans' predominantly utilitarian approach to 
practices such as infanticide and abortion was not particularly intended to meet 
the needs of an unwillingly pregnant woman. It was rather designed to 
guarantee that the husband, as absolute head of the family, could judge 
whether or not the new offspring was desirable. Likewise, if men opposed 
abortion it was because they thought that it threatened their interests, not that it 
violated foetal life. No wonder, then, that antiquity did not moralize much about 
abortion. The idea that abortion is primarily a moral issue is an invention, not 
discovery, which was left for the Jews and Christians to make.
The ancient Hebrews believed that the human soul was the one quality which 
distinguished man from animals, and that it was only discernible from the 
moment of birth to the moment of death (Margolies, 1970). The basic ethical
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code of Judaism was crystallized in the Ten Commandments, including the 
classical command Thou shalt not murder'. According to Exodus a part of the 
Old Testament, Jewish law seemed to provide a penalty for an accidental 
abortion, but this was not as harsh as the penalty for the killing of a human 
being:
When men have a fight and hurt a pregnant woman, so that she suffers 
a miscarriage, but no further injury, the guilty one shall be fined as much 
as the woman's husband demands of him, and he shall pay in the 
presence of judges. But if injury ensues, you shall give life for life, eye for 
eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for 
wound, stripe for stripe (quoted by Connery, 1977: 8).
It was only in the Septuagint, a Greek version of the Old Testament translated in 
the third pre-Christian century, that instead of this wording the explicit penalty 
for an intentional abortion appeared (Noonan, 1970). This interpretation was 
later incorporated into early Christian dogma.
The advent of Christianity brought about a reorientation of values leading to a 
change in attitude toward many issues. Where the new religion was truly 
innovative was in making attitudes to sexuality and reproduction the symbols of 
the difference between Christians and pagans and the key indicator of individual 
morality. The early Christians adopted from the Jews their general respect for 
human life at all stages, an attitude which put them in conflict with the 
surrounding Roman world where abortion and infanticide were widely accepted. 
From this competition, there gradually emerged a dominant Christian view that 
not only made chastity a moral ideal but linked it with the concept of 
reproduction as the only justification for sexual activity.
Christian objection to abortion was related mainly to speculation about the 
existence of a soul, particularly a soul which was the creation of God. An 
extensive debate about the origin of the soul and the nature of the foetus 
developed over the first 400 years of Christianity, involving figures such as 
Tertullian, St. Jerome, St. Augustine, St. John Chrysostom, and many others 
(Noonan, 1965, 1970). The arguments from a theological perspective indicate 
that the early Christians did not consider as murder an abortion performed 
before the soul is in the body. Tertullian (155-220), one of the first Latin Fathers, 
followed the ancient doctors in agreeing that one could not talk about the foetus 
until quite some time after conception and that an abortion was justified if 
required to save the woman's life (McLaren, 1990). Similarly, St. Augustine
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(354-430), who played a key role in elaborating the early Christian moral codex, 
wrote that 'no soul was present in foetal life until the moment of quickening, 
when the mother-to-be detected the first stirrings of life within her body' (Smith, 
1970: 27).
Also during the following centuries there were frequent discussions in the 
Catholic Church about when life begins, but the debate produced controversial 
prescriptions (Connery, 1977; Hurst, 1991). Usually, the church fathers 
regarded abortion and contraception as very much the same — attempts to 
enjoy sexual pleasure without bearing children — but they did not believe in the 
immediate animation of the embryo. Gratian, the classical author in the area of 
church legislation, in a codification of Canon Law in 1160 held that abortion was 
not murder before the infusion of the soul (Connery, 1977). St. Thomas Aquinas 
(1227-1274) maintained, as had Aristotle, that the human soul is infused into 
the body of the male foetus about 40 days after conception and into the female 
foetus after about 80 days (Rodman, Sarvis, and Bonar, 1987). The fourteenth- 
century theologian John of Naples introduced into the debate the view that 
aborting an inanimate foetus to save a woman's life should be tolerated, and his 
view later found many followers. In the papal constitution Sedes apostolica, 
issued by Gregory XIV in 1591 and effective for almost the next three centuries, 
the penalty for abortion existed only for an abortion of an animated foetus 
(Connery, 1977). Thus, the Catholic position on abortion was for a long time not 
as absolute as is commonly believed.
Not until the seventeenth century did Catholic thought consolidate against 
induced abortion by assigning to foetal life an importance equal with that of the 
mother. In 1620, the Belgian physician Thomas Fienus attacked the Aristotelian 
idea of delayed animation of the foetus and worded a new theory of ensoulment 
from the time of conception (Connery, 1977). However, it was only in 1869 that 
Pope Pius IX, in his constitution Apostolicae sedis, officially promulgated a 
marked change in Church law by eliminating the distinction between the formed 
and unformed foetus. Even when an abortion was performed to save the life of 
the pregnant woman, excommunication was henceforth the penalty for both the 
woman and the service provider (Noonan, 1970). The teaching of the Catholic 
Church was developed to an almost absolute prohibition of abortion in the 
encyclical Humanae vitae issued by Pope Paul VI in 1968 (Carlen, 1983). 
According to the theological interpretation of this instrument, only two 
exceptions to the prohibition are thinkable: an ectopic pregnancy and a
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cancerous uterus (Callahan, 1970). In recent years, the Vatican's anti-abortion 
stance has become increasingly uncompromising. The two most authoritative 
pieces of contemporary papal teaching — the encyclicals Veritatis splendor and 
Evangelium vitae issued by Pope John Paul II in 1993 and 1995, respectively — 
unconditionally reject any manipulations that result in the destruction of human 
embryos, including those occurring in relation to procedures such as in vitro 
fertilization, as these represent the worldwide expansion of a despicable 'culture 
of death' (Fray, 1995). It is certainly not coincidental that the Catholic Church 
traditionally emerges as a male-dominated, hierarchical institution calling in 
conservative terms for women's return to their 'natural1, silent and subordinate 
role. Ironically, though, the Catholic clergy today finds itself in a position quite 
similar to the one which prevailed two millennia ago: surrounded by an 
environment in which abortion is broadly practised and tolerated.
This outline of the history of abortion would not be complete without at least a 
short reference to the views taken by non-Catholic churches in Europe. The 
Eastern Orthodox Church, like the Roman Church, also claims to be the only 
infallible Church of Christ, and, like Rome, strongly condemns abortion. St. Basil 
the Great, in his Three Canonical Letters (374-375), was apparently the first 
Christian theologian who explicitly rejected the distinction between the ensouled 
and unensouled foetus. He thus established a strongly anti-abortion tradition 
which is held by the Eastern Church to the present day (Callahan, 1970). 
Protestant thinking, in contrast, has always allowed considerable variation of 
approach to abortion. While the majority of Protestant churches remain silent 
about the question, some Protestant leaders openly support the idea of abortion 
as a private decision of the physician and his patient, but Protestant 
fundamentalists, like Luther and Calvin centuries ago, take the Catholic position 
(Fletcher, 1970; Sheeran, 1987).7 As regards Judaism, Jewish theology 
provides little direct guidance on abortion. In summary, Orthodox Jews tend to 
support a restrictive abortion position, while Conservative and Reform Jews 
seem to take rather liberal views (Moore-Cavar, 1974).
Little is known about the incidence of abortion in Europe before the twentieth 
century. Catholic historians such as Noonan (1965, 1970), Callahan (1970) and 
Connery (1977) have argued that Christians down through the ages always held 
a firm anti-abortion attitude both in theory and in practice, but apparently this
7 Interestingly, it was among the Protestant sect of Hutterites that the most scrupulous adherence 
in demographic history to precepts forbidding the practice of abortion or contraception has been 
recorded (Eaton and Mayer, 1954).
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was not quite the case. The most telling aspect of the history of contradictions 
among Christian authorities in the timing of the onset of animation or life in the 
foetus is not their truth or falsehood, which cannot be established, but rather the 
tendency to harmonize religious tenets with existing social practices. It may be 
inferred from the repeated arguments of the mediaeval clergy that lay people 
throughout Europe often infringed religious prescriptions on abortion (Subrtova, 
1991); presumably the practice had some currency or it would not have been 
condemned. Unfortunately, ecclesiastical sources provide no description of 
family limitation behaviour. Knowledge and practice of abortion are obvious, 
however, from a variety of other historical sources. For instance, the principal 
medical textbooks in use in the Western world from ancient times have usually 
mentioned abortion as a surgical procedure (Himes, 1970). Advances in surgery 
which took place during the Renaissance, combined with the rise in opposition 
to Catholic doctrine, probably encouraged the use of induced abortion not only 
when the mother's life or health were threatened by the pregnancy, but also as 
a method of fertility control (Rodman et al., 1987). According to a number of 
studies in historical demography, birth control in marriage was already practised 
on a more or less wide scale in the eighteenth century in some aristocratic 
circles in France, England, Belgium, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and Hungary, 
undoubtedly by means of contraception or abortion (Andorka, 1978; Livi-Bacci, 
1986). However, the more general social conditions favouring small families 
were lacking in Europe until the beginning of the nineteenth century, and the 
practice of abortion before the transition from high to low fertility was probably 
rather limited (UN, 1973).
With the period of Enlightenment, the countries of Europe and of European 
settlement entered a new demographic era.8 European populations had 
probably never produced the maximum number of children possible, but until 
the eighteenth century their fertility rates were relatively high and stable. The 
modern decline in fertility, an integral part of the so-called demographic 
transition, began during the second half of the eighteenth century, when fertility 
started to fall in France and also to some extent in Switzerland and Belgium as 
women began to limit their fertility in marriage. In the nineteenth century, fertility 
also began to fall in Britain and Scandinavia, and later in Germany and Austria- 
Hungary. In other countries, especially in Southern and Eastern Europe and 
Russia, the decline did not commence until the end of the nineteenth or the
8 For a more detailed discussion, see Coale (1967, 1969, 1973), Shorter, Knodel, and van de 
Walle (1971), Caldwell (1976, 1982), Coale and Watkins (1986), Chesnais (1992), Livi-Bacci 
(1992), Mason (1992).
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beginning of the twentieth century. By the 1930s, birth rates were low in virtually 
all European populations. There is no completely adequate explanation of why 
childbearing behaviour changed and precipitated the demographic transition. It 
is widely agreed, however, that the secular decline in fertility in the now 
industrialized countries was closely related to basic changes in social and 
economic conditions which occurred as part of the process of modernization of 
these societies. Among the crucial factors likely to have facilitated this change 
were the emotional and economic nucleation of the family, industrialization, 
urbanization, social mobility, rising levels of education, and reduction of the 
influence of churches (UN, 1973).
The shifts in attitudes towards reproduction are believed to have been 
conditioned, among other things, by improved knowledge and acceptability of 
contraception and abortion. Voluntary birth prevention was at first employed to 
avoid having children in excess of the number that couples wanted, and later to 
control the timing of births as well. The existence of such practices is shown, 
indirectly, by demographic data that indicate steep declines in fertility at older 
ages and ever-earlier stopping of childbearing by women in European countries 
throughout the nineteenth century. While abstinence and contraception by 
coitus interruptus probably accomplished much of the reduction of fertility, there 
is a widespread belief that abortion, as simply one more step on a continuum of 
fertility-controlling practices, often supplemented ineffective contraception. The 
frequency of abortions, though hard to establish because of their 
overwhelmingly secret character, is presumed to have been high even in such 
nominally Catholic countries as France and Italy.9 Also, medical literature and 
newspapers of the period suggest that women used folk remedies in the hope 
of inducing abortion.10 However, there is some evidence that these were such 
dangerous procedures that women resorted to them only in cases of extreme 
need, mostly outside of wedlock (Knodel and van de Walle, 1979). Having 
unplanned births continued to be a not very rare experience for women because 
there were limited options in the event of an accidental conception.
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the discussion of abortion and 
fertility, once dominated by the church, was gradually secularized, and the state
9 The broadly accepted explanation is that Catholic women who had had abortions did not really 
face excommunication because, when they confessed their sin, they were usually granted 
absolution. There is little doubt that this practice persists in many Catholic countries to the present 
day.
10 See, for instance, Carr-Saunders (1936), Himes (1970), Glass (1967), Potts and Selman 
(1979).
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began to replace priests in policing reproductive behaviour. The history of such 
policies is important, as much for the light it casts on the conditions which have 
shaped them, as for their demographic effects. These conditions lie partly in 
demographic trends and partly in changes in ideology, in economic 
circumstances, and in the increasing administrative capacity of governments. 
The 1800s, in particular, were a period of great social and economic change, 
when the growth of industrial capitalism led to the rise of the middle class and 
the establishment of its moralistic values as the values of the time. Repressive 
attitudes towards sexuality, combined with pronatalist policies and growing 
evidence that abortion was the cause of much maternal mortality and morbidity, 
resulted in prohibitive abortion laws (UN, 1973). In France, a 1791 statute stated 
that criminal abortionists would be prosecuted, and its amended form of 1810 
also provided for the prosecution of their patients (UN, 1992b). In England, 
abortion after the time at which the first movements of the foetus were obvious 
was made a statutory crime in 1803; in 1861, all abortions became criminal 
offences, punishable by life imprisonment (David, 1992). Over the century, a 
growing number of countries followed France's and England's lead in placing 
severe restrictions on the performance of abortion at any stage of pregnancy. 
By the late 1800s, this state of affairs had few opponents and the majority of lay 
people accepted the repressive laws as a normal fact of life (McLaren, 1990). 
However, there is little information on the effectiveness of these policies.
At the onset of the twentieth century, abortion regardless of the duration of 
pregnancy was legally forbidden throughout Europe, but the ethics and the 
social justification of anti-abortion laws began to weaken. The idea that the 
woman who sought an abortion was committing a crime was no longer accepted 
by an increasing section of the public in many countries (McLaren, 1990). An 
important catalyst for a new way of thinking about abortion was the devastating 
effect of World War I, which led to disillusionment with traditional values and a 
loss of faith in the stability of the social order. Dramatic changes occurred in 
marriage and family structures as women moved into the world of employment 
in ever-increasing numbers (Glass, 1967). Another critical prerequisite that 
undermined traditional attitudes to induced abortion was large-scale 
improvement in medicine. As medical science made considerable strides in 
eliminating conditions that had previously threatened maternal health, the 
indications for abortion shifted gradually away from the more clearly medical 
towards social ones (Luker, 1984). By the 1930s, the first-trimester medical 
abortion became as safe as delivery at term, and it was rather the
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criminalization of abortion which, by driving women to quacks, was considered 
responsible for the health risks associated with abortion. Since reliable 
contraception was still in its infancy, illegal abortion, practised fairly openly and 
with significant harmful consequences in the form of mortality and morbidity, 
appeared as a frequent back-up method of birth prevention in many countries of 
Europe in the inter-war period. In particular a high frequency of abortion is 
presumed to have occurred during the worst years of the Depression of the 
1930s.11 Since there is some evidence that advertisements by abortionists were 
freely published (Davis, 1963), one gets the impression that the attitude towards 
abortion was quite tolerant in Europe before World War II. However, the differing 
political philosophies and goals of particular national governments shaped a 
variety of responses to this situation (UN, 1973).
Between approximately 1920 and 1985, socio-demographic conditions that 
constituted the rationale for prohibitive abortion policies gradually changed and 
discussions on abortion legislation moved towards a greater concern for 
women's rights and family well-being. Criticism of restrictive abortion laws and 
calls for abortion to be permitted on request or for a broad range of social 
indications became elements in a long-running abortion debate in developed 
countries. Although the abortion issue has been discussed in many contexts, 
the decisive arguments which eventually disarmed much of the opposition and 
stimulated the relaxation of abortion laws in countries with different socio­
cultural heritages can probably be traced to four interrelated factors (David, 
1992): (i) general recognition of the threat to public health of legally restricted 
abortion; (ii) support for a woman's right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy 
under safe conditions at an early state of gestation; (iii) development of reliable 
contraceptives and liberalization of legislation concerning their availability; and 
(iv) provision of equal access to all methods of fertility regulation for women of 
all strata of society.
Since 1920, Europe has experienced three major waves of liberal change in 
abortion legislation.12 The first is usually associated with the revolution in Russia 
and the resulting new social organization introduced by the Bolsheviks. In 1920 
the Soviet Union became the first country to legalize abortion on request in the 
first 12 weeks of pregnancy, but 16 years later this measure was repealed and 
abortion was again declared a criminal offence. In non-socialist Europe,
11 See Carr-Saunders (1936), UN (1954), Glass (1967), McLaren (1990).
12 See WHO (1971), Schubnell (1975), David (1992).
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liberalization began with the introduction of socio-economic indications for 
abortion in the 1930s in Iceland, Sweden, and Denmark, and spread to Finland 
and Norway after World War II. Adoption of these policies in Scandinavian 
countries reflected greater support for the growth of services to the public and a 
more liberal religious climate than existed in many other European countries. 
The beginning of the next large wave started with the 1955 reintroduction of the 
previous liberal abortion legislation in the USSR. Following the Soviet example, 
all the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe except East Germany and 
Albania adopted similar legislation at various dates from 1955 onwards. The last 
wave of change was initiated by the British Abortion Act of 1967, which widely 
extended permissible indications. Between the late 1960s and mid-1970s, laws 
effectively authorizing abortion on broad grounds or on request were enacted in 
most of Northern and Western Europe as well as in several states of the USA 
and some other non-European states inhabited predominantly by populations of 
European origin. Some years later liberal legislation also reached Southern 
Europe (Henshaw and Morrow, 1990; UN, 1992b).
Although the recent European history of abortion legislation also features a 
number of anti-abortion laws and restrictive countermeasures,13 it is not an 
exaggeration to claim that the major legislative developments during the 
twentieth century mirror a real revolution in societal attitudes towards abortion. 
As a social issue, abortion has been removed from the realm of criminality and 
placed in the context of health and social policies. International developments in 
abortion laws have been diverse, but the overall movement has been toward 
liberalization of laws through legislative interpretations that have reduced legal 
barriers to access to abortion services (Cook and Dickens, 1978, 1988). During 
the 1980s, liberal attitudes towards abortion legislation seemed to prevail in 
most of Europe. Easy access to safe abortion services came to be increasingly 
regarded as a positive factor that serves both the interests of individual couples 
in improving their health and happiness, and the interest of the state in 
promoting the reproductive freedom of its citizens and avoiding the high social 
and health costs associated with illegal abortion (WHO, 1991; David, 1992). 
This is not to say that abortion legislation is now once and forever a resolved 
problem. Laws governing abortion in European countries are still subject to 
controversy and command various degrees of social approval (Glendon, 1987; 
Ketting, 1991; Berer, 1993). Reproductive epidemiology, ethics, and the
13 See UN (1973), David and McIntyre (1981), David, Fleischhacker, and Hohn (1988), Hord et al. 
(1991), Ketting (1992).
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principle of respect for human rights may still inspire many improvements in 
legislation, as may the ongoing debate between the activists of the 'pro-choice1 
and 'pro-life' movements.
Demographically speaking, in the period after World War II many European 
countries approached or reached the stage of long-term population decline. This 
new era of demographic history could be called 'beyond the demographic 
transition' (Campbell, 1974) or, because it is characterized by a number of 
novelties, may even merit the label 'second demographic transition' (van de 
Kaa, 1987; Lesthaeghe, 1992). If the social norms and attitudes behind the first 
European transition to low fertility were conditioned by industrialization, 
urbanization, and secularization, the second transition is dominated by the 
growing importance of rights ensuring personal freedom and possibilities for 
individual self-fulfilment in fast-changing post-industrial societies. The 
improvement in contraceptive technology and the increased access to legal 
abortion and sterilization that have occurred since the late 1950s have been 
important facilitators of these developments.
Although the recent demographic trends in abortion in Europe, as well as in the 
world generally, have been heterogeneous and therefore do not lend 
themselves to easy generalization, evidence indicates that abortion continues to 
be an important way to avoid unwanted births. However, similarly to mortality 
and fertility, abortion as a demographic phenomenon appears not to be socially 
neutral. The recourse to abortion is today, as it always was, an important 
symptom of more-or-less hidden forces and conflicts operating within the social 
environment. The extent to which pregnancy termination, legal or illegal, is used 
to regulate fertility, and the demographics of the groups relying most heavily on 
this method, are apparently shaped by sexual behaviour, by social and 
economic pressures to limit or delay childbearing, by the availability and 
reliability of contraceptives, and by the legal, cultural, and political climate that 
surrounds abortion services in a particular country (Frejka, 1985). Contemporary 
inter-country differences in abortion seem to support the broader notion of a 
noticeable division of demographic regimes between the West and the East of 
Europe (Monnier and Rychtarikova, 1991). In Northern and Western Europe, 
abortion has largely shifted from a measure used primarily to prevent births that 
would reduce the family's well-being to a means towards achieving greater 
fulfilment of individual desires, and in particular to prevention of premature 
commencement of family formation. In Eastern European countries, in contrast,
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induced abortions most often help to stop childbearing within families, and thus 
perform the role that modern contraceptives play when they are readily and 
regularly available (Blayo, 1989; David, 1992).
To sum up, the incomplete, and often highly incomplete, historical evidence 
suggests several possible conclusions. The first is that the abortion issue is not 
a feature of only modern times. Human reproduction was probably never 
'natural' and there have always been individuals who have for one reason or 
another taken steps to limit their progeny by means of induced abortion. As 
Devereux (1967: 98) stated, 'it is impossible even to construct an imaginary 
social system in which no woman would ever feel at least impelled to abortion'. 
The present incidence of abortion thus has long-established historical 
precedent. The frequency of abortion practices, the motivation to make use of 
them, and the availability of relevant services have depended on technology 
and social attitudes, but the idea of induced abortion was rarely absent. The 
moral status of the foetus has always been ambiguous, and people have always 
been ambivalent in their feelings about the rightness or wrongness of abortion. 
While some teachings condemned abortion in theory and attempted to make it 
taboo, no ideology eliminated it in practice. There was never a fixed relationship 
between the type of legal regulation and the frequency of abortion. It does seem 
safe to claim that an artificial termination of pregnancy could almost always be 
obtained if necessary, even under highly restrictive social circumstances. Nor is 
there reason for imagining a linear historical growth in the incidence of abortion; 
it appears rather to have increased at some times and decreased at other times. 
To understand fully the purposes to which abortion tactics are turned requires 
locating them in their cultural and political setting. Human fertility and fertility- 
control tactics are artefacts of social environment; this is perhaps the most 
important conclusion that could be taken from the recorded historical 
experience.
1.5 Preliminary review of the literature on abortion in Eastern Europe
Since the late 1950s, the countries of Eastern Europe have been prominent in 
the minds of demographers concerned with abortion. There are several reasons 
for this. The most obvious is the unprecedented permissive legislation on 
abortion which was implemented in most of these countries from 1955 onwards. 
A second reason is that subsequent changes in abortion levels and, more 
broadly, demographic behaviour reflected an unparalleled interplay of liberalized
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abortion policy and other societal forces, and thus served as a lesson in 
demographic policy-making. A final reason is that researchers were able to profit 
by the comparatively rich reservoir of statistical data. Despite many country- 
specific deficiencies, more reliable abortion statistics have been available for 
Eastern Europe than for any other region of the world.
The aim of this review, however, is not to present a complete coverage of the 
literature on abortion in Eastern Europe; this would not be feasible. The point is 
rather to highlight the major lessons to be drawn from more general findings. 
Brevity and simplicity seem to be necessary for this purpose. Although different 
patterns of emphasis could be adopted, the presentation focuses on the 
following three topics: abortion policies, abortion behaviour, and causes and 
consequences of abortion practice.
1.5.1 Abortion policies
There is a fair amount of evidence that the incidence and statistical 
measurability of induced abortion vary according to its legality in a country. 
Much has been written in assessing comparative legal approaches, monitoring 
international trends, and using experience gained in one country to instruct 
legislative efforts in another. A classification system for abortion legislation 
throughout the world, which distinguishes between 'illegal', 'conditional' and 
'elective' statuses of abortion, was developed by Kalis and David (1974) and 
updated for Eastern Europe in subsequent publications.14
Although there has often been a tendency to portray the socialist world as a 
homogeneous monolith, many writers have recognized that the countries of 
Eastern Europe, in spite of their common ideology, did not constitute a politically 
homogeneous region. This is no less the case with abortion policies. According 
to van der Tak (1974), McIntyre (1972a,b) and David and McIntyre (1981), a 
considerable de jure similarity as regards abortion was achieved mainly in the 
period 1955-1962 when policies permitting first-trimester procedures on broadly 
interpreted and easy-to-meet social indications were implemented throughout 
the region (except in East Germany and Albania), and were reintroduced in the 
USSR. In comparison with the restrictive abortion laws which operated in other
14 See Schubnell (1975), David and McIntyre (1981), David (1982), Tietze and Henshaw (1986), 
Henshaw (1990).
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developed countries at that time, Berent (1970) describes the changes in 
abortion regulation in Eastern Europe as revolutionary.
A key question to be asked when considering the wave of permissive abortion 
laws in the 1950s concerns the grounds for their introduction. In-depth 
commentaries on this issue are rare. As was pointed out by Macura (1974: 374), 
'we do not know much about the genesis of these policies before they were 
published1. Perhaps this is why most of the policy case studies tend to start at 
the point of decision rather than, more broadly and more realistically, by 
examining the background to the changes to see how they fit into a continuous 
social policy.
Frequently, the public health purpose is considered to have been the most 
important incentive for abortion legalization. For instance, Sachdev (1988: 4) is 
convinced that socialist countries were motivated to reform their laws ‘because 
of an alarming increase in illegal abortions and the consequent problems of 
maternal mortality and morbidity1. Potts et al. (1977: 133) also suggest that 
pressure came from 'the toll of ill-health' created by high illegal abortion rates 
during the post-war years. A general statement on the medical basis of the 
1950s liberalization of access to abortion in European socialist countries is that 
of Klinger (1971: 1154):
These measures ... were intended to protect the health of the women, as 
in earlier years great numbers of illegal abortions were induced which 
were dangerous not only to health, but in many cases to life: according to 
the new laws induced abortions can be performed in health institutions 
only, after medical examination of the state of health and duration of 
pregnancy of the woman.
Yet this public health argument is not the only one used to explain the adoption 
of permissive abortion policies. The desire to grant greater social freedom to 
women is the second most commonly mentioned explanation. In this 
perspective, Marxism as the exclusive source for all official decision-making 
under socialism is often taken into consideration. In Brackett's interpretation 
(1968: 160), most Marxists have believed that socialism was the antithesis of 
capitalism, and that if abortion was found to be damaging to capitalist society, 'it 
must be good for the socialist society'. Berent (1970) remarks that the right of a 
woman to determine the number of her children has figured prominently in 
socialist programs for female emancipation since the nineteenth century; in his 
opinion, this tradition certainly contributed to the reduction of restrictions on
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abortion in the 1950s. Other analysts (Callahan, 1970; McIntyre, 1972a; David, 
1974; Macura, 1974) emphasize the role of Lenin who, as early as 1913, 
allegedly explicitly advocated legalization of abortion as being essential to a 
woman's basic right to choose if and when to bear children. This account is 
consistent with the aim officially presented by the Supreme Soviet in its 1955 
abortion decree, which also appears almost word for word the same in other 
Eastern European codes of that time: '... to give women the possibility of 
deciding by themselves the question of motherhood' (quoted in Field, 1956: 
426).
Nevertheless, these two kinds of interpretation, the medical and the ideological, 
are of little satisfaction to some authors. For Knarr (1977) population policies 
tend to be formulated in response to a variety of needs which may remain 
unarticulated in a formal sense; in his view, for instance, the emergence of the 
liberal policy on abortion is inseparable from the reform tide which swept Eastern 
Europe after Stalin's death in 1953. According to Callahan (1970), among the 
tacit but presumed factors which favoured change in abortion policies in the 
1950s were the absence of effective contraceptives in socialist countries, and 
the desire to bring all women under closer supervision by state health 
institutions. Besemeres (1980) extends this assessment with the comment that 
socialist governments often chose to conceal their true intentions under the 
cloak of vague humanist proclamations. In his view abortion legislation was for 
communist statesmen, through its likely impact on fertility levels, also an 
inexpensive instrument to increase the nation's living standard. Soviet-style 
population policies in all European socialist states, he writes, were implemented 
in order that Soviet hegemony in the area would not be undermined by the 
demographic factor. Besemeres's argument, however, is rather at variance with 
other literature. The following quotation from Macura's (1974: 374) study 
conveys the dominant opinion about the demographic relevance of abortion 
liberalization and related policy measures in socialist countries:
I do not believe that demographic objectives were the principal reasons 
for the adoption of these measures. The whole reorganization of society 
was designed to produce greater social justice, equal opportunity, and to 
affirm the responsibility of society for the welfare of vulnerable groups... 
Demographically relevant measures were implemented in order to put 
Marxist ideology and theory into effect.
Irrespective of the permissiveness demonstrated by the legislative changes 
during the late 1950s and early 1960s, it is known that the official view of
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socialist governments on their liberal abortion policies 'has always tended to be 
that it is basically a regrettable and temporary necessity' (Besemeres, 1980: 28). 
Many writers15 believe that it was this ambivalence, reinforced by alarm at 
declining birth rates, which prompted many Eastern European governments to 
tighten the abortion laws and implement active pronatalist policies in the late 
1960s and 1970s. In Berent's (1970: 36) words, demographic developments 
have generally been received 'with surprise, often with incredulity, and always 
with disapproval' by the national authorities. Callahan (1970: 246) refers to 'the 
apparent governmental desire ... to use and adjust abortion (and contraception) 
laws as part of official demographic strategies'. Likewise, Calot and Hecht (1978: 
193) found that steps to restrict legal abortions in socialist Europe were 
'essentially demographic', and thus they were in contrast with the previous non­
demographic motives for liberalization. It is paradoxical, as Tabah (1980) noted, 
that stricter abortion policy in socialist Europe coincided with the era of removing 
obstacles to abortion in the West.
Later efforts to reduce the availability of abortion are generally considered, 
however, to be much more country-specific than earlier liberalizations. As 
McIntyre (1972a: 202) wrote, 'these counter-measures were diverse both in 
nature and in terms of the strength and determination with which they were 
employed'. Nevertheless, even following these initiatives, Eastern Europe as a 
whole represented for most demographers 'a relatively liberal area in regard to 
abortion practices' (Berent, 1970: 280). The only significant exception to this rule 
— Romania, which between 1966 and 1989 pursued an extremely rigid anti­
abortion policy — has attracted enormous attention from demographers.16
Examining the overall evidence on abortion and other demographic policies in 
socialist Europe since the 1950s, few would disagree with Macura's caution 
(1981: 31):
Nothing could be more wrong than to suggest that the development of 
policies affecting population in European socialist countries was a 
uniform process. Governmental attitudes and policies varied in many 
respects, as did the timing and emphasis of measures enacted.
If there was one aspect found to be basically common to the legal changes 
concerning abortion in all European socialist societies, it was probably the
15 McIntyre (1972a), Macura (1974), Pressat (1979), Frejka (1980), David (1982).
16 See David and Wright (1971), Teitelbaum (1972), Potts et al. (1977), Berelson (1979), David 
and McIntyre (1981), Hord et al. (1991).
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peculiar form of policy-making, labelled by McIntyre (1972a: 183) 'social 
experimentation', and described by David and McIntyre (1981: 86) as moving 'in 
a trial-and-error fashion'.
1.5.2 Abortion behaviour
Induced abortion has proved to be an ever-present element in human fertility 
control worldwide. Yet the situation in the countries of Eastern Europe, because 
of the long history of legal availability of abortion, has since the 1950s attracted 
special attention. In Kapotsy's words (1972: 193), this was in the context of 
viewing socialist Europe as 'a demographic laboratory' — a test environment for 
examining demographic responses to policy interventions.
An important reason for this emphasis has been the reliability of reported 
statistics. The quality of abortion data for Eastern Europe has been appraised as 
ranging from 'moderately good to exceptionally accurate' (Potts et al., 1977: 70), 
depending on the situation in particular countries. According to Tietze and Lewit 
(1981a), the degree to which the number of legal abortions can be expected to 
approximate total induced abortions increases with a non-restrictive abortion 
law, reasonably adequate abortion services, and a functioning reporting system. 
Czechoslovak and Hungarian data are considered to be among the most 
complete national sets; information from other former socialist countries is 
judged to vary in coverage and reliability.17
The main and most often noted result of abortion legislation in the 1950s was an 
increase in legal abortion throughout the region. Various students of conditions 
in Eastern Europe and the USSR have observed that this increased incidence of 
reported abortion was associated with increased identified pregnancy rates: 
'Following liberalization, the total number of pregnancies increased sharply, 
reflecting a sharp rise in the number of legal abortions', writes Brackett (1971: 
102). Other authors characterize these changes as 'dramatic' (David, 1982: 25), 
'abrupt' (McIntyre, 1972b: 45; Frejka, 1983: 499), or even 'spectacular' (Tietze 
and Lehfeldt, 1961: 1150; van der Tak, 1974: 14). Irrespective of more recent 
pronatalist interventions, the high frequency of induced abortion has remained a 
repeatedly cited feature of the demographic as well as the social situation in
17 See Tietze and Lewit (1981a), Henshaw and Morrow (1990), Blayo (1989, 1991a,b), David 
(1992).
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Eastern Europe, especially when compared to other developed countries.18 
However, in attempts to assess the effects of abortion liberalization on 
demographic behaviour, changes in the total numbers of pregnancies recorded 
must be interpreted critically. To a certain extent, sharp increases in the total 
numbers of reported pregnancies may be explained by the fact that legal 
abortions replaced illegal ones and thus led to the official recording of 
pregnancies that formerly went unregistered. Another interpretation is that 
abortion made it possible for women to conceive again earlier than if their 
pregnancies had been carried to term; this is because the length of gestation 
(during which conception cannot occur) and the period of sterility (following the 
end of the pregnancy) are both shorter if there is an induced abortion instead of 
a full-term pregnancy. In spite of the difficulties of precise measurement of the 
effect of liberalized abortion policies, however, there is little doubt among 
demographers that when abortion laws became permissive, numbers of legal 
abortions increased sharply throughout Eastern Europe.
Although it has often been stressed that it is hazardous to speak of the whole 
region in overly general terms, some analysts, being more or less aware of the 
specific conditions in individual countries, have come to important conclusions 
about the pattern of abortion in Eastern Europe. A sizeable part of the literature 
tries to describe the demographic profile of women who terminate their 
pregnancies, focusing on the essential demographic variables: the age, marital 
status, and parity of abortion seekers. Thus Tietze and Lewit (1981a: 48-49) 
comment on Czechoslovak, East German, and Hungarian data from the 1970s:
[Throughout the world], legal abortions are obtained at all stages of their 
reproductive lives by women between menarche and menopause. In the 
countries of Eastern Europe ... [however] ... the rates tend to rise to a 
plateau among women in their late twenties and early thirties. This 
pattern is primarily due to higher abortion rates among older women 
rather than to lower rates among younger women.
In Heitlinger's (1987) view, the findings obtained in different countries of Eastern 
Europe during the 1970s make it possible to define the typical abortion seeker 
as a married woman in her late twenties or early thirties, who does not want any 
additional children. Many demographers have observed since the 1960s that it 
was most often the third pregnancy of a married woman which was terminated 
by abortion in this region. Writing recently on this aspect, David (1992)
18 See Tietze (1964, 1975), Potts (1967), David (1982, 1992), Frejka (1983), Tietze and Henshaw 
(1986), Blayo (1989, 1990,1991a,b), Henshaw and Morrow (1990), UN (1992a,b).
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concludes that, in former socialist Europe, abortions were used mainly to space 
births and end childbearing, rather than to delay the commencement of 
childbearing. In comparison with the late teenage peak characteristic of Western 
European and North American abortion rates, 1970s and 1980s Eastern 
European age-, marital status-, and parity-specific abortion data are considered 
to evidence a conspicuously different behavioural pattern (Tietze and Lewit, 
1981a,b; Blayo, 1989).
A minority of studies was occupied with some additional, more specific attributes 
of the abortion situation in Eastern Europe, such as the length of gestation at 
which pregnancies were terminated, or the occurrence of repeat abortions. 
Among the most comprehensive contributions in these areas are those by David 
and McIntyre (1981), Tietze and Henshaw (1986), Henshaw and Morrow (1990), 
Blayo (1991a) and David (1992). They suggest that in the international context, 
the countries of Eastern Europe have been exceptional for constant high 
proportions of first-trimester procedures, and for high percentages of seekers 
with previous abortion experience. The first phenomenon is plausibly explained 
by Tietze (1975), Henshaw (1990) and David (1992): legally, second-trimester 
abortions have since the 1950s been permitted only on medical indications. The 
second phenomenon, however, requires a more in-depth consideration of the 
broader circumstances of abortion practices.
1.5.3 Causes and consequences of abortion practices
Induced abortion is not an isolated phenomenon; as Petchesky (1984: 33) 
wrote, it does not 'fall from the sky'. Not by accident, many writers have been 
deeply interested in what may be distilled from abortion and fertility data, what 
broader conclusions may be drawn about abortion laws and practices, and what 
lessons may reasonably be learned from the Eastern European experience. 
Some questions which deserve investigation have been posed by Potts et al. 
(1977: 132):
Is the law a significant determinant of the total number of induced 
abortions in a country? Does a liberal law translate abortions from illegal 
to legal? Does a liberal law encourage pregnancies that might otherwise 
have gone to term to be terminated? Is a restrictive law a deterrent to 
induced abortion? Does awareness of a liberal abortion law undermine 
contraceptive practice?
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Though assessments are 'complicated by a series of factors' (Brackett, 1971: 
102), the prevailing opinion is that permissive laws do not appear to be the sole 
determinant of the high incidences of legally induced abortions in Eastern 
European populations. For instance, there is a widespread suspicion that part of 
the increase in reported abortions was due to the transfer of unregistered 
procedures, believed to have been numerous before the legal changes, from 
illicit abortionists to hospitals. For many authors, the decreasing level of 
abortion-related mortality and morbidity in most Eastern European countries 
during the 1960s is an indirect indication of a decline in illegal abortion 
procedures.19 'Insofar as the laws are designed to safeguard women from the 
danger of illegal abortions, they seem quite successful', wrote Callahan (1970: 
252) in appreciation of the public health results of more liberal legislation. 
Unfortunately, as Berent (1970) pointed out, not enough is known about the 
incidence of illegal abortion to test the hypothesis about its decline after 
liberalization of abortion laws. According to Frejka (1983: 509), illegal abortions 
probably continued to occur in substantial numbers even after liberalization 
inasmuch as 'the transition of illegal to legal abortions is a gradual process'. 
Some recent reports confirm that neither illegal abortion nor medical 
complications of abortion practice is a minor issue in Eastern Europe.20
In assessing the demographic influences of legalized abortion, the impact on 
fertility is by far the most often mentioned. There is little doubt that abortion 
liberalization had a substantial fertility-suppressing effect in Eastern Europe.21 
Analyses have suggested that the reductions in fertility that occurred in Eastern 
Europe between the early 1950s and early 1960s were not related to changes in 
age structure or proportions married, but to changes in marital fertility and, 
hence, to birth control. Some researchers consider abortion to be the main 
factor in fertility decline in the region since the 1950s:
What the socialist countries believed was simply a humane measure 
[induced abortion] which would be used in emergencies had become the 
universal method of birth control (Scott, 1976:144).
It is evident that abortion is still mainly responsible for the relatively low 
birth rates of at least Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, 
Yugoslavia, and very probably the USSR (David, 1982: 31).
19 See Hetze and Lehfeldt (1961), Hetze (1964, 1971, 1975), Potts (1967), Brackett (1971), 
Klinger (1971), David and Russo (1971), van der Tak (1974), Potts etal. (1977), Henshaw (1990).
20 See Ryan (1987), Blayo (1990,1991a), Popov (1991), David (1992).
21 See Hetze (1964), UN (1973), van der Tak (1974), Pressat (1979), Besemeres (1980), Tabah 
(1980), David and McIntyre (1981), Blayo (1991a,b).
31
Yet these conclusions cannot be accepted without reservation. For instance, 
according to an analysis of the proximate determinants of fertility carried out by 
Frejka (1983: 517), the Czechoslovak, East German, and Hungarian data on 
abortion, fertility, contraception, and nuptiality during the 1960s and 1970s show 
that 'the fertility inhibiting effect of induced abortion has, as a rule, been less 
than that of contraception'. The difficulty in assessing more clearly the impact of 
abortion practices on fertility trends is that a fertility decline started in most 
countries before the more liberal abortion laws were introduced. Some writers 
recognize this circumstance in their reports and conclude that it would be 
erroneous to attribute all of the decline to abortion.22 Thus, there are indications 
that fertility decline was not initiated by the changes in abortion laws, but was 
rather accelerated by them.
The recent history of Eastern Europe has also offered the possibility of 
observing what happens when liberal access to abortion is suddenly 
administratively restricted. The two most famous examples, the case of Romania 
after the 1966 anti-abortion decree, and the follow-up of 220 Czech children 
born during 1962-63 to women whose request for abortion had been denied due 
to stricter interpretation of abortion legislation, are often quoted as textbook 
cases of the consequences of anti-abortion measures: widely practised illegal 
abortion, exceptionally high maternal and infant mortality, psychological costs, 
widespread developmental disorders among unwanted children, and only 
temporary increments in fertility levels.23 As McIntyre (1972a: 210) commented 
when reviewing this evidence, patterns of legal abortion are difficult to reverse 
as a simple matter of governmental policy; the restrictive efforts are likely to 
foster at most 'a burgeoning illegal practice with social and health costs'.
If there is unanimous agreement on one point in the demographic literature on 
Eastern Europe, it is probably on the chief underlying cause of high abortion 
rates: a reference to limited use of contraception appears in almost every study 
on this topic. Though a mixture of contraception and abortion as means of 
fertility control is generally believed to exist in every society, Eastern Europe has 
commonly been considered something of a contraceptive vacuum.24 The 
expression 'enforced contraceptive recklessness', originally used by Okolski
22 See Berent (1970), McIntyre (1972a), Heitlinger (1976), Besemeres (1980), David and McIntyre
(1972), UN (1973), David and Matejcek (1981), David et al. (1988), David
(1990) , Hord et al. (1991).
24 See Potts (1967), Berent (1970), David (1982, 1992), Frejka (1983), Blayo (1991a), Thomas
(1991) .
(1981).
23 See Teitelbaum
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(1983: 273) with reference to Poland, has become part of the demographic 
terminology on Eastern Europe (David, 1992). Moreover, fertility surveys 
conducted in particular countries25 add empirical evidence that 'family planning' 
in Eastern Europe has been to a large extent a synonym for practising highly 
ineffective methods; coitus interrupts, the oldest but not a very reliable means 
of pregnancy control, has been the predominant method throughout the region.
Most demographers believe that the high abortion rates in Eastern European 
countries have more to do with the absence of reliable contraception than with 
the permissiveness of abortion legislation. However, what explains the low levels 
of contraception? The literature has generated three congruent and mutually 
complementary answers to this crucial question.
First: in describing the demographic past of Eastern Europe, some authors26 
have noted that the wave of abortion liberalization preceded the diffusion of 
more advanced contraceptives. The birth control pill, for instance, became 
available only during the 1960s, and spread relatively slowly even in the West 
(McLaren, 1990). For Blayo (1990: 3), this confirms a simple logic:
One of the most surprising features of these [Eastern European] 
countries is that they should have given women the possibility of having 
legal abortions before modern contraceptive methods were available... 
As a result, recourse to abortion has been much more common in these 
countries than in Western Europe.
Thus, the very permissive systems, if not total obstacles to the improvement of 
contraceptive practices, are regarded through the timing of their development as 
at least important hindrances.
Second: according to some of those who have followed demographic 
developments in Eastern Europe, there is a strong suggestion that the 
availability of simple and readily accessible abortions leads to dependence upon 
them as a means of birth control.27 Legalization of abortion is suspected of 
having retarded the effective practice of contraception. It is often hypothesized 
that easily available abortion — a one-event procedure which offers certainty 
rather than supposition — may appear cheaper and more appropriate than 
regular contraception to individual couples (Moore-Cavar, 1974; UN, 1973). The
25 See Krotki (1977), Krotki and Hecht (1977), David and McIntyre (1981), Heitlinger (1987), UN 
(1989b, 1992a).
26 Potts (1967), Tabah (1980), Blayo (1990, 1991a), David (1992).
27 See Callahan (1970), David and McIntyre (1981), Frejka (1983), Hord etal. (1991).
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high frequency of repeat abortions is sometimes cited to support this argument 
(David, 1974; Blayo, 1990). As McIntyre (1972a: 210) expressed it:
Once abortion has been legalized and widely utilized for a period of time, 
much of the inexplicit ethical and inertial resistance of individual women 
to this form of fertility control is removed.
Third: some writers attach great importance to the fact that in the centrally 
planned economies, the decision to produce or import contraceptives and the 
running of family planning services were exclusively governmental matters.28 Yet 
expenditures for contraceptives had to compete with other priorities set by the 
government. Observers seem to be agreed that, given the enduring economic 
difficulties of the socialist countries, the use of contraceptives was never actively 
fostered. The effects on private behaviour were realistically described by Mazur 
(1981: 196), in his analysis of abortion in Poland:
As a practical matter, obtaining the relatively scarce contraceptives is not 
simple: It requires both persistence and willingness to wait on yet another 
line, as the purchase of such commodities as fresh fruit and meat also 
requires.
The way in which a series of writers see abortion in former socialist Europe is 
not as a matter of choice, but rather as 'a pressing necessity created by the lack 
of alternative' (David, 1992: 15).
Of course, behind the East European abortion figures lie a number of additional 
social and cultural factors of considerable importance: a high level of 
industrialization, a long history of family nuclearization, a high level of women's 
participation in the labour force, chronic housing problems, the low quality of 
public services, increasing urbanization, and changing patterns of sexual 
behaviour. Some writers29 were able to detect these elements and use them in 
their analyses of abortion trends; a broader discussion of their findings would, 
however, exceed the scope of this preliminary overview of the literature.
The tenor of most of the demographic writings on abortion in the countries of 
Eastern Europe, regardless of their particular approach, is that there is really an 
abortion 'problem' in this part of the developed world. Perhaps Callahan (1970: 
247) had something like this in mind when he wrote that behind Eastern Europe
28 See Besemeres (1980), David and McIntyre (1981), Frejka (1983), Okolski (1983), Popov 
(1991), Thomas (1991), David (1992).
29 See Callahan (1970), McIntyre (1972a), David and McIntyre (1981), Heitlinger (1987).
34
lies a dilemma in the experience with permissive laws. On the one hand, 
there is strong conviction that women should be able to make their own 
choice... On the other hand, ... too many women, in a word, are choosing 
abortion.
This is a statement to which few will take exception.
1.6 Aims and organization of the present study
Abortion in the countries of Eastern Europe is certainly not terra incognita. The 
foregoing review of relevant literature shows that during the past thirty years a 
body of demographic evidence has been gathered about this important topic. Is 
there, in fact, any need for further investigation? Of course, the answer cannot 
be negative, not least because of the continuous character of the reproductive 
processes and the corresponding need for steadily updating the old 
demographic evidence. Yet the case for more research on abortion in former 
socialist Europe can be based upon better arguments as well.
Although overall allusions to socialist abortion policy appear in most of the 
demographic studies on this topic, not enough is known about the more subtle 
differences between particular items of legislation in the region, about changes 
in interpretation of the national laws, or about specific motivations which were 
the background of communist decision-makers' official rhetoric. A useful 
approach here seems to be less reliance upon proclamations, and more 
sensitivity to the factors of the broader environment: to social issues, economic 
developments, mechanisms of legislative decision-making, all of which may 
have played substantial roles in the totalitarian state's attitude to demographic 
phenomena.
The demographic analysis of patterns of abortion in Eastern Europe is 
troublesome for a number of reasons, but the available evidence may seem to 
have been already well explored. However, the search for a true, more 
structured picture of abortion patterns is mainly a matter of comparative 
analyses focusing on subgroups within the population. In view of the quality of 
some national data sets, much better comparative statistics can be produced in 
this respect than merely 'X per cent were under 20, Y per cent were 20 to 24', 
and so on. Broad comparisons and evaluations of different abortion regimes 
seem premature without more careful and informed case studies than are 
currently available. This study is intended as a contribution to this end.
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The current state of knowledge of wider causes and consequences of abortion 
practices in Eastern Europe also needs revision. Great masses of data have 
been compiled and carefully analysed, but little effort has been directed to the 
actual behavioural process underlying the use of abortion. Some scholars have 
made general guesses about the socio-demographic circumstances leading to 
extraordinarily frequent recourse to abortion, but the problem deserves a more 
in-depth treatment. Perhaps it has been presumed that demographers in 
socialist countries themselves would provide the required information. However, 
where the more sensitive areas of the demographic situation were concerned 
(and abortion certainly belonged among them), it was somewhat naive to expect 
frank and full accounts from behind the Iron Curtain. Most likely the explanation 
would not be complete, avoiding such critical expressions as 'monopolistic party- 
ideology', 'lack of personal autonomy', or 'limited role of individuals in 
determining their own future'; none of these could easily appear in Eastern 
European journals before 1989. The most fundamental question concerning 
abortion in Eastern Europe is still worth asking: what are the problems 
surrounding a high level of abortion in the region really, and how should they be 
formulated and interpreted?
This thesis is organized into nine chapters, each building on the previous one. 
Following the present general introduction to the subject, Chapter 2 focuses on 
the history of abortion legislation in Eastern Europe from a politics-oriented, 
rather than a policy-oriented, perspective. To provide a broader background for 
the assessment of trends in abortion, Chapter 3 describes major trends and 
patterns of fertility change in Eastern European populations during 1950-90. 
Chapter 4 investigates political and socio-economic determinants of 
reproductive behaviour in the former Soviet-bloc countries; it deals with socio­
economic factors, welfare policies, the status of women, marriage and divorce 
patterns, attitudes towards family size, and use of contraception. Chapter 5 
analyses the main demographic aspects of abortion use in individual countries 
of the region, with special reference to the demographic outcomes of both 
liberalizing and restrictive policies, and the role of abortion as a fertility-inhibiting 
factor. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 concentrate on the former Czechoslovakia. Chapter 
6 accounts for period variation in abortion in the Czech and Slovak populations 
during 1960-90, with particular emphasis on socio-demographic characteristics 
of abortion obtainers. Chapter 7 examines the abortion experience of Czech and 
Slovak women from a cohort perspective. In Chapter 8, fertility responses to
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abortion policy measures introduced by Czechoslovak governments in 1957 and 
1986 come under closer scrutiny, using the age-period-cohort concept as the 
analytical framework. Finally, Chapter 9 sums up the study's principal 
conclusions about abortion in Eastern European populations during the post- 
World War II period and ends with some recommendations for future research.
The study focuses primarily on the period between 1950 and 1990. The former 
date marks approximately the emergence of communist governments and the 
beginning of socialist reconstruction throughout non-Soviet Eastern Europe — a 
major social change resulting from a new political power structure in Europe 
following World War II. The latter date coincides with the peak of the anti­
communist turmoil of the late 1980s and the establishment of more or less 
democratic orders in the region. One can hardly imagine a more natural 
demarcation in the time frame. The date 1990, particularly, is of great 
significance. Every analyst attempting to comprehend the demographic situation 
of Eastern Europe after the collapse of Soviet-style regimes will have to deal 
with another state of affairs. The current ethnic splits and changes visible on the 
political map are the most dramatic, but certainly not the sole, evidence of these 
new circumstances.
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Chapter 2: THE POLITICS OF ABORTION POLICY IN THE COUNTRIES
OF EASTERN EUROPE
2.1 Introduction
Policies regulating the legal status and general availability of abortion are often 
considered to be the easiest to analyse since they are explicit and codified. In 
many countries abortion laws materialized only after prolonged political 
struggles, and those processes have received a good deal of attention in 
popular as well as scientific literature. In such circumstances, it is not difficult to 
assess what concerns and interests underpin a particular abortion policy. In 
some contexts, abortion policies seem largely to be articulated with a view to 
eliminating unsafe abortion procedures. In others, promulgation of abortion laws 
appears more to result from public debate about the rights of individuals to 
reproductive freedom.1 Typically, abortion legislation is likely to remain in a state 
of permanent flux as medical science changes and modern influences become 
stronger than traditional ones. Thus, the consequences of laws on abortion 
often lead to new legislation. Concern with public health and the political tension 
between individual and collective priorities are both believed to be powerful 
elements in relation to which laws concerning abortion are articulated.
However, it can be argued that abortion policies are usually less prominent 
within the total range of social policies than most demographers are inclined to 
believe. Past experience and present political practice suggest that population 
policy measures are hardly ever designed as goals in themselves.2 Most often 
they are implemented to also serve other than demographic or public health 
purposes, and to be the means to broader objectives. What are these 
objectives? According to van de Kaa (1978), the most fundamental aims 
pursued by a national government are (a) to maintain the territorial integrity and 
national sovereignty of the state; and (b) to improve the quality of life, in both a 
material and a non-material sense, of the society it represents. How these two 
basic objectives are transformed into primary national objectives of government 
policies depends on a variety of factors. Such policies may be formulated on the 
basis of theoretical considerations, or grounded in a particular ideology or 
religious conviction; or they may be the result of the interplay of contending 
societal forces. Thus they tend to reflect, although not necessarily as faithfully
1 With the exception of China, Singapore, and Tunisia, nowhere has limitation of population 
growth been an explicitly expressed official motive for the introduction of an abortion law (van der 
Tak, 1974; UN, 1992b, 1993c).
2 For examples, see Berelson (1969), Weiner (1971), Hodgson (1983), Coleman (1990).
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as a mirror, all the material desires and ideological views that exist within a 
society.
This chapter is designed to give an overall coverage of the forces that shaped 
the development of Eastern European abortion policies in the period from 1917, 
when socialism was established in Russia, to 1989, when most of the 
communist regimes in Europe tumbled. Of course, every study on the politics of 
population policy involves serious demarcation difficulties because the area of 
overlap between politics and population is vast; on broad definitions of both, one 
might well need to discuss a country's history and social and economic policies 
in their full complexity. To keep the subject within reasonable bounds, in this 
chapter the emphasis is placed on the issue of pronatalism versus antinatalism, 
and priority is given to demographic and social rather than philosophical, legal, 
or medical problems related to abortion. The discussion starts with a brief 
recapitulation of Marxist population thought. Subsequent parts of the chapter 
describe the evolution of abortion-related policies in Eastern Europe, focusing 
on four distinctive historical periods: the post-revolutionary phase 1917-36; the 
Stalinist industrialization phase 1936-55; the post-Stalinist phase 1955-60; and 
the phase of more independent national policies 1960-89. Though an 
oversimplified periodization, it nonetheless provides a helpful framework for 
discerning the major trends in socialist policies on abortion.
2.2 Population and the Marxist classics
In Eastern Europe during the years of the communist rule, Marxism was held to 
be an exhaustive, comprehensive and fully scientific social philosophy; a set of 
universal propositions to explain all natural, social, economic, and cultural 
phenomena. Accordingly, the actions taken by communist governments in 
demographic matters were frequently rationalized with Marxist dicta. One would 
expect, therefore, Karl Marx (1818-1883) and Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) to 
have given a demographic flavour to their central theory of dialectic materialism. 
In fact, however, the writings of Marx and Engels reveal only limited interest in 
demographic matters as such.
The key ideas of Marx's and Engels's writings were influenced significantly by 
German philosophy, British political economy, Darwinism, and French 
revolutionary and utopian thought of the early nineteenth century (Petersen, 
1988; Skidmore, 1993). What Marx and Engels found attractive in these
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intellectual concepts were the idea of inevitable progress and the notion of 
development as a response to conflict among societal forces. They argued that 
the fundamental substance of any society was a substructure consisting of 
economic relationships and knowledge of how to use the forces of production 
and exchange within that society. The history of mankind is one of continuous 
economic struggle between social classes through which less advanced social 
systems are replaced by more developed ones. The essence of classical 
Marxism is criticism of the capitalism of the early nineteenth century, leading to 
the conclusion that the emancipation of mankind could not be achieved except 
by organizing revolution and establishing a socialist society, the first stage of 
communism. Under communism ultimately there would be no private property, 
therefore no social class, which meant no ruling class, and of course no more 
need for the tool of the ruling class, the state, which (in Engels's celebrated 
phrase) would 'wither away'. Thus, Marx and Engels previewed future history as 
a dynamic process of continuous progression; violent revolution was for them 
inevitable, even if the historical conditions had to be appropriate for it to occur.
Few of the Marxist classics contain material that could be classified as 
demographic. The founders of Marxism hardly tackled population theory save 
through sporadic, unsystematic and conveniently flexible pronouncements. The 
central theme in these writings stemmed from a polemic against Thomas Robert 
Malthus (1766-1834) and the population principle expressed in his Essay which 
he first published in 1798 and substantially developed in subsequent editions. In 
contrast to the notion that unlimited human progress is hindered only by 
imperfect social organization, an idea of the Enlightenment, Malthus found the 
fundamental cause of human misery in the universal, and thus irremovable, 
biological principle of human sexual attraction; his central argument was that 
maximum food production can never keep pace with maximum population 
increase (Petersen, 1979). Marx agreed with Malthus that poverty and 
unemployment, at least in European society of that time, resulted from 
'overpopulation'. But he defined this as an excess of workers relative to 
opportunities for employment, a condition that he termed the 'law of population' 
in capitalism. To Malthus's concept that natural forces always tend to raise 
population beyond the number that can be supported by economic production, 
Marx counterposed a historical-materialist postulate that patterns of population 
reproduction derive from the nature of the economic base of a society. The 
essence of Marx's objection to Malthus's theory was expressed in a single­
sentence form in Das Kapital (1867):
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Every particular historical mode of production has its own special laws of 
population, which are historically valid within that particular sphere (Marx, 
1976 [1867]: 784).
By this polemic outburst against Malthus, Marx established what his disciples 
proclaimed as the only scientific theory of population. However, even if Marx's 
main point is taken for granted — that with the development of a capitalist 
economy there is a long-term trend toward an ever larger number of 
unemployed — he has virtually nothing to say about what governs population 
change in primitive, feudal, or socialist societies. Moreover, what Marx termed 
his law of population for capitalist society is clearly incomplete, since it pertains 
not to population but to the labour force; the two overlap, but they are not 
identical.
Marx's and Engels's basic concern was with their present. In picturing the future, 
they tended to be generally optimistic, but in detail vague and ambiguous. 
Observing the onward march of the industrial revolution and socialist movement 
during the nineteenth century, they had no doubts about the ability of 
productivity to eventually win the population-production race or about the 
scientific inevitability of socialism. The overthrow of the current social system 
was for them a prerequisite to all social betterment; and the solution of 
population problems would be so automatic under socialist institutions that they 
did not find it useful even to sketch in how this would be achieved. Marx and 
Engels believed that socialist civilization would have at its disposal a constantly 
expanding productive capacity, and that demographic processes would be 
brought under the rational control of a co-operative community. In the spirit of 
this logic, Engels predicted an almost unlimited ability in a socialist society to 
manage any population problem:
There is of course the abstract possibility that the human population will 
become so great that limits of growth must be set. But if the communist 
society should find itself compelled to regulate the production of people 
in the same way that it will already have regulated the production of 
things, then precisely this society and this one alone, will be in a position 
to do so without difficulty... In any case, it will be up to those people to 
choose whether, when, how and which means they use (Engels, 1983 
[1881]: 200).
As Petersen (1964: 90) observed, 'by such a comment, Engels avoided having 
to discuss in any detail either the economic significance of population growth or
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the moral system of the socialist society he was advocating1. Owing to this 
abstention in Marx's and Engels's writings, it is not altogether clear what their 
ideas were about the nature of demographically relevant arrangements in a 
socialist society: the institution of the family, the role of women, or the question 
of fertility control. Early Marxist visions of the socialist society, as expressed in 
such well-known documents as the Communist Manifesto (1847), included as a 
standard feature the emancipation of the woman from household drudgery; but 
whether she should also be emancipated from bearing and rearing many 
children was not made explicit. Some of the remarks that can be found in 
Engels's work The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (1884), 
the main classical Marxist opus on demographic subjects, reveal his disdain for 
bourgeois marriage and his interest in fully collectivized social organization. 
Engels pointed to the family and its subjection of women as a symptom and 
support of the exploitative social order, and a means for preserving private 
property and passing it on from male to male:
We are now approaching a social revolution in which the economic 
foundations of monogamy as they have existed hitherto will disappear... 
With the transfer of the means of production into common ownership, the 
single family ceases to be the economic unit of society. Private 
housekeeping is transformed into a social industry. The care and 
education of the children becomes a public affair; society looks after all 
children... (Engels, 1972 [1884]: 138-9).
Yet the guidelines of Engels hardly went beyond the vaguest allusions about 
how in fact the socialist community would accomplish the collectivist upbringing 
of children after the revolution and relieve women of their special burdens as 
wives and mothers:
What we can now conjecture about the way in which sexual relations will 
be ordered after the impending overthrow of capitalist production is 
mainly of a negative character, limited for the most part to what will 
disappear. But what will there be new? That will be answered when a 
new generation has grown up... (Engels, 1972 [1884]: 145).
By the eve of World War I, although socialism had made considerable headway, 
orthodox Marxism was on its way to extinction. Marx's writings before 1850 
demonstrate that he obviously considered a proletarian revolution to be near. 
Yet this prognosis, like many of Marx's predictions, seemed to have been 
mistaken. Moreover, Marx and Engels had greatly underestimated the extent of 
democratic reforms and their power to permit the state to protect workers and 
distribute goods more widely. It was Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, or V.l. Lenin (1870-
42
1924) who reinvigorated Marxism. In his numerous essays, Lenin explained why 
the spontaneous revolution that Marx had foreseen had not come to pass. 
Imperialism had so changed world conditions, Lenin argued, that it permitted 
capitalists to provide some benefit to the working class by draining the 
resources of underdeveloped nations. This postponed the pauperization of the 
masses, and as a result it also postponed revolution. But imperialism is only as 
strong as its weakest link, and colonial areas were the weak links of capitalism. 
Because of this, it was no longer necessary to wait for revolution in advanced 
industrial societies: any area in the world could support a revolution. Thus, 
Lenin's new theory not only helped to explain why revolutions had not taken 
place in fulfilment of Marx's predictions, but also justified revolution in his native 
Russia.3
Neither Marx nor Engels seems to have ever explicitly commented on the issue 
of birth control and abortion. Lenin's sparse observations accordingly represent 
the only comment on the subject in the classical Marxist writ. The well-known 
text here is Lenin's article 'The working class and neomalthusianism', published 
in Moscow in June 1913. In it, Lenin makes a forceful assault on those who 
would justify legalized abortion in terms of preventing the suffering of the future 
offspring, and recommends abolition of the Tsarist laws prohibiting abortion and 
distribution of literature on contraception in Russia:
Such laws are nothing but hypocrisy of the ruling classes. These laws do 
not heal the ulcers of capitalism, they merely turn them into malignant 
ulcers that are especially painful for the oppressed masses (Lenin, 1963 
[1913]: 237).
What this passage suggests is that people should be allowed the right of birth 
control, up to and including abortion. However, elsewhere in the same article it 
is clearly stated that a growing proletariat is an essential prerequisite for a 
victorious socialist revolution. Lenin seems to enjoin the working classes not to 
make use of birth control, which he ranks with 'the ugliness of social 
neomalthusianism'. Instead, workers should multiply and leave fertility regulation 
to the moribund classes:
The working class is not perishing, it is growing, becoming stronger, 
gaining courage, consolidating itself, educating itself and becoming 
steeled in battle... We are already laying the foundation of a new edifice
3 It is also obvious that Leninism was providing a subtle association of the interests of Marxism 
with the interests of the Russian nation. The association was so subtle that later communists 
frequently presented these interests as identical.
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and our children will complete its construction. That is the reason — the 
only reason — why we are unconditionally the enemies of 
neomalthusianism, suited only to unfeeling and egoistic petty-bourgeois 
couples... Freedom for medical propaganda and the protection of the 
elementary democratic rights of citizens, men and women, are one thing. 
The social theory of neomalthusianism is quite another (Lenin, 1963 
[1913]: 237).
Thus, Lenin makes a distinction between the practice or support of birth control 
and the theory that excess births are the root cause of all working-class misery. 
Yet, when thought through, such differentiation contains a considerable portion 
of logical controversy; in fact, Lenin seems to be arguing both for and against 
abortion prohibition. Given this strange and somewhat contradictory combination 
of attitudes, it is difficult to say what long-term policy measures in the area of 
abortion legislation Lenin might have felt necessary. Apparently, Lenin believed 
that once the capitalist economic system was replaced by socialist production 
and planning, rational behaviour and commonsense would prevent any social 
difficulties.
In short, the classical Marxist texts contain no more than a fragment of a theory 
of population change. What Marx and Engels formulated, and Lenin developed, 
was a set of principles which they regarded as governing population and its 
economic and social correlates. Their basic orientation was clearly against the 
laissez-faire norms of liberal capitalism and toward radical social reorganization, 
but their outline of the population situation in a future socialist society was on 
many points unclear. As with many key assertions in Marxist writings, the way in 
which population issues were treated remained largely open to differing 
interpretations. As a consequence, those who claimed to be the heirs of Marx, 
Engels, and Lenin in theory and policy-making had no clear guidelines within 
which to shape a specifically socialist population policy. Moreover, dogmatic 
interpretations of Marx's loose position on the subject of population 'laws' have 
tended to inhibit systematic treatment of demographic theory by later Marxist 
writers. The usual belief was that a law of population specific to socialism would 
automatically occur once a socialist economy was established. Production would 
then serve the needs of society as a whole, resulting in full employment, 
planned and proportional development, and rational use of productive as well as 
demographic resources. This view remained typical of Marxist demographic 
thought until the early 1960s.
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2.3 Soviet Union, 1917-36: revolutionary law and order
The Soviet attitude to abortion, as to most other social issues, had a twofold 
origin. Its sources, not completely complementary to each other, were Marxist 
ideology and the conditions of Tsarist Russia on the eve of the twentieth 
century. Russia had remained largely sequestered from the great European 
movements such as the Reformation, Renaissance, and Enlightenment. At the 
close of the Tsarist era, it was a semi-feudal empire, which lagged considerably 
behind the other industrializing countries of Europe in all aspects of economic 
and cultural life. Tsarism represented a system 'of autocracy tempered 
frustratingly with grudging reform, of retrograde social policy, and of wasteful 
and demoralizing foreign adventures' (Juviler, 1976: 172). The Russian 
economy was predominantly agrarian, primarily dependent on agriculture at a 
pre-scientific and pre-mechanical level; industrial development was slow and 
irregular, beset by social and political upheavals. The social situation of the 
country was characterized by widespread poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, 
female subordination, slave-like conditions of workers and peasants, and many 
related social problems (Lorimer, 1946; Schlesinger, 1949). The Tsarist heritage 
made Russia one of those states ripest for social revolution, but least capable of 
achieving the Marxist dream of a civilization free of economic and social 
problems.
Religion played an important role in pre-revolutionary Russia and many public 
policies, including those on matrimonial and family matters, were in the hands of 
the Russian Orthodox Church. In line with church dogma, all abortions were 
regarded as murder under Tsarist penal law, and both the physician and the 
woman involved were liable to imprisonment for up to ten years and loss of all 
civil rights (Savage, 1988; Popov, 1993). Despite this, a number of authors 
reported that clandestine abortion was just as much a mass phenomenon in pre­
revolutionary Russia as elsewhere.4 Not surprisingly, the Congress of the 
Society of Russian Physicians, held in Moscow in 1913, adopted a resolution 
urging decriminalization of abortion as a means of reducing the large number of 
women coming to hospitals with complications from illegal abortions (Avdeev, 
1989). Public debate on abortion continued until the outbreak of World War I, 
but no changes were made in legislation (David and McIntyre, 1981).
4 See, for instance, Lawton (1927), Field (1932), Halle (1933), Schlesinger (1949).
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After the 1917 October Revolution, the new Soviet regime was in its actions 
strongly motivated by a vision of a harmonious future society of the type pictured 
by Marx and Engels. Flushed with the success of the revolution, members of 
Lenin's victorious party, the Bolsheviks, plunged into the task of changing the 
social environment. To abolish the old order became the principal strategy to 
overcome the backwardness of Tsarist Russia. The top priority was to eradicate 
inequality and the basis of traditional privilege and potentially 
counterrevolutionary social power: the church, the landowning class, capitalism, 
and the patriarchal family. The patriarchal family, in particular, was viewed as 
the embodiment of tradition; as the most pervasive and therefore the most 
powerful impediment to the forward course of the revolution. Replacement of the 
traditional family form by the communist collective, the so-called Novyi byt (New 
Order), was one of the core cultural tasks of the Russian Revolution (Halle, 
1933; Reich, 1974 [1930]). Indeed, as Petersen (1964) pointed out, there was 
hardly a better measure against conservatism than to liberate family 
relationships, for so long as the older generation was able to set the thought 
and behaviour patterns of the younger generation, social change was likely to 
be slow. In addition, the emancipation of women, a traditional Marxist 
revolutionary ideal, was expected to channel some of the vast reservoir of 
womanpower out of the home and into the socialized economy.
During the first years after the revolution every possible effort was made to free 
individuals from the claims of the family. To achieve this goal, the government 
relied principally on two groups of measures: first, it sought to provide communal 
facilities for the upbringing of children, as well as for eating, cooking and other 
household chores; second, it promulgated pertinent legislation. During the first 
nine years of Soviet rule, two family codes (dated October 17, 1918, and 
November 19, 1926) plus a number of other decrees developed a consistent 
family policy.5 All legal inequalities between the sexes were abolished. De facto 
marriage and divorce, and equal status of children born both in and out of 
wedlock, were legally implemented. Religious marriage was no longer 
recognized by law, and the civil registration of marriages was reduced to a 
formality of no importance. Divorce became inexpensive and easily obtainable. 
As one Western historian summarized the situation, 'it was rather generally 
though vaguely agreed that the family was not worth much as an institution and 
would eventually disappear' (Geiger, 1968: 43).
5 For details about the early Bolshevik policies related to family, see Lorimer (1946, 1958), 
Schlesinger (1949), Mace and Mace (1963), Petersen (1964), Bronfenbrenner (1968), Geiger 
(1968), Millett (1971), Reich (1974), Knarr (1977), Juviler (1978), Holt (1980).
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While the regime actively sought to weaken family ties, it was not much 
concerned with matters related to sexuality. In the first days after the October 
Revolution penalties for abortions were cancelled in practice, but not by law 
(Savage, 1988). The Tsarist prohibition of abortion remained in force until 1920, 
through the period when the major social and political upheavals — revolution, 
Civil War, foreign intervention, famine and epidemics — took place. The daily 
conditions of Soviet Russia became probably harder than under the Tsarist 
regime. The economy was ruined, inflation was astronomical, the rural sector 
collapsed into a state of deep backwardness (Hughes and Welfare, 1990). 
Parental inability to support children was one of the gravest social problems of 
those days.6 Presumably, illegal abortion became an even more common mode 
of limiting family size. For instance, incomplete data for 1919 on the situation in 
Moscow and Petrograd indicate a ratio of about three abortions to ten births 
(Knarr, 1977). Many of those operations are believed to have been performed 
by unskilled quacks under primitive conditions, and to have been associated 
with high rates of complications and maternal mortality. Observations at the time 
indicated that up to 50 per cent of women resorting to abortions became 
infected in the course of the operation (WHO, 1971).
Apparently, it was the feeling that legislated punishment was useless and only 
drove abortion practices underground that prompted the government to adopt 
relevant measures. In 1919, a council of medical and legal experts and 
members of women's organizations was established to review abortion 
legislation (Savage, 1988). On November 18, 1920, these efforts culminated in 
a substantial legal change: by a decree jointly issued by the Commissariats of 
Health and Justice, abortion was made available upon the request of a woman 
during the initial trimester of pregnancy. In the official commentary, particulars 
and aims of the new legislation were set out as follows:
(1) To permit such operations to be made freely and without any charge 
in Soviet hospitals, where conditions are assured of minimizing the harm 
of the operation;
(2) To absolutely forbid anyone but a doctor to carry out this operation;
(3) Any nurse or midwife found guilty of making such an operation will be 
deprived of the right to practice, and tried by a People's Court;
(4) A doctor carrying out an abortion in his private practice with 
mercenary aims will be called to account by a People's Court (quoted in 
Schlesinger, 1949: 44).
6 One of the results of this intense period of social crisis was a large number of homeless children 
wandering around the country in search of the means to live; see Stolee (1988).
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The nullification of the punitive Tsarist legislation on abortion was also 
incorporated into a new penal law.7
The liberalization of 1920 was from its beginning intended to be only a 
temporary measure. To quote the text of the abortion decree, the new abortion 
law was presented as an 'evil' necessitated by the fact that 'the moral survivals 
of the past and the difficult economic conditions of the present still compel many 
women to resort to [abortion]' (Schlesinger, 1949: 44). The act legalizing 
abortion argued not in terms of a woman's right to choose, but in terms of the 
inability of the society to provide for all children. While the country was so poor 
women were to be offered the opportunity of abortion, but in the future, or so the 
law seemed to imply, this opportunity could be withdrawn. The law made no 
mention of contraception. Some governmental attempts were made to 
discourage abortions by means of education and health propaganda (Lorimer, 
1958; Hyde, 1970), yet it is doubtful that these campaigns were very concerted. 
A number of Western visitors at the time reported that the effort was not very 
wholehearted.8
Like later Soviet decrees related to childbearing, the abortion law of 1920 was 
not presented as a measure designed to implement a population policy or to 
advocate birth control. It was deemed a social welfare measure; a means of 
raising the status of women, protecting their health, and recognizing their 
equality. One of the most explicit comments on the new abortion legislation that 
can be coaxed from the propagandist writings of the time was made by 
Alexandra Kollontai (1873-1952), a leading figure in the women's movement in 
the early years of the Soviet regime and an official of the Soviet government. In 
her speech at the Sverdlov University in 1921 Kollontai asked:
What is the reasoning behind this new attitude [to abortion]? Russia, 
after all, suffers not from an overproduction of living labour but rather 
from a lack of it. Russia is thinly, not densely populated. Every unit of 
labour power is precious. Why then have we declared abortion to be no 
longer a criminal offence? ... Abortion exists and flourishes everywhere, 
and no laws or punitive measures have succeeded in rooting it out. A 
way round the law is always found. But 'secret help' only cripples 
women; they become a burden on the labour government, and the size 
of the labour force is reduced. Abortion, when carried out under proper
7 The first Soviet Penal Code (dated July 1, 1922) imposed a penalty for consensual abortion only 
when performed by an unlicensed practitioner, or under 'inappropriate' conditions (that is, outside 
a public hospital) by a licensed practitioner (Zielinska, 1993).
8 See Lawton (1927), Field (1932), Halle (1933), Schlesinger (1949), Appel (1990).
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medical conditions, is less harmful and dangerous, and the woman can 
get back to work quicker. Soviet power realises that the need for abortion 
will only disappear on the one hand when Russia has a broad and 
developed network of institutions protecting motherhood and providing 
social education, and on the other hand when women understand that 
childbirth is a social obligation-, Soviet power has therefore allowed 
abortion to be performed openly and in clinical conditions (quoted in Holt, 
1977: 148-149; italics in original).
What this statement reveals is that even the Soviet feminist intelligentsia, or at 
least an important part of it, perceived fertility control to be anti-socialist. It was 
generally assumed that, with the development of socialism and the improvement 
of social conditions for women and children, the problem of unwanted 
pregnancies would gradually decrease and eventually disappear. This was a 
characteristic feature of the Soviet utopianism of the 1920s: there was a sense 
that all problems were soon going to work themselves out, so there was no need 
for an elaborate policy. It seems clear that no populationist considerations 
entered into the initial social policies of the Soviet regime.
It is unlikely that accurate abortion statistics relating to the years after 1920 will 
ever be available for the former USSR. The dissemination of all data on abortion 
was officially barred in 1929 (Popov, 1991), a ban that lasted for almost 60 
years and one that betrays the inclination of the Soviet system to regard 
abortion as a shame to be concealed rather than a social problem to be solved. 
Although it is impossible to indicate the extent of abortion practice in the early 
Soviet period with any numerical precision, there is no reason to distrust 
anecdotal statistical documentation from certain administrative districts which 
suggests a large-scale rise in the resort to abortion, as well as a significant drop 
in the number of illegal procedures and consequent injuries, throughout the 
country after the new legislation came into effect.9 Potts et al. (1977: 65) 
estimate that during the 1920s, 18-20 pregnancies in every 100 ended by legal 
abortion in the USSR; but the true figure was certainly neither constant over 
time nor uniform across different areas. Lorimer (1946: 128) reported that 
1924-25 statistics for the European part of the USSR showed an average ratio 
of 13 abortions per 100 live births, while in 1934 the number of abortions was as 
large as the number of births in many areas, and probably higher in the cities of 
Central Asia as well as in the Russian Federation and the Ukraine. Heer (1968b: 
230) quoted Russian demographer Urlanis, according to whom 700,000 legal
9 See Field (1932, 1956), Halle (1933), Schlesinger (1949), Mace and Mace (1963).
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abortions and 3 million births were reported in the Russian Republic in 1934, 
equivalent to approximately 23 abortions per 100 births.
The situation in Moscow with regard to births and abortions as reported by the 
Soviet medical statistics is shown in Table 2.1. This evidence seems to suggest 
a growing resort to abortion in the late 1920s and early 1930s. This may have 
been due not only to increasing accuracy in abortion recording, but also to 
increasing individual motivation to reduce fertility, and to an increase in the 
number of facilities in which abortions could be performed. Unfortunately, the 
nature of available data makes it impossible to assess more precisely the 
separate roles of these factors.
Table 2.1: Reported births and abortions in Moscow, 
1911,1914,1921-27,1934-35
Year Total
births
Total
abortions
Births 
per 1,000 
population
Abortions 
per 1,000 
population
Abortions 
per 100 
births
1911 6.0
1914 31.0 3.2 10.0
1921 30.6 5.7 19.0
1922 35,320 7,969 25.6 5.5 23.0
1923 48,852 9,062 30.1 5.5 19.0
1924 51,980 10,183 29.3 5.7 20.0
1925 57,537 18,071 31.0 9.7 31.0
1926 57,100 31,986 28.9 15.8 56.0
1927 75.0
1934 57,000 154,584 271.0
1935 70,000 155,000 221.0
Sources: Lorimer (1946), Field (1956), Savage (1988).
The 1920 Soviet law on abortion was through its consequences important for 
the abortion debate in other countries. First, it showed that change towards a 
more liberal approach to this issue was possible. Second, it revised perceptions 
of the safety of the operation: until that time it had been widely believed that 
surgical abortion was an unsafe procedure, but the Soviet experience 
suggested that abortion-related morbidity and mortality could fall significantly in 
response to the legalization of abortion.10
10 In 1932 a distinguished British medical journal commented that if the results reported by Soviet 
doctors concerning induced abortion were accurate, ‘they will from the strictly medical point of 
view deserve serious consideration by those planning new legislation appropriate to the outlook 
and habits of our time* (Lancet, 19 March, 1932: 627; quoted in Francome, 1984: 63).
50
2.4 Soviet Union, 1936-55: family revitalized
Beginning with the middle-1920s, the Soviet government gradually reversed its 
original permissiveness and began to adopt a more conservative approach to 
family affairs. Behind this reversal was a realization that the main causes of 
social problems were not only the so-called petty-bourgeois remnants and 
external catastrophes such as war or famine, but also factors operating within 
Soviet society itself. Disintegration of the family which the revolution had caused 
and even encouraged was identified as one of these factors. The first signal of 
discontent with developments in family matters came in fact from Lenin, shortly 
before his death in 1924, when he urged more discipline and less personal 
freedom as proper revolutionary attitudes:
Although I am nothing but a gloomy ascetic, the so-called 'new sexual 
life1 of the youth — and sometimes of the old — often seems to me to be 
purely bourgeois, an extension of bourgeois brothels. That has nothing 
whatever in common with freedom of love as we Communists 
understand it... The revolution demands concentration, increase of 
forces. From the masses, from individuals. It cannot tolerate orgiastic 
conditions... If harmful tendencies are appearing, creeping over from 
bourgeois society into the world of revolution — as the roots of many 
weeds spread — it is better to combat them early (quoted in Zetkin, 
1929: 57 and 60).
In 1924, new regulations were published introducing a high fee for abortion as a 
deterrent, although it was often waived in cases where the woman could not 
pay. At the same time, special commissions were established to control the 
number of free-of-charge procedures (Avdeev, 1989; Popov, 1993).
Yet the years between 1921 and 1928 were still years of increasing prosperity, 
the result of Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) which temporarily returned to 
private ownership and to a certain extent re-established capitalism. While all key 
sectors of industry were retained in state administration, private 
entrepreneurship was encouraged in small-scale factories, the market was 
resuscitated, and joint farming was given full support (Nove, 1989). A period of 
famine in 1921-22 preceded better times, but the NEP eventually was a 
success, and by 1927 the pre-war levels of production had been restored in 
industry and surpassed in agriculture (Baradat, 1992).
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Lenin's death in January 1924 became an important moment in Soviet history, 
since it brought to the fore the questions of succession and the future 
orientation of the Soviet state. Finally, it was Joseph Stalin (1879-1953) who 
had sufficiently consolidated his support to be able to take power. Stalin brought 
together a mix of Marxist theory, Leninist authoritarianism, traditions of Tsarist 
absolutism, and his own personality. Within a few years he had eliminated all 
opponents, gained total power over the Communist Party (which meant over the 
Soviet Union), and imposed a harsh one-person rule that later became known 
as a 'cult of personality'. As Stalin sun/eyed the state of the country over which 
he now held sway, he became convinced that precious time had been wasted in 
fruitless daydreams. Abandoning Lenin's goal of world revolution and 
proclaiming the end of the NEP, Stalin concentrated on a single objective: to 
build socialism in the Soviet Union. From that point on, Russia was to be 
considered the bastion of the communist movement, and anything that added to 
the strength of Russia as a nation was good for that movement.
By the end of the 1920s, the whole country had embarked on a massive 
program of forced industrialization and collectivization of agriculture based on a 
series of five-year plans and the centralization of economic control. The First 
Five-Year Plan (1928-32) laid down targets for the production of everything 
necessary for an advanced economy. The main goals were electrification and 
the production of steel and coal, which meant the economic subordination of 
light industry and communal services to heavy industry. Such economic 
advances could come only at an enormous price. The Stalinist recipe for 
industrialization required a closed economy in which human resources, like all 
others, were completely subject to central command. In an effort to mobilize the 
populace, Stalin sponsored an era of political oppression that resulted in 
unprecedented repression of individual rights. For instance, the Plan 
incorporated a policy of forced dislocation of people from the country to 
industrial centres.11 To increase labour discipline and overall productiveness, an 
escalating succession of restrictive laws and limitations in welfare policies were 
used. The years that followed the promulgation of the Plan were marked by a 
stress on productivity and by an unprecedentedly harsh attitude towards those 
who did not participate.12 The cost of these policies in terms of the losses
11 Migration to the cities averaged 1.1 million per year in 1926-29 and increased to about 3 million 
per year in 1930-32 (Livi-Bacci, 1993).
12 For more details about Stalinist social policies, see Lorimer (1958), Petersen (1964), 
Bronfenbrenner (1968), Juviler (1976), Conquest (1986), Lewis (1987), Livi-Bacci (1993).
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suffered was enormous; 'seldom was any government to wreak such havoc in its 
own country' (Lewin, 1968: 515).13
It is a commonly accepted fact that industrialization, urbanization and the 
movement of populations to the cities lead in most societies, at least in the initial 
stages of these processes, to a decrease in the birth rate. The Soviet Union 
cannot have escaped this phenomenon. Precise figures were never published, 
but estimates made by different demographers consistently indicate a 
substantial decline in Soviet birth rates during the late 1920s and early 1930s 
(Table 2.2). Although plausible data on abortion are not available, it may be 
assumed that the decrease in birth rates coincided with increased resort to 
abortion, particularly in the period of acute decline in living standards that 
accompanied the first wave of collectivization and intense effort at rapid 
industrialization (Avdeev, 1989). There is also some evidence that high numbers 
of applications for abortion raised serious difficulties in hospital accommodation 
(Field, 1956; Hyde, 1970). Sooner or later it must have become apparent to the 
regime that its liberal family legislation on divorce, alimony and abortion 
encouraged 'frivolous attitudes toward the family and family obligations' (Juviler, 
1967: 32). People living in such an environment were unlikely to become the 
stable, hard-working and conscientious workers required for a socialist society. 
Fertility decline and related social phenomena were considered even more 
alarming in view of the worsening international situation and the growing 
possibility of war.
In the late 1920s and early 1930s access to abortion was gradually restricted. A 
number of political and medical exceptions were introduced to curtail the use of 
legal abortion services; for example, Communist Party members were de facto 
denied access to legal abortion (Avdeev, 1989; Popov, 1993). Beginning in 
1935, a new regulation was issued, forbidding abortions for first pregnancies, 
restricting the time limit to the first three months after conception with a minimum 
of six months between operations, and prescribing curettage without 
anaesthetic as the only method of pregnancy termination (Mace and Mace, 
1963; Knarr, 1977). In May 1936 a draft law was formulated that, among other 
things, prohibited abortion and provided that not only the doctor but also the 
woman having an abortion would be punished. The state authorities, in an
13 Among other things, Stalinist policies resulted in a period of catastrophe-level mortality and 
morbidity in the Soviet population. It has been estimated that between 1928 and 1933 the infant 
mortality rate increased from 182 to 317 per 1000 live births, and that life expectancy dropped 
from 38.9 years to an almost unbelievable level of 11.6 years (Andreev, Darsky, and Kharkova, 
1994).
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Table 2.2: Estimates of crude birth rates for the Soviet Union, 1914-45
Year Total area: European area:
(a) (b) (c) (d) (b) (c)
1915 37.4 39.7
1916 32.5 29.9
1917 28.8 23.9
1918 32.4 32.0 31.8 32.0
1919 30.6 31.0 30.8 31.0
1920 31.7 31.2 31.0 31.2
1921 35.0 35.5 35.3 35.5
1922 36.2 37.3 36.8 37.3
1923 44.0 43.9 42.8 43.9
1924 42.3 41.0 43.1 42.0
1925 43.8 45.0 44.7 44.7
1926 42.3 44.0 44.0 43.7 43.7
1927 41.6 43.7 46.8 43.4 43.4
1928 41.1 44.3 44.3 45.8 42.2 42.2
1929 38.8 41.8 44.5 39.8 39.8
1930 38.0 41.2 42.5 39.2 39.2
1931 34.1 32.6 40.7 31.0
1932 29.2 32.6 36.1 31.0 31.0
1933 30.3 32.6 34.0 31.0
1934 25.0 32.6 30.5 31.0
1935 28.4 28.6 31.6 36.2 30.1
1936 31.7 32.3 34.3 34.9
1937 37.1 38.7 38.7 40.3
1938 36.9 37.5 37.5 39.4
1939* 33.3 36.5 36.5 40.4
1940* 31.2 31.2 31.2 36.3
1941 31.5
1942 24.9
1943 20.5
1944 17.2
1945 15.9
Notes: * USSR borders changed considerably between September 1939 and August 1940, see 
Lorimer (1946: 184-190)
Sources: a - Biraben (1958), b - Heer (1968b), c - Urlanis (1977), d - Andreev et al. (1994).
exceptional moment of democracy, invited the Soviet public to discuss the new 
proposal. Although a number of statements published promptly in the Soviet 
press reflected the prevailing feeling that couples should have the right to 
determine the number of their children,14 popular debate on abortion was 
suddenly cut off. The propagandist journal Pod znamenem marxizma (Under the
14 For examples of quotations illustrating public opinion, see Schlesinger (1949), Field (1956), 
Mace and Mace (1963), Holt (1980).
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Flag of Marxism) published a statement which signalled that the government 
had already decided on an energetic course against abortions:
The principal motives for abortion have been liquidated in our socialist 
State... Therefore, mass abortions resorted to for egoistic reasons are 
not to be tolerated. The Soviet State cannot countenance the fact that 
tens of thousands of women ruin their health and delay the growth of a 
new generation for socialist society (quoted in Schlesinger, 1949: 310).
The new legislation, practically unchanged from the original draft, was published 
on June 27, 1936, together with a large commentary (Schlesinger, 1949: 269- 
272). It stated that owing to the vast growth of material well-being in the USSR, 
and taking into consideration the high political and cultural level of the Soviet 
people, it was 'possible seriously to organize the struggle against abortions by 
prohibitive laws as well as by other means' (Schlesinger, 1949: 270). The 1920 
liberal law was justified as a measure related merely to the social chaos of the 
Civil War period 1917-20; now, emphasis had to be placed on protecting the 
health of Soviet women against injuries resulting from abortions, as revealed by 
medical evidence that was previously neglected. Abortions were forbidden 
except under narrowly defined medical indications where the continuation of 
pregnancy endangered the life or threatened serious injury to the health of the 
pregnant woman, or if there was the likelihood of hereditary disease. A doctor 
performing an illegal abortion was liable to imprisonment for up to two years, 
rising to three years for unqualified persons. A woman undergoing such an 
abortion was to be reprimanded for the first offence and fined for a second 
offence. No action was taken against contraception, but nothing further was 
done to promote its acceptance. At this time also, family allowances were 
initiated for parents with seven or more children, as well as several other 
measures promoting natality, expanding the child-care networks, and 
discouraging the dissolution of families.15
Thus, Soviet ideology entirely abandoned its earlier concept that woman's 
primary function, like that of man, is social activity, and that bearing children 
should be accessory to this function. As long as it was not possible for the state 
to accept the social disorganization attested to by emerging patterns in 
demographic behaviour, the equalitarian and antistatist elements of Marxist 
ideology had to give way. Marxism in this sphere, as in others, became little 
more than a collection of quotations, useful only in justifying current policies.
15 For more details about Soviet pronatalist policies of the mid-1930s, see Lorimer (1946, 1958), 
Schlesinger (1949), Heer and Bryden (1967), Madison (1968), DiMaio (1981).
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The status of the family was changed from that of a barely tolerated 'survival of 
the past' to that of an indispensable primary cell in Soviet society. Motherhood 
was practically declared a profession to be encouraged, even when carried to a 
point hardly compatible with any other form of productive activity. The 
promulgation of a restrictive abortion law disregarded prevailing public 
sentiment, and was indicative of the suppression of personal freedoms which 
had existed in the early years of the Soviet era. Though women were not 
encouraged to abandon their jobs for the home — a development which neither 
they themselves nor the state could afford — traditional sex roles within the 
family were by and large reasserted. As the ex-revolutionary and once Lenin's 
collaborator Leon Trotsky (1879-1940) commented from his exile in Norway, 'a 
Thermidorean reaction in the sphere of the family set in' (Trotsky, 1973 [1936]: 
86).
Concurrently with the legislative developments there occurred a marked shift in 
the overall propaganda approach towards sex and family matters. Those in 
power now placed emphasis in their speeches on the increase of population in 
the Soviet Union contrasting with the decadence of capitalist nations; on the 
equality of women in all matters, with special accent on their share in productive 
labour; and on the glory of motherhood in the Soviet Union (Lorimer, 1958; 
Besemeres, 1980). Information related to sex and reproduction was increasingly 
restricted. From 1936 even sex research, sex education, and all kinds of erotic 
art were absolutely forbidden, leaving the population sexually ignorant (Kon, 
1992; Khomassuridze, 1993).
For the people the best way to cope with the restrictive situation would perhaps 
have been to resort to contraception. Yet such a solution was not very relevant 
given the conditions of the Soviet population in the 1930s. It seems that at that 
time major segments of this largely peasant population were not much used to 
the possibility of influencing procreative practices. Demographic data indicate 
that the country as a whole had not yet reached the point of transition from 
uncontrolled to controlled fertility; that is, it was in a similar situation to most of 
Western Europe in the mid-nineteenth century.16 Moreover, scholars who 
studied the situation in Soviet society during the post-revolution years noted 
signs of fatalism, ignorance, male chauvinism, and deeply rooted religious 
inhibitions, all of which made for widespread unwillingness to use
16 See Lorimer (1946), Coale, Anderson, and Harm (1979).
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contraception.17 In addition, the Soviet regime from its early days was largely 
reticent on the subjects of sex and contraception. What sorts of attitudes the 
official propaganda promoted may be deduced from a statement made by N. 
Semashko, the first People's Commissar for Public Health, in an address to 
students which he made in 1927:
Comrades: You have to come to the universities and technical institutes 
in order to study. This is now the main goal of your lives. And even as all 
your impulses and views are subordinated to this goal, as you must deny 
yourselves not infrequently many extraneous pleasures because they 
would be detrimental to your main goal — that of studying and becoming 
educated collaborators in the reconstruction of the state — by the same 
token you will have to subordinate ail other activities of your life to this 
same goal. For at this time the state is too poor to support you, to 
undertake the rearing of your children, and to care for parents. Therefore 
we advise you: Abstain! (quoted in Reich, 1974 [1930]: 197)
On the rare occasions when the mass media mentioned sex matters and birth 
control, they did so in the spirit of this general consensus, or followed an even 
more uncompromising line. Thus the author of an article published in the 
women's journal Rabotnitsa (Working Woman) in 1927 wrote:
We must make clear from the very beginning that the application of any 
means of preventing pregnancy is abnormal. The healthy woman must 
be a mother, for only maternity brings the full development of her 
physical and spiritual strength. In other words, the result of sexual 
intercourse must be conception (quoted in Holt, 1980: 101; italics in 
original).
Given such standpoints, it is scarcely surprising that the state authorities did 
little to produce or publicize contraceptives, and that the available means were 
chronically 'lacking in variety, reliability, and quality' (Geiger, 1968: 193). For 
many decades, the Soviet people had to rely almost exclusively on rather 
primitive forms of fertility control, such as abstinence, coitus interruptus, 
douching, and homemade devices. Whatever shifts in private behaviour the 
state institutions hoped to attain through policy measures, a need for family 
planning was likely to remain high.
The effects of changes to the 1920 legislation on abortion were dramatic. The 
immediate result of the virtual prohibition of abortion was widespread confusion,
17 For more information about contraceptive use in various parts of the Soviet Union in the inter­
war period, see Schlesinger (1949), Lorimer (1958), Geiger (1968), Millett (1971), Holt (1980), 
David and McIntyre (1981).
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since many women came as usual to the hospitals only to be turned away 
(Mace and Mace, 1963). It can easily be surmised that prohibition did not 
remove the popular demand for abortion, but rather sent abortion practices 
underground. There is some evidence that cases violating the legal provisions 
were frequent, and often resulted in grave health complications, since doctors 
and backyard abortionists were under pressure from the population to perform 
abortions illegally. The authors of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia (1973, vol. 1: 
26) write:
The number of abortions in [the Soviet Union] in 1937 as compared with 
1935 fell by a factor of more than three, but in subsequent years the 
number of abortions began to rise again, mainly as a result of 
nonhospital abortions, which accounted for 80 to 90 per cent of the total.
Field (1956: 425) quotes a Russian emigre, a gynaecologist who in the 1930s 
had worked in Leningrad, as saying that there was a constant stream of 
infections caused by unsterile abortions:
About 70 per cent of the women in our department were there because 
of complications following botched up abortions... Beds reserved for 
maternity cases had been increased, while those reserved for 
gynaecology had been decreased; we had so many of these cases we 
didn't know what to do with them. And the mortality was very high... .
Notwithstanding the demand for abortion, the sanctions for those who violated 
the law remained severe. Chalidze (1977) reported that doctors were obliged to 
report to the authorities women with complications after illegal abortion, and 
even to refuse to treat them unless they revealed who had performed the 
abortion. A Procurator's Instruction of November 1940 on the 'War on criminal 
abortion' required the doctor suspecting abortion to keep detailed records, 
especially concerning who the woman was, and to preserve all evidence, 
including the foetus (Savage, 1988).
Demographically speaking, the main outcome following the abortion law of 1936 
was a sharp change in the Soviet birth rate. However, although it may be 
assumed that reasonably accurate information on the population of the Soviet 
Union was available to Stalin's government at that time, no data on vital events 
were published.18 Available estimates (Table 2.2) indicate an increase in the
18 Presumably, such a practice had some advantages from the viewpoint of communist 
propaganda: as Lorimer (1958: 228) pointed out, 'it concealed a good many skeletons', such as 
the negative demographic consequences of collectivization.
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birth rate from 28-36 births per 1,000 population in 1935 to 32-35 in 1936, and 
37-40 in 1937; thus, in the USSR as a whole the 1937 birth rate is estimated to 
be 13-20 per cent higher than that of 1936. In the cities of European Russia, the 
impact on the number of births was presumably even more dramatic. According 
to Heer (1968b: 231), in Moscow the number of births in 1937 increased by 92 
per cent over the 1936 figure, in Leningrad by 69 per cent, in Minsk by 39 per 
cent, and in Baku by 39 per cent.19 Yet these effects were only short-lived; 
presumably, Soviet couples largely resorted to illegal methods of birth control. 
With the onset of World War II, fertility dropped further, and the estimated 1940 
rate of 31 births per 1,000 population indicates a decline below the figure for 
1936, the year abortion restrictions were implemented.
The tendency towards strengthening the 'socialist family' continued in policy 
measures promulgated during the late 1930s, by means of which the Soviet 
state increased assistance to expectant mothers and provided family allowances 
for third and subsequent children on a graduated basis (Hyde, 1970; Urlanis, 
1970). The climactic point in the Stalinist population policy was the 'costly, 
elaborate and peculiar system of financial and honorary awards to mothers' 
(Lorimer, 1958: 223) implemented in 1944 after the Nazi invasion had 
decimated the Soviet populace. In a response to this calamity, a complicated 
system of orders and medals for mothers of large families was set up, together 
with a new family legislation which deprived de facto marriage of its legal 
recognition, placed serious obstacles in the way of divorce, abolished alimony, 
granted greater labour law protection for women, extended family allowances to 
third and subsequent children, and expanded the provision of child-care facilities 
(Juviler, 1978). That the government by changing women's socio-economic 
conditions intended to change reproductive behaviour follows from the 
selectivity and focus of that legislation: it glorified motherhood, taxed persons 
without families, and provided special aid to unmarried mothers and mothers 
with many children (Heer and Bryden, 1967; Madison, 1968).
The regime justified the new policies in terms of social welfare and help to 
families whose fathers had died in the war. However, it was apparently also 
expected that these measures would stabilize the hierarchy of social relations 
and increase the nation's human resources. It may be inferred that these steps 
were taken with a clear political intent. During Stalin's rule, the power of the
19 To be correct, sharp improvements in mass nutrition, and living standards generally, after the 
deprivations of the first two five-year plans might have also been a factor in increased natality.
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Soviet regime became largely dependent on social solidarity, hierarchical 
relationships, and centralized authority. A decent family was regarded as a 
microcosm of the socialist system; indeed as a guarantee of the fixity of the 
Soviet order. The pronatalist program was continued for a few years, but in 
November 1947 it was announced that the schedule of payments would be cut 
in half beginning on January 1 of the following year (Heer and Bryden, 1967). 
Apparently, after the post-war recovery, it was no longer deemed expedient to 
make such a heavy investment in increasing manpower, and social policies 
accordingly moved from compelling motherhood toward only encouraging it.
The USSR was not the only country which experimented with abortion 
legislation before World War II. The 1930s also saw liberal modifications of the 
Icelandic, Danish, and Swedish abortion statutes, in which the concept of socio­
economic indications had been introduced (WHO, 1971). The Spanish 
Revolution of 1936 attempted to decriminalize abortion, too (Zielinska, 1993). 
None of these provisions, however, equalled in its consequences the 
dimensions of the abortion reform in the Soviet Union between 1920 and 1936. 
On the other hand, repressive laws against abortion and birth control were 
passed not only in the USSR, but also in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany during 
the 1920s and 1930s (David, Fleischhacker, and Hohn, 1988; McLaren, 1990). 
Together with the Soviet experience, these reactions may be considered 
symptomatic for totalitarian regimes in a time of preparation for war.
2.5 Soviet Union, 1955-89: abortion relegalized
During World War II, Soviet society experienced a deep demographic crisis. 
Vast distance and limited resources kept many men from their wives over long 
periods of service without leave. Women were labouring long hours, and 
shortages of food, clothing, and housing were severe. It has been estimated 
that at least 20 million more persons died than would have died in peacetime 
and at least 20 million babies were not born who might have been born if the 
nation had not been at war.20 The war had profoundly adverse affects on family 
life, especially by increasing the numbers of illegitimate and homeless children 
and by creating an unbalanced sex ratio.21 The psychological damage caused 
to Soviet citizens and the impact of the number of maimed and injured have
20 For estimates of Soviet population losses caused by the War, see Lorimer (1946), Sauvy 
(1956), Heer (1968a), Andreev et al. (1994), Pirozhkov and Safarova (1994).
21 For instance, Juviler (1967) estimated that, at the end of the war, for every two men there were 
three women between the ages of 20 and 39 years. In 1950, the Soviet population as a whole 
consisted of 100.1 million women and only 78.4 million men (GOSKOMSTAT, 1988).
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never been effectively calculated. However great the population losses might 
have been, the war-induced sex imbalance, resulting in women moving into 
unskilled or semi-skilled jobs that would otherwise had been held by men, might 
have been as important as ideology for understanding the logic of post-war 
demographic policy-making in the Soviet Union.
Given the conditions of war, it is perhaps not surprising that the issue of abortion 
received little attention from the government. Notwithstanding the legal 
prohibition implemented in 1936, Soviet women apparently continued to resort 
to abortion, and the number of illegal procedures and abortion-related maternal 
deaths is believed to have been high. Although few statistics are available to 
document the extent of abortion, there is no reason to disbelieve accounts in 
Soviet demographic literature of the abortion situation in the early 1950s:
The planned goal of the [1936] Decree was not attained because the 
growth of women's education, their wide inclusion into production, the 
growth of the general well-being of the population, and the 
correspondingly higher demands produced the actual preconditions for 
lowering the number of children in the family. As a result, the number of 
abortions performed outside hospitals, mainly criminal, began to grow 
intensively, and by 1954 the general number of abortions attained the 
level existing before the 1936 legislation (Shlindman and Zvidrinsh, 
1973: 143).
The first official indication that abortions did not cease in the USSR after the 
1936 ban was a decree dated August 4, 1954, absolving women from legal 
liability should they obtain illicit abortions (Field, 1956). Although the repeal 
appeared without comment, the aim apparently was to make it easier for women 
who had abortions to report eventual complications and to reveal the illegal 
practitioners. Following the 1954 decree, the Soviet press began to publicize 
criminal abortion cases, in an attempt to impress upon women the criminality of 
abortion and diminish their use of it (Savage, 1988). Evidently this did not have 
the desired effect, because some months later the government again took up 
the problem of illegal abortion, this time in a more energetic way.
On November 23, 1955, a new decree entitled 'On the annulment of the 
prohibition of abortions' was passed by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 
(Field, 1956). In its main features this measure was identical to the one 
promulgated in 1920: it permitted the performance of abortion upon request 
during the first three months of pregnancy; stipulated that it must be done by 
qualified personnel in medical installations in accordance with instructions
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issued by the Ministry of Health of the USSR; and confirmed that operations 
performed outside hospitals, by persons without medical training, or for money, 
remained criminal offences. After the twelfth week of pregnancy abortion was 
permitted only for medical reasons which endangered the mother's life or health, 
or for eugenic reasons. The regulation also specified that abortion could not be 
legally performed less than six months after a previous abortion. The cost of 
abortion was assessed at five roubles — a low sum which certainly did not cover 
all expenses related to the procedure — and the operation was evaluated as 
qualifying patients for up to ten days of unpaid leave.22 In the brief commentary 
preceding the decree it was noted that it was the advance in Soviet social 
conscience and cultural level that permitted the lifting of the abortion restriction. 
Prevention of the health hazard created by illegal abortions and the recognition 
of a woman's right to decide freely about motherhood were declared the main 
intentions of the new decree — a reason much the same as that used in 
conjunction with the prohibition of 1936. As in 1920, the re-liberalization of 
abortion was accompanied by special provisions for the care of pregnant women 
and mothers (Callahan, 1970).
The new abortion policy move seemed to suggest that the Soviet leadership 
realized the failure of legal proscription to eradicate the practice of abortion and 
the impracticability of prohibiting something for which there was much popular 
demand. The new decree made it at least possible to bring abortions under the 
control of state institutions. It was hoped that education and greater use of 
contraception would curb the abortion rate. To this purpose, Article 66 of the 
Law on Public Health stipulated that the possible harm of abortion should be 
explained to mothers requesting it, and that efforts were to be made to 
discourage women from terminating first pregnancies; however, if a pregnant 
woman persisted in her request, her application must be approved (WHO, 
1971). Fear that the new legislation might again undermine the stability of Soviet 
families is suggested by the fact that little publicity was given to the new 
measure in the public media (Field, 1956; David, 1974).
What made the new abortion legislation more interesting was its conspicuous 
inconsistency with the general view of Soviet officials of that time on 
demographic matters. Soviet literature of the 1940s and 1950s is full of frenetic 
denunciations of family planning, and even observers accustomed to 'the
22 Abortion on non-medical grounds thus became the only procedure in the Soviet system for 
which the state did not pay the woman's medical expenses and the place of work did not pay her 
while on leave from work (Savage, 1988).
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scurrility of Bolshevik polemics' were able to find 'the outrageous distortions and 
bizarre associations [in these writings] something of a new departure' (Petersen, 
1964: 113). Until the late 1950s, the Soviets interpreted the law of population for 
socialism to mandate rapid population growth and high birth rates. In the world 
generally, rapid population growth was believed to increase political and 
economic instability, thus producing a climate ripe for proletarian revolution. In 
the USSR itself, relatively high birth rates were considered proof of the 
superiority of communism (Cox, 1976; VonFrank, 1984). A quotation from a 
public speech delivered in January 1955 by Stalin's successor N.S. Khrushchev 
(1894-1971) offers a typical example of the official attitude:
Bourgeois ideology invented many cannibalistic theories, among them 
the theory of over-population. Their concern is to cut down the birth rate, 
reduce the rate of population increase. It is quite different with us, 
comrades. If about 100 million people were added to our 200 million, 
even that would not be enough. Under socialism the raising of the birth 
rate is regarded not only as a matter of providing greater labour power. 
The socialist state also looks at the matter from the viewpoint of the 
nation's future (quoted in Heer, 1965: 532).
How was it possible that a communist government headed by a person with 
such a view approved a permissive abortion law? It is true that the lifting of the 
abortion ban happened to coincide with an increase in numbers of persons of 
childbearing age: those born in 1936, the first year of Stalin's pronatalist policy, 
reached 19 years of age in 1955. Yet it seems doubtful that the probable 
increase in the numbers of births was a circumstance of major importance. The 
search for the conditions that produced the decision of 1956 would probably not 
be complete without speculation about the coincidence of the legalization of 
abortion with the liberal political orientation which Khrushchev's government 
took after Stalin's death in 1953. Stalin's sudden passing from the scene 
released in Soviet politics shock and uncertainty.23 There was considerable 
manoeuvring for power after 1953 and it took some time before the new 
leadership consolidated its authority. Genuinely committed to leading his country 
away from the despotism of Stalin, Khrushchev launched a policy of 
liberalization, which is generally referred to under the rubric of 'de-Stalinization'. 
As a part of the de-Stalinization program, a less politicized approach to social 
problems became possible.24 Given these circumstances, the reinstallation of an
23 Some Western observers of the Soviet scene seemed even convinced that the Soviet Union 
could not survive Stalin's death (Cohen, 1985).
24 Indeed, the period 1953-56 in the Soviet Union became known as the 'Thaw1 after Russian 
writer I. Ehrenburg's 'liberalizing' novel of the same title was published.
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earlier Leninist norm concerning abortion may be interpreted as a gesture by 
which the new and politically still shaky administration wanted to demonstrate 
that it was more responsive than had been Stalin to public opinion and popular 
welfare. That Khrushchev could be a liberal when he thought it politically 
expedient became even more obvious in the early 1960s, when he offered 
support to a liberal wave of thinking in an effort to win public support against his 
dogmatic opponents (Viereck, 1967). Thus, it seems safe to suppose that 
Khrushchev was concerned mainly with political benefit when he liberalized 
abortion law. As Azrael (1975: 100) explained in his review of Khrushchev's 
policies:
Given the nontransferability of Stalin's charisma, any Communist in 
[Khrushchev's] position would have found it expedient to turn to the 
patristic sources for authority, and to sponsor reforms which could be 
touted as historic breakthroughs. Furthermore, any such successor 
whose investiture had become the occasion for an expose of Stalin, and 
hence for the outbreak of a grave domestic and international legitimacy 
crisis, would probably have been especially eager to demonstrate the 
'purity' of his Leninism and the direct continuity between his policies and 
those of the Founding Father.25
Among those who followed the demographic policies of the Soviet Union, the 
new Soviet abortion law evoked a feeling 'as if the regime, with a shrug of 
shoulders, chose what seemed to be the lesser of two evils' (Mace and Mace, 
1963: 230). In the West, the law was received with surprise and it was predicted 
that the Soviet government, at any time, might change its mind and prohibit 
abortions again (Field, 1956). This, however, never happened. During the 
ensuing years the fairly permissive abortion system became one of the firmly 
established features of Soviet social policy. For example, when in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s Soviet statesmen began to consider the low rate of population 
growth an important political issue, Soviet demographers proposed various 
political actions to correct the unfavourable population trends and raise the 
national birth rate, but nobody dared to seriously discuss changes in abortion 
legislation (Heer, 1972). 'We simply cannot agree with some suggestions, such 
as a proposal to prohibit abortion', wrote in 1971 a leading social scientist in his 
contribution to the debate on family policy, apparently echoing the problematic 
effects of the 1936 Soviet abortion prohibition (Valentei, 1971: 28). This 
pragmatic argument was probably closely associated with the legal one:
25 However, it is questionable whether the policies for which Khrushchev was regular spokesman 
during this period need to be attributed to him personally. After Khrushchev's removal, moreover, 
the dominant new slogan propagated under Brezhnev, namely 'On Lenin's path', reflected the 
plausibility of the inference that Khrushchev had departed from Leninism.
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obviously, it was felt that the evasion on a large scale of the 1936-55 restrictive 
Act, visible in the form of large numbers of illegal abortions, undermined respect 
for the socialist law. The non-coercive approach to shaping family choices 
prevailed also in the 1981 policy reform, the last of the direct pronatalist Soviet 
policies which, on a regionally differentiated basis, increased family grants, 
extended maternity leave, and raised monthly allowances, but left intact all the 
provisions of the liberal abortion legislation.26
Even though Soviet abortion policy after 1955 moved closer to some 
compromise between the ideal and the practical, closer to a reflection of public 
attitudes, Soviet family legislation, medical policy, and medical practice 
remained inconsistent and were contrary to the actual choices and practices of 
Soviet women. For instance, the Fundamentals of Public Health Legislation of 
the USSR, issued in 1969, entitled the woman to decide whether she would 
have a child, thus enforcing the statement in the preamble of the abortion law of 
1955. A woman, it was said, should feel neither material need nor shame when 
deciding on motherhood in Soviet society (Juviler, 1978). On the other hand, 
1968 Soviet legislation on marriage and the family enjoined the state to protect 
and encourage motherhood (Smirnov, 1983). In practice this meant that the 
state neither paid for a woman's abortion nor allowed doctors to treat her legal 
abortion at a state hospital as a professional confidence. Not only did the 
hospital officials know the purpose of a woman's visit; her employer would also 
know that she had had an abortion because, in order to explain her absence 
from work, the woman had to show her supervisor a certificate of disability from 
the hospital specifying the reason for her visit (Chalidze, 1977). Criminal 
abortions, defined as procedures performed outside the hospital or by an 
operator who did not meet the required standards of medical education, were 
punishable by up to eight years in a labour camp, but illegal abortionists were 
often tolerated by the legal authorities or given only mild penalties (Popov, 
1993). Consequently, abortions were frequently performed illegally by people 
ranging from skilled doctors to quacks, for various fees and under many levels 
of medical care (Ryan, 1987). Finally, to reduce the apparently still high levels of 
unsafe illegal abortion, the Ministry of Health decided in December 1987 on a 
step that was rather exceptional: it permitted the performance of abortion up to 
the 29th week of pregnancy on juridical, genetic, or broad medical grounds, and,
26 For more details about the Soviet fertility policies of 1981, see Weber and Goodman (1981), 
Feshbach (1982), Jones and Grupp (1987), Lewis (1987), Juviler (1991). For an interesting 
glimpse into Soviet thinking about population problems in general, and the abortion issue in 
particular, see an interview given by T. Ryabushkin, prominent Soviet demographer (Population 
and Development Review, 1983).
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after authorization by a commission of local physicians, even on request (USSR, 
1987).
Badly neglected was the area of contraceptive services (Desfosses, 1981; 
Popov, 1991, 1993). Decades after the relegalization of abortions, Soviet 
medical authorities were unable to provide widely available contraception. 
Supplies of contraceptives, like most Soviet consumer goods, were subject to 
perennial shortage and distribution problems. Moreover, modern forms of 
contraception were never promoted by the Soviet medical propaganda. Thus, 
the intra-uterine device was described in a 1958 Soviet medical handbook as 
unconditionally harmful, and a 1963 volume stated that its use must be 
forbidden. In 1962 the Ministry of Public Health published an order 'On 
measures to be taken to fight against abortion1, but in 1974 the same Ministry 
published a letter of instruction 'On the side-effects and complications of oral 
contraceptive use' that de facto prohibited use of the pill for contraceptive 
purposes. The policy of discouraging the use of contraception was also 
incorporated in the law 'On measures of improving state financial assistance to 
women with children' enacted by the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the 
USSR in September 1981. In the 1980s, the most significant innovations of 
Soviet medical policy were the introduction of new technology for safe, early 
abortion on an outpatient basis and the provision of post-coital contraceptive 
services; preventive family planning strategies, however, were hardly 
introduced.
Only towards the close of the pre-Gorbachev era did social problems related to 
sex and reproduction become more visible. Consequently, the 'pros' and 'cons' 
of Soviet abortion legislation came to be discussed more openly. The high 
abortion rate was implicated in the problem of rising infant mortality. Reducing 
the amount of abortion (without, however, suggesting any restriction) became 
frequently presented as a prerequisite for an improvement of the country's 
demographic situation, by which was meant presumably an increase in the birth 
rate. B. Urlanis, a distinguished Soviet demographer, may have been reflecting 
some official thinking along these lines in his article of December 1980 which 
deplored abortion not only as a health hazard but also as a lost conception:
At present, all women in our country are allowed to have abortions — as 
long as the necessary conditions are met... No medical statements are 
required. Only one thing is required — that the woman wants it. Yes, the 
right to have an abortion is an important right. Every woman may 
exercise it. But I want to emphasize: exercise it, not abuse it. After all,
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this operation ... is fraught with serious consequences. First of all, the 
artificial termination of pregnancy affects the woman's health... Secondly, 
in a good many cases the woman who has an abortion completely loses 
the ability to become a mother... In the third place, we must not forget 
about the economic loss to the country: even if the operation goes well, 
the woman is away from the workplace for some time... . Finally, 
abortions are a blow to the economy and to the future labor resources... 
Of course, we cannot compel married couples to have the number of 
children that the country's population has to have if it is to grow. We 
merely have to create the conditions, both moral and material, in which 
the family itself will want a second child, and then a third... (Urlanis, 
1981: 10-11; italics in original).
Finally, abortion became labelled a social problem or, in the official terminology, 
a phenomenon alien to socialism. In 1983, after many years of almost total 
reticence by Soviet politicians in the matter of abortion, this view was openly 
expressed by E. Shevardnadze, then the Communist Party's first secretary in 
Georgia and a candidate member of the Politburo, in a speech delivered at a 
meeting of Party officials:
Reluctance to have a child is more often than not based on 
thoughtlessness and egoism. Certain medical practitioners not only fail to 
prevent such situations but flagrantly violate the law and engage in this 
dubious practice at home. Moreover, even if everything is done 
according to the rules, it's no different, comrades — there is an 
undesirable moral coloring in it. We must exercise the utmost caution. 
When this becomes a mass phenomenon, to a certain extent it assumes 
... an antistate, antisocial nature, and one should combat this evil —  
tactfully, of course, but persistently (Shevardnadze, 1984: 4).
These statements describe well the complex and not completely consistent 
arguments to which the issue of abortion law gave rise in the Soviet literature. 
They indicate that, as a practical matter, Soviet women were not entirely free in 
obtaining legal abortions. The tension between legality and official immorality 
demonstrated that individual rights with respect to abortion were seen 
exclusively as legal rights granted by the state, not human or natural rights. 
Sound family life and concomitant values continued to be favoured in Soviet 
propaganda until the last years of the Soviet era, although without the politically 
tinged pronatalist fanaticism of the Stalinist period (Juviler, 1978; Desfosses, 
1981). Expediency, pure pragmatism, and practicality, rather than the ideal of a 
good society, lay behind the practice of welfare and social security. Most 
probably, changes in abortion legislation were found to be no longer possible, or 
even socially and economically risky. After all, for the regime the best guarantee 
of a disciplined and reasonably healthy labour force was to have a sound family
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structure in which all would find security and a basic living standard. Developed 
as a part of the ideology and practice of Marxian socialism, Soviet social policies 
became important elements of the totalitarian social structure of Soviet society. 
In what Fukuyama (1992: 169) aptly calls 'a Faustian bargain1, the Soviet regime 
offered substantial social provisions and guarantees, requiring in return that 
nobody became involved in any action against the current order. And in 
accepting this bargain, people living under this regime became not just the 
regime's victims, but its beneficiaries and perpetuators as well.
2.6 Eastern Europe, 1955-60: following the Soviet lead
After World War II, the USSR spread its power throughout the eastern part of 
Europe which the Soviet army had liberated from the Nazis.27 The establishment 
of a system of socialist states in Europe under Soviet control was essentially an 
outcome of the Moscow, Yalta and Potsdam Conferences of 1944 and 1945 
which yielded the post-war division of Europe into rival domains justified in terms 
of superpower interests and opportunities for defence (Seton-Watson, 1960; 
Szajkowski, 1982). These agreements placed the countries of Eastern Europe in 
the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union, which later took the momentous 
decision of imposing its social system upon these countries. In addition to Soviet 
influence, communist rule in Eastern Europe owed its origins to the readiness of 
communist parties in each country to use all possible means to secure for 
themselves the monopoly of power, and to the physical exhaustion and political 
disorientation of war-ravaged populations (Szajkowski, 1982; Staar, 1988). 
Communists gained control over Eastern Europe in less than three years after 
the cessation of hostilities in 1945. Politically, as well as economically and 
socially, the USSR became in an astonishingly short time the metropolis, and 
the East European socialist states its colonies.
Although there has been no shortage of attempts to define the political systems 
of communist states, no simple all-embracing label applies to all the important 
aspects of the changing and often contradictory political realities of Eastern 
European states during 1948-89. Nevertheless, certain sharp differences 
between socialist and Western liberal-democratic states cannot be overlooked. 
According to White, Gardner and Schopflin (1987), one may consider four main, 
though by no means exhaustive, traits of the socialist socio-political system. All
27 Yugoslavia and Albania were exceptional in that they were not liberated by the Soviet army, but 
primarily by home-grown resistance.
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these four elements were closely interrelated and applicable, at least in 
principle, to all of the socialist states in Eastern Europe. In combination they also 
explain why Soviet-style socialism eventually lost its potential for becoming a 
realistic alternative to modern bourgeois democracy:
(1) In the first place, all European socialist political systems based themselves 
upon a sole official ideology which was derived from the theories of Marx, 
Engels, and Lenin. This ideology implied radical, frequently coercive actions 
aiming to overcome the perceived evils of capitalism and to foster the socialist 
system's survival. The doctrine of Leninism contained also the principle of 
'socialist internationalism', which in practice meant for the national states limited 
sovereignty and the obligation to pursue a strategy in policy-making that was 
entirely subordinated to Soviet interests. Thus, the countries of Eastern Europe 
were isolated from the outside world and their societies were being transformed 
into carbon copies of the Soviet model.
(2) The socialist states were ruled by a single, or at least a dominant, political 
party, the communist party, which governed all aspects of political, economic, 
and social life. The party apparatus penetrated all state institutions, as well as 
every executive and legislative body engaged in rule making; for every 
component in the hierarchy of state institutions there was an equivalent in the 
hierarchy of the party structure, directing the former. The resultant one-party rule 
showed little or no interest in the views and wishes that existed in the extra-party 
environment. Internally, the party was organized in a hyper-authoritarian 
fashion: each level in the party's hierarchy was entirely subordinated to the 
decisions of the level immediately above it. This practice gave the party elite 
control over other communists and, by extension, over all elements of society. 
The concentration of political power in the hands of a few top party officials 
excluded the majority of the population from political participation, requiring it to 
consent to policies it had had no part in formulating. The methods of rule were 
designed to avoiding any undesirable innovation and to guaranteeing maximum 
structural rigidity.
(3) The economy in the socialist states was almost entirely in public ownership, 
and production was typically organized through a central planning apparatus. 
Economic mechanisms for averting long-term recession and technical 
stagnation, however badly needed, were never developed. In the course of time, 
all East European economies degenerated into unproductive, non-competitive
69
machineries, attended by small groups of party bureaucrats. Bureaucratization 
of the economy transformed enterprises into bureaucratic institutions and the 
enterprising spirit into a crime. The policy of industrial buildup was directed 
towards the Soviet model of production by accenting extensive growth of the 
heavy and armament industries, and neglecting the service sector and the 
necessary equilibrium among various economic branches as well as ecological 
sustainability. Welfare policies were a standard part of the general 
developmental strategies, but given the poor performance of socialist 
economies few funds for social purposes remained available. As a 
consequence, and also because of the egalitarian considerations contained in 
Marxist ideology, systems of social welfare were considered primarily 
instruments for social standardization, rather than tools for full human 
emancipation.
(4) Socially, the Sovietization of Eastern Europe meant the destruction of the 
human bonds generally described as the civil society. The hypertrophic 
application of political principles (class origin, party membership) promoted 
fictitious merits, independent of individual skills. Political repression was 
sanctified and glorified as the means needed to preserve the socialist gains. A 
universal sense of powerlessness, suspicion, and hostility was maintained 
among the populace. The regime demanded servile obedience and conformity, 
levelled all forms of diversity, and thus undermined the foundations of societal 
dynamism. Its overall goal was to build and to conserve a passive, entirely 
controllable society, totally committed to the political program of the ruling elite. 
In summary, it is not an exaggeration to describe the introduction of Soviet-type 
socialism into Eastern Europe as 'a (socio-)ecological catastrophe' (Konopasek, 
1992: 257).
Generally speaking, during the pre-war era Eastern European countries had 
been, despite their great ethnic, social and economic heterogeneity, at a lower 
stage of development than Western Europe. At the end of World War II, the 
region was markedly poorer, more agricultural, and less industrialized than the 
West, with the possible exceptions of Czechoslovakia and East Germany which 
could have been ranked among the industrial countries by pre-war standards.28 
Between 1945 and the early 1950s, Eastern European societies experienced a 
period of turbulent socio-political adjustment during which the communist rulers
28 For more information on pre-war socio-demographic developments in the Eastern European 
countries, see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.
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came to power. The reconstruction from war and, above all, the creation of the 
political and economic foundations of Stalinist socialism were accompanied by 
changes in the system of legislation and social policies. Overall social conditions 
were favourable: liberation from the Nazi reign of terror created considerable 
sympathy for the Soviet Union and aroused the hope that its social system 
would be just and prosperous. However, contrary to what happened in post­
revolutionary Russia, previous legislation was not mechanically rejected, but 
rather the old schemes were step by step adapted. The experience of the Soviet 
Union, as the first avowedly socialist state, inevitably had a continuing influence 
in Eastern European countries.
At the beginning of the 1950s abortion laws included in penal codes in the 
majority of Eastern European countries were similar to the ones in pre­
revolutionary Russia (Zielinska, 1987). Differences were minor and concerned 
only the severity of sanctions and catalogues of mitigating and aggravating 
circumstances. These restrictive policies were inspired by the predominantly 
pronatalist elements of European culture, particularly by traditional religious and 
ethical arguments against abortion, and by the allegedly high health risks 
ascribed to it. Only in Poland, Romania, and to a certain degree in Yugoslavia 
were there slightly modernized penal codes of the late 1920s or early 1930s 
which decriminalized some abortions, such as those requested because of rape 
or incest (David, 1970). Although abortions were to a large extent legally 
prohibited, there is little doubt that resort to illegal abortion was not infrequent 
throughout the region. There is some evidence to suggest that the procedure 
became quite easily obtainable following World War II, as an informal response 
of medical professionals to wartime troubles (Gal, 1994). Unfortunately, no 
precise data are available to assess the demographic importance of abortion 
practices, and attempts to assess it by exploring secondary sources, such as 
the evidence on abortion-related mortality, have so far not produced convincing 
results.
Post-war social developments in Eastern Europe resulted in unprecedented 
changes in abortion legislation. In Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, legal avenues 
for induced abortion under medical indications had already been slightly 
broadened during 1950-53. Officially, the new rules for performing abortions did 
not go beyond the concept of therapeutic reasons for abortion, but their practical 
interpretation clearly inclined towards more broadly conceived socio-medical 
indications. In Hungary, existing prohibitions on abortion were enforced during
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1949-53, but from 1954 the newly established medical boards started to review 
requests for 'therapeutic' abortion considering medical as well as social grounds 
(Klinger, 1985). More radical changes in the legal regulation of abortion became 
apparent in Yugoslavia. The 1951 Penal Code of Yugoslavia provided for the 
non-responsibility of the woman terminating her own pregnancy or undergoing 
an unlawful abortion. It was the first legislation in socialist countries to adopt this 
principle before it was instituted in the USSR. Yugoslavia's Federal Act of 1952 
on abortions provided for both medical and socio-medical indications. The 
interruption of pregnancy was permitted up to the third month of gestation in 
cases of medical, eugenic, legal, ethical (rape, seduction, incest) and 'social' 
indications; the last category, however, was not defined. It was also specified 
that abortions could take place only in medical institutions upon approval by a 
commission composed of a gynaecologist, an internist and a social worker 
(Andolsek, 1988; Rasevic, 1990).
The developments of abortion legislation followed a rather different pattern in 
Albania and East Germany. Albania, in contrast to what was happening in other 
socialist countries, maintained a strictly enforced ban on abortion that allowed 
the termination of pregnancy only on narrowly defined medical grounds (David, 
1970). In the German eastern occupation zone, which later became East 
Germany, the Soviet Military Administration in its first few years implemented 
regional laws on abortion, replacing the previous restrictive Nazi legislation. In 
Brandenburg, Mecklenburg, Thueringen and Saxony such changes were made 
in 1947, in Upper Saxony in 1948 (Zielinska, 1987). The majority of those acts 
allowed abortions to be performed during the first three months of pregnancy for 
medical, juridical, eugenic and humanitarian reasons. As Tietze (1969) reported, 
unprecedented numbers of abortions were authorized following this legislation. 
As the political situation stabilized and economic conditions improved, efforts 
were made to reduce the number of abortions by means of medical 
propaganda. A reversal in legal regulation came in September 1950 when the 
'Law on Protection of Mother and Child', passed by the government of the newly 
established German Democratic Republic, restricted the grounds for abortion to 
medical indications to be determined by a special commission. As the official 
commentary explained, the legislation was primarily intended to increase the 
number of births (GDR, 1950; Schulz, 1971).
The years 1956-60 became the crucial period for the evolution of abortion 
legislation in Eastern Europe. In a relatively short time after the reform of Soviet
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abortion laws in December 1955, all of the socialist countries of Europe 
excepting East Germany and Albania enacted substantial changes in the form 
and substance of their socio-legal attitudes towards abortion. Poland and 
Bulgaria introduced a new law on abortion in April 1956, Hungary in June and 
Romania in September of that year; Czechoslovakia did the same in December 
1957, and Yugoslavia followed suit in February 1960. There seems to be little 
doubt that the 1955 Soviet decree set the pattern for the legislation in other 
European socialist countries: like the USSR, all six countries listed permitted 
legal abortion during the first trimester on easy and flexible grounds unless there 
were specific medical contraindications.
Abortion was not exempted from legal regulation, but the control was usually 
loose. Hence it is justifiable to affirm that Eastern European countries embarked 
in the late 1950s on a broadly 'permissive1 policy on abortion; the legitimacy of 
such labelling is readily apparent in the tone of the revised laws.29 However, 
within the overall pattern of easily available legal abortion, a good deal of 
variation existed between individual countries. Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Polish, 
and Yugoslav codes required that a woman present specific indications and that 
abortions were authorized by special commissions, but the criteria were not 
difficult to meet. The Romanian law, like that of the Soviet Union, simply did 
away with all legal requirements for the woman under 12 weeks of pregnancy 
and allowed her to go directly to an outpatient clinic. Hungary and Bulgaria 
required that women go to hospitals, and in Poland a woman was permitted to 
go to her family doctor or a private outpatient clinic. Second trimester abortions 
were allowed only on medical indications, except in Hungary where the limit for 
minors was 18 weeks. In all these countries, the ultimate decision on abortion 
rested with the doctor who was to perform the operation. In each, the 
acceptable indications for abortion were very broad, ranging from medical to 
socio-economic. Abortions done on request or on social indications had usually 
to be paid for by the applicant, but the charges requested covered only part of 
the cost of the operation and hospitalization, or were included in the health 
insurance systems, thus making abortion services generally cheap. In short, 
almost all the imaginable indications for abortion became acceptable in 
principle, and the corresponding conditions were in practice easy to meet. 
Contraindications to abortion were similar in all countries: a period of gestation 
in excess of twelve weeks, an induced abortion within the preceding six months,
29 For the complete wording of the national abortion laws, see Bulgaria (1956), Hungary (1956), 
Poland (1956), Czechoslovakia (1957), Romania (1957), Yugoslavia (1960).
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or acute or chronic pathology of the woman's reproductive system. Polish and 
Yugoslav abortion law explicitly required instruction in contraception when 
abortions were authorized, and the other abortion laws implicitly endorsed 
similar action.
Officially, not much was published about the reasons for passing the permissive 
laws beyond stressing the public health rationale and the importance of the 
measures to the improvement of equality between sexes. This is how a 
prominent Marxist writer put it in his essay on abortion policies in Eastern 
Europe:
Legal abortion was chosen as a measure of family planning because:
1. No highly effective contraceptives, acceptable to all classes of the 
population, were available.
2. It became necessary, for humanitarian reasons, to wage an intensive 
campaign against illegal abortion because of its danger to the health and 
life of women.
3. It was necessary for medical and psychological reasons to bring 
abortion, hitherto carried out by quacks, under medical supervision and 
treatment (Mehlan, 1970: 302).
Similar statements are not rare in the Eastern European demographic and 
sociological literature of that time. Using words reminiscent of the Soviet 
abortion decree of 1955, those who were explaining the new provisions argued 
that previous laws making abortion a criminal offence were outdated, unrealistic 
and, more importantly, unworthy of a socialist society. From what is known of 
those years, one gains the impression that the medically and socially justifiable 
support of easily accessible abortion merely received official recognition.
Little is known about the underlying policy process which resulted in the 
extraordinarily liberal legislation on abortion throughout Eastern Europe. Given 
the one-party rule one might even be inclined to deny to the socialist systems 
the very existence of anything that could properly be called a 'policy process'. 
During the early stages of the European communist regimes, most political 
decisions emerged as actions enforced from above: 'the ruling communist 
parties ... simply issued decisions which were then handed over for 
implementation to the various subordinate bureaucracies' (White et a!., 1987: 
174). Such decisions were binding in all matters of this kind, and they were held 
to reflect the influence of ideology or power politics within the leadership, but not 
of individuals or groups outside the leadership. To be sure, there was a complex 
'bureaucratic crypto-politics' (politics behind-the-doors) often involving a number
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of party and state bodies and sometimes adviser groups, but these institutions 
were staffed mainly by communist party members and there was no shortage of 
sanctions to make sure that they complied with the party's directives. This was 
the usual way in which policies were delivered, no matter what kind they were or 
what purpose they should serve.
Some Eastern European writers claimed that the passing of the new laws on 
abortion was preceded by 'considerable and passionate discussion in political, 
health, legal, and security spheres, as well as in mass organizations, factories, 
etc.' (Jerrie, 1958: 1). In a similar vein, Tietze (1981: 23) wrote that 'legalization 
of abortion for nonmedical reasons [in Czechoslovakia] was preceded by almost 
two years of public discussion'. However, the reliability of these appraisals is 
suspect. Heitlinger (1987) quoted a leading Czech doctor as saying that the 
'discussion' was limited to the canvassing of 'progressive' opinion by the party 
authorities among medical professionals who were known to be in favour of 
legalizing abortion; opponents were hardly allowed to express their views and 
their arguments were ignored. Similarly, Okolski (1988) wrote that in Poland, 
Catholics who opposed the liberalization were not free to speak in public. Thus, 
as in any dictatorship, the degree of political participation of the populace under 
European communist regimes was at the discretion of the power elite and its 
willingness to take outside voices into consideration. It seems safe to suppose 
that the relatively complex pattern of differing public opinions concerning 
abortion that exists in Western societies was suppressed, rather than simply 
absent, in Eastern European countries.
The liberalization of Eastern European abortion policies in the 1950s may also 
be interpreted as being fostered by the hard economic situations faced by 
populations still suffering from the effects of the war and subsequent socialist 
reconstruction. With the general liberalization of life in most of the Soviet bloc 
that took place in the mid-1950s, it became easier to admit that generally difficult 
living conditions existed in European socialist countries. Some communist 
politicians hit publicly upon the idea that if they had fewer citizens to cater for, 
the economic problems and the tasks of maintaining housing and food supplies 
would be much more manageable (typically, it was stressed that slowing down 
population growth should be only temporary). For example, Besemeres (1980: 
124) quotes W. Gomulka, then the chief of the Polish communist party, as 
saying in 1959:
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If capitalist England had the same natural increase as Poland does, its 
standard of living would be falling constantly... The natural increase of 
population prevailing in Poland at present is a serious obstacle to the 
growth of the nation's living standards.
Moreover, one should not underestimate the permanent influence of the policies 
of Moscow within the Eastern European political environment of that time. With 
the possible exception of the Yugoslav and Albanian leaders, all the European 
communist parties derived their origins, their claims to legitimacy, and thus their 
policy-making logic, directly from their subservience to the Soviet Union. In the 
monolithic political structure of Eastern Europe, dominated by the 'Big Brother' in 
the Kremlin, plans to reshape man, nature, and society could not be much more 
than an application of the Soviet archetype. It must also be remembered that in 
a communist political system, both the political centralism and the dependence 
on the Soviet Union tended to magnify the ideological significance of any issue. 
To borrow a fitting expression from Ulc (1974: 69), 'to the ideological mind 
anything [might have] become a matter of principle'. One may even hypothesize 
that the uncritical imitations of Soviet abortion law in most of the Soviet-bloc 
countries were not entirely a matter of blind loyalty but part of a shrewd 
Machiavellian calculation: they helped to narrow the countries' juridical and 
social diversities, thus making them more easily controllable by the tried Soviet- 
style rules. Unified laws on abortion, then, can be seen as justified like welfare 
benefits as much as instruments of social control. It may never be known to 
what extent those who implemented liberal policies on abortion anticipated and 
deliberately exploited the broader socio-political consequences of these 
measures. Nevertheless, there seems no reason to exclude such thinking as 
possible considerations of communist policy-makers of the late 1950s.
2.7 Eastern Europe, 1960-89: from monolith to polymorph
Between the beginning of the Khrushchev era in the mid-1950s and the fall of 
the Berlin Wall in 1989 the geo-political map of Eastern Europe did not change, 
but the contours of political relations and the colouring of social conditions in 
individual countries did not remain constant. What was euphemistically called 
the 'European socialist camp' certainly continued to exist, but as time passed 
the principles set in motion in Moscow were slowly eroded by the pragmatic 
necessities of everyday life in particular national states, by national cultures, and 
by the influence of international events. Especially after the defection of 
Yugoslavia (in the early 1950s) and Albania (in the early 1960s) from the Soviet
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alliance, the Soviet Union's policies became viewed more as exemplary acts 
that should be followed in the general sense rather than as concrete orders. 
Brzezinski (1967) calls this trend 'domesticism'. Moscow was still the pivot of the 
alliance system, but deviations from or revisions of Soviet guidance were 
permitted, on the condition that these acts did not seriously threaten the socialist 
order or alliance system, and hence the Soviet Union's perceived or real 
interests.30 In addition, beginning in the mid-1960s, the USSR became 
increasingly drawn into support for quasi-communist liberation movements in the 
developing countries (Szajkowski, 1982; Halliday, 1983). As a result, further 
socio-political incorporation of Eastern European countries into the Soviet 
sphere of influence became less central to Soviet policy-makers. However, it 
was not until the mid-1980s, at the point at which M. Gorbachev took over as 
leader of the Soviet Communist Party, that the Soviets left the countries of 
Eastern Europe to their own fate (Batt, 1991).
Between 1950 and 1965, Eastern European populations experienced a rapid 
transition from the upper to the lower end of the European fertility spectrum. As 
elsewhere in developed countries, the post-war years saw birth rates in general 
higher than those prevailing in the 1930s (Berent, 1970). Until the early 1950s 
most East European populations (including that of the Soviet Union) were 
characterized by relatively high crude birth rates (CBRs), broadly covering the 
range from 15 to 30, and even to 45 if Albania is taken into account (Figure 2.1). 
By the mid-1950s this equivalent of the Western post-war 'baby boom' had all 
but exhausted itself, and everywhere (except in East Germany) the secular 
trend towards fertility decline, which was apparent throughout the area before 
the war, had again set in. By the mid-1960s the CBRs in most Eastern 
European countries reached levels oscillating somewhat below those then 
prevailing in most of the industrially advanced Western Europe. However, the 
extent of the decline in CBRs was far from uniform among the countries of the 
region. On the whole, the falls were steeper for countries with higher fertility 
levels in the earlier years. As a consequence, inter-country fertility differentials 
tended to diminish with time. By the mid-1960s, CBRs varied within a range of 
13-20, except, of course, for the much higher levels in Romania after 1966 and 
in Albania. However complicated the issue of causation appeared, one thing
30 Thus, from the 1960s, Romania was able to get away with having more independent foreign 
policies, and Hungary was able to experiment with its own domestic reform program. On the other 
hand, the 1968 democratic reforms in Czechoslovakia and the 1980-81 experiments with political 
pluralism in Poland —  apparently seen as seriously threatening friendship and co-operation with 
the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and their common struggle against imperialism —  
were sharply criticized (Tismaneanu, 1992).
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Figure 2.1: Crude birth rates: Eastern European countries, 1948-90
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was clear: the decline was not just a statistical illusion caused, say, by war- 
induced changes in the age structures of Eastern European populations. It 
became obvious that social and economic factors such as industrialization, 
urbanization, increased participation of women in the labour force, increasing 
attractiveness of consumption models, endemic housing shortages, and new 
patterns of family planning behaviour had all played roles (McIntyre, 1972b; 
David and McIntyre, 1981 ).31
New demographic phenomena that emerged in Eastern Europe during the late 
1950s and 1960s precipitated a significant change in Marxist demographic 
thought.32 Right up to the Khrushchev era, Marxist demographers were almost 
exclusively in favour of rapid population growth and high birth rates. The 
relatively substantial post-war natural growth of Eastern European populations, 
due mostly to the compensation for war losses, provided the basis for the 
postulate of fast and unlimited population development under the socialist order. 
It was assumed that this was a manifestation of the so-called population law 
specific to socialism, and that speeding up the socialist reorganization of society 
would automatically lead to the solution of all social problems, including 
demographic ones. Hence, no need was perceived to control demographic 
developments, leaving these to spontaneous mechanisms of self-regulation. 
The question of whether this was the proper interpretation of Marx's indefinite 
position concerning the 'laws of population' was seldom debated. By the 1960s, 
however, more and more Marxist scholars dared to approach Marxism as an 
open concept, not a collection of sacrosanct and increasingly irrelevant 
formulae. Soon, the prevailing view became that Marx's 'laws' referred only to 
the employment of the population, not to demographic events as such, and that 
lower fertility was in fact a 'progressive' social achievement.33 In accord with this 
theoretical turnabout, it was argued that demographic processes require the 
formulation of specific laws based on objective and concrete research, not on an 
a priori theoretical stipulation. Moreover, the idea of 'law' itself came to be seen 
as dependent on human action. If there is a law of population in a socialist 
society, it was claimed, this must be translated into reality through conscious
31 Fertility change in Eastern European populations during 1950-90 is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3.
32 For more details on Marxist demographic thinking during this period, see Cook (1967), Brackett 
(1968), Guzevatyi (1970a,b), Urlanis (1970), Macura (1974, 1981), Kvasha (1981), Weber and 
Goodman (1981), Wynnyczuk (1981), VonFrank (1984), Lewis (1987).
33 Another element clearly involved was the belated recognition that developing countries on the 
whole preferred to receive assistance from the UN or elsewhere to keep down their populations, 
rather than to be reassured that they had no problems and that all they needed was to be on their 
guard against family planning programs (Besemeres, 1975).
79
effort. The correct Marxist position, then, is to purposefully control demographic 
processes. Quite naturally, population policy became viewed theoretically as an 
organic part of socio-economic policies, although in practice most socialist 
countries never officially adopted transparent national population policies or 
promulgated quantitative demographic goals.
As the East European communist regimes gradually and with different degrees 
of success withdrew from the role of miniature alter ego of the USSR, their 
national population policies began increasingly to reflect local social and 
demographic conditions. From regarding population developments with 
unconcern or untroubled confidence, the communist governments of Eastern 
Europe passed over to
attitudes ranging from active involvement, or at least the recognition that 
such involvement may become necessary in the near future, to a morbid 
preoccupation with how to reproduce, similar to that of the centipede 
who stopped to reflect on his ability to walk (Besemeres, 1975: 50).
Discussions of demographic trends were closely tied up with discussions of 
economic policy and strategy, in particular with questions of labour supply. More 
and more often it was argued that the permanent low level of fertility would 
result, in the long run, in unfavourable population conditions. Since the 
legalization of abortion in the late 1950s largely coincided with the fertility 
decline, the practice of abortion became one of the obvious explanations of the 
perceived demographic crisis. Consequently, most Eastern European countries 
altered their laws on abortion on one or more occasions, simultaneously 
resorting to a range of stimulatory measures to improve conditions for accepting 
childbearing and childrearing in families. But unlike the situation which prevailed 
in the 1950s, when population policy in Eastern Europe appeared to be largely 
dependent upon prior political developments in Moscow, countries of the region 
were now evolving broad-scale 'experimental' policies concerning population, 
many of which differed from the Soviet model.
With these generalities as a background, it seems useful to take a closer look at 
the East European countries one by one. In the discussion that follows, the 
countries are grouped according to the internal consistency which was 
evidenced by changes in abortion statutes during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. 
For the purposes of this analysis, and at the risk of some oversimplification, one 
may in this respect identify three groups of countries:
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(a) countries that consistently increased the legal availability of abortion 
(Yugoslavia, East Germany), or at least did not restrict abortion substantially 
(Poland);
(b) countries that introduced both restrictive and liberal changes concerning 
the legal availability of abortion (Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria);
(c) countries that legally banned abortion (Romania, Albania).
2.7.1 Yugoslavia
In Yugoslavia, the already permissive abortion system laid down by the law of 
1960 was further liberalized in April 1969 (Yugoslavia, 1969). The new policy 
measure reaffirmed the liberal attitude to abortion and provided that pregnancy 
could be interrupted on request on a variety of medical grounds (mental health, 
foetal abnormalities), in cases when it resulted from rape or incest, and also 
'when one can rightly expect that because of child birth a woman might be 
subjected to seriously disturbing physical, family, or material circumstances 
which cannot be changed in any other way1 (Simoneti et al., 1975: 676). The 
entire procedure of application and decision was to be reviewed and managed 
by special commissions, whose duty was also to advise women of the possible 
harmful after-effects of abortion and to inform them about available 
contraceptive methods. Abortions had to be performed in health establishments 
where the conditions were such as to ensure that the operation could be 
successfully carried out. Implementation of the 1969 Act, as well as the 
establishment of commissions and provision of necessary conditions in medical 
institutions, were the responsibility of republics and provinces of the Yugoslav 
federation that were to adopt specific laws, with each giving due regard to local 
conditions.
In 1974, Yugoslavia became the first country to proclaim in its Constitution that it 
is the individual's right to decide freely on family planning and that this right can 
be limited only for medical reasons (Yugoslavia, 1974). As a consequence, the 
right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy was codified during 1977-79 in a 
number of regional laws, in which the only restrictions, usually specifying the 
latest stage in pregnancy at which the abortion could be performed, stemmed 
from concern to protect women's health (Yugoslavia, 1979). Thus, specific 
measures were left to the discretion of regional authorities, reflecting an 
exceptional decentralization of policy-making among the socialist countries of
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Eastern Europe. As time passed, this practice resulted in considerable 
differences among federal units in the legal bases of family planning.34 
However, it is worth emphasizing that the right to family planning articulated in 
the 1974 Federal Constitution was interpreted almost exclusively as the right to 
abortion. Only Slovenia and Croatia implemented laws regulating other relevant 
medical procedures, such as sterilization and artificial insemination.
2.7.2 East Germany
East Germany did not participate in the 1955-60 wave of liberal alterations in 
abortion legislation and for several years pursued a restrictive policy on abortion 
based on the law of 1950. The reasons for such a strategy are a matter of 
speculation, but it seems likely that the prohibition of abortion was retained in 
order not to deepen the country's demographic decline: during the 1950s East 
Germany experienced heavy illegal outmigration of young people via West 
Berlin, a phenomenon which because of its extraordinary socio-political and 
demographic implications eventually led East German authorities to erect the 
Berlin Wall in 1961.35 Some writers (Callahan, 1970) point out that the strategy 
may also have been a response to negative experiences with liberal laws during 
1947-50 which apparently did not reduce the number of criminal abortions. One 
should also note that while in other socialist countries no consistent population 
policy was pursued, in East Germany demographic considerations were a focus 
of attention of the Party. The premises of socialist population policy were 
already formulated in the first Constitution of 1949, which in a strongly 
pronatalist fashion emphasized the need for improvement of the material 
conditions of families with children (Giersdorf, 1982; Zielinska, 1987).
Only in March 1965 was the 1950 abortion ban modified to again include 
juridical and socio-medical grounds similar to those promulgated on a temporary 
basis in 1947-48 (GDR, 1965; Kaser, 1976). Abortion was authorized when 
there existed a serious danger that the physical and mental health of the woman 
would be impaired by the pregnancy, delivery, or child care. Abortion, free and 
in hospitals, was permitted if authorized by a district commission (normally 
including a local medical officer, a gynaecologist, two other medical specialists 
and a representative of the local women's organization). Interestingly, the 1965
34 See Pervan (1986), Malacic (1990), Rasevic (1990), Stampar and Kapor-Stanulovic (1990), 
Avramov (1991).
35 Combs (1960) and Myers (1970) have estimated that between 1950 and 1957 East Germany 
suffered a net migratory loss of not less than 2 million, or some 11 per cent of its 1950 population. 
About 40 per cent of these migrant were between 14 and 24 years of age.
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regulation was originally issued by the Ministry of Health as a secret instruction 
to doctors of the public health service, and it was only through the protests of 
Protestant priests that it became known to the general public (Schulz, 1971).
During the early 1960s, East Germany became the first socialist country to 
introduce modern contraceptives (hormonal and intra-uterine methods), and in 
1969 it showed similar leadership by passing a law permitting the sterilization of 
women for contraceptive reasons (Neumann, 1990). It was after these 
developments that, in March 1972, the East German authorities approved what 
was then the most liberal abortion statute in Eastern Europe (GDR, 1972). The 
new law treated the woman's right to decide about termination of pregnancy as 
an indispensable element of her equality in the fields of professional life, 
marriage and family. In order to make it possible for a woman to decide on the 
number, time, and sequence of births she was granted, in addition to the 
existing contraception options, the absolute right to decide on the interruption of 
pregnancy within the first trimester. The pregnancy had to be terminated in a 
hospital and by a physician, and the usual sickness and insurance benefits were 
applicable. Only in cases where the pregnancy was more than 12 weeks 
advanced was the woman required to submit a request to a commission of 
medical specialists.
The result of the 1972 policy change was a significant and apparently 
unintended decline in birth rates (Figure 2.1). A few years later, the East 
German government attempted to counteract these unintended effects. In May 
1976, an explicitly pronatalist social policy package was introduced, containing, 
in particular, a prolongation of paid maternity leave (Buttner and Lutz, 1990). 
However, the 1972 abortion legislation remained in force in the years that 
followed and throughout the 1980s, without significant change.
Thus, in East Germany, as in Yugoslavia, the liberalization of abortion laws was 
undertaken for explicitly ideological reasons: the right to abortion was declared 
to be one of the fundamental civil rights and liberties. It was probably not 
coincidental that, within Eastern Europe, the Yugoslav and East German liberal 
abortion policies showed most traits of stability.
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2.7.3 Poland
In Poland, the abortion act adopted by the Parliament in April 1956 became the 
legal basis for policing induced abortion for more than 35 years. In practice, the 
law was interpreted according to instructions that were issued subsequently by 
the Polish Ministry of Health. According to the first of these instructions, 
implemented in May 1956, the final decision concerning each application for 
interruption of pregnancy was transferred to a local commission composed of 
physicians and social workers, and applicants had no right to appeal the 
commission's verdict in cases of refusal. In December 1959, more permissive 
instructions were issued according to which the only proof needed to obtain an 
abortion on social grounds was the applicant's request. Moreover, the physician 
was allowed to perform the abortion in a hospital, in an outpatient clinic, or in a 
private surgery (David and McIntyre, 1981). No gestational age was specified as 
a legal time limit, leaving the matter to the discretion of physicians. The new 
measure resulted in a fairly permissive interpretation of the abortion law: 
requests were often accepted orally, and whether the operation was actually 
performed became merely the doctor's responsibility (Holzer, 1991). At the same 
time, the government encouraged the formation of the Polish Family Planning 
Organization, facilitated the establishment of counselling centres and 
popularized the sale and use of contraceptives (Besemeres, 1980).
In the years 1972-75, the Polish government introduced several pronatalist 
measures, such as the provision of longer maternity leave and increased 
childbirth benefits, but no anti-abortion policies were introduced (Holzer and 
Wasilawska-Trenkner, 1985). A modification of administrative instructions 
concerning abortion was issued in December 1980 (Okolski, 1983, 1988). It 
introduced minor changes to the previous ordinance, the most important being 
the limitation of the right to perform operations to obstetricians and 
gynaecologists who passed national proficiency tests. That ordinance was 
followed by a letter from the Minister of Health encouraging physicians to resist 
pressure from pregnant women for abortion, especially in the case of a first 
pregnancy. However, its vague wording left leeway for differing interpretations. 
In 1981 a proposal reportedly announced by the Ministry of Health included a 
ban on outpatient clinic abortion and stated that the physician had the right to 
refuse to perform an abortion on moral grounds. These proposals, however, 
were not made operational under the communist regime, and in practice an oral
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Statement about a woman's bad living conditions continued to be a valid 
indication for abortion (Fuszara, 1991).
The Polish case may seem curious, as a majority of Poles are known to be 
Roman Catholics with strong attachments to the church. The Polish Catholic 
Church not only traditionally considered permissive abortion legislation morally 
harmful; it also acted as the main supporter of political opposition during the 
communist dictatorship, as well as as the guardian of moral values. Indeed, 
Polish Catholics had already initiated several waves of discussion about the 
abortion law during the 1960s and 1970s (Ziolkowski, 1974; Kaser, 1976). 
Particularly after the emergence of the Solidarity movement in 1980, the Polish 
clergy was able to exert a growing pressure on the government to restrict 
access to abortion (Fuszara, 1991). Simultaneously, through parish teaching 
and obligatory courses before marriage, the church took a more pedagogical 
approach in supporting anti-abortion attitudes among practising Polish Catholics 
(Okolski, 1988).
Some have argued that the religious views were not entirely opposite to those of 
the state, since both the Church and the Communist Party endorsed the official 
model of a modern woman combining the three roles of mother, worker and 
citizen (Mazur, 1980, 1981). Such interpretations seem to be to some degree 
refuted by frequent public statements against abortion made by Polish Catholic 
representatives (as quoted by Okolski, 1983) and, above all, by the well known 
views of the Polish-born Pope John Paul II, whose influence in Poland has been 
considerable. What seems a more plausible explanation is that, given the 
prevailing political circumstances in Poland before 1989, the most the church 
could do was to criticize the abortion law; in return, the approach in government 
circles was to tolerate the Catholic position towards abortion. It was only in 
September 1989, in a new political atmosphere, that the idea of changing the 
1956 abortion law was raised in the Polish Parliament by Catholic deputies 
(Mrugala, 1991). Consequently, in 1990 the Polish Ministry of Health introduced 
a restriction on access to abortion, requiring three independent opinions (two 
medical doctors and one psychologist) to authorize an abortion, and allowing 
physicians to refuse to perform procedures on non-medical grounds (Holzer, 
1991). More restrictive measures followed in 1992 and 1993.
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2.7.4 Czechoslovakia
As in the case of Poland, the Czechoslovak abortion act of 1957 remained in 
force for more than three decades. Its key phrase that permission for termination 
of pregnancy could be granted on medical grounds or for other reasons 
deserving special consideration was governed by a series of administrative 
changes subsequent to its introduction. The 'other reasons' were not specified in 
the 1957 legislation, but were established by the practice of the then operating 
medical abortion commissions to include a broad range of economic and social 
grounds. Moreover, abortions were performed free of charge and women could 
settle the necessary administrative procedures both at their places of residence 
and their places of work.
In 1962 Czechoslovakia became the first Eastern European country to restrict its 
hitherto permissive abortion system (Czechoslovakia, 1962). The new edict, 
effective from January 1, 1963, cited as 'other reasons' advanced age of the 
woman; three or more living children; disruption of the family; economic 
responsibility for the family falling mainly on the woman (including death or 
disability of the husband); a difficult situation of an unmarried woman; pregnancy 
due to rape or other offence; and the failure of prescribed contraceptives. 
Further novelties were a strict requirement to apply for abortion in the district of 
a woman's residence; and a modification of the composition of abortion 
commissions to comprise a gynaecologist, a social worker, and a deputy from 
the local administration. In addition, the edict required a more rigorous judgment 
of 'social' reasons in general and prescribed fees for abortions requested for 
non-medical reasons, the former provision applying particularly for younger 
women. In 1964 and 1966, other abortion regulations were issued, but these 
concerned largely the composition of the commissions, and did not change the 
principal features of the abortion policy (Koubek, 1984).
The 1962 amendment was further tightened by an order of the Ministry of 
Health, effective from June 1973 (Czechoslovakia, 1973; Vidlakova, 1975). 
Under the revised administrative guidelines, abortion commissions were 
instructed to deny approval to married women with no children or only one child, 
unless the applicant was over 40 years of age, or pregnant due to rape or other 
criminal act. As a contraindication to abortion, the requirement that the woman 
had not undergone an abortion in the past six months was extended to 12 
months, excepting women with at least four children. Although women were
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again allowed to apply both in their locality of domicile and in the locality of their 
job, the new regulation meant that considerable stress was put upon the 
process of obtaining permission for an abortion.
The stricter interpretation of the abortion law was introduced in the context of 
the extensive pronatalist policy initiatives taken during the period 1968-73. 
During those years, the Czechoslovak government instituted a range of material 
incentives to lessen the economic constraints confronting couples with 
children.36 The timing of these very popular measures was probably not just 
attributable to the demographic consciousness of the Czechoslovak regime. In 
the late 1960s, Czechoslovak society lived through the traumatic experience of 
political and economic reform, which was unexpectedly halted by an invasion of 
the Warsaw Pact armies in August 1968. In the months that followed, there were 
heavy purges in the media and in cultural life; thousands lost their jobs in a 
mass clearout of the reformist elements, and large numbers of people chose to 
leave the country.37 It can be argued that the then new political leadership, 
which was almost literally installed in power by the Soviet troops, needed to 
demonstrate its viability and receptivity to social issues. Engineering a rise in 
living standards by implementing generous population policy measures was an 
alluring option (Ales, 1992). Indeed, official propaganda often interpreted the 
increasing numbers of births during 1969-74 in a remarkably political vein: as 
evidence of public support for the truly socialist way of development in 
Czechoslovakia after the 1968 'period of the crisis' (Ulc, 1974).
In the 1980s there were further shifts in the Czechoslovak policy on abortion. 
The scholarly as well as the popular press was increasingly noting that the 
abortion commissions were very bureaucratic, and that the slowness of their 
decision-making often prevented the use of more cautious abortion techniques, 
particularly vacuum aspiration (Stloukal, 1989). The issue of abortion also came 
to be seen in a new light because of a series of psychological studies focusing 
on a group of Prague children who were born after their mothers' applications 
for abortion were denied.38 In September 1980, the prohibition on abortion in 
cases where the woman had already had an abortion within the last 12 months
36 For more details about this pronatalist package, see Pavlik and Wynnyczuk (1974), Heitlinger 
(1976), Frejka (1980), Koubek (1981, 1984, 1990), Pavlik (1985), Andrle and Srb (1991).
37 Recently, the numbers of those who 'illegally' (without official permission) left Czechoslovakia 
between 1961 and 1970 have been estimated at 148,000, of which probably over 100,000 
emigrated between mid-1968 and the end of 1970 (Shawcross, 1990; TERPLAN, 1992).
38 When compared to a control group of children bom from pregnancies at least neutrally 
accepted, these children exhibited a number of unfavourable deviations in their bio-psychological 
development (David eta/., 1988).
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was amended to six months (Czechoslovakia, 1980). In October 1986, the more 
liberal approach to abortion culminated in the promulgation of a new abortion 
law. Effective from January 1, 1987, the law abolished the abortion 
commissions, leaving the decision to be made almost exclusively with the 
woman and her doctor (Czechoslovakia, 1986). Only women who had had an 
abortion within the last six months were not to be granted permission, unless 
they had had two deliveries, were at least 35 years of age, or their pregnancy 
was the result of a rape. The regulation further required the consent of parents if 
the applicant was under 16 years of age. Abortions were generally permitted 
within the first 12 weeks of pregnancy, and only if the gestation was over 12 
weeks or if there were health contraindications did the law require the request to 
be reviewed by a medical committee. Simultaneously, the new law attempted to 
reduce the use of abortion by providing some contraception (not condoms) free 
of charge, and by charging a fee for non-therapeutic abortions performed after 
eight weeks' gestation. The new measure was presented to the public without 
any demographic comment, merely as an improvement on the problematic 
public health implications of the old regulation (Wynnyczuk, 1987).39
2.7.5 Hungary
According to the law of June 1956, every Hungarian woman who requested it 
could have her pregnancy interrupted without conditions until the twelfth week of 
gestation. This legal regulation on abortions was not changed for more than 17 
years, although in the late 1960s the government implemented a series of 
pronatalist measures.40 In October 1973, Hungarian authorities issued a 
decision that called for a revision of the system of approving abortions. Effective 
from January 1, 1974, abortions remained available on request only for single, 
divorced, separated, and widowed women during the first 12 weeks of 
pregnancy, and in the case of minors until 18 weeks (Hungary, 1973). Married 
women were entitled to abortion only under one of the following conditions: they 
were over 40 years old; had at least three living children or had had three or 
more confinements; or had two living children and had, in addition, undergone at
39 It is a bitter irony that the relaxation of the abortion law in 1986 was one of the very rare 
occasions when the repressive communist regime showed a liberal attitude to public issues. 
Otherwise, mainly in the areas of political and economic pluralism, Czechoslovakia of the late 
1980s was still going backward, while Hungary, Poland, East Germany and, most importantly, the 
Soviet Union were going forward (Sword, 1990).
40 The formerly very low family allowances were increased in 1965 and 1966. In 1967, childcare 
allowances which came into effect following the five months' maternity leave with full wage were 
introduced. These offered a benefit approximately equal to the minimum wage level to formerly 
employed mothers up to the child's third birthday (Andorka, 1993).
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least one 'obstetrical event', a category which included live births, stillbirths, 
ectopic pregnancies, and induced abortions (the latter considered only if taking 
place after the second confinement). Married women who did not meet these 
criteria might still request an abortion for medical, eugenic, juridical, and 'serious 
social reasons', including, for example, circumstances where the woman had no 
separate dwelling unit. Medical-lay commissions were introduced for granting 
authorizations in questionable or borderline cases. The fee for abortions 
performed for non-medical reasons was increased to cover actual costs, but 
could be waived in cases of demonstrated need.
In addition to promulgating these regulations on abortion, the Hungarian 
government introduced a range of comprehensive population policy measures 
(including higher family and childcare allowances) aimed at raising family size, 
lowering the number of induced abortions, and promoting more effective 
contraceptive practice by giving virtually every physician the right to prescribe 
contraceptive pills (Klinger, 1977; Kulcsar, 1984). The regulations were publicly 
justified as a response to the negative effects of abortion on the woman's 
health, and with statistics supposedly showing an increase of premature births 
to women who had had abortions. More broadly, a media campaign reasserted 
the rationale of national over individual interests and attacked the 'unhealthy' 
spirit of individualism (leading to birth control) as unacceptable in a socialist 
society. This policy change was perceived as so coercive that it precipitated a 
rare, and little-publicized, moment of overt resistance from groups of social 
scientists and students, who petitioned Parliament and collected signatures 
against the regulations until they were threatened with job loss (Gal, 1994). 
Nevertheless, the routinization and ultimate laxness of abortion committees, and 
women's growing sophistication about the system, meant that only a very small 
proportion of requests went ungranted (Szalai, 1988).
Apparently, the Hungarian authorities were not satisfied with the demographic 
results of the policies introduced in 1973. By the late 1970s a new long-term 
population policy objective was declared which was basically the same as that 
of a few years before: 'to moderate the process of population decrease, to stop 
it in the long run and, then, to achieve ... a population increase' (Klinger, 1991: 
222). A series of family-related policy measures was introduced between 1979 
and 1982, including substantial increases in family allowances (Andorka and 
Vukovich, 1985). In 1985, a new type of childcare allowance was introduced, 
offering a sick-pay type benefit to formerly employed mothers up to the child's
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second birthday (UN, 1989c; Andorka, 1993). However, the access to legal 
abortion remained unrestricted and was even slightly simplified by a set of 
provisions aimed at more speedy authorizations of abortions (Hungary, 1982, 
1986). As Kaposztaz and Monigl (1987) explained, this was because Hungarian 
decision-makers felt it more efficient to maintain the continuity of Hungarian 
demographic policies, and wanted to emphasize incentive, rather than coercive, 
principles in the new measures. This political stance notwithstanding, Hungarian 
demographers repeatedly argued that it was necessary to alter public attitudes 
toward abortion by appropriate means, since 'abortion should be considered a 
"last solution" and not a routine method of birth control1 (Klinger, 1988: 226). It 
was in this context that, in 1987, voluntary sterilization was legalized as a family 
planning method (Hungary, 1987). One year later, the obligation to consult a 
committee before aborting was abolished and abortion was made broadly 
available, particularly for women with two or more children, so that abortion 
became available more or less on demand (Hungary, 1988; Varkonyi, 1989; 
Meszaros, 1990).
2.7.6 Bulgaria
The legal instructions issued in Bulgaria in 1957 which made abortion easily 
available remained in force for ten years. In December 1967, the Bulgarian 
government decided to administratively restrict access to abortion, a move that 
complemented a set of policy measures to encourage fertility and increase 
national birth rates (Bulgaria, 1967, 1968; Stefanov and Naoumov, 1974). The 
new regulations, effective from January 1, 1968, increased family allowances 
and prohibited termination of pregnancy for childless women except in cases of 
serious medical indications or other cases approved by a committee consisting 
of three physicians. Unmarried women could have an abortion only if they were 
under age 16, had been victims of rape or incest, or had had serious social 
indications established by a woman's health centre, and if the pregnancy was of 
not more than 10 weeks' duration. If gestation was more than 10 weeks or the 
woman had aborted within the previous six months, abortion was only permitted 
on therapeutic grounds. Abortions continued to be available on request without 
committee approval for women aged over 45 or who already had three or more 
children. This legislation notwithstanding, the restrictions imposed in 1968 were 
not rigorously applied in practice; even women with one or two children could 
obtain abortions if they persisted in their requests after a committee had tried to 
dissuade them (David and McIntyre, 1981). Constraints on abortion were
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relaxed somewhat in 1970 when authority was given for interruption of 
pregnancy for all unmarried women and for married women with one child 
(Kaser, 1976).
A second return to a pronatalist policy was foreshadowed in April 1973 when the 
restrictions on abortion were again extended, denying childless women and 
women with only one child access to abortion (Bulgaria, 1973). Exceptions were 
made only in the case of rape or incest, if the woman was a minor or over 45 
years of age with at least one child, or for serious medical reasons. These 
provisions were relaxed in February 1974, permitting abortion if the woman was 
unmarried, regardless of parity (Bulgaria, 1974). The Bulgarian government, 
however, did not fully return to the abortion-on-request system that prevailed 
from 1956 to 1968. In summary, as Donkov (1991) pointed out, policy measures 
related to abortion in socialist Bulgaria were anything but consistent, shifting 
from a situation of full freedom (1956-68) to one of strict limitation (1968-73), 
and then (1974-90) to legislation that narrowed the limitations to a number of 
particular cases. A new abortion policy was implemented in February 1990 when 
the ministry of health issued a decree legalizing abortion on request for all 
women providing that gestation was not more than 12 weeks and the abortion 
did not pose a danger to the mother's health (UN, 1992b).
2.7.7 Romania
The Romanian experience with legal regulation of induced abortion represents a 
unique chapter in the history of population policy-making. According to the 
Decree of 1957, Romanian women were given the right to request and receive 
termination of an unwanted pregnancy without seeking prior approval of an 
abortion commission. Unlike the regulations in other East European countries, 
bureaucratic formalities related to the procedure, such as record keeping, were 
kept to a minimum (David and Wright, 1971). The fee for abortion was very low 
and the only requirement was that the pregnancy be of less than 12 weeks' 
duration (Teitelbaum, 1972). Thus, abortions became widely available at low 
cost and in a manner respecting the woman's privacy.
During the late 1950s and early 1960s the birth rate in Romania fell considerably 
(Figure 2.1). This decline was largely attributed to the liberal abortion law 
(Muresan and Copil, 1974). To remedy this situation, Decree No. 770 was 
introduced in September 1966 (Romania, 1966). This prohibited abortions
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except if the pregnancy endangered the life of the woman such that no other 
means of preserving it was available; if a hereditary disease was involved; if the 
pregnancy was the result of rape or incest; if the woman was 45 years of age or 
older; or if she had delivered and reared four children. Narrowly defined medical 
indications were included in the ensuing instruction for physicians, with 
discretion remaining only in the psychiatric area (Romania, 1966). 
Contraceptives were not mentioned in the anti-abortion law, but they were made 
largely unavailable by discontinuing their importation from abroad so that those 
who wanted them could obtain them only through illegal, black-market 
connections. The new policy on abortion was accompanied by a series of 
measures meant to encourage women to bear children and to reinforce the 
family; these included financial allowances for families, child support benefits, 
maternity leave, work protection for pregnant women, retirement benefits for 
parents with two or more children, and measures which made divorce much 
more difficult to obtain (David and McIntyre, 1981). Another pronatalist 
manoeuvre was the introduction of a tax which penalized all childless persons 
25 years of age or older, married or not (Trebici, 1975). The utter reversal in the 
national population policy came as a shock, as witnessed by the enormous 
increase in the 1967 birth rate (Berelson, 1979).
In subsequent years the Romanian regime of N. Ceausescu followed in its 
policies the spirit of the 1966 pronatalist legislation, to which it ultimately added 
coercive measures unparalleled elsewhere. In 1972, family allowance payments 
were raised once more and differentiated by family income levels (Muresan and 
Copil, 1974). The 1973 amendment of the abortion law enabled women over 
age 40 to get legal abortions, but the number of children constituting an 
indication for abortion still remained at four (Romania, 1973). However, by the 
late 1970s the Romanian birth rate had again declined to a low level, although 
there had been no 'antinatalist' law to which this could be ascribed as in 1966. 
Despite a steady deterioration in the material conditions of everyday life, 
pronatalist propaganda flourished in multiple domains, sex education was 
stepped up, mothers who bore many children were honoured as 'heroes of 
socialist labor', and multiple parenthood was declared a noble patriotic duty 
(Romania, 1984a: 19). Explicitly stated demographic objectives of that time were 
worded similarly to objectives in the sphere of production. In like manner they 
also reflected wishful thinking rather than serious analysis of the real situation.41
41 Among the official objectives was to raise the birth rate by about 40 per cent; to achieve a 
population of 25 million by 1990 and 30 million by 2000 (the actual 1980 figure was 22 million);
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In December 1985 another, even more stringent, law on abortion was passed 
according to which being aged over 40 and having four children were no longer 
sufficient grounds for abortion on request; to qualify for a legal abortion a 
woman had to be over 45 years old or have five living children under the age of 
18 (Romania, 1985). At the same time, the law formally banned all contraception 
and provided a number of provisions to punish both physician and woman for an 
illegal abortion. Thereafter, unlawful abortion was considered a grave 
transgression to be severely punished. For instance, the 1986 amnesty decree, 
which reduced sentences for most crimes, listed illegal abortion among the most 
serious, absolutely unforgivable crimes, alongside murder and armed robbery 
(Romania, 1986).
Ceausescu's rigid pursuit of pronatalism reached its climax in the 
implementation of an ordinance that required employed women to undergo 
three-monthly gynaecological examinations, and at the same time denied those 
who refused to obey their rights to dental and medical care, pensions, and 
social security (Romania, 1984b; Kligman, 1992). If a woman was discovered to 
be pregnant, her pregnancy was to be closely monitored. Regardless of the 
officially professed intention to eliminate elements that might negatively 
influence the development of pregnancy, these examinations subjected all 
women of childbearing age to arrogant control of their intimate lives, and 
practically turned their bodies into instruments to be used in the service of the 
state. This extremely heavy-handed form of anti-abortion policy was based not 
on considerations of maternal health or morals, but on concern over sluggish 
demographic growth combined with the perceived need to secure an adequate 
workforce to achieve economic independence from other nations. It is 
interesting to note that these measures were advanced at a time when the 
Romanian population was growing, not declining in size.
As Teitelbaum and Winter (1985) pointed out, Romania represented an extreme 
case of the generalized pronatalism which, from the mid-1960s, typified the 
Eastern European region. For policy-makers in other socialist countries, and 
indeed for the whole world, Romania's unsuccessful experience with the 
prohibition of abortion was a warning that banning abortion does not stop 
secular decline in birth rates. However, the gap between ideology and practice, 
that is, between the Ceausescu regime's official rhetoric and the horrendous
and to attain an annual population growth rate of 1 per cent and keep it over the indefinite future 
(during 1980-85 the growth rate was 0.5 per cent); see Zlatescu (1982), Romania (1984b).
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everyday life experience of ordinary Romanians, was not internationally 
recognized until the 1980s. It was only after the fall of the regime in 1989 that 
innumerable reports began to be filed about the political manipulation and 
resulting horrors of life in communist Romania.42 Immediately after the 
December 1989 revolution that overthrew Ceausescu, the new government 
removed restrictions on contraceptive use and legalized abortion (Romania, 
1989).
2.7.8 Albania
More than any other East European country, Albania defies reliable analysis. 
With a social structure that had not yet emerged from feudalism in 1945, with 
demographic patterns typical of a Third World country, peculiar relations with the 
rest of the world, and an unerring faith in an ideology that bizarrely combined 
Islam and Stalinism, Albania has been an anachronism in twentieth-century 
Europe (Marmullaku, 1975; Kirk, 1981). A number of abnormalities may be 
detected from the (very limited) available information on Albanian population 
policy. Contrary to the rest of Eastern Europe which was toying with liberal 
abortion laws, the Albanian communist regime always seemed to display an 
uncompromising anti-abortion attitude and to pursue a determinedly pronatalist 
policy. For many years, Albanian authorities continually affirmed their 
commitment to, and satisfaction with, the high national birth rate, and actively 
supported the bearing of numerous children and the rearing of large families. In 
1981, measures were taken 'in favour of mother and child1, including the 
extension of maternity leave and prohibiting the sale of oral contraceptives (UN, 
1987). Controls placed on internal migration succeeded in restricting the growth 
of the urban population, and thus probably helped to delay secular declines in 
fertility levels (Sivignon, 1983). In 1990, one of the country's top health officials 
wrote:
Albania is undergoing a dynamic population increase... The State 
implements a pronatalist demographic policy... Concentration on the 
family planning and health education policy is convincing people to 
increase the number of children they have, improve birth spacing, and 
preventing undesired pregnancies by adopting natural methods and 
freely using condoms, which are sold in pharmacies. Women are only 
allowed to use hormonal and mechanical contraceptives when there are 
medical indications. Legal abortion is permitted only for medical reasons 
and must always be approved by the medical commission of each
42 See Grigoriu-Serbanescu (1990), Puia and Hirtopeanu (1990), Hord et al. (1991), Kligman 
(1992).
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district. This family planning policy, which is linked to demographic trends 
and to the rate of socioeconomic development, has proved to be 
effective for Albania (Alia, 1990: 10).
In contrast to the legal situation in other socialist countries except Romania, the 
Albanian criminal code stipulated the punishment for an unlawful abortion to be 
re-education through work or imprisonment up to two years for the woman, and 
imprisonment for up to eight years for the abortionist (Albania, 1988). The 
Catholic church, which whilst forbidding artificial means of contraception 
provided counselling on fertility cycles, was outlawed in Albania in 1967 (Rich, 
1992). Apparently, abstinence was the only easily available method of limiting 
family size. Stubbornly independent in all things, the Albanian government did 
not alter its strictly prohibitive attitude to abortion until mid-1991, when the 
Ministry of Health issued a directive that made abortion available on request to 
couples, as well as at the request of a pregnant woman when the pregnancy 
was conceived outside of marriage (UN, 1992b; Dumani, 1993; Sahatci, 1993). 
However, by 1991 the official aim of the country's population policy still was to 
maintain the birth rate at its current level (UNFPA, 1991).
2.8 Conclusion
Abortion legislation has a controversial and varied history in the Eastern 
European countries. The development of the socialist governments' involvement 
in abortion policies should be viewed as a chain of related events which began 
in the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 and the Soviet Union's pioneer experience, 
inspired by the Marxist belief that the collectivity can demand that individual 
desires take second place to its priorities. From being a society that relied 
heavily on traditional arrangements, the people of the Russian Empire were 
thrust into the most radical social experiments up to that time. In the Bolshevik 
era, social policy was infused with egalitarianism and abortion was permitted for 
any reason. The Stalinist period, with its brutal economic determinism, brought a 
de-liberalization in social matters and made legal abortion very difficult. After 
Stalin, the law was relaxed, the availability of abortion improved, but the right to 
abortion was not glorified as a positive feature of the Soviet system and the 
official attitude to it remained ambiguous. Nonetheless, the restoration of the 
1920 abortion provisions in the mid-1950s was an early aspect of the de- 
Stalinization process, and shortly thereafter legislation similar to the new Soviet 
model was adopted by most Soviet-bloc governments. Like the Bolshevik 
reforms, these actions were inspired and given impetus and justification by an
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ideology adapted from abroad, drafted by bureaucratic and expert elites, and 
implemented rapidly on a sweeping scale.
After some years, abortion availability became widely seen as having played a 
direct causal role in the sharp decline in fertility. That interpretation, combined 
with a tendency to prefer more rapid population and labour force growth, 
suggested abortion restriction as a possible partial remedy. How the state 
should intervene in the personal lives of women as childbearers became a 
pressing policy problem for the European socialist states. Successive measures 
reflected different stances on the issue as the social priorities of particular 
regimes changed and differences among country-specific conditions became 
more palpable. As time passed, ideological vehemence was eschewed in favour 
of a pragmatic, if bureaucratic and highly authoritarian, approach. The upshot 
was a fairly large divergence between the official dogma (that children in a 
socialist society should be born as the result of a conscious decision by families 
who want them) and the actual reality. Thus, socialist population policies were 
not completely rational adaptations to practical needs. Totalitarian systems have 
no built-in feedback mechanisms to check the adequacy of introduced 
measures, and their course is typically marked by intermittent reversals from one 
extreme to the other. This characteristic of the system was no less manifest in 
socialist policies on abortion than in other policy spheres.
One could argue at length whether the laws relevant to abortion influenced 
demographic developments or reflected them. In all probability they did both. 
Similarly, one could emphasize either how far communist policy-makers came 
toward liberation, toward freedom of choice and equality, or how far they failed 
to go. Secularists and feminists may find communist policies on abortion, if not 
women's position in the society at large, to have been advanced and 
enlightened. However, it is worth noting that within the context of totalitarian 
socialism the right to abortion was scarcely ever an individual right, at least not 
in the Western sense. Rather, policies on reproduction were a part of the larger 
design of creating a fully manageable society; they were determined by the 
political elites in the context of a unitary social ideology and an authoritarian 
political system. The Eastern European mass public influenced abortion 
legislation by its behaviour, rather than by its articulated opinions.
A related point is that in the socialist states the concept of population policy was 
not humanitarian but essentially political. Consequently, in totalitarian conditions
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population policy became a direct instrument of social and political control over 
individual behaviour, indeed an instrument which could be employed by the 
regime for any purpose it saw fit. Thus, communist rulers on the one hand 
favoured restrictive abortion laws to moderate the demand for relevant health 
services or to induce the growth of the future working force, or on the other hand 
used permissive abortion policies as well as other 'social rights' to affect group 
psychology and to compensate for the absence of material welfare and political 
rights. For obvious reasons, the socialist policy-makers were often less than fully 
explicit about the political motives behind their policies. However, given the 
great brutality and suddenness of some of the measures that were taken, it 
would be naive to accept the repeated official claims that the principal purposes 
of legislation were philanthropic, irrespective of the direction of the shift. The 
history of Eastern European policies on abortion may be viewed as indicative of 
the character of the communist polity: by refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy 
of individual freedom in reproduction, the totalitarian state was able to extend its 
control more deeply into the minds and bodies of its citizens. Durkheim's words 
capture the essence of the attitudes that prevailed under those conditions:
Each in his sphere vaguely realizes the extreme limits set to his 
ambitions and aspires to nothing beyond. At least if he respects 
regulations and is docile to collective authority ... he feels that it is not 
well to ask more... The equilibrium of his happiness is secure because it 
is defined... (Dürkheim, 1968 [1897]: 250).
A more general lesson from the Eastern European experience with abortion 
legislation is that demographic policies are seldom free of ideological and 
political influence. Ethical, religious, and humanitarian considerations, though 
they play an important role in discussions about population policy, do not make 
this type of policy essentially different from others. In any form of public policy 
one can detect the consistent element of state control for state ends. In 
authoritarian political settings, population engineering tends to be used to foster 
economic stability, to eliminate the possibility of social rebellion, and to secure 
the durability of ruling elites. This perception might well be added to van de 
Kaa's (1978) list of the most fundamental objectives of governmental policies 
mentioned in the introduction to this chapter.
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Chapter 3: FERTILITY IN EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, 1950-90
3.1 Introduction
The number of abortions that take place in a society mirrors how people live. 
When a woman elects to have an abortion, the decision reflects her personal 
attitude and disposition as well as the specific features of culture, traditions, and 
societal and institutional arrangements that characterize the community where 
she is living. The connections between the patterns of abortion in a particular 
social setting and the broader characteristics of that setting can be analysed in a 
variety of ways.
Demography has a strong tradition of viewing abortion as an essential 
component of the process of population reproduction. This approach has a 
number of advantages. First of all, it makes it possible to examine abortion by 
means of tried analytical techniques which are conceptually close to those used 
in the study of other demographic phenomena. Another, and perhaps more 
important reason, is that there appears to be a relationship between trends in 
abortion and the evolution of fertility patterns in a population. 1 There is reason to 
believe, therefore, that the role abortion has played in Eastern Europe's 
demographic history cannot be satisfactorily understood without placing it more 
generally in the context of trends in reproductive behaviour.
This chapter examines the main features of post-World War II fertility change in 
Eastern European countries. Its main limitations should be stated explicitly. First, 
no comprehensive description of Eastern European fertility trends is offered: the 
focus is on problems, rather than on full demographic histories of specific 
countries. Second, the range of the problems discussed is limited both by the 
general design of this study and by the nature of the area selected. A number of 
characteristics make the former socialist Eastern Europe of special interest as a 
demographic test-tube for students of social change. One is the population's 
diversity: the European socialist bloc lacked many things, but was rich in ethnic, 
cultural, and economic heterogeneity. The potential usefulness of such 
heterogeneity in aiding demographic research is obvious, although it is equally 
clear that a concern for differences should not obscure the similarities. 
Furthermore, this potential can be realized because a substantial amount of
1 For examples, see Muramatsu (1960), Requena (1968), van der Tak (1974), Omran (1976), 
Blayo (1991a,b).
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Statistical data is available for the countries of Eastern Europe, and most of 
these data are relatively easy to compare.
The national, historical, and cultural heritages played an important role in 
shaping demographic trends in post-war Eastern Europe; therefore this chapter 
begins with the past and a brief characterization of demographic developments 
before 1950. This is followed by a description of major changes in fertility levels 
and patterns observed between 1950 and 1990. Not all aspects of fertility are of 
interest here. A few principal dimensions of change over time suffice to define a 
fertility regime for present purposes: quantum, age pattern, and variation in 
these, are the principal characteristics used.
3.2 Demographic developments before 1950
During most of the period for which there are reasonably reliable statistical data, 
the level of fertility was relatively high in Eastern Europe compared to other 
developed countries. David (1970) argued that there was little 'family planning' in 
Eastern European populations until the second half of the nineteenth century. In 
what were in those days East Prussia and Austria-Hungary (later East Germany, 
the Czech Republic, and Hungary), the modern decline in marital fertility began 
about 1870; that is, some 80 years later than in France, Switzerland, and 
Belgium (Coale and Watkins, 1986). The decline was slow in starting and its first 
stage was related to a decline in the proportion of married persons in the total 
population. As marriages were progressively postponed, women were exposed 
to the risk of conception in marriage for shorter periods, and the numbers of 
births decreased. The second stage accompanied the Industrial Revolution, 
when marital fertility began to decline as a result of birth regulation. However, it 
was only after 1900 that the decline in birth rates reached the most outlying 
parts of Europe's South and East. It is difficult to state precisely when the 
decline began in individual countries, as the birth rate fluctuated from year to 
year, and the registration of births was unreliable. According to Pavlik (1991b) 
and Chesnais (1992), it is nonetheless possible to say that the demographic 
transition did not begin until about 1900 in Slovakia, between 1910 and 1920 in 
Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and the USSR, and 1960 in Albania.
Generally, the later the decline in fertility started, the less important was the 
influence of changes in nuptiality. Because changes in fertility behaviour evolved 
similarly in areas which shared a common language (or dialect) and cultural
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history, the process by which family limitation spread throughout Europe has 
been to a significant degree one of geographic diffusion. However, as Cleland 
and Wilson (1987) pointed out, it is not completely clear what exactly was being 
diffused: was it a knowledge about, or the actual availability of, the means of 
fertility limitation; or a change in the perceived value of children; or a shift from 
fatalism to conscious decision making; or some combination of these? The 
means used to bring fertility under control are not known in any precise sense, 
but they undoubtedly included the age-old practices of coitus interruptus, 
abstinence, and abortion, as well as various 'folk' contraceptives. Mechanical 
devices available in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were 
mostly deemed impractical and inconvenient (Himes, 1970 [1936]). Thus, it is 
hard to avoid the conclusion that the decreases in fertility levels resulted not 
from a qualitative change in demographic behaviour but rather from ‘quantitative 
changes in the frequency, dissemination, and techniques of old practices in 
response to new conditions of life' (Revelle, 1968: 354).
Why fertility declined in such a historically unprecedented, sustained, and 
apparently irreversible fashion has occupied demographers for more than half a 
century. But 'the chemistry of the agent that made people prefer smaller families 
remains elusive' (Demeny, 1968: 520; italics in original). The single most 
comprehensive generalization posits that as secularization and modernization 
proceeded, individuals increasingly began to perceive low fertility as 
advantageous and belonging to the realm of the 'calculus of conscious choice' 
(Coale, 1973: 65). One key reason for this seems to have been change in the 
economic and social aspirations of people; other important factors were the 
shifts in literacy and education levels, urbanization, industrialization, and 
changes in the status of women; all of these may be summarized under the 
general rubric of 'modernization'. However, given that the fertility declines in 
particular countries started under a variety of socio-economic conditions, it 
seems that the roles of particular factors of 'modernization' were facilitating and 
permissive, rather than decisive (Mason, 1992). Perhaps the only factor that the 
European countries had in common was that declines in fertility occurred in the 
face of official disapproval, in the absence of modern methods of contraception, 
and without much influence of any form of mass media.
People exercise fertility control so as to ensure that the number of children born 
to them conforms to their preferences concerning timing of pregnancies and size 
of family. As the determinants of these preferences differed considerably
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between particular European countries, a great deal of regional variation in 
levels of 'low' fertility resulted. In the period 1920-50, Europe showed large 
demographic contrasts (Table 3.1). In most of its North and West, the crude birth 
rate (CBR) had already dropped below 20 births per 1000 population by the 
1920s, the only significant exception being the Netherlands. In the Balkans, 
Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and the Iberian Peninsula, CBRs were clearly 
declining, but remained higher than 20 as late as 1940. Indeed, well into the 
period 1930-35 some of these countries experienced CBRs close to 30, a level 
suggested by Habakkuk (1971) as typical of pre-industrial Europe or, in other 
words, of the early phases of demographic transition.
The CBR is of course a very superficial indicator of overall fertility, since it is also 
influenced by changes in the age and sex composition of the population. But the 
observations made on the basis of CBRs are consistent with other evidence 
and, in particular, with the existence of specific modes of family formation in 
Eastern Europe. These are known to have been typical because of the 
persistence of very early and virtually universal marriage (Table 3.2), identified 
by Hajnal (1965) as the 'Eastern European pattern' of nuptiality.2 This distinctive 
pattern of marriage arose mainly from particular cultural, economic, and 
historical conditions experienced by Eastern European populations (Sklar, 1974; 
McIntyre, 1980). In the Balkan region, where low levels of economic 
development prevailed along with the practice of arranged marriages, girls 
married young. The preference for early marriage lay in the closeness of the 
nuclear family to the kinship group, quite common in countries like Romania or 
Yugoslavia, and is assumed to have been inherited both from years of Turkish 
Muslim rule and from the pattern of landholding and the practice of inheritance. 
In East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and certain parts of 
Russia, family and church control over marriage was less constraining, and 
nuclear families were economically more independent, thus making couples less 
likely to marry young under family pressure; consequently, these countries 
demonstrated nearly Western European marriage patterns.
2 Hajnal (1965: 101) observed that the European demographic pattern 'pervaded the whole of 
Europe except for the eastern and south-eastern portion', and suggested that if a line were drawn 
connecting Trieste and St. Petersburg almost all of the area falling west of that line would be 
found to have exhibited the Western marriage and fertility patterns. This grand geographic 
dichotomy can scarcely be expected to hold in all specific cases, but the extensive Princeton 
study of the history of demographic transition in Europe came to generally supportive conclusions 
(Coale and Watkins, 1986).
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Table 3.2: Proportions never married at selected ages in some European
populations around 1930
Region and 
country
Year Males Females
20-24 45-49 20-24 45-49
Eastern European countries
Albania no information
Bulgaria 1934 56.0 2.7 34.5 1.4
Czechoslovakia 1930 88.0 6.0 61.9 9.8
Hungary 1930 81.1 5.4 51.6 6.3
Poland 1931 83.0 4.2 61.0 7.1
Yugoslavia 1931 60.5 4.9 35.0 4.7
USSR 1926 51.0 2.5 27.7 3.6
Selected other European countries
France 1936 56.1a 9.5b 35.4a 12.6b
Germany 1933 90.0 6.0 74.0 12.0
Greece 1928 82.9 7.4 55.8 3.8
Italy 1936 91.0 9.7 69.3 13.9
Netherlands 1930 89.6 11.0 75.4 15.3
Norway 1930 93.5 14.9 81.3 22.6
Spain 1940 93.5 9.2 78.6 13.7
Sweden 1935 93.8 16.7 78.3 23.1
United Kingdom0 1931 86.3 11.5 74.5 17.3
Note: a - age group 20-29; b - age group 40-49; c - not including Northern Ireland. 
Sources: Glass (1968), UN (1992c), Ilyina (1994).
Furthermore, data in Table 3.1 indicate that Eastern European populations were 
generally less educated, more agrarian, and less urbanized than their 
counterparts in the West and North of the continent.3 One consequence arising 
from these dissimilarities in demographic patterns was different dynamics of 
population growth in particular countries. Between 1920 and 1940, the total 
populations of most Eastern European countries increased by 25-35 per cent 
(considerably smaller increases were recorded only in Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary), while in Western and Northern Europe growth as a rule did not 
exceed 15 per cent (the exception was the Netherlands). Although mortality and 
migration also played roles, there is little doubt that this diversity in population 
growth rates was primarily the result of the differences in fertility levels and 
trends (Kuczynski, 1931; Kirk, 1946; Combs, 1960). Moreover, the higher 
mortality in pre-war Eastern Europe probably meant that its fertility played an 
even greater role in overall demographic developments.
3 These differences may to some extent be a reflection of the weaknesses in pre-war social 
statistics in certain Eastern European countries, particularly in the Balkans and the USSR (Kirk, 
1946; Jackson, 1985).
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In summary, in the period 1920-30 Europe consisted of two principal groups of 
countries: one constituting a demographically progressive 'centre' in Western 
and Northern Europe; the other forming a 'periphery' which was lagging well 
behind in the transition to low fertility: Eastern Europe including the Balkans, the 
Soviet Union, and the Iberian Peninsula. Only capitalistically mature 
Czechoslovakia and semi-industrial Hungary (along with, of course, highly 
developed Germany) did not fit this somewhat simplistic typology, their socio­
demographic conditions being in many respects closer to the more advanced 
countries in the West than to their neighbours in the East and South. But even 
Czechoslovakia was demographically heterogeneous; while its western 
provinces (Bohemia and Moravia) were advanced, Slovakia and Ruthenia were 
backward (Fialova, Pavlik, and Veres, 1990).
The more-or-less orderly demographic development in Eastern Europe during 
the 1920s and 1930s was completely disrupted by World War II. Each of the 
countries experienced in some measure the catastrophes of battles and 
invasions. The demographic consequences of these events were extraordinary. 
Between 1938 and 1945, population transfers, war-related mortality, and the 
deaths of politically and 'racially' persecuted civilians, particularly Jews, in the 
territories occupied by the Nazis were the predominant forces influencing 
population change. The number of deaths in Eastern Europe (not including the 
USSR) was two-and-one-half times as great per capita as in the other European 
countries involved in the war (Frumkin, 1951). On the whole, nations allied with 
Germany or incorporated into the Reich suffered less, at least until the final 
phase of the war. Birth rates in East Germany, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, 
and the USSR decreased sharply during the war (Myers, 1970; Andreev et al., 
1994). In Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary some disturbances in trends of 
the birth rate occurred, but these amounted to only minor departures from 
'normal' pre-war tendencies (UN, 1958a; Scott, 1965). This can be explained by 
the fact that, in these countries, armies were disbanded, the numbers of 
individuals directly involved in military action were relatively small, and war- 
induced disruptions of families were less severe. In the territory of 
Czechoslovakia, the CBR even increased (to levels comparable to those of 
1925-29), partly as compensation for very low fertility during the economic 
depression of the 1930s, and partly owing to political conditions which favoured 
marriages; married people were more likely to be exempted from compulsory 
work in the German Reich (Srb, 1993).
104
Following 1945, international migration, both voluntary and forced, broke out on 
a mammoth scale to become the major factor in Eastern Europe's demographic 
development during the early post-war years. The biggest migratory movement 
resulted from the expulsion to Germany of several million ethnic Germans from 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. The transfers were carried out partly as 
unplanned deportations, and partly as organized evacuations, prepared in line 
with the provisions of the Potsdam Conference of August 1945 (Schechtman, 
1962). In the Russian-occupied zone of the German Reich, which in 1949 
became East Germany, the influx of migrants apparently more than offset war- 
related population losses (Table 3.3).
Table 3.3: Estimated populations of Eastern European countries,
selected years 1938-50
Country3 1938 1940 1945 1950
Albania 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2
Bulgaria 6.6 6.3 6.9 7.2
Czechoslovakia 14.4 14.7 14.2 12.3
East Germ any 16.5 16.8 17.9 18.4
Hungary 9.1 9.3 9.0 9.3
Poland 31.8 32.1 25.0 24.6
Romania 15.5 15.9 15.7 16.2
Yugoslavia 15.8 15.8 15.3 16.2
Eastern Europe w ithout USSR 110.7 112.0 105.4 105.4
USSR 165.5 192.6 170.5b 178.2
Notes: a - figures are in millions and relate to the January 1 populations residing within the 
post-war boundaries, b - 1946.
Sources: Scott (1965), Mitchell (1975), UN (1991a, 1992c), Andreev et al. (1994).
Territorial changes made during 1939-47 also had a significant impact on 
demographic processes in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union annexed Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania, and took over large provinces from German East Prussia, 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania (Lorimer, 1946). The borders of Poland 
were redrawn and shifted westwards as a consequence of cession to the Soviet 
Union of the eastern one-third of the pre-war lands, and the acquisition of most 
East Prussian and some other ex-German territories in the Oder-Neisse area. 
East Germany was carved entirely from the former German Reich. 
Czechoslovakia gained from Hungary a small district called Bratislava 
Bridgehead; Bulgaria acquired from Romania the region of southern Dobrudja; 
and Yugoslavia seized from Italy a few Adriatic islands (Frumkin, 1951; Sword, 
1990). Thus, part of the post-war demographic developments taking place in 
Eastern Europe, including a sharp increase in the ethnic homogeneity of
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national states, came from a reshuffling of population groups. Population figures 
for particular countries over the years 1938-50, which reflect all of the above 
components of change, are given in Table 3.3. The total population of Eastern 
Europe (without taking into account the USSR) did not alter between 1945 and 
1950, although several countries registered sharp changes. It is interesting that 
it was during this period of great social instability that the communist 
dictatorships were established in the region under the influence of the Soviet 
Union.
In common with countries of Northern and Western Europe and some other 
developed societies of European origin, after World War II there was a rise in 
the birth rate in many countries of Eastern Europe. In 1950, the birth rates in 
Albania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia were above 1940 
levels; while Bulgaria, Romania, the USSR, and in all probability also East 
Germany experienced declines (Table 3.1). However, after 1950 or 1951, period 
levels of fertility in each of these countries began to fall, and except for short­
term rises in several countries, continued to fall until the mid-1960s.
3.3 Fertility trends and patterns, 1950-90
3.3.1 Trends in overall period fertility
While the demographic picture in the years immediately following World War II 
was dominated by international migration, the most important factor affecting 
population developments in Eastern Europe after 1950 was the changes in 
procreative behaviour. Figure 3.1 presents trends in total fertility rates (TFRs).4 
A general decline in the rates is the most obvious impression one gets from the 
figure.
At the beginning of the post-war period, TFRs in Eastern European countries 
were very dissimilar, as individual countries were at different stages of 
demographic development. In the 1950s and early 1960s, Eastern Europe 
showed relatively moderate, short-lived increases in fertility levels, in contrast to 
the large-scale 'baby boom' experienced by most Western countries between 
the late 1940s and early 1960s. Over this period, European socialist countries 
went through their demographic transitions at accelerated rates by historical
4 For a tabular presentation of TFRs in Eastern European countries during 1950-90 see Table 
A3.1 in the Appendix.
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Figure 3.1: Total fertility rates 
Eastern European countries (excluding Albania), 1950-90
Bulgaria
Poland
' Romania
Yugoslavia
t  2.6
Year
East Germany
------ Hungary
* USSR
Yugoslavia
C 2.6
Year
Sources: UN (1977, 1992d, 1993b), Blayo (1987, 1991), Vishnevsky (1988), Dishnica 
and Galanxhi (1991), Ely (1991), Festy (1991), Meksi and laquinta (1991), 
Lutz and Scherbov (1994).
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Standards. The years 1950-65, in particular, were characterized by considerable 
declines in TFRs, as well as by reductions in total numbers of births and also 
substantial changes in the timing of reproduction. In countries with the highest 
fertility levels in 1950, the decline was more rapid and thus produced a strong 
'catch-up' effect. Albania, Poland, and Yugoslavia tended to have the highest 
regional TFRs throughout the 1950s and early 1960s, while Hungary and 
Bulgaria had the lowest. With the late 1960s, temporary upswings in fertility 
appeared, although they did not develop into a lasting phenomenon in any 
country, except possibly Albania. By 1970, the region had one of the lowest 
fertility rates in the world (UN, 1976). Fertility changes occurring in Eastern 
Europe during the period 1970-90 were less dramatic, but they were unique in 
that they brought overall fertility to levels lower than ever previously experienced 
in the region. Towards the late 1970s a certain homogeneity in fertility levels 
emerged within Eastern Europe, but in the 1980s there was again a divergence 
of period fertility trends. However, regardless of the fertility level around 1950 
and the timing and tempo of reductions in individual countries, period TFRs 
recorded in the region in 1990 were relatively low, and, with the exception of 
Albania, the USSR and Poland, below 2.0.5
Nevertheless, as Figure 3.1 shows, the pattern of decline of fertility in Eastern 
Europe was not simple. Indeed, it is arguable whether there was a common 
regional pattern of fertility change. Individual countries show fairly divergent 
trends in their fertility levels and little synchronization with each other in the pace 
of change. This is partly a result of variant regional reproductive norms and 
partly a result of the short-term effects of population policy measures 
implemented in particular countries. Omitting some short-term variation in the 
levels of fertility, and ignoring Albania, for which there are not enough data 
available, one may nevertheless distinguish four types of settings in which 
fertility developments showed certain similarities:
(a) Yugoslavia is the only country in Eastern Europe where the downward trend 
in the TFR over the period in question was generally smooth and consistent.
5 Demographic developments which characterized the situation in Eastern Europe, perhaps apart 
from East Germany, during the 1970s and the 1980s, have largely separated the East from the 
rest of Europe as well as from other countries that have completed their fertility transitions. By the 
late 1980s, all developed countries with the exception of Albania fell into the low-fertility category 
(TFR<2.5). In most of the industrialized world, however, the TFR was well below 2.0, ranging from 
1.3 in Italy to 2.1 in New Zealand and Ireland (UN, 1990b, 1992d; Monnier and Rychtarikova, 
1991). Thus, even those Eastern European countries that were already below the 2.0 level still 
had somewhat higher fertility than other developed countries.
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Between 1950 and 1990, Yugoslavia experienced a virtually uninterrupted 
decline in the TFR from 3.7 to 1.8.6
(b) Bulgaria and Poland may be classified as countries in which the decline in 
fertility levels persisted during most of the post-war period, but in which some 
significant departures from this trend nevertheless occurred. During 1950-67 
Bulgaria registered a fairly uniform decline in its TFR from 2.9 to 2.0. In the 
period 1967-74 the TFR oscillated between 2.0 and 2.3, but later the secular 
decrease was reasserted and by 1990 the TFR was 1.7. Poland recorded a 
rapid fall in its TFR from 3.7 to 2.2 in the period 1950-69; yet in the following 14 
years the TFR fluctuated around 2.3, and the fertility decline resumed only after 
1983.
(c) In Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and the USSR the post-war 
fertility decline not only fluctuated but in some years virtually reversed. 
Czechoslovakia experienced such a change between 1968 and 1974, when its 
TFR increased from 2.0 to 2.5. East Germany recorded slight increases in its 
TFR during 1958-64, but a true turn came between 1975 and 1980 when the 
TFR jumped from 1.6 to 2.0. In Hungary, one major increase occurred between 
1951 and 1954 when the TFR rose from 2.5 to 3.0; and a similar change took 
place between 1962 and 1975 when it increased from 1.8 to 2.4. In the USSR, 
the TFR dropped during the period 1954-80 from 2.9 to 2.2; but between 1980 
and 1987 there was an increase to 2.5. The downward trend reappeared only 
after 1987.7
(d) Romania followed by far the most aberrant track. It began with one of the 
highest fertilities, befitting one of Europe's least developed societies, which 
during the 1950s and early 1960s spontaneously declined to very low levels. 
This provoked, from 1966, the harshest pronatalist population policy in modern 
demographic history. Between 1966 and 1967, Romania's TFR increased from 
1.9 to 3.7; that is, by more than 90 per cent. After 1967, the level of Romanian 
fertility resumed its long-term decline, although it was twice interrupted by short­
lived increases in 1973-74 and 1983-86.
6 However, the overall figures mask differences in fertility developments within the country, 
particularly contrasts between the more developed provinces in the north and the rather backward 
areas in the south. According to Avramov (1991), during the period 1985-90 TFRs ranged from 
1.7 in Croatia, Slovenia, and Voivodina, 1.8 in Bosnia-Hercegovina, 2.0 in Montenegro and 2.2 in 
Macedonia and Serbia to 4.0 in Kosovo, which has a large Albanian minority.
7 However, the figures for the Soviet Union as a whole obscure inter-ethnic and inter-regional 
fertility differentials of great magnitude. Soviet data for 1990 show that the TFR in the USSR 
varied from 1.9 in Ukraine to 5.1 in Tajikistan (Lutz and Scherbov, 1994).
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One way to summarize these rather dissimilar patterns of fertility decline in 
Eastern Europe is to subject the series of TFRs displayed in Figure 3.1 to linear 
regression analysis. The goal of this type of analysis is to find for each country 
the straight line that best fits the observed trend in the TFR.8 Table 3.4 shows 
the results of applying regression analysis to the series of total fertility rates for 
individual Eastern European countries. The values of R2 and adjusted R2 show 
variation from country to country in the degree to which trends in the TFR during 
the period 1950-90 can be approximated by a regression line. Regression lines 
give fairly adequate approximations of fertility trends in Yugoslavia, Poland, East 
Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, where they are capable of 'explaining1 
65 per cent or more of the variance in the TFR during 1950-90. Not surprisingly, 
Albanian data can also be quite effectively approximated with a straight line, 
partly because there are only a few observations available for the period in 
question. When applied to the USSR, Hungary, and Romania, linear regression 
captures comparatively low proportions (50 per cent or less) of variance in the 
TFR, and thus the regression lines do not provide adequate statistical 
descriptions of fertility change in these countries during the post-war decades.
Table 3.4: Summary statistics for linear regression analyses of trends in 
TFR in Eastern European countries, 1950-90
Country N Slope of 
regression line R2
Statistics of fit: 
adj. R2 t-stat. P
Albania 16 -0.109 88.9 88.1 10.6 <.001
Bulgaria 41 -0.014 66.2 65.3 8.7 <.001
Czechoslovakia 41 -0.023 70.3 69.5 9.6 <.001
East Germany 41 -0.024 73.3 72.6 10.3 <.001
Hungary 41 -0.018 46.8 45.4 5.9 <.001
Poland 41 -0.041 75.7 75.1 11.0 <.001
Romania 41 -0.016 17.9 15.8 2.9 <.005
Yugoslavia 41 -0.038 89.5 89.2 18.2 <.001
USSR 35 -0.012 52.1 50.6 6.0 <.001
Sources: see Figure 3.1.
Graphical presentation of regression lines (Figure 3.2) highlights similarities 
between certain countries. From this simplified perspective, it appears that the 
fertility declines in Poland and Yugoslavia proceeded in an analogous fashion:
8 The required least squares regression line should correspond to the equation approximated TFR 
= B0 + B1 x (year of observation), where is the slope of regression line and B0 is its intercept. 
To show how adequate the regression line is for approximating the relationship between TFR and 
calendar time in a given set of data, two coefficients of determination (R2 and adjusted R2) can be 
calculated. For details about linear regression analysis see Greene (1991).
110
both started from relatively high levels and had a rather fast average tempo. For 
Czechoslovakia and East Germany, the slopes of the regression lines indicate 
moderate intensities of fertility decline. The trend lines estimated for the 
remaining countries have much gentler slopes. The USSR and Bulgaria appear 
to have experienced the lowest overall declines in the TFR over the period in 
question.
Figure 3.2: Regression lines for total fertility rates 
Eastern European countries (excluding Albania), 1950-90
Bulgaria
Poland
3.2 - • ■ Romania
5J 3.0 -
Yugoslavia
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E  2.6 -
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------- Hungary
* • USSRÜ 3.0 -
Yugoslavia
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Sources: see Figure 3.1.
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3.3.2 Age-specific period fertility
The TFR is a period summary measure of the level of childbearing. It may be 
interpreted as the average number of live-born children a hypothetical cohort of 
women would have during their childbearing years if they were subject to the 
age-specific fertility rates (ASFRs) observed in a given period. The same level of 
TFR may, however, result from different age-specific patterns of fertility. 
Demographers usually distinguish between patterns of late childbearing and 
early childbearing, although a wider range of possibilities is conceivable. With 
some simplification, it might be said that the pattern of late childbearing, which 
corresponds to a convex curve of ASFRs at the older ages, is typical for 
populations which practise little fertility control, whereas an early age pattern of 
fertility, with a pronounced peak at the younger childbearing ages and fertility 
declining sharply thereafter, is characteristic of controlled fertility. In any case, a 
particular distribution of ASFRs can be seen as the outcome of a number of 
biological and cultural factors. The most important are: fecundability and 
exposure to the risk of conception; age at marriage; duration of marriage; 
incidence of marriage dissolution; number of children desired; length of birth 
intervals; and number of children already born and surviving in families.
Figure 3.3 shows the ASFRs recorded in Eastern European countries in 
selected years 1950-90.9 The figures demonstrate that the general decline of 
fertility during this period was associated with significant shifts in the relative 
frequency of childbearing in particular age groups. With the exception of 
Albania, all countries were characterized by consistent and rather large fertility 
declines among women aged 30 and over, indicating that reductions in later 
marital fertility played a major role in the overall trend. Among other things, this 
resulted in a marked concentration of childbearing at younger ages. The data 
also are evidence that shifts in the timing of fertility differed not only over time 
but also between countries. These changes and differences can be summarized 
in terms of two characteristics: the age group at which the age-specific fertility 
rate was at a maximum, and the degree of concentration of fertility with respect 
to woman's age.
9 For a tabular presentation of ASFRs for Eastern European countries see Table A3.2 in the 
Appendix.
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Figure 3.3: Age-specific fertility rates for Eastern European countries,
selected years 1950-90
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Figure 3.3 (cont.) 
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Figure 3.3 (cont.) 
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Sources: Teitelbaum (1972), UN (1977, 1992d), Vishnevsky (1988), Ely (1991), Meksi and 
laquinta (1991).
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Table 3.5 gives a simple classification of Eastern European countries with 
respect to the timing of reproduction, based on the relative contributions made 
to the TFR by women in age groups 20-24 and 25-29. Three major types of age 
pattern with respect to the peak age of fertility are distinguished: an early-peak 
type in which the maximum fertility occurs in the age group 20-24 years, a late- 
peak type in which the maximum is in the age group 25-29 years, and a broad- 
peak type in which the age-specific fertility rates for women 20-24 and 25-29 
years of age differ only slightly, while greatly exceeding the rates for younger 
and older age groups.10 Albania stands out as a population with a strong and 
persistent tradition of late childbearing. On the other hand, Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria and Romania seem to have an 
uninterrupted history of early fertility from the beginning of the period studied. 
Yugoslavia, Poland, and the USSR had the broad-peak or late-peak type of 
fertility during the 1950s and early 1960s, before shifting to the early-peak type 
by about 1965. Thus, by the late 1960s, a sharp and remarkably well-defined 
early-peak age pattern was characteristic in all of Eastern Europe, except 
Albania. As the 1970s began, the proportion of the TFR accounted for by the 
age group 20-24 alone varied in individual countries from 30 to about 40 per 
cent. Thereafter, the contribution of this age group to the overall level of fertility 
continued to increase, reaching and often greatly exceeding 40 per cent. One 
consequence of this early pattern of childbearing was that, despite the ongoing 
changes in overall fertility levels, increasing proportions of women in Eastern 
Europe completed their fertility before age 30. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
fertility rates in the age group 20-24 declined in several countries of the region, 
but they remained high by European standards. By the late 1980s, the country 
with the lowest ASFR in that age group in Eastern Europe was East Germany, 
with 145.6 live births per 1,000 women in 1988; but this still appears high when 
compared with other low-fertility countries. At that time, fertility rates in the age 
group 20-24 for other European countries rarely reached 100 per 1,000, and 
generally ranged from 60 to 90 per 1,000 (UN, 1992d).
In the other age groups, varying fertility levels were observed during the period 
1950-90 (Figure 3.3). In the age group 15-19, fertility remained relatively stable 
in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia; it fluctuated in 
East Germany, with increases between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s, and in 
Bulgaria and the USSR, with increases during the 1980s; and consistently
10 This classification is commonly used in United Nations studies (UN, 1965, 1992d).
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decreased in Albania. At the older ages, declines were quite substantial. In East 
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria the fertility of older women 
sharply decreased during the 1950s, and already by about 1960 had become 
very low after age 40 and negligible after age 45. In Poland, Romania, 
Yugoslavia, and the USSR, higher levels of fertility among older women 
persisted somewhat longer; but beginning with the mid-1970s, the ASFRs for 
women over 40 years of age dropped to very low levels, less than 10 per 1,000, 
even in these countries. Albania was the only Eastern European country which 
during the post-war years recorded exceptionally high, though decreasing, levels 
of fertility among women over 40 years of age.
In addition to the ASFRs, indicators of the degree of concentration of fertility 
according to age may also be used to compare fertility change in individual 
Eastern European countries. Formally, the measures of concentration of fertility 
are identical with those commonly used to describe relative concentrations of 
quantitative phenomena in geography or economics. A well-tried way to 
graphically represent concentration is the Lorenz curve. This device was 
originally proposed to measure inequality of income, but has been recognized to 
have wider applicability in demography as well. It has been used, for example, 
for analysing population concentration (Duncan, 1957), summarizing the 
distribution of the practice of contraception among specific groups within a 
population (Ghanma, Rider and Sirageldin, 1984), and measuring the relative 
concentration of fertility along various demographic dimensions, such as age, 
marital duration, or historical time (Lutz, 1987, 1989).
In its classical version, the Lorenz curve gives a complete picture of the 
relationship between cumulated proportions of 'producing units' and 'output 
units'. This can easily be applied to fertility, as age groups may be seen as 
'producing units' and the proportions in which the corresponding ASFRs 
contribute to the level of the TFR as 'output units'. The necessary operations to 
prepare the data for this type of analysis are: (1) to array age groups in order of 
increasing ASFR; (2) to calculate cumulative proportions in which individual age 
groups contribute to the total length of the reproductive life span (Xj) and, at the 
same time, to the observed level of the TFR (Yj); and (3) to construct the Lorenz 
curve by plotting the cumulated proportions of reproductive life span (Xj) against 
the corresponding cumulated proportions of TFR (Yj). In some instances it 
seems desirable to have the concentration represented by a curve not only 
given graphically but also expressed by a single quantitative indicator of
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concentration. Perhaps the best-known indicator of this kind is Gini's 
concentration ratio (CR) that can be computed using the formula:11
CR = I Xj Yi+1 -  I Xi+1 Yj (3.1)
The Lorenz curve would follow the diagonal of the XjYj graph if all five-year age 
groups had equal levels of fertility, and would be reverse L-shaped coinciding 
with the X-axis if, in a highly hypothetical case, all fertility was concentrated in 
one age group. The extent of concentration is indicated graphically by the 
degree to which the curve departs from the diagonal, and is expressed 
mathematically by the value of the concentration ratio. The concentration ratio 
measures the ratio between the area on the graph contained between the curve 
and the diagonal and the entire area of the triangle below the diagonal. In 
theory, it can vary between 0, on the line of perfect equality, and 1, on the 
reverse L-shaped lines of perfect inequality. However, the upper limit of the ratio 
depends on the number of producing units taken into account. When women's 
reproductive life span is considered as consisting of seven five-year age groups 
(15-19, .... 45-49), each representing 14.3 per cent of the potentially fertile life 
span 15-49, the maximum possible value of the concentration ratio is 0.857. 
This corresponds to a situation in which all fertility is produced by one five-year 
age group. For ease of interpretation, Gini's concentration ratio can be divided 
by this upper limit to produce what might be called the adjusted Gini ratio, one 
which has a range from 0 to 1.
Adjusted Gini ratios for fertility in Eastern European countries, based on 
quinquennial fertility rates observed during the years 1950-90, are given in 
Table 3.6. For the period 1950-80, the figures show trends towards the 
concentration of fertility into narrower age ranges. The 1980s are then 
characterized by stabilization of the concentration indicators at relatively high 
levels in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland; and by 
comparatively low and still increasing concentration ratios for Albania, Romania, 
Yugoslavia, and the USSR. In nearly all years for which the necessary data are 
available, the extent of age concentration of fertility, as expressed by the 
concentration ratio, is highest in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany. 
Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and the USSR usually have somewhat lower 
concentration ratios. Hungary is a borderline case: up to the early 1970s it was 
among the countries with a higher concentration of fertility, but in later years it
11 For a broader discussion of the concentration ratio, see Duncan (1957).
119
Table 3.6: Adjusted Gini ratios for fertility rates with respect to age 
Eastern European countries, selected years 1950-90
Country ______________ Adjusted Gini ratios (x 1,000):
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Albania 352 327 309 329 439 514 565
Bulgaria 559 607 625 643 657 674 665 665
Czechoslovakia 510 547 609 614 637 641 667 673 672
East Germany 544 555 566 576 596 667 690 681 683
Hungary 503 523 578 611 610 603 628 632 633
Poland 471 488 530 568 574 588 612 611 612
Romania 490 524 551 533 561 604 618
Yugoslavia 448 486 511 535 543 556 581 596 603
USSR 479 494 522 536 559 590 599 596
Note: Data refer to the indicated year or to the closest available date; see Table A3.2. 
Sources: see Figure 3.3.
joined the low-concentration group of countries. Albania is an outlier, with very 
low concentration ratios, particularly during the period 1950-70.
The difference between the age concentration of fertility in Albania in 1960 and 
East Germany in 1980 is contrasted in Figure 3.4a. These two concentration 
curves correspond to the lowest and highest degrees of concentration detected 
for Eastern Europe. The diagram demonstrates that the two fertility regimes are 
quite uneven: in the then pre-modern population of Albania the concentration 
cun/e is comparatively close to the diagonal, whereas in the much more 
developed East Germany of 1980 it is substantially further from the diagonal, 
implying that a relatively small fraction of the potentially fertile period accounts 
for a large fraction of the total fertility rate observed (Figure 3.4b).
Calculations presented above also make it possible to examine the relationship 
between the overall level of fertility and the degree of concentration of fertility 
with respect to age. The data for Eastern Europe reveal a negative association. 
It seems that, at least during most of the period for which the analysis was 
made, lower concentrations of births by age were associated with higher overall 
levels of fertility (Figure 3.5). This finding is not very surprising. It is well known 
that the process of fertility decline tends disproportionately to eliminate births at 
older ages in particular. Thus, in a population that controls fertility and has 
essentially completed its demographic transition a higher age concentration may 
be expected, than in a population where demographic transition is still in
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Figure 3.4: Lorenz curves for the age concentration of fertility (a), and 
relative contributions made to the total fertility rate by women in individual 
age groups (b): Albania, 1960, and East Germany, 1980
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Sources: UN (1977, 1992d).
process. As fertility decline proceeds, and becomes tied up with later marriage 
and greater female education, the very young ages are also disproportionately 
affected after a time. The introduction of birth control into a fertility regime
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Figure 3.5: Association between total fertility rate and adjusted Gini
concentration ratio
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likewise tends to increase the concentration of childbearing in a more narrow 
age range.
As far as Eastern Europe in the period 1950-90 is concerned, the statistical 
association between the concentration ratio and the total fertility rate is quite 
strong. The coefficient of linear correlation for these two variables is -0.875, 
which is highly statistically significant (p<0.001) and means that 77 per cent of 
the variance in observed TFRs can be statistically attributed to the variance in 
the concentration ratio. When Albania, with its very high TFRs and low 
concentration ratios, is removed from the analysis, the coefficient of linear 
correlation decreases to -0.812; but this still suggests that about two-thirds of
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the variance in TFRs is statistically attributable to the variance in concentration 
of fertility by age.
However, findings published by Lutz (1989) indicate that the negative 
association between the overall level of fertility and the degree of concentration 
of reproduction holds only until a certain stage of the demographic transition 
process. In post-transition societies, where birth control is almost universal and 
highly efficient, it is the distribution of desired family sizes in the population that 
determines the concentration of fertility with respect to age. 'And since the 
distribution of family sizes desired is generally rather even in modern societies', 
writes Lutz (1989: 193), 'this tends to result in lower concentration if desire and 
reality are not too far apart'. It may be hypothesized that by about 1980 such an 
approximation of actual family sizes to desired family sizes had eventuated 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and the USSR, 
because after this date the previously consistent increases in the concentration 
of fertility practically ended in these countries (Table 3.6).
3.3.3 Cohort fertility
It is well known that levels of period fertility tend to fluctuate under the influence 
of historical events and conditions, in consequence of changes in the timing of 
births of particular parities. The question arises of what effect such shifts in the 
timing of births have on the fertility of particular birth cohorts. Completed fertility, 
which is the total fertility rate of a birth cohort, is thus important for assessing 
long-term changes in fertility behaviour. Unfortunately, information on completed 
fertility cannot be accurately obtained for a cohort until all women in the cohort 
have reached the end of their reproductive period. Hence, calculation of the 
completed fertility of more recent generations requires some estimation, which is 
usually based on ASFRs in the most recent year for which data are available.
Table 3.7 shows that in most Eastern European countries, cohort fertility 
declined substantially for the generations born from 1930 to 1945 and fluctuated 
thereafter. This means that the female cohorts most affected by the decline 
were those which reached age 20, the age which marks the beginning of highest 
fertility, between 1950 and 1965. In Bulgaria, East Germany and Hungary the 
1930 cohort already had fairly low completed fertility of about 2.1. Romania 
deviates sharply from the general pattern as the data for 1935, 1940, and 1945 
cohorts show a consistent increase when compared with the 1930 generation.
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Table 3.7: Estimated completed fertility in Eastern European countries 
(excluding Albania), 1930-60 birth cohorts
Country Birth cohort:
1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960
Bulgaria 2.08 2.07 2.09 2.08 2.09 2.03
Czechoslovakia 2.37 2.33 2.27 2.12 2.17 2.13 2.09
East Germ any 2.12 2.12 1.98 1.86 1.79 1.83 1.86
Hungary 2.07 1.97 1.91 1.89 1.94 1.93 1.98
Poland 2.83 2.60 2.42 2.25 2.20 2.19
Romania 2.29 2.34 2.44 2.49 2.43 2.34
Yugoslavia 2.59 2.43 2.40 2.31 2.16 2.11 2.05
USSR3 2.00b 1.93c 2.01d 2.06
Notes: a - cumulative cohort fertility up to age 35, b - cohort 1941, c - cohort 1946, d - cohort 
1951.
Sources: Festy (1991), Anichkin and Vishnevsky (1994).
As regards the fertility behaviour of the generations born after 1945, who 
reached 20 years of age in 1965 and later, several types of development may 
be distinguished. In Bulgaria, East Germany, and Hungary, the post-1945 
generations appear to have experienced completed fertility of between 1.8 and 
2.1. In Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Yugoslavia, the cohorts born after 1945 
generally had higher levels of completed fertility, between 2.1 and 2.3, although 
the data show some reductions in completed fertility for more recent 
generations. Romanian cohorts born after 1945 experienced a gradual decrease 
in their completed fertility, but the levels recorded for individual cohorts were all 
substantially higher than in other Eastern European countries for which data are 
available. Comparable data on cohort fertility are lacking for Albania and are 
deficient for the Soviet Union. However, it has been estimated that in the USSR 
completed fertility was about 2.2 in nearly all cohorts born between 1941 and 
1951 (Lutz and Scherbov, 1994).
3.4 Conclusion
A firm first conclusion that can be drawn from the preceding analysis is that the 
course of fertility in Eastern Europe during 1950-90 varied among the countries 
of the region. The timing of changes in period fertility levels differed greatly 
among these countries, and the directions of these changes were far from 
uniform: there were consistent decreases in a few, temporary increases in 
others, and short-term periods of relative stability in many. The changes that 
were taking place were evidently related to past population developments in the
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various countries, as well as to the different reproductive behaviour of cohorts 
that had their beginnings at different historical periods.
The post-war fertility trends in Eastern Europe may be viewed partly as a 
continuation of the secular trend towards low fertility. During the decade of the 
1950s the general trend was one of a decline, and by the early 1960s period 
fertility levels had reached very low levels in a number of countries of the area. 
By the mid-1960s, Eastern Europe as a whole had assumed what might be 
called leadership in the worldwide fertility decline. However, during the late 
1960s and early 1970s dramatic increases emerged in a number of countries, 
resulting in fertility levels that resembled those of the early or mid-1950s. Since 
the late 1970s, changes in fertility levels have been smoother; a declining trend 
prevailed again in most Eastern European countries, and the period TFRs 
recorded by the late 1980s were generally lower than ever previously 
experienced in the region.
In a sense, the analysis presented in this chapter raises more questions than it 
answers. The first and somewhat elementary question is: 'What factors may 
account for the rather complex, irregular, and regionally uneven decline in 
Eastern European fertility during the period 1950-90 ?'. Chapter 4 examines this 
problem in the light of the demographic and other evidence available.
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Chapter 4: DETERMINANTS OF REPRODUCTIVE BEHAVIOUR
IN EASTERN EUROPE
4.1 Introduction
For decades, demographers and sociologists have focused attention on fertility 
change in various countries. Specialists in different social sciences have 
advocated numerous theories and analytical frameworks, some of which 
contradict each other. The conceptual framework used in this chapter is that 
pioneered by Davis and Blake (1956) and further developed by Bongaarts 
(1978, 1982). In this model, fertility levels and fertility change are viewed as 
being determined by three broadly defined categories of factors: societal factors; 
social norms; and intermediate variables that directly affect fertility.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the socio-economic, political, cultural, 
and behavioural factors that may account for changes in reproductive behaviour 
in Eastern Europe during the period 1950-90. Because this overview pertains to 
countries which provide varying historical and cultural contexts and covers 
several decades, generalization necessarily neglects specific situations which 
are exceptions. The aggregate approach is used despite obvious differences in 
fertility levels and tempos of change. These differences complicate the analysis 
at a cross-country level, and therefore it would be presumptuous to suggest that 
the arguments presented here constitute a definitive view. However, any 
recognition of contrasts among the formerly socialist countries of Europe cannot 
deny profound similarities, especially in ideology and long-term social 
processes. Indeed, it was precisely because of this reality that these countries 
were seen as a part of the Soviet bloc.
The review covers six themes, chosen on the pragmatic ground that they have 
been found in earlier investigations to embrace powerful correlates of 
reproductive behaviour: socio-economic trends; welfare policies; role and status 
of women; marriage and divorce patterns; family size preferences; and 
contraceptive use.1 The available statistics on relevant social and demographic 
trends are presented, a compilation of interest in itself since the countries 
concerned were often in the past unwilling to publish social data.
1 Abortion is discussed separately in Chapter 5.
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4.2 Socio-economic factors
During the years 1945-89, Eastern European societies experienced a long and 
extremely difficult period of establishment, consolidation, reform, and gradual 
decay of communist rule. Over the first years post-war (roughly from 1945 to 
1956), the new communist governments of this region established the 
institutions and policies of Soviet-style socialism. This was a time of very rapid 
change: the Eastern European states achieved in a few years what had taken 
three decades to accomplish in the Soviet Union after 1917. This was possible 
because the new regimes had a ready-made model based on the Soviet 
experience, which they simply implemented, making no allowance for a society's 
individual characteristics. The socio-economic policies of the new regimes had 
elements that were both benevolent and oppressive. On the one hand, the 
governments introduced measures that were often well received: subsidized 
housing, health care, education, and guaranteed employment. On the other 
hand, these generous policies were accompanied by restrictions on independent 
political and economic organizations, elimination of freedom of expression, and 
increasingly powerful secret police forces.
Economically, each of the Eastern European states pursued the twin policies of 
rapid industrialization and collectivization of agriculture. As in the Soviet Union, 
emphasis was placed on heavy industry (metallurgy, machine tools, 
engineering, petrochemicals) at the expense of light industry and consumer 
goods. The economy could be steered in this direction because of increasing 
state ownership in all spheres of production, and because of strict, state- 
controlled central economic planning. Moreover, prices were fixed by 
government agencies, and labour markets were restrained by narrow, centrally 
administered wage structures as well as by the virtual prohibition of dismissals. 
Collectivization of agriculture also followed the Soviet pattern, although the 
process was not nearly as brutal as in the Soviet Union during the late 1920s 
and early 1930s. Pressure to join the socialized farms was both physical and 
financial, and there was heavy resistance from private farmers that often led to 
arrests or deportations. Nevertheless, by the early 1960s, most farmland in 
Eastern Europe was in the socialist sector.2 Remaining private activities in 
agriculture, as in industry and the service sector, were marginalized. In most
2 The only exceptions were Poland and Yugoslavia where, owing to the active opposition of the 
peasantry, collectivization broke down and the private holding of farmland remained the dominant 
feature.
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countries, housing was the major private asset other than monetary savings, 
although private rental of housing was illegal.
From the end of World War II to the 1960s, all of the Eastern European states 
experienced rapid social transformation. Perhaps the biggest social change was 
the rapid 'proletarianization' (the formation of a mass of wage-dependent 
labourers directly subordinated to the state-dominated economies), which 
accompanied the urbanization and industrialization of these countries. Among 
the consequences of these changes was a decline in the percentage of people 
living and working in the countryside. From 1950 to 1970, all countries except 
Albania were transformed from largely rural, agricultural societies to industrial, 
urban ones (Tables 4.1 and 4.2).3 Urbanization then continued through the 
1970s and 1980s, but at a somewhat slower pace.
Table 4.1: Percentage of population in urban areas in Eastern European 
countries, selected years 1950-90
Country 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Albania 20.3 30.6 31.8 33.8 35.7
Bulgaria 25.6 38.6 51.8 61.2 67.7
Czechoslovakia 37.4 46.9 55.2 67.5 77.1
East Germany 70.8 72.3 73.7 76.2 77.2
Hungary 39.3 42.6 48.5 57.0 64.3
Poland 38.7 47.9 52.3 58.1 61.8
Romania 25.5 34.2 41.8 49.1 53.7
Yugoslavia 22.0 27.9 34.8 45.3 56.1
USSR 39.3 48.8 56.7 63.0 65.8
Sources: UN (1991a, 1993b).
Table 4.2: Percentage of labour force engaged in agriculture and forestry 
in Eastern European countries, selected years 1950-90
Country 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Albania 85.0 71.3 62.0 55.6 48.4
Bulgaria 73.0 56.5 42.2 18.1 12.2
Czechoslovakia 37.1 24.4a 16.4 13.1 12.3d
East Germany 24.0 17.6 12.4 10.6 8.1
Hungary 49.0 38.4 25.4 18.6 11.5
Poland 56.0 47.7 35.8 28.5 20.8
Romania 74.0 64.5 51.9 30.5 20.2
Yugoslavia 70.0 57.3a 43.0b 30.6C 21.7
USSR 42.1 31.9 20.0 13.0
Notes: a - 1961, b -1971 , c - 1981, d -1991.
Sources: FAO (1992), TERPLAN (1992), UN (1992c).
3 However, it is proper to mention that there was a great deal of change in the administrative 
status of cities (especially capitals) during the post-war period, parallel to the general social 
reorganization of Eastern European countries. Official data on urban population tend to overstate 
the trend towards urbanization. Part of the change was in fact due to incorporating large suburban 
areas into the cities.
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The two decades between 1950 and 1970 were also a period of very rapid 
economic growth throughout the region; one probably unique in history in that it 
resulted largely from deliberate 'architecture'. The average annual rates of 
growth of the net material product were fairly high, about 5-8 per cent per 
annum for most countries in most of the years up until the mid-1970s (Table 
4.3). This growth was not perfectly steady, but it was almost so, there being no 
long recessions or stagnations during the period.
Table 4.3: Economic growth in Eastern European countries, 1950-89: 
average annual rate of growth of net material product (per cent)
Country_______ 1950-55 1955-60 1960-65 1965-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-85 1985-89
Albania 6.9 8.3 8.4 6.1 6.4 2.8 2.9
Bulgaria
Czecho­
11.0 10.6 7.0 8.6 7.8 5.1 3.8 3.2
slovakia 7.7 7.2 1.2 6.9 5.4 3.7 1.7 2.0
East Germany 13.0 8.8 3.5 5.2 5.5 4.2 4.5 3.1
Hungary 4.9 7.4 4.5 6.8 6.6 3.2 1.4 1.0
Poland 8.8 6.7 6.0 6.0 10.0 1.4 0.1 3.0
Romania 12.0 7.8 8.9 7.6 11.2 7.2 3.7 -1.4
Yugoslavia 11.2 9.7 7.7 6.0 5.8 6.4 0.2 1.1
USSR 11.2 9.3 6.3 7.7 5.9 4.5 3.4 2.7
Source: UN (1991b).
Some Western economists have found it difficult to estimate economic growth in 
the communist states, complaining (correctly) of the inadequacies of 
measurement.4 The trouble is that it is easier to say that the official statistics 
exaggerate progress than to say what the 'true' rate of progress was, since this 
depends on definitions, assumptions, and methods. Nevertheless, by most 
measures, the centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe delivered hefty 
overall growth rates through the 1950s and most of the 1960s. Moreover, 
Eastern Europe did not fare badly in comparisons of growth rates and standards 
of living with other countries in Europe, especially those in Southern Europe.
4 The concept of net material product used in Eastern European statistics corresponded to total 
net value of goods and 'productive' services produced in the country. The sectors covered were 
agriculture and forestry; industries (mining, manufacturing, construction); transport, 
communication, and trade; and 'productive' services (tourism, catering, and banking). Economic 
activities not directly contributing to material product (public administration and defence, personal 
and professional services, etc.) were not included. This classification had its basis in the Marxian 
distinction between productive and unproductive work (Pearce, 1992). Under a system where the 
development of the sen/ice sector was overshadowed, this practice was likely to produce an 
upward distortion of the index of total output. For a full account of this problem, see Marer (1985), 
Komai (1992).
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Undoubtedly, this early economic success contributed greatly to the political 
legitimacy of Eastern European regimes. Confident about future economic 
progress,5 governments were able to deliver jobs, health care, and especially 
education on an unprecedented scale. The use of more advanced technologies 
required higher qualifications in the labour force and a greater variety of skills in 
all sectors of the economy, thus stimulating school enrolment and increases in 
the level of education (Table 4.4).6 It might be supposed that urbanization 
together with increases in education levels tended to generate a more complex 
social structure with an increasing division of labour, greater opportunities for 
social mobility and individual achievement, and disadvantages for large families. 
There is little doubt that during the 1950s these factors influenced Eastern 
Europe's demographic picture in a generally similar way to elsewhere in the 
world.
Table 4.4: Percentage of population 25 years of age and over with no more 
than first-level education, Eastern European countries, 
selected years 1950-90
Country 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990
Albania 97.3d
Bulgaria 90.4a 89.1e 74.1h
Czechoslovakia 88.0 83.9f 67.9 54.1 41.0°
East Germany 49.1' 30.1k
Hungary 94.2b 90.1 84.1 72.5 59.2
Poland 80.3 73.9 60.41 44.3P
Romania 93.7d 81.8J 55.6m 29.29
Yugoslavia 89.4C 89.3f 80.8' 69.7k
USSR 70.39 48.4 36.2n 22.8r
Notes: a - 1946, b - 1949, c- 1953, d - 1955, e - 1956, f - 1961, g - 1959,h - 1975, i - 1971, 
j - 1966, k - 1981,1 - 1978, m - 1977, n - 1979, o - 1991, p - 1988, q - 1992, r - 1989. 
Sources: TERPLAN (1992), UNESCO (1993).
By the 1960s, rates of Eastern European economic growth began to decline, 
and the region fell economically further and further behind the market 
economies of the West. There were numerous reasons for this reversal (Kornai, 
1981). First and most important, the methods of economic policy-making
5 A good illustration of the high level of confidence with which the communist regimes of Eastern 
Europe entered the 1960s is a memorandum of 1961 in which Hungarian officials envisaged 
growth by 1980 that would '... not merely exempt our people wholly from problems of livelihood but 
allow the attainment of consumption targets ... sufficient to satisfy the harmonious physical and 
intellectual needs of man. ... The proposed levels of consumption will arrive at a standard of 
saturation on a society-wide scale' (quoted in Stokes, 1993: 9).
6 Statistics on educational attainment give the levels of education as they are defined by the 
educational system in each country, and comparing them is therefore difficult. In general, figures 
in Table 4.4 show proportions of persons who completed at least one year at the primary level of 
education but did not go on to secondary school, plus illiterates and persons without formal 
schooling.
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pursued in the 1950s were no longer practicable. The policy of extensive 
development, which sought to create economic growth by adding inputs such as 
raw materials and labour, became increasingly difficult. The cheap resources, 
both human and physical, had been largely depleted. It became harder, for 
example, to move people from the countryside into the cities once 
collectivization was completed and the cities were becoming overcrowded. 
Practically all labour reserves were already absorbed and chronic labour 
shortages became characteristic. In addition, the Eastern European populations 
became increasingly dissatisfied with the political and social restrictions 
associated with the economic 'slow-down' and with the scarcity and poor quality 
of consumer goods. This dissatisfaction resulted in a series of mass protests, 
the most notable of which were the Hungarian revolt of 1956 and the Prague 
Spring of 1968.
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, reacting to the stagnation in economic 
growth and to the atmosphere of public unrest, most Eastern European 
countries attempted decentralizing economic reforms.7 Many of these reforms 
had some success in the short run (Brus and Laski, 1989), and Eastern 
European populations could take some comfort in their seemingly stabilized 
economic security. Moreover, domestic economic problems were partly offset by 
increasing trade within the region, which allowed countries to import relatively 
cheap energy and raw materials from the Soviet Union and to sell to that country 
their own relatively low-quality goods, which often were not competitive in 
Western markets. Another source of growth was increased trade with the West, 
often accompanied by generous Western credits (Marer, 1989).
However, by the late 1970s and early 1980s, all of these 'safety valves' began to 
close. The economic reform programs encountered resistance from bureaucrats 
and managers, and proved to be ineffectual in the absence of ownership reform 
and more thorough liberalization of the political environment. After all, the main 
purpose of the reforms was to help the system to survive, not to change its 
substance. Failure to dismantle the bureaucratic apparatus and to abandon the 
paternalistic relationships between state and enterprises meant that managers 
and workers had no incentives for process or product innovation. This resulted
7 Two countries in the region abstained from this reform process: Albania, which remained 
conservatively faithful to the original Stalinist model with respect to both policies and socio­
economic framework, and Yugoslavia, which in the late 1940s broke away from the Soviet bloc, 
and then experimented with its own economic program that pragmatically combined state 
ownership of means of production, decentralized policy-making, workers' self-management, and 
relatively few price controls.
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in slow technological progress and a gradual decline in the productivity of the 
workforce. In addition, the favourable terms of trade with the Soviet Union began 
to reverse, as Moscow became increasingly reluctant to subsidize Eastern 
European economies and insisted on payment in convertible (Western) 
currencies. With world market prices for oil jumping dramatically after the 1973 
Middle East crisis, economic growth was impeded in the East not less than in 
the West. Finally, Western credits began to dry up as it became clear that the 
Eastern European governments were not able to repay the amounts they had 
borrowed in the 1970s.
Thus, by the 1980s, the economies of all Eastern European states were in 
serious trouble. Rates of economic growth fell to 1-3 per cent per annum, or 
even to negative values (Table 4.3). Real wages and living standards continued 
to fall; and the external debts of many countries were large (Gelb and Gray, 
1991). The overcentralized planning apparatus, which once worked quite well in 
generating rapid growth in heavy industry, proved to be hopelessly incapable of 
inducing growth in the more sophisticated sectors of the economy. Plans 
continued to protect firms from collapse and to overemphasize the heavy 
industry and energy sectors at the expense of agriculture, consumer goods, 
services, and high technology. What resulted was an inharmonious sectoral 
structure with cyclical shortages and limited choice of consumer goods, including 
foodstuffs.8 Consequently, ordinary people had to waste much physical and 
mental energy merely to ensure the basic needs of their families were met. To 
complicate matters further, a new malady spread swiftly throughout the region: 
the so-called 'second economy' or semi-legal private enterprise which through 
informal channels provided services or redistributed goods in short supply, thus 
filling gaps left by the structural inadequacies of the 'first' (state-owned) 
economy (Sampson, 1987). In some countries, the 'second economy' became a 
mass phenomenon.9
In short, during the 1980s the economic situations of Eastern European 
countries went from bad to very much worse. One cannot say that this state of 
affairs was only the result of bad economic policies. The final collapse of the 
Eastern European economies was much deeper-rooted: in the nature of the 
socialist system of economic planning, the ownership and power structure, and
8 Indeed, shortages became so characteristic of centrally planned economies that a major work 
on the subject is quite simply entitled Economics of Shortage (Kornai, 1980).
9 For instance, Stark, Masselier and Mittner (1990) estimated that during the 1980s, the 'second 
economy* provided supplementary revenue to as many as 75 per cent of Hungarian households.
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in the mode of political and social organization of Eastern European states in 
general. As the attainment of a satisfactory economic standard of living became 
a major problem in many Eastern European families, it is understandable that 
the macro-economic situation had a strong influence on reproductive behaviour 
at both the societal and the individual levels. For most people, the cost of 
childbearing became very high in relation to their disposable income; 
improvements in income were typically sought in extensive employment outside 
the home and limitation of family size.
4.3 Welfare policies
Perhaps the major social accomplishment of the communist regimes was that, 
for most of the post-war period, they were able to ensure a substantial degree of 
economic security and decent living standards for large masses of people. This 
security was far from perfect, but it became guaranteed for everyone, at least 
formally. The essential elements of this economic security can be listed as 
follows:
(a) There was full employment, and what was more important, a severe shortage 
of labour. This meant that people were free from the threat of grave material 
hardship due to unemployment.
(b) Public education was free of charge, and so were health services.10 Although 
the quality of these services may have been inferior, the fact that the state 
provided them free enhanced among its citizens a sense of security.
(c) There was a centralized, comprehensive public pension system. The level of 
pension was generally very low compared to a full salary, but it was 
guaranteed for every retired person. There was also a network of institutions 
and a system of benefits to support those incapable of fending for 
themselves: orphans, single mothers, the sick, the handicapped, and the 
chronically ill.
(d) Prices for basic consumer goods were symbolic, as they were heavily 
subsidized by the state. Commodities like milk and bread were always 
inexpensive in the socialist countries (UN, 1990d). There were also large 
subsidies on services which satisfied basic, socially justified needs.* 11 On the
10 To be correct, in some Eastern European countries the right to free health services initially 
applied only to those employed in the state sector (Kaser, 1976).
11 In the late 1970s it was estimated that in East Germany passenger transport fares covered 
only 30 per cent, and in Hungary less than 50 per cent, of real costs. In the Soviet Union, rent and 
payments for municipal services (electricity, gas, and central heating) covered less than one-third 
of state expenditures for these purposes (UN, 1979).
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other hand commodities considered to be luxuries, such as coffee, colour 
televisions, motor cars and petrol, were priced in a discriminatory manner.
(e) According to official ideology and the law, it was the state's responsibility to 
provide housing.12 In reality, housing was one of the low-priority, notoriously 
neglected sectors, and most people had to wait substantial periods of time 
until state housing was allocated to them (Table 4.5). However, when housing 
finally was assigned, rents were subsidized so that rental payments were 
relatively low.13
Table 4.5: Waiting periods for housing in selected Eastern European
countries in the 1980s
Country Typical length of time 
on a waiting list (years)
Bulgaria 5 - 10
Czechoslovakia 6 -8
East Germany 3 -4
Hungary 4 -6
Poland 15-30
USSR 10-15
Notes: Bulgaria: Figure relates to applicants currently living in very poor conditions (e.g., in a 
kitchen or cellar); or as co-tenants in a single divided dwelling; or with less than 5 m2 of 
living space per capita. Czechoslovakia: Figure for larger cities, 1987. East Germany: 
National average, 1982. Hungary: Figure for Budapest, 1986. Poland: 1987 figure for 
purchase of a subsidized co-operative dwelling. USSR: State-rented accommodation was 
allocated only to those with less than 5-7 m2 of living space per capita.
Source: Kornai (1992: 234), based on various national estimates.
(f) The almost complete liquidation of private property and the almost complete 
elimination of the market resulted in a considerable equilibration of most 
components of social status. In particular, eradication of both very high and
12 In Yugoslavia, the citizen's right to housing was declared in Article 164 of the 1974 Federal 
Constitution: 'Citizens shall be guaranteed the right to acquire a tenancy title to a dwelling in social 
ownership, which ensures him permanent occupancy, under conditions specified by statute, of a 
socially-owned dwelling for the satisfaction of his personal and family housing needs' (Yugoslavia, 
1974: 174). Similarly, Article 44 of the 1977 Soviet constitution reads: 'Citizens of the USSR have 
the right to housing. This right is ensured by the development and upkeeping of state and socially- 
owned housing; by assistance of co-operative and individual house building; by fair distribution, 
under public control, of the housing that becomes available through fulfilment of the programme of 
building well-appointed dwellings; and by low rents and low charges for utility services' (USSR, 
1977: 28).
13 Some data on rents for the 1980s can be found in Sillince (1990). The information may be 
summarized as follows. In Albania, typical rent for a flat represented 3-7 per cent of one person's 
monthly income. In Bulgaria, rents were on average equivalent to 5 per cent of a family's income. 
In Czechoslovakia, the average rent amounted to 6 percent of a working-class family's income. In 
East Germany, the rent for a flat was 0.8-1.3 Marks per m2, although the real cost was about 
three Marks. In Hungary and the USSR, the average rent as a proportion of average individual 
income was 3-5 per cent. In Yugoslavia, rents accounted for only about 4 per cent of a family's 
total household expenditure.
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very low wages in the state sector led to a low differentiation of money 
income and, consequently, of welfare.14 Because of this practice, individual 
initiative and competitiveness were largely stifled in Eastern European 
societies. The resultant social immobilism led to a general degradation of the 
workforce, but it also contributed to the feeling among most social strata of a 
guaranteed, unshakeable security and social comfort.
(g) Although crime existed, public safety was far tighter than in most capitalist 
countries. This was partly connected with the bases of economic security 
already discussed: there was little economic incentive to commit crimes. But it 
was also partly a consequence of the fact that Eastern European countries 
were by and large totalitarian police states, where people were under 
permanent control.
The existence of generous social provisions in socialist states was not 
accidental. 'Cradle-to-grave1 state paternalism became, during the post-war 
period, the main form of political legitimation of all Soviet-type regimes. 
According to Feher (1982: 68), this modus operandi originated in the Soviet 
Union in the early post-Stalinist period, when the power elite came to the 
pragmatic conclusion 'that oppression had to be rationalised, that political 
tyranny had somehow to be coupled with a certain paternal care for the average 
citizen, in short that the system must become to some extent reciprocal'. Thus, 
the socialist system increasingly took care of its citizens' physical and cultural 
well-being and provided the available range of choices regarding their needs; 
but all for the sake of the system's political safety. Furthermore, this kind of 
paternalistic state care was closely associated with constraints on the 
individual's freedom of choice. The state cared for everyone, capable and 
incapable alike, but everyone was eventually trapped in a state net covering the 
whole of society.
Seen in a broader perspective, measures and provisions that are commonly 
called 'demographic' or 'fertility policies' appear to have been important 
components in the broader concept of welfare policies practised by the socialist 
states. This may seem too obvious to need saying; yet a good deal of the 
literature on Eastern European demographic policies overlooks it. Ideally one 
would present the phenomenon to be explained (the history of demographic 
policy-making), the explanatory factors (considerations and intentions that 
underpinned these policies), and the relationships among them in a form that
14 For a detailed analysis of the remarkably egalitarian distribution of incomes in Eastern 
European countries, see Asselain (1987).
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would make it possible to move from historical description to theoretical analysis. 
Unfortunately, there is not enough information available for such an evaluation. 
Therefore, one must be content with a great deal less: a list of the policies, and 
an attempt to speculatively shed some light on their socio-political genesis.
Table 4.6 gives an overview of the main fertility-related policies implemented in 
Eastern European states between 1947 and 1989. In broad terms, the post-war 
period may be divided into three parts: (a) a phase of implementation of 
'socialist' welfare policies and liberalization of abortion, from 1947 to about 1965; 
(b) a populationist stage, approximately 1965-75; and (c) a phase characterized 
by a shift to persuasive measures, family-oriented policies, and relaxation of 
abortion restrictions, roughly 1975-89. These phases occurred in most Eastern 
European countries, although in a diversified manner which calls for closer 
investigation.
Table 4.6: Overview of the main demographic policies in Eastern European
countries, 1947-89
Country_____Year_____Policy
Albania no information
Bulgaria 1951 a new system of maternity and family allowances introduced
1956 abortion made available on request
1967 regulations on abortion restricted; family allowances increased
1973 abortion further restricted; family allowances again increased
1974 abortion regulations slightly liberalized
1975 birth grants increased
1984 miscellaneous incentive measures to encourage childbearing
introduced, including an increase in family allowances
1985 maternity benefits and family allowances increased 
1988 paid leave for pregnancy and birth extended
Czecho- 1956
Slovakia 1957
1962 
1964 
1968-73
1973
1979
1982
1986
1987
1988
paid maternity leave extended; birth grants introduced 
abortion permitted for social grounds 
abortion regulations restricted 
maternity leave extended
family allowances and maternity grants increased; maternity
leave extended; low-interest loans for newlyweds introduced
abortion regulations further restricted
childcare allowances increased
family allowances increased
abortion permitted on request
maternity leave extended
qualifying conditions for family allowances liberalized
East 1947-48
Germany 1950
1961
1965
1967
abortions permitted on non-medical grounds 
a new system of maternity grants and family allowances 
introduced; abortion regulations severely restricted 
maternity leave extended
juridical and socio-medical reasons for abortion legalized 
family allowances extended (cont.)
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Table 4.6 (cont.)
Country_____ Year_____Policy
East 1972
Germany 1976
1984
1986
1987
abortion permitted on request; maternity leave extended 
paid maternity leave extended; family allowances increased 
benefits for mothers with 3 and more children extended 
longer childcare leave and increased allowances for working 
mothers with children; low-interest loans for newlyweds 
family allowances increased
Hungary 1951 a new system of family allowances introduced
1952 existing prohibitions on abortion enforced
1953 medical boards established to rule on request for abortions
1955 maternity leave and maternity grants introduced
1956 abortion made available on request
1959 family allowances greatly increased for third child
1965-66 family allowances increased, emphasis shifted to second births 
1967 childcare allowances introduced for working mothers 
1972-74 new increases in family allowances for second child 
1973 availability of abortion restricted
1976-80 family allowances repeatedly increased
1982 liberalization of previously restrictive regulation on abortion
1985 childcare allowance introduced for mothers of children under 
two years of age; antenatal maternity leave extended
1986 abortion further liberalized
1987 voluntary sterilization legalized as a family planning method
1988 abortion made de facto available on request
Poland 1948 a new system of maternity leave and allowances introduced
1956 abortion legalized on broadly interpreted social grounds
1957 family allowances extended
1972-75 maternity leave extended; family allowances increased; low- 
interest loans for newlyweds introduced 
1978 maternity grants introduced
1981 family allowances for low-income families extended
1984 provision of low-interest loans to young couples with children
Romania 1948
1956 
1960 
1966
1968
1974
1979
1982
1984
1985
1986 
1989
a new system of family allowances introduced
abortion permitted on request; family allowances increased
family allowances increased
abortion regulations severely restricted; contraception prohibi­
ted; maternity leave extended; divorce made less available 
maternity grants increased 
abortion further restricted 
children's allowances increased 
children's allowances increased
a three-part program to raise fertility: (a) a lowering of the mini­
mum age of marriage for women to 15; (b) a 5 per cent tax on 
childless people over age 25; (c) compulsory medical screening 
for pregnancy for women aged 25-30
increased taxes for the childless; further restriction on abortion; 
increased family allowances with emphasis on higher parities 
surgical sterilization prohibited
all restrictions on the performance of abortions repealed
(cont.)
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Table 4.6 (cont.)
Country Year Policy
Yugoslavia 1951 a new system of family allowances introduced
1952 abortion permitted on socio-medical grounds
1954 maternity leave introduced
1960 abortion legalized on social grounds
1967 decentralization of population policy-making within federation
1974 the human right to family planning declared in the constitution
1980 health insurance coverage extended to family planning; 
financial reimbursement during parental leave introduced
USSR 1947 a new system of family allowances introduced
1955 abortion legalized on request
1956 maternity leave extended
1968 maternity leave extended
1974 family allowances for low-income families extended
1981 childbirth allowance introduced, birth grant increased and ma­
ternity leave extended on a regionally differentiated basis
1982 interest-free loans introduced for young families with children
1985 higher family allowances for low-income families
1986 increased benefits for one-parent families
1987 leave for parents to care for sick children extended
1989 child allowances extended for low-income families
Sources: ARPL, Koubek (1974), David and McIntyre (1981), UN (1987, 1989a, 1990a, 1992b, 
1993c).
4.3.11mplementation of 'socialist' policies
During the 1950s, communist governments in the region did relatively little to 
directly influence procreation. However, most countries adopted new regulations 
in respect of maternity leave, child-care grants, and family allowances; or 
revised those welfare policies that had been in force since pre-war times.15 The 
measures used ranged from direct financial inducements to and compensations 
for the costs of childbearing, to health care and educational benefits provided in 
kind. The major items, both in actual expenditures and presumed influence, 
were monthly child allowances paid to parents.
Demographic objectives do not, however, seem to have been the principal 
reasons for these measures; after all, birth rates were still relatively high. There 
was also a general belief that industrialization and the expansion of employment 
opportunities, income and consumption would positively influence attitudes 
towards family size. Arguably, policies related to childbearing were originally
15 In Czechoslovakia, for instance, paid maternity leave for women employed in the public service 
had already been legislated in 1926 (Koubek, 1974). In Poland, a similar regulation was 
introduced in 1924 (Kozlowska and Wojtyla, 1975). Of course, a special case was the USSR, 
which had already introduced explicitly pronatalist policies in 1936, and modified them in 1944 and 
1947 (see Chapter 2, Section 2.4).
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introduced in the name of greater social justice and equal opportunity. 
Specifically, they were intended to reduce the burdens of large families by 
decreasing inequalities in per capita household income caused by differing 
numbers of children. Permitting abortion on broad social grounds or on request 
in the period 1955-60 was part of this political process, which swept through 
nearly all of Eastern Europe.16 A somewhat less straightforward, but 
nonetheless important, purpose of these policies was also to symbolize the 
dedication of the socialist state to taking care of the welfare of the family and 
other vulnerable groups, and to establishing the legal procedures and 
institutional arrangements required for implementing social policies.
4.3.2 Populationist stage
Some years after the implementation of permissive abortion regulations, 
generally in the early to mid-1960s, policy-makers in most of the socialist 
countries became genuinely interested in, if not alarmed by, the accelerated 
decline of birth rates, as this indicated the possibility of future labour shortages 
and aging populations. Authorities responded with a large variety of 
interventions intended to increase, or at least to maintain, the existing levels of 
fertility.17 A passage from an article by Srb and Konecna (1976: 111) makes it 
clear that these measures were directly related to manpower requirements:
The economic facet of population policy [implemented in the years 
1968-73 in Czechoslovakia] follows from the long-term conception of our 
society's material rise. It has to secure a regime of demographic change 
that would perspectively guarantee a smooth supply of particular age 
groups to the process of production, a gradual elimination of age 
disproportions caused by past events, and the best prerequisites for 
safeguarding the program of the development of our socialist society.
Most of the nine countries introduced or expanded pronatalist cash incentives in 
order to reduce the costs of childbearing. Many facilities and incentives adopted 
in the 1950s on social and humanitarian grounds, such as monthly family and 
child care allowances, lump-sum birth grants, and paid maternity leave, were 
expanded to meet explicitly demographic objectives. For instance, family 
allowances moved from being uniform by parity to placing initially moderate and 
then substantial emphasis on second and third children in a family. Other
16 However, in East Germany full liberalization of the abortion law was delayed to 1972, and in 
Albania it was not introduced until 1991; see Chapter 2.
17 For a comprehensive description of the measures used, see Berent (1970), McIntyre (1975), 
Frejka (1980), David and McIntyre (1981), Legge and Alford (1986), Debroy (1989).
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measures were implemented anew, such as taxes beneficial to families and 
disadvantageous for those who had no children, and low-interest loans for 
newlyweds which could progressively be written off with the birth of each child. 
Abortion was again restricted in four countries — drastically in Romania in 1966, 
and mildly in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria at various times during the 
1960s and 1970s. Repressive measures, such as the limitation of access to 
contraceptives, were used in several countries, particularly in Romania.
As for the early 1970s, Eastern European countries may be classified into three 
groups according to their population policies. The first group, which consisted of 
Albania and Yugoslavia, did not proclaim or apply any pronatalist policy.18 The 
second group, comprising Poland and the USSR, had no declared policy in this 
field but had some measures which indirectly influenced the birth rate. The last 
group included Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and 
Romania, where official population policy was explicitly pronatalist, aiming at 
precise quantitative and at times qualitative demographic targets. Indeed, the 
fertility developments discussed in Chapter 3 can in part be associated with 
policy measures enacted in 1966 in Romania, in 1967 and 1973 in Hungary, in 
1968 and 1973 in Czechoslovakia, and in 1973 and 1977 in East Germany (see 
Figure 3.1). The fact that these countries (except Romania) relied primarily on 
rather costly incentive payments has to be seen in the context of the relatively 
favourable Eastern European economies in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Yet 
another point seems common to the rationales behind these policies: all 
stemmed from the ideological tenet that it was appropriate for the socialist 
regime to manipulate demographic change to suit economic considerations, 
rather than to adapt the economy to existing demographic conditions.19
4.3.3 The 1970s and 1980s
In the mid- and late 1970s, it became clear that the introduction of pronatalist 
policy measures had not had enough effect to reverse long-term fertility 
declines. Demographic evidence was increasingly interpreted as indicating that
18 There was no pronounced pronatalist swing in this period in Yugoslavia; instead, the provision 
that 'it is a human right freely to decide on family planning' was added to the Yugoslav constitution 
(Yugoslavia, 1974: 183). Albania, on the other hand, was always openly pronatalist, but no 
specific incentive measures have ever been implemented. Apparently, Albanian authorities did not 
feel it necessary to intervene as the existing levels of fertility were high anyway.
19 It is interesting to note that it was only under communism and other authoritarian, state- 
oriented systems, such as in Nazi Germany, that individual reproduction came to be seen as an 
issue of national importance, and was at times equated with participation in the industrial labour 
force (Finkle and McIntosh, 1979).
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pronatalist policies and restrictions on abortions had at most a temporary, short­
term effect on period fertility by accelerating intended births and shortening birth 
intervals, but did not substantially change the family-size preferences and thus 
the lifetime fertility of the cohorts involved. Period fertility rates increased, but 
cohort rates did not. Against the background of pronatalist policies, the fertility 
decline was perceived as very significant:
Population policy provisions affected in particular the minor component of 
the population climate (spacing of children) but have practically no effect 
on its basic component (planned number of children). In recent years, 
children have been born that were not born earlier, perhaps even those 
who would have been born later. From this it is obvious that a decline of 
fertility must be expected in ensuing years (Pavlik and Zborilova, 1978: 
75-76).20
Confronted with this evidence, and faced with growing economic problems that 
seemed to necessitate a restructuring of expenses paid from the state budget, 
many governments decided to abandon their once active pronatalism. Thus, the 
1980s saw a gradual turn away from extensive and expensive pronatalist policy­
making. The efficacy of financial incentives as means of encouraging women to 
bear more children came to be openly doubted. Governments turned towards a 
broader concept of family policy, yet official proclamations usually did not go 
beyond the rather unspecific statement that the major objective of socialist 
population policy was to 'create conditions so that the family wishes to have two 
or three children [as this is] desirable not only from demographic but also from 
economic, social, and psychological viewpoints' (Wynnyczuk, 1981: 359). In 
practice, however, reliance on vaguely defined family policies diverted attention 
from other pressing problems: the difficult living conditions of young couples, 
lack of adequate housing, shortages of consumer goods and poor quality of 
services.
By the 1980s, most Eastern European governments seem to have stopped 
looking for ways to reverse fertility trends. Existing schemes of maternity grants 
and child allowances continued to be used as measures to improve the
20 The quotation relates to the pronatalist policy measures introduced in Czechoslovakia in 
1968-73. To be sure, some writers considered these measures to be very effective (see 
Vidlakova, 1975; Srb, 1979; Frejka, 1980). However, as time passed, increasing numbers of 
demographers have found the long-term effects of pronatalist policies implemented in 
Czechoslovakia, as well as in other Eastern European countries, to be nil or at best negligible (see 
Blayo and Festy, 1975; Pressat, 1979; Festy, 1981, 1991; Andorka and Vukovich, 1985; Bodrova, 
1985; Demeny, 1986; Hecht, 1986). The only exception seems to be Romania's temporary, but for 
a while substantial, increase in the birth rate following the banning of abortion in 1966 (Berelson, 
1979).
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economic situation of low-income families, and this social welfare objective 
became the dominant rationale for population policy. Systems of monetary 
benefits introduced in the 1970s remained in force, and benefit rates were even 
periodically increased, but any possible demographic effect of these provisions 
was nullified by growing inflation.21 In view of the rising level of abortion, 
promotion of contraceptive practices among the population was increasingly 
recognized as a legitimate task of socialist population policy, except perhaps in 
Albania and Romania.22 However, in an environment of central planning, the 
need for contraceptive services had first to compete with other demands on the 
national economy. Unfortunately, the politicians were often unwilling to make the 
major financial reallocations that such a policy required.23 A much cheaper 
solution for them was to reliberalize abortion. Thus, Bulgaria relaxed the 
restrictions on abortion in 1974, and liberalizing moves were made in Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, and the USSR during the 1980s.
Yet, in the 1980s there were also a few attempts to induce increases in fertility 
levels. Mild pronatalist measures were established in the USSR in 1981 and in 
Hungary in 1985.24 In what was a faint replica of the demographic 'engineering' 
of the early 1970s, the two countries implemented a number of not very radical 
provisions, ranging from increased maternity allowances and sick-pay-style 
benefits for employed mothers to higher maternity grants and various family 
income supplements. However, as can be inferred from Figure 3.1, these 
policies had no more than a marginal impact on long-term fertility trends. Thus, 
only Romania during the 1980s maintained, and over time even strengthened, 
its system of pronatalist measures, relying predominantly on Draconian 
repressions introduced in 1966. Ceausescu's policies resulted in more births
21 For example, data from sample surveys conducted in Czechoslovakia show that the increase in 
total income of young family households (no more than five years after marriage) only 
compensated for the increase in consumer prices (Hirsl, 1991: 223):
1970 1976 1985 1988
index of total income 
of young family households (%) 100.0 114.8 136.1 148.9
index of consumer prices (%) 100.0 111.4 141.8 149.1
22 A typical example of the official attitude to contraception can be found in the overview of 
Czechoslovak population policies by Pavlik and Wynnyczuk (1974: 350): The authorities support 
contraceptive research and the use of contraceptives with a view to reducing the abortion rate and 
to improving the quality of the population.'
23 For instance, data collected by Veres (1987) indicate that in Czechoslovakia the production of 
condoms stagnated between 1976 and 1985 at the level of 23-24 million per year, roughly equal 
to a ratio of 6,000 condoms to 1,000 men aged 15-49 years. No condoms were imported from 
abroad.
24 The new policy measures were clearly pronatalist in intent in both countries. However, it seems 
likely that the Soviet reform had yet another target: to raise the birth rate in Slavic and Baltic 
areas, and thus to limit the disproportionate growth of non-European populations within the USSR; 
see Weber and Goodman (1981).
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than would otherwise have occurred, but only at considerable human cost: the 
frustration of parental choice, increased maternal mortality in consequence of 
illegal abortions, and the prospect of sharply fluctuating demands for child care 
facilities, education, housing, employment and, later, pensions, as the big 
cohorts reach successive age levels.25 Ceausescu's brutal policies had no effect 
whatever on Romania's economic growth.
In retrospect, population policies used by European communist regimes during 
the post-war period appear rather erratic, mixing measures liberalizing and 
prohibiting induced abortions with increases in monetary benefits. In addressing 
the decline of fertility, governments relied a great deal on family policies. This is 
not surprising, since these programs largely fitted the concept of the socialist 
state as a welfare state; moreover, family-oriented policies were likely to be well 
received by the population. They provided governments with ready-made tools 
for tackling not only the fertility problem but also the spread of 'destructive' social 
practices such as abortion and anti-family habits. However, despite its 
popularity, family policy proved to be an imperfect instrument for stimulating 
fertility. Although the long-term relationship between policy measures and fertility 
change remains complex, the evidence from Eastern Europe suggests that the 
impact of family-oriented measures was limited, following a rather simple pattern 
of action and reaction: after each new set of benefits was introduced, the 
novelty quickly became taken for granted by the citizenry, the hoped-for 
behavioural response soon disappeared, and fertility resumed its decline.
The lesson to be learned from the Eastern European experience is that one­
sided pronatalism, however orthodox and contrived it might be, may not be 
enough to counteract antinatalist tendencies. This is because people's 
demographic behaviour is not based solely on material considerations, but is 
affected by numerous conditions that cut across several sectors of a 
government's social and economic policy. Thus, perhaps the greatest deficiency 
of the Eastern European governments' attempts to encourage fertility was the 
failure to identify the more subtle motives and determinants that underlie human 
behaviour.26 On the other hand, the general transition to very low fertility that 
occurred under free market systems in the industrialized capitalist countries may 
have been at least delayed in Eastern Europe, and in some cases temporarily
25 For more information on Romania's pronatalist policies in the 1970s and 1980s, and the social 
and demographic consequences of these, see Berelson (1979), Romania (1984b), Hord et at. 
(1991), Kligman (1992).
26 Indeed, it is arguable that some of these conditions, motives and determinants are ultimately 
beyond the state's capacity to do anything about, other than through Draconian measures.
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reversed, by the pronatalist interventions. In that sense it can be concluded that 
demographic policy was, indeed, an important factor in fertility change in 
Eastern European countries.
4.4 Role and status of women
The societal and economic changes in Eastern Europe after World War II also 
led to a radical transformation of the social status of women. One of the most 
visible changes was their increasing participation in economic activities. 
However, women's employment in Eastern Europe had a number of peculiar 
features. First, the level of female employment was exceptionally high, 
particularly in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, Romania and 
the USSR, where over two-thirds of the women of reproductive age were 
economically active (Table 4.7).27 In other Eastern European countries women 
were also an integral and indispensable component in the total labour force. The 
Eastern European economies could not have operated without the labour 
provided by women, and this circumstance had a substantial impact on 
demographic developments in the region.28 But the level of women's economic 
activity fluctuated over time, and there were also substantial differences 
between countries, depending on the state of the economy and governmental 
economic strategies. At certain times, especially during the Stalinist period of the 
early 1950s, when extensive industrialization demanded vast labour resources, 
women were mobilized to join the labour force; at other times, they were 
persuaded to withdraw to bear and rear children.
Secondly, there were large differences in the involvement of women in different 
sectors of the economy (ILO, 1980; Anker, 1985). Some industries and 
occupations were traditionally 'feminized' and notoriously badly paid; the textile 
industry, trade, mass catering, education, and health care are the most obvious 
examples. The female labour market was characterized by horizontal, rather 
than vertical, professional mobility and by generally bad working conditions. 
Women's wages were typically much lower than men's, and their work was
27 The economically active population is defined as those persons who constitute the supply of 
labour. Women on maternity leave were considered economically active in Eastern European 
countries. For details concerning collection and comparability of census data on the economically 
active population, see UN (1958b).
28 For empirical evidence suggesting that the labour force participation of women reduced fertility 
in Eastern Europe, through mechanisms operating similarly to those in the West, see Heer (1981), 
Gregory (1982).
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Table 4.7: Percentages of women economically active in selected age 
groups in Eastern European countries, selected years 1950-91
Country Year Age group:
20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39
Albania no information
Bulgaria 1956 69.0 69.3 73.2 76.9
1965 72.1 83.8 86.4 88.0
1975 77.5 90.4 93.8 94.5
1985 —  91.0b — 96.4 94.8
Czechoslovakia 1961 68.2 57.4 59.1 65.4
1970 79.1 78.9 79.4 81.0
1980 83.4 90.7 92.0 92.8
1991 —  90.3b — —  94.4d —
East Germany 1964 72.1a — 68.0C —
1971 74.6 79.3 —  79.6d —
1981 84.6 93.9 94.8 94.6
Hungary 1949 55.5 45.0 33.8 30.9
1960 55.3 48.7 49.1 50.7
1970 66.2 65.3 68.7 71.0
1980 59.9 69.8 81.1 84.9
1990 59.3 62.9 77.4 85.2
Poland 1950 67.8 60.7 61.6 63.0
1960 67.8 62.8 63.4 66.9
1970 73.3 75.1 77.7 79.8
1978 68.4 75.1 79.5 81.9
1988 64.0 70.0 76.7 83.0
Romania 1956 78.1 74.3 —  73.6d —
1966 74.3 78.5 78.4 78.7
1977 75.6 83.1 83.5 83.6
1990 68.5 80.0 81.8 73.7
Yugoslavia 1961 62.0 53.2
1971 55.8 56.2 51.3 49.3
1981 57.0 64.1 62.7 58.2
USSR 1970 —  86.3b — —  92.7d —
1979 84.8 93.8 95.2 95.9
1989 77.2 88.2 92.0 94.1
Notes: a - age group 21-24, b - age group 20-29, c - age group 25-39, d - age group 30-39. 
Sources: ILO (1992), TERPLAN (1992), UN (1992c).
less esteemed and in general underprivileged.29 Thus, although women entered 
the productive labour force in large numbers, they still suffered from various
29 For instance, Heitlinger (1979: 154) quotes Czechoslovak data from 1970, according to which 
the proportion of women in the lowest income category (up to 1,400 crowns monthly) was 45 per 
cent, compared to only 6 per cent for men and 20 per cent for the whole population. Anker (1985) 
reviews surveys from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland in which many women declared 
themselves secondary earners and reported that they would withdraw from the labour force if their
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forms of inequality. Women's income was, however, crucial to the survival of 
most families. The two-income family was both a norm and a necessity, and for 
the vast majority of women economic considerations were the primary 
motivation for seeking a job. This is clearly reflected in the results of surveys 
carried out in Eastern European countries which show that women, especially 
those more qualified, tended to return to work only a few months after the birth 
of a child (Srb, 1967; Ovchinnikova, 1973; Mazur, 1980).
The creation of equal opportunities in employment outside the home led in 
Eastern Europe to a multiplication of female roles, rather than to a reshaping of 
those roles. Unlike working fathers, the majority of working mothers had to 
undertake two jobs: one in the family and one outside the home. Surveys 
conducted in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary in the late 1970s and 
1980s show that working women spent on average more than four hours daily 
on housework and child care, compared to one-and-a-half hours for working 
men (Anker, 1985; Einhorn, 1993). Indeed Mazur (1980) quotes a Polish 
propagandist journal according to which the ideal type of woman should 
combine three duties: those of mother, gainfully employed person, and citizen. 
Among other things, this statement reflects the way women's social roles were 
portrayed in Eastern European mass media, which is perhaps not surprising in 
an environment in which home-grown feminism was suppressed and Western 
feminism derided because it did not give central focus to production and class 
relations.
In this context, it must be mentioned that the policies of Eastern European 
governments always contained provisions to at least soften the contradictions 
between a woman's employment activities and her family interests. The 
measures most often used may also be listed as pronatalist policies. They 
included: paid leave to take care of a newborn child, with the woman's job being 
reserved and the period of leave being counted as part of her labour record; 
provision of childcare facilities; provision of jobs on a part-time or limited contract 
basis; the possibility of retiring on a pension earlier, depending on number of 
children and length of service; and several other special conditions related to the 
employment and health care of mothers of young children (Wynnyczuk, 1981). 
Yet in the profoundly male-dominated communist governments, the terms of 
these policies inevitably were set by men. In practice, therefore, they remained 
insufficient to promote 'more than a minimal restructuring of working and living
husbands' incomes were higher. Bridger (1992) cites a Soviet source claiming that in the mid- 
1980s women received only 73 per cent of male average earnings.
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arrangements within the home' (Heitlinger, 1980: 15). Marxist sociologists used 
to explain this failure by the fact that
the contemporary stage in social production development [in Eastern 
European countries] does not allow for a complete solution to the 
problem of creating social and economic prerequisites for a harmonious 
combination of work and maternal duties (Bodrova, 1978: 88).
In other words, despite official egalitarian ideology, the state colluded in the 
production of a sexual division of labour by permitting fundamental inequalities 
to persist in both the domestic and public spheres. Presumably it did so because 
such a policy was functional: it conformed to the supposed priority of economic 
and demographic growth over social considerations. One very important 
consequence was that women in Eastern Europe overwhelmingly enjoyed less 
autonomy than men, and tended to retreat into domestically-oriented roles of 
dependence and passivity;30 this was strongly in contrast to the formal 
commitment of communist governments to encouraging women's social 
participation. In all probability, this gender asymmetry marked not only economic 
and political relations, but also many other areas of behaviour bearing on family 
and sexual relations.
To be sure, there were genuine achievements in women's emancipation in 
Eastern Europe (Scott, 1974, 1976; Heitlinger, 1979, 1980). For instance, one of 
the most important policy initiatives taken by the communist regimes was a 
thorough elimination of legal inequality between men and women. More 
significantly, these regimes largely succeeded in broadening the accepted 
scope of women's education and work, and in creating a cultural milieu in which 
social provisions for maternity came to be regarded as an essential component 
of state social policies. But these advances were not achieved without a 
significant cost to women. They became full-time workers31 and fully-fledged 
citizens, but they also remained largely responsible for what earlier generations 
of women did as full-time mothers and housewives.
30 This is well illustrated by studies which show that women's participation in public life (and, 
specifically, their representation in leading positions in Communist Parties, which were the 
exclusive bases of political power in Eastern Europe) was rather marginal compared to men's, and 
also in sharp contrast to the significance of women in the production process (Field, 1968; 
Sokolowska, 1977; Heitlinger, 1979; Harasymiw, 1980; Rimashevskaya, 1994).
31 One of the things that differentiate what happened in Eastern Europe from what has happened 
(perhaps later) elsewhere in the West is that part-time employment was less of an option. 
Heitlinger (1979) quoted several surveys conducted in the USSR suggesting that working women 
considered the possibility of a part-time work to be generally disadvantageous, mainly because its 
income was substantially lower than that of full-time employment. Consequently, part-time work in 
Eastern Europe remained largely restricted to students and older people after retirement.
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Demographie behaviour and women's status are concepts that cover a broad 
spectrum of ideas and practices. Heitlinger (1993: 280) argues:
At one extreme one sees married women whose motherhood (and very 
often the number of sons) is the principal basis of their self-identity, 
social standing and the respect awarded them by the wider community... 
At the other end of the spectrum is an elite category of women who have 
gained control over their bodies and their sexual relationships, who are 
able to have as many children as they want, and who have fulfilling, 
highly-paid careers that enable them to convert the high opportunity 
costs of children into lower direct costs.
Given that no useful summary measure exists to describe the social status of 
women as a group,32 it is difficult to make 'absolute' statements about the 
situation in European communist countries. However, available evidence 
suggests that most women in these countries occupied an intermediate position 
between the opposing models of a successful career mother and a 'breeder'. 
They were extensively occupied in paid work, and accordingly had to restrict 
their fertility and time spent in mothering; but they did so not out of a desire for 
emancipation, but mainly because of the household's need for a second income. 
At the same time qualifications, work, and income discrimination, problems of 
coping with both maternal and work roles, and apparently also the survival of 
male supremacy due to which domestic labour was not fairly divided; all these 
created a situation in which a large proportion of women experienced sex 
inequality. Innovations in family policy over the years, such as those aimed at 
increasing the protection of women as mothers, actually emphasized sex-role 
differences instead of eroding them, and further worsened the position of 
women in society. What these policies failed to stress was that rearing children, 
unlike childbearing, is not necessarily exclusively women's business. 
Rimashevskaya (1994: 275) put it succinctly when she wrote that the primary 
cause of male-female inequality under communist regimes was the 'over­
emancipation' of women.
4.5 Marriage and divorce patterns
In most regions of the world, social change is accompanied at some stage by 
significant shifts in family life. The conventional functions of the family are 
eroded, the timing and nature of marriage commitments change, and the
32 For a good discussion of the theoretical and methodological problems of measuring the status 
of women, see Hommes (1978).
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proportion of individuals devoted full-time to traditional family life decreases. 
Among the factors assumed to reduce the prevalence of marriage are the trend 
towards greater judicial equality of men and women, greater job independence, 
the declining authority of traditional norms, and the general climate of change in 
attitudes towards reproduction. The availability and widespread use of efficient 
methods of fertility control are also believed to have had a direct impact on 
marriage habits. Modern techniques of fertility regulation permit greater 
confidence in preventing unintended pregnancies both before and after 
marriage. Among other things, greater fertility control makes it possible to 
reduce the risk of premarital conception, and this in turn results in smaller 
numbers of marriages contracted in consequence of the bride's pregnancy. 
Further, because of couples' increased capacity to confidently defer parenthood 
within marriage, the early years of marriage become typically childless, which in 
turn fosters cohabitation, divorce, and the postponement of marriage in 
subsequent cohorts. Owing to these behavioural changes, the declines in fertility 
and nuptiality have been more or less simultaneous. These trends have been 
reported in many Western countries, as well as in Eastern Europe (UN, 1990c). 
There is, however, a very significant difference. Until recently, marriage 
remained much more prevalent in Eastern European populations than in the 
West.
This is not to say that the family formation process in Eastern Europe did not 
undergo considerable transformation during the post-war period. However, there 
has been much more change in the West. Figure 4.1 illustrates the post-1950 
developments in nuptiality in selected European countries in the form of trends 
in female total first marriage rates (FTFMR).33 While pre-war Europe had been 
divided into West and East marriage patterns along Hajnal's (1965) line roughly 
joining Trieste with St. Petersburg, the period of the late 1940s to the mid-1960s
33 The FTFMR is analogous to the total fertility rate; it is a commonly used period summary index 
of nuptiality, computed by summing age-specific female first-marriage ratios (ratios of first 
marriages of women at a given single year of age to the total number of women at that age) for 
women aged 15 to 49 years. If these ratios were observed in a real cohort, the sum would 
represent the frequency of first marriages by exact age 50 in this cohort. When calculated for a 
given year, the FTFMR expresses the average number of first marriages before age 50 that would 
be experienced by a hypothetical female birth cohort had it been subject to current age-specific 
first marriage ratios. Because of the capacity of first marriages to heap cross-sectionally at levels 
unsustainable in the long term, the period FTFMR may exceed unity (more than one first marriage 
per person), which would be absurd for a real cohort. This may occur, for example, during a 
transition period when age at first marriage is falling: the fact that declining proportions of a real 
cohort would be necessarily subject to lower marriage rates at older ages is not reflected in the 
manner in which the cumulation across ages is done in calculating the FTFMR. Similarly, during 
periods when age at marriage is rising, the FTFMR for a given calendar year may be lower than 
that of a real cohort. Historical phenomena (wars, recessions, etc.) can also produce 
exaggeratedly high or low FTFMRs.
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Figure 4.1: Female total first marriage rates
selected European countries, selected years 1950-90
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Sources: FSO (1991), Ely (1991), Sardon (1991, 1992).
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brought a considerable levelling off of inter-country differences in nuptiality 
levels. The West experienced the 'marriage boom' which led to sudden 
increases in marriage rates and to the disappearance of the Western marriage 
pattern (Hajnal, 1953, 1965). The East, on the other hand, registered decreases 
in previously high levels of first marriage; the only exception was East Germany, 
where the trends in nuptiality resembled those in Western Europe. Owing to 
these trends, East-West differences in nuptiality levels temporarily disappeared. 
As Sardon (1992) has shown, by 1960 the FTFMRs were close to 1.0 (ranging 
from 0.96 to 1.07) in most European countries for which data exist, the only 
exception being Albania with a FTFMR of 0.82.
Since the late 1960s, however, nuptiality trends in the West and the East have 
diverged. In Western Europe, the prevailing trend was a gradual, regionally and 
temporally fairly consistent shift in marriage timing and prevalence, with 
marriage occurring later and no longer being almost universal as it had been in 
the immediate post-war period. By the late 1980s, FTFMRs in the majority of 
Western Europe had dropped to such low levels that their continuance would 
mean that only 50 to 70 per cent of women would ever marry. This was in strong 
contrast to developments in most of Eastern Europe, where in the late 1960s 
and 1970s there was a halt in the downward trend, followed by increases in 
nuptiality levels. By the 1980s, a general declining trend had reappeared 
throughout the Eastern bloc, with East Germany at the forefront. However, these 
reductions in nuptiality were much less pronounced than those in Western 
Europe. By the late 1980s, Eastern European FTFMRs were between 0.8 and 
0.9 (Figure 4.1), indicating that fairly high levels of nuptiality were still the rule. 
Even in East Germany, the country with the lowest FTFMR within the Soviet 
bloc, the incidence of first marriage was higher than in any non-socialist country 
in Europe except Ireland, Greece and Portugal (Macura, Adams, and Holzer- 
Zelazewska, 1994).
The sum of age-specific first marriage ratios is a measure of intensity of the first 
marriage process; the main indicator of its timing is age at marriage. Trends in 
female median age at first marriage (FMAFM)34 in selected European countries
34 The FMAFM can be calculated from the age distribution of women entering first marriage or 
from age-specific first marriage ratios. If derived from absolute numbers of women marrying, it is 
influenced by rates of entry into first marriage by age as well as by the age structure of women. If 
computed from age-specific first marriage ratios (as in Figure 4.2), the FMAFM is free of the 
distorting effect of age structure and can be interpreted as the median age at entry into first 
marriage in a hypothetical female cohort experiencing throughout its lifetime the age specific first 
marriage ratios of the given year.
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are displayed in Figure 4.2. The data indicate that the experience of Eastern 
countries was substantially different from that of the rest of Europe. The main 
feature of the trends in Eastern Europe has been the persistence of relatively 
early marriage, with the FMAFM seldom exceeding 24 years. Around 1950, 
FMAFMs in Eastern Europe ranged from below 22 years in Albania to above 24 
years in Poland. In the 1950s and 1960s there were moderate declines in 
female ages at first marriage (only in Albania, where early marriage had long 
been the custom, was the trend generally upward). The reductions were most 
pronounced in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, where FMAFMs dropped by about 
1.5 years between 1950 and 1970. The post-war economic recovery, the 'mood 
of reconstruction', and the softening of norms requiring individuals to postpone 
marriage until after reaching a certain social status may be listed as general 
factors which underpinned the tendencies to marry earlier. Part of the change 
may also have been due to the increasing participation of women in the labour 
force, which probably resulted in new patterns of sexual activity, premarital 
relationships and, consequently, marital behaviour. The 1970s and 1980s, then, 
were characterized by a stabilization or only slight changes in age patterns of 
nuptiality, with FMAFM typically between 21 and 23 years. Only East Germany 
experienced during the 1980s a substantial rise in age at first marriage, but by 
1989 its FMAFM was still below 24 years. In Eastern Europe as a whole, early 
marriage thus continued to be the norm, despite the generally high female 
employment rates.
In the West, FMAFMs followed a U-shaped pattern during the post-war period. 
Beginning in the early 1950s, ages at first marriage declined in virtually all 
Western populations, although the extent of decline varied from country to 
country. Sometime between the late 1960s and mid-1970s, FMAFMs dropped to 
23 years or less in the majority of Western countries. Thus, by the early 1970s 
female ages at first marriage had converged to approximately the same low 
level in both the East and the West of Europe. Thereafter, however, they started 
to rise very sharply in the West. Sweden experienced the upswing towards later 
marriage several years earlier than other countries, but after 1980 such a trend 
was apparent in nearly all of Western Europe. By the late 1980s, FMAFMs in a 
large number of Western European populations clustered around 25 years, and 
in some reached even higher levels, indicating that women tended, and were 
able, to postpone marriage to a fairly advanced age.
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Figure 4.2: Female median age at first marriage 
selected European countries, selected years 1950-89
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What resulted from these developments was the emergence of a new East-West 
divide in patterns of nuptiality. This time, however, Czechoslovakia, East 
Germany, Hungary, and Poland — countries that in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries had unequivocally conformed to the Western European 
marriage pattern (Sklar, 1974) — displayed nuptiality regimes that placed them 
on a par with the rest of the countries under Soviet influence. Thus, a cleavage 
along political boundaries, isolating the socialist regimes of Eastern Europe from 
the democracies of Western Europe, replaced the geo-cultural dividing line 
previously identified by Hajnal (1965). Comparable data for the USSR are 
lacking, but several published studies show the persistence of relatively high 
nuptiality rates and the prevalence of early marriage in the Soviet Union as a 
whole, as well as a great diversity of marriage patterns in its several republics 
(Anderson, 1982; Volkov, 1986; Willekens and Scherbov, 1994).
Trends in divorce, too, followed different paths in Eastern and Western 
European countries, although the contrasts between the two regions were not 
as large as those in patterns of nuptiality. As can be seen from the total divorce 
rates (TDRs),35 over the four decades between 1950 and 1990, European 
countries experienced notable changes in divorce rates (Figure 4.3). These may 
be linked to shifts in standards of living, social relations, and the new social 
climate resulting from modernization, secularization, individualization, socio­
economic and political changes. Around 1950, European TDRs varied within a 
wide range, from less than one divorce per 100 marriages in Albania to more 
than 20 in East Germany. In Eastern Europe (except in East Germany and, to a 
lesser extent, Bulgaria), the 1950s and 1960s were a period of increasing 
incidence of divorce. In the West, in contrast, these two decades saw slight 
declines in TDRs, the only significant exception being Sweden where the TDR 
was rising. But the greatest surge came after 1970. Between 1970 and 1980 
TDRs increased by 50 per cent or more in a number of Western European 
populations, with Sweden characteristically leading. By the 1980s, these upward 
trends had diminished somewhat; nevertheless, around 1985 a number of 
countries in Western and Northern Europe registered TDRs of 30 divorces per 
100 marriages or higher. Southern Europe, however, was typified by much lower 
incidences of divorce. In Italy, for example, the TDR reached a level of just eight
35 The TDR is obtained by summing duration-specific divorce ratios: ratios of divorces at different 
single-year marriage durations to the initial size of the marriage cohorts which have reached these 
durations. If the ratios were those observed in a marriage cohort, the TDR would represent the 
frequency of divorces in this cohort. Here, the ratios are calculated for each of the calendar years 
considered, and the TDR thus reflects behaviour of members of different cohorts, like the FTFMR.
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Figure 4.3: Total divorce rates (per 100 marriages)
selected European countries, selected years 1950-90
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divorces per 100 marriages by the late 1980s, while Portugal and Greece 
reported only slightly higher figures (Guibert-Lantoine and Monnier, 1992).
In Eastern Europe, the period 1970-90 was one of interesting regional 
differentiation in divorce rates (Figure 4.3). In one group of countries, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and the USSR, the incidence of 
divorce increased rather quickly, attaining levels comparable to those in Western 
Europe. During the 1980s, TDRs recorded in this group of countries reached 30 
divorces or more per 100 marriages. The remaining countries belonged to a 
second group, which over the same period recorded smaller increases or 
stabilizations in the incidence of divorce, though on very different levels as is 
illustrated by TDRs ranging from 10 to about 20 divorces per 100 marriages. In 
part these contrasts within the Eastern bloc can be explained by differences in 
the legal availability of divorce. Thus, in Romania the spectacular drop in the 
TDR between 1965 and 1970 is primarily attributable to exceptionally restrictive 
legal regulation of divorce, dating from October 1966 (Trebici, 1975). Similarly, 
the sharp increase in the Soviet divorce rate between 1965 and 1970, which 
was followed by a drop during 1970-75, was almost certainly due to a liberal 
change in the divorce law that came into effect in January 1966 and allowed 
persons to divorce who might have desired to do so for a long time (Anderson, 
1982). Differences in religiosity may have been another important factor. The 
relatively low incidences of divorce in Albania, Yugoslavia, and Poland can 
largely be explained by the strong influence of Muslim and Catholic religious 
norms. Thus, regional contrasts in divorce rates have been partly a result of 
uneven legal availability of divorce, and partly a reflection of authentic 
differences in the demand for divorce, stemming from varying traditions and 
contrasts in life-style patterns.
This brief overview of East-West contrasts in patterns of marriage and divorce 
makes it clear that post-war developments in the Eastern part of Europe 
followed a different path from those in the West. Demographers are accustomed 
to attributing the Western European retreat from marriage, and the family 
generally, to the continuing and intensified impact of the modernizing forces put 
in train by industrialization and economic development: secularization, the 
growth of rationality, and individualism (Lesthaeghe, 1983, 1992; van de Kaa 
1987). Yet many of these forces have been present in Eastern Europe, too. 
Why, then, have the countries of Eastern Europe experienced less uniform and 
much less pronounced changes in their nuptiality regimes; why have they
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maintained higher prevalences of marriage, lower median ages at marriage, 
and, to some extent, lower levels of divorce than have been typical of Western 
Europe?
It is not easy to hypothesize what the causes of this East-West divergence in 
nuptiality patterns might have been. Were respect for traditional family values, 
and their popularity, more firmly rooted in Eastern European culture than they 
were in Western countries? A more plausible explanation could perhaps be 
found in the existing economic and political realities of Eastern Europe. With 
lower levels of economic development, a less vigorous consumer culture 
emerged, offering fewer sources of satisfaction and time use that could compete 
with family involvement. One particularly important consequence of the bad 
economic performance of European socialist regimes may have been the critical 
shortage of housing, which made it extremely difficult for young couples to live 
together without being married, or for discordant spouses to find separate 
housing. Women in particular may have been economically restrained from 
taking initiative to end marriages. Shortages of accommodation could also have 
encouraged higher nuptiality rates and earlier marriage. Because allocation 
rules typically gave priority to married couples (Kirk et al., 1975), individuals who 
sought to realize personal independence through establishing their own 
households had a strong incentive to marry, and to marry early.
A complementary explanation is that pronatalist incentives, family benefits, and 
financial subsidies for newlyweds provided by Eastern European governments 
did stimulate a family-oriented lifestyle. Owing to the systems of allowances and 
benefits related to family, single persons may have tended to view the married 
state as more advantageous than celibacy or cohabitation. Moreover, there is 
some evidence suggesting that for young people from the country, marriage was 
the path leading from the village to the town, and therefore to a greater degree 
of social advancement. This seems to have been the case especially in the 
Soviet Union, where there was for many years a strict system of residential 
permits and internal passports, designed to control the number of immigrants 
into large cities. People who did not meet the required criteria could become 
eligible to move to these places by marrying a resident (Willekens and 
Scherbov, 1994). In this context, the point can be made that the system of pro- 
family policies may have served not only social but also important political ends. 
Obviously, individuals who are concerned primarily in the welfare of their own
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families are less likely to become involved in dissident activities against the 
regime.
Maybe the crucial force behind the comparatively high marriage rates in Eastern 
Europe was the clamp totalitarian regimes placed on individual opportunity. In 
the intense political atmosphere of Soviet-type societies, where opportunities for 
study, travel, free expression, and career-making were severely limited, the 
family seemed to provide privacy, a source of authenticity, and a range of 
supplementary possibilities for individual self-realization. Perhaps the effect of 
restrictions on individualism was rather stronger on men than on women, 
because the private world of family and domestic arrangements, the sphere in 
which women are traditionally more involved, is likely to be less affected by an 
oppressive political system. The absence for men of personal opportunities 
outside the family may well have been a critical factor in the relative 
attractiveness of marriage in Eastern Europe. Thus, while in Western 
democracies family life, with its responsibilities and restrictions, has been 
regarded as inhibiting the quest for individual fulfilment, in Eastern Europe the 
situation developed in an opposite direction, with the family serving as an 
important domain of individual self-assertion. Traditional prejudices against non- 
legalized unions,36 and the rather limited role of contraception in preventing 
unplanned premarital conceptions, may also be assumed to be significant 
reasons for the relatively high demographic importance of marriage in Eastern 
Europe. If the hypothesis that this cluster of socio-political factors affected 
marriage behaviour is a correct one, then it is possible to argue that these 
factors also had a considerable effect on the level of fertility.
4.6 Desired family size
One way of gaining an insight into fertility change is through an examination of 
family-size preferences. Although it is well known that data on birth expectations 
are fraught with technical and interpretative uncertainties (Ryder, 1973; Blake, 
1974), the topic is too potentially revealing to be simply dismissed. After all,
36 To be sure, cohabitation has not been as uncommon in Eastern Europe as one might expect. 
For instance, the 1984 Hungarian microcensus (Carlson and Klinger, 1987) found that in age 
groups 20-24 to 40-49, between 5.2 and 9.3 per cent of never married women were cohabiting. 
The corresponding figures among divorced women ranged from 16.6 to 18.8 per cent. In total, 
however, the propensity in Hungary to cohabit was considerably lower than in most Western 
European countries. Moreover, Carlson and Klinger note that a substantial proportion of 
cohabiting persons may have been in fact Romanies (Gypsies), who in Hungary constitute a 
distinctive subpopulation, typified by a migratory lifestyle and a culture in which 'civic legitimacy 
has not supplanted kin legitimacy' (Carlson and Klinger, 1987: 98).
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most demographers are inclined to believe that stated preferences for a given 
number of children directly reflect factors that are influential in determining the 
fertility of individual couples, particularly when efficient methods of birth control 
are available. Though the intensity of preferences may vary between couples as 
well as between partners, there are no convincing grounds for the assertion that 
the question about a preferred number of children is totally alien to people living 
in developed societies, and that their answers are, therefore, meaningless. 
Presumably, family-size norms and preferences operate within a complex of 
other circumstances and preferences. Fertility preferences may be reflections of 
a number of interrelated factors, ranging from psychologically determined 
perceptions and desires to voluntary choices made by couples with respect to 
their economic situations and life goals. Of course, it is not so much the desire 
for children as the desire to have a certain number of children that matters.
Data for Eastern Europe on the average number of children planned or 
considered desirable by women come from a variety of surveys. A survey on 
planned parenthood in Czechoslovakia in 1956 seems to have been the first of 
its type conducted in Eastern Europe (Krotki, 1977), and was eventually 
followed by several dozen similar surveys in other countries of the region; the 
majority, however, were undertaken in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. 
The discussion below covers surveys about attitudes towards family size, and 
omits studies limited exclusively to achieved fertility or methods and practices of 
contraception and abortion. Unfortunately, very little of the potentially relevant 
material is suitable for analysis. The amount of information reported from 
surveys varies, and analysis is further constrained by the fact that several 
survey reports were published only in national languages. In addition, with the 
limited information at hand, it is uncertain how nationwide a picture of desired 
family sizes is provided by some surveys.
Most surveys seem to have been aimed exclusively at married respondents, 
except for four small surveys in Czechoslovakia between 1963 and 1967 which 
targeted women before marriage, and the 1987 East German survey which did 
not control for marital status. However, it is almost certain that not all of the 
surveys were based on truly random samples, and consequently some inter­
country or temporal differences in indicators could reflect sampling defects. 
There may also have been differences in the wording of the crucial question on 
attitude to family size. In theory, questions can be about the number of children
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'expected1, 'planned', or considered 'ideal';37 or respondents may simply be 
asked which single family size is the 'best' according to unspecified criteria, in 
which case it is not clear how much the answer reflects personal preferences 
and how much perceptions of societal norms. Even subtle differences in 
definitions of terms or wording of questions obviously have some effect on 
comparisons, but one can only speculate on their possible influence. All of this 
prevents presentation of a comparative summary for the whole of Eastern 
Europe.
Table 4.8 shows the average numbers of children desired by married women of 
various reproductive ages in several Eastern European countries and years. 
Naturally, family-size preferences may relate to a preferred family-size range 
rather than to a single number of children. However, a broader discussion of 
ideal family size distributions for Eastern Europe is impeded by the scarcity of 
available data, because for some surveys an average number of children 
desired is the only information that is available. As can be seen, the number of 
surveys published in a form that permits at least this comparison varies from 
zero for Albania to more than ten for Czechoslovakia. By and large, the data 
given in Table 4.8 indicate ultimate numbers of children which interviewed 
women found ideal or desirable. The results show that average desired family 
size oscillated between two and three children per family in all of the relevant 
surveys. The average number of children considered ideal varied from 2.7 per 
woman in Yugoslavia in 1970 to 2.0 in Hungary in 1986 (the somewhat lower 
figures for Czechoslovakia in 1966 and 1973 relate only to urban populations); 
but for an overwhelming majority of inquiries the variation is roughly between 2.1 
and 2.5 children. There is no clear relationship between fertility desires and 
demographic policies or actual fertility performance. For instance, on average 
relatively small families were preferred in the 1960s and 1970s despite the wave 
of government pronatalism through most of the region which elevated period 
levels of fertility.38 In some countries, there has been a tendency towards
37 For a good discussion of the relations between these three concepts, see Berent (1983). It may 
be noted, however, that in a number of surveys ideal and actually planned numbers of children 
were found to be not very different. For instance, according to the results of the 1977 
Czechoslovak fertility survey the average planned number of children per family was 2.27; the 
average number of children considered ideal for a family similar to that in which the respondent 
lived was 2.38; and the average number of children per family considered ideal for the country as 
a whole was 2.49 (FSO, 1978).
38 Even in Romania, where pronatalist pressure was extraordinarily strong, the number of children 
preferred by women in 1978 was quite low, and corresponded to one of the lowest levels reported 
in Europe around the mid-1970s (Berent, 1983).
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Table 4.8: Average desired / ideal number of children in Eastern Europe,
selected countries and years
Country Year Characteristics of the survey 
sample (number of respondents, 
marital status, age range)
Average 
desired / ideal 
fam ily size
Albania no information
Bulgaria 1976 6,911 EMW, 15-44 2.25
Czechoslovakia 1956 10,645 CMW, 15-39 2.20
1959 3,191 CMW, 15-49 2.36
1963 1,888 NMW, 15-30, towns only 2.12
1964 1,556 NMW, 15-30, village only 2.31
1966 1,000 NMW, aged 21, towns only 1.93
1967 1,000 NMW, aged 21, village only 2.14
1970 2,994 CMW, 15-54 2.31
1972 3,470 CMW, 18-49 2.20
1973 400 CMW, 15-34, towns only 1.96
1977 3,041 CMW, 18-44 2.27
1981 3,029 CMW, 18-39 2.20
1985 6,184 CMW, 18-39 2.04
East G erm any 1987 1,500 W, 18-40 1.93
Hungary 1958 6,732 CMW, 15-49 2.33
1966 8,800 CMW, 15-49 2.10
1974 3,142 CMW, 15-35 2.06
1977 4,009 CMW, 15-40 2.06
1986 3,800 CMW, 18-39 2.00
Poland 1963 2,381 CMW, 15-49 2.26
1972 15,354 CMW, 15-49 2.63
1977 9,799 CMW, 15-45 2.50
1981 7,772 CMW, 15-45 2.30
Romania 1978 10,141 CMW, 15-49 2.22
Yugoslavia 1970 5,064 CMW, 15-49 2.71
USSR 1969 31,002 CMW, 18-39 2.42
Notes: CMW - currently married women, EMW - ever married women, NMW - never married 
women, W - all women, regardless of marital status.
Sources: Sib (1963, 1973, 1979), Berent (1970, 1983), Srb and Kucera (1959), Srb, Kucera, and 
Vysusilova (1961), Srb and Kucerak (1974), Frenkel (1976), UN (1976), Wynnyczuk and 
Sracek (1976), Klinger (1977, 1985), Dvorak, Srb, and Ales (1983), CSO (1980, 1982, 1987), 
Smolinski (1983), Kraus (1987), Speigner (1988).
reduction of the average desired family size over time, although it may be 
assumed that an ideal of a childless union or a one-child family remained rare. 
The data for Hungary, in particular, seem to indicate the process of social re­
stratification, leading over time to a growing proportion of married women 
desiring a small family; however, this shift tended to stop at a relatively 
moderate average level of two children per family.
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Table 4.9 shows the distributions of family size preferences ascertained by five 
fertility surveys conducted in Czechoslovakia between 1956 and 1985. The data 
indicate a gradual, although not entirely consistent, shift to a small-family ideal 
among married women. The major trend seems to be the declining desire for 
larger families. This is true especially for the period between 1970 and 1985 
during which the proportion of respondents wishing to have at least three 
children dropped from about 30 per cent to less than 15 per cent. In each 
survey, the distribution of desired family sizes is highly concentrated at the two- 
child norm; this accounts for three-fifths to two-thirds of all responses. Changes 
over time on the lower end of the distribution of family size preferences were not 
very dramatic, indicating fluctuations in proportions of women preferring small 
families. Apparently, permanent childlessness was the goal of only a marginal 
fraction of the married population, while the one-child family ideal accounted for 
only between 7 and 13 per cent of all family-size preferences. However, the data 
in Table 4.9 should be treated with caution as it is not clear to what extent 
observed differences are the result of dissimilarities in survey designs.
Table 4.9: Distribution of family size preferences in Czechoslovakia 
(per cent) according to results of selected fertility surveys
Year 
of survey
Number of children desired: Total
0 1 1-2 2 2-3 3 4+ unknown
1956 4.0 9.1 60.1 21.5 5.3 100.0
1959 0.9 7.8 60.4 25.3 5.6 100.0
1970 1.2 6.7 59.6 — 32.5 — 100.0
1972 1.4 12.9 57.7 22.7 5.3 100.0
1985 0.3 10.0 1.2 64.6 7.4 11.2 3.2 2.1 100.0
Note: For more details about particular surveys, see Table 4.8.
Sources: Srb et al. (1961), Srb (1963), FSO (1971), Srb and Kucerak (1974), Kraus (1987).
The general conclusion emerging from the fertility surveys discussed is that in 
the post-war decades an overwhelming majority of women in Eastern Europe 
planned their families to avoid having many children. In Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary, this tendency was evident in surveys conducted in the late 1950s, and 
the ideal of a family of two, rather than three, children is then apparent in all 
subsequent surveys. The persistence of this preference for small families 
suggests that it did not occur accidentally. It may be hypothesized that one 
reason for it may have been the low 'value' of children, both as economic and as 
spiritual assets, which is typical of more modern egalitarian family attitudes. 
Modern socio-economic development altered the family's economic and 
educational functions; made children more costly by requiring higher quality in
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them; and brought into question their importance relative to that of other family 
and individual goals and activities. These conditions, along with high levels of 
female employment, income difficulties, limited housing, low levels of consumer 
services, uneven sharing of housework between husbands and wives, 
emergence of alternative sources of social status and psychic satisfaction that 
previously had been provided by children, and other related factors, weakened 
the economic and social function of a big family and made a large number of 
children undesirable. Most of these factors were not unique to Eastern Europe. 
More peculiar is the fact that the emergence of the small-family ideal in Eastern 
European countries had already become apparent in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, well out of proportion to their development levels or other common 
determinants of family-size preferences. It is also worth noting that the socio­
economic changes that took place in these countries in subsequent years 
appear to have had so little effect on preferred numbers of children in families.
According to Mason (1983), family-size preferences may indicate either that 
couples have chosen their style of life and the number of children they want on 
the basis of personally defined goals, or that the social norm of having a 
particular number of children is so strong that independent decisions on this 
matter have become nearly impossible. The preference for a two- to three-child 
family in Eastern Europe could be interpreted in both ways: as an attribute of 
couples and at the same time as a group characteristic governed by external 
constraints imposed upon people by the economic and institutional conditions in 
which they lived. Wroblewski (1965: 28) offers an explanation for the Polish 
fertility decline of the 1950s which highlights this dual nature of family-size 
preferences:
A child is a ball and chain in professional and social life. Give up work? 
Bah! It's easier not to begin a family. One gets used to a larger family 
budget. Someone making a decent living... would have trouble raising 
even one child — in spite of the development of nursery schools, 
playgrounds, and summer camps and in spite of the family allowances. 
They would have real difficulty in raising two. After all, they have no 
intention of giving up amenities which have become elementary... like 
radio, the cinema, or a different pair of shoes in winter and summer. 
People earning above-average incomes can live decently even with two 
children, but to them 'decently' means something more. They do not 
want to lower their standards and would rather buy an automobile or take 
a trip abroad than have children. And this is what they do. People... 
[who] had a hard time during the war, after the war, and during the 
ascetic stalinist [sic] period, give full rein to their appetites now that there 
is stability... Perhaps they prefer fun to duty, perhaps they have more 
than enough duties without trying to raise a child...
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Thus, Wroblewski seems to suggest that in the 1950s the family-size decisions 
and life-style preferences of many couples were directly affected by socio- 
historical events specific to that epoch. It may be hypothesized that these 
couples could later become 'reference1 or 'identification' families39 for later 
cohorts, which did not experience the events related to war and Stalinism. Thus, 
the fertility preferences of the generations which entered the childbearing ages 
in the 1950s were gradually transformed into a set of family-size norms that 
persisted long after this period, despite the continuing changes in socio­
economic conditions. The appearance of many small families may have in itself 
altered average ideas of the 'normal' number of children and the desirable ways 
of drawing pleasure from life. Naturally, in the absence of direct empirical 
evidence to prove this hypothesis, these conclusions must be considered 
tentative.
4.7 Contraception
With some oversimplification it may be said that the transition from high to low 
fertility essentially corresponds to a gradual separation of sexuality and 
procreation. One phenomenon that has run parallel to, and facilitated, this 
change has been the 'modernization' of fertility control in general, and the 
introduction and increasing use of efficient methods of preventing conception in 
particular. The influence of modern methods of birth control should not be 
overstressed, for they are a means and not a cause, and their use is not 
indispensable to conception control or birth limitation. However, there is little 
doubt that diffusion of modern methods enabling greater precision in fertility 
regulation and giving women control of the limiting of births has played a role in 
the reduction of fertility in developed societies to current low levels. In Western 
countries, the emergence of these methods, the dissemination of the new 
behavioural norms which they fostered, and the impact of these innovations on 
society as a whole are generally referred to as the 'contraceptive revolution' 
(Westoff and Ryder, 1977). However, unlike in the United States and many other 
Western countries, the increased practice of effective contraception has been of 
relatively recent origin in Eastern Europe, reflecting the region's unique social 
and demographic situation in the post-World War II period. Contraceptives such 
as the hormonal pill and the intra-uterine device gained broad recognition and 
became available only in the late 1960s, whereafter they were usually subject to
39 For an excellent discussion of the concept of reference group as a mechanism for the 
acquisition of norms related to fertility, see Clay and Zuiches (1980).
164
chronic shortages. Sterilization remained rarely used, often being regarded as 
‘too grave an operation to be used merely for limiting fertility1 (Vojta, 1961: 
112).40 As a result, Eastern European populations became notorious for the 
relatively low prevalence of modern contraceptive methods and heavy reliance 
on traditional, non-supply techniques of birth control.
Although contraceptive prevalence surveys were carried out in many Eastern 
European countries, international comparative data on contraceptive use are 
scarce. Some important reasons for cross-national incomparability of data are 
dissimilar sample designs, differences in survey methods and the range of 
methods included as 'contraception', and different definitions of women and 
couples in need of contraception. Ideally, survey data should exclude cases 
where current non-use reflects circumstances other than the lack of any effort to 
prevent an unintended pregnancy. Such circumstances include actively seeking 
to become pregnant, being already pregnant, being in the postpartum period, 
sterile or of doubtful fecundity, and being recently married, when fertility plans 
may be unfixed and pregnancy may be accepted when it occurs. Unfortunately, 
most surveys conducted in Eastern Europe do not make it possible to exclude 
'rational non-users' from the analysis, and it is often difficult to judge what 
influence their inclusion may have had. Similarly, surveys differ in whether they 
concentrate on past or current contraceptive use, and on how they categorize 
users of multiple methods. Given these problems, survey data on contraceptive 
use must be approached with caution.
Table 4.10 shows the results of several surveys concerning the methods and 
practice of birth control undertaken in Eastern Europe since the late 1950s. 
Before analysing these data, it should be noted that it is difficult to assess the 
use of family planning methods within a society because questioning tackles 
private issues; knowledge of a method is not the same as its use; and methods 
may not be used consistently. Even though some surveys have defects that limit 
their value, they can nevertheless be taken together as complementary sources 
of information. Among these surveys, special mention should be made of the 
Czechoslovak inquiries of 1956 and 1959 and the Hungarian surveys of 1958 
and 1966, as these are the oldest available sources of data on contraceptive 
practice. The Czechoslovak results (Srb and Kucera, 1959; Srb et al., 1961) 
showed that among married women of reproductive age the most frequently 
used method was coitus interrupts, which was the chief method of about two-
40 The extremely low popularity of sterilization as a birth control technique can to some extent be 
explained by the fact that for many Eastern Europeans it was associated with the Nazi occupation.
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thirds of those who claimed to be practising fertility control. Around 20 per cent 
of contraceptors used condoms, leaving only a negligible percentage for other, 
more modern and more efficient techniques. Among the Hungarian women 
interviewed, between 50 and 60 per cent of contraceptive users practised coitus 
interrupts only, and roughly 20 per cent relied on some sort of barrier method 
(CSO, 1980). Surveys conducted during the 1960s and 1970s showed that this 
experience of Hungarian and Czechoslovak couples was shared by many other 
populations of the region.
Judging from the more recent surveys, the use of more refined and more 
efficient techniques seems to have grown throughout the region, as has the 
proportion of couples practising some form of birth control. But progress in the 
overall pattern of contraceptive use was slow, and use of more reliable forms of 
contraception remained relatively uncommon. Hungary appears to be the only 
Eastern European country which, during the 1970s and 1980s, experienced a 
considerable shift in contraceptive patterns. This change was the result of a set 
of policies, gradually introduced after the mid-1960s, which were intended to 
increase the availability of modern contraceptives. The first Hungarian-produced 
oral contraceptive was marketed in 1967, and the first intra-uterine device in the 
early 1970s; at the same time, procedures for obtaining oral and hormonal 
contraception were considerably simplified (Klinger, 1985). Thus, within less 
than a decade the Hungarians achieved a dramatic increase in the use of 
modern contraceptives. These changes, particularly the introduction of the pill, 
made such an impact that the proportion of contraceptive users relying solely on 
coitus interrupts dropped to 23 per cent by 1977, and to only 11 per cent by 
1986 (UN, 1989b). However, the Hungarian success story was unique in the 
Eastern European context. In the rest of the region, coitus interrupts continued 
to account for the majority of contraceptive behaviour at least through the 
1970s, despite the attempts of some countries (particularly East Germany and 
Poland)41 to improve access to pills and lUDs. In the extreme cases (Bulgaria in 
1976, Romania in 1978, and the Soviet Union in 1979), non-appliance methods 
accounted for about 90 per cent of contraceptive practice (Table 4.10).
What were the reasons for the persistence of this contraceptive 'conservatism' in 
Eastern Europe? The situation in each country varied, but there were obviously 
some common determinants underlying the generally sluggish diffusion of 
modern contraceptives. Indeed, a closer look at the Eastern European realities
41 See Okolski (1983), Hamand (1989), and Mehlan (1990).
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reveals a number of explanatory factors, both on the 'supply' and the 'demand' 
sides of the contraceptive equation.
(a) Shortage of contraceptives: during the communist era, production and 
distribution of contraceptive devices had low priority in government policy. 
Contraceptives were not imported from Western countries, and little funding 
was made available for their purchase within the Soviet bloc or for ensuring 
appropriate increases in domestic production.42 Thus, the problems of erratic 
supply and poor distribution of contraceptives had similar origins to those 
plaguing the socialist economy in general, and the consumer goods sector in 
particular.43
(b) Pronatalist considerations: in some Eastern European countries
contraceptive supplies were at certain times deliberately disrupted to 
encourage childbirth in order to meet the perceived demands of the national 
economy for labour. The most notable cases were Romania between 1966 
and 1989 (David, 1990) and Albania up to 1991 (Dumani, 1993), but the 
notion that contraceptive practices should not be officially promoted because 
of their possible suppressing effect on birth rates surfaced from time to time 
in all countries of the region.44
(c) 'Bad press': each method of contraception had its bad press in Eastern 
Europe. Reports about the harmful effects of oral or intra-uterine 
contraceptives, in particular, received wide press coverage. Health 
propaganda typically overemphasized the risks associated with the use of 
high-tech contraception, often concluding that non-appliance forms were 
better than appliance ones.45 Medical professionals were usually reluctant to
42 In most Eastern European countries, catching up with European standards of contraceptive 
supplies would clearly have necessitated major financial inputs into pharmaceutical industries. For 
instance, Presl (1977) estimated that, if the number of users of hormonal contraceptives in 
Czechoslovakia were to increase by 20 per cent, domestic production would have to increase four 
to six times.
43 The lack of contraceptives on Eastern European domestic markets became proverbial. For 
example, David and McIntyre (1981: 109) claim that, by the late 1970s, the primary methods of 
contraception in the Soviet Union were 'the housing shortage, the lack of double beds, and the 
fatigue of working wives'. As at 1975, it was calculated that supplies of condoms covered only 16 
per cent, of lUDs 11 per cent, and of pills less than 1 per cent of the estimated demand of the 
Soviet population: by 1985 the corresponding figures were 15, 30, and 9 per cent (Popov, Visser, 
and Ketting, 1993).
44 A telling example of the official ambivalence over contraceptives can be found in Stefanov and 
Naoumov's (1974: 168) overview of Bulgarian population policies: 'In the spirit of the country's 
population policies, contraceptive devices ... are available, but their adoption is not encouraged as 
it is in countries whose demographic policy is to reduce population'.
45 Heitlinger (1979, 1987), Desfosses (1981), David and McIntyre (1981), Visser, Remennick and 
Bruyniks (1993), and Visser et al. (1994) present comprehensive evidence that Eastern European 
public health officials and medical doctors were inclined to believe that pills and lUDs are 
dangerous to a woman's health and should be prescribed only for medical disorders. Perhaps the 
most extreme example can be found in Popov et al. (1993: 232), who quote from a directive
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prescribe certain types of female contraception, and often insisted that the 
prescription be preceded by a set of in-depth clinical examinations. Ironically, 
concern for women's health thus frequently appeared among the main 
grounds for official reluctance to promote research into, and the 
popularization of, modern birth-control methods. However, it must be 
acknowledged that Eastern European variants of hormonal and intra-uterine 
contraception had more side-effects than Western-produced brands 
(Thomas, 1991)
(d) Negative public opinion on modern contraceptives: many Eastern Europeans 
were deeply suspicious about modern methods of contraception. The 
conviction was widespread that the pill and IUD cause breast cancer, weight 
gain, and bleeding irregularities; similarly, the condom was linked in people's 
minds with venereal diseases and prostitution (Desfosses, 1981; Zverina, 
1991; Popov et al. 1993). Non-supply methods of contraception, on the other 
hand, were popular because their use was regarded as fairly safe, and their 
use was independent of the functioning of public health services and sources 
of pharmaceutical supplies. A survey conducted in Czechoslovakia in 1991 
yielded fairly typical results in this respect, indicating a general distrust of 
modern contraception and, perhaps more importantly, much ignorance about 
the relative advantages and disadvantages of contraceptive methods (Table 
4.11). Therefore, it would be misleading to attribute the continued use of 
traditional contraceptive techniques merely to the unavailability of alternative 
methods. Rather, Eastern European contraceptive patterns attest that 
survival of 'old fashioned' contraception practices in a population is not only a 
technical condition but a cultural one (Santow, 1993).
The limited use of more efficient birth control techniques had significant effects 
on demographic patterns in Eastern Europe. It affected the ways people thought 
about sex and procreation, and consequently influenced their reproductive 
behaviour. Among other things, the relative absence of effective means of family 
planning impeded the spread of more individualistic, self-indulgent forms of 
behaviour, and thus helped to preserve some of the traditional, family-oriented 
attitudes and lifestyles. Progress in preventing unwanted conceptions was 
retarded, which in turn meant that overall fertility levels in Eastern European 
countries never fell as low as they did in many Western populations. It is also
issued by the USSR Ministry of Public Health in the mid-1980s: The long-term use of pills can 
have as a result a serious destruction of the main internal organs. It is prohibited to speak about 
pills in lectures on contraceptive use. If some women do nevertheless ask a doctor about using a 
pill, it is strictly prohibited to supply them with any commercial names of pills'. There is little doubt 
that health targets were often used simply to mask expansionist population policy objectives.
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Table 4.11: Attitudes towards contraception among Czechoslovak women
in 1991 (per cent)
Criterion Perception Method:
Sterili­
zation Pill IUD Condom
Non-supply
m ethods3
Safety in term s of side-effects:
safe 41 38 50 82 80
unsafe 20 33 29 2 3
don't know 39 29 21 16 17
total 100 100 100 100 100
Reliability in term s of failure:
reliable 75 62 70 88 48
unreliable 3 22 8 4 37
don't know 22 16 22 8 15
total 100 100 100 100 100
M oral/religious acceptability:
acceptable 39 56 50 69 73
unacceptable 30 11 18 9 5
don't know 31 32 32 22 22
total 100 100 100 100 100
Interference with sex life:
disturbing 26 10 14 53 52
not disturbing 13 36 54 31 32
don't know 61 54 32 16 16
total 100 100 100 100 100
Notes: Based on responses of a sample of 1,072 women aged 15-44; the sample was
representative for age and urban/rural residence, a - non-supply methods: rhythm, withdrawal, 
abstinence, douching, folk methods, and unspecified ('other1) methods.
Source: Ketting et al. (1992).
clear that the generally low levels and limited effectiveness of contraceptive use 
resulted throughout Eastern Europe in a high incidence of unplanned 
pregnancies necessitating resort to abortion — a phenomenon discussed in 
more detail in the rest of this thesis.
4.8 Conclusion
This chapter has covered such a wide range of topics that these concluding 
reflections can touch only a few salient points. Though many of the findings are 
relatively straightforward and many of the inferences are self-evident, the 
evaluation of such diverse material is bound to raise difficulties. Much of the 
evidence that seems to support particular explanations of the demographic 
developments in Eastern Europe is open to alternative interpretations. Although 
this evidence can be used to argue for a particular interpretation, its real 
importance perhaps lies in suggesting that there is more than one interpretation.
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Plausible reasons for the unique, often peculiar, features of post-war social 
change in the former socialist states of Eastern Europe are not hard to find in 
the political and economic climate of the period 1945-89. The dramatic, 
unprecedented, and often traumatic political events and social changes in this 
region during this period included rapid transitions to centrally planned industrial 
economies; the establishment of political systems that strongly suppressed 
personal autonomy; high numbers of women in employment and the 'equal' 
status formally accorded to them; chronic economic hardship resulting in low 
standards of living, widespread acceptance of the 'double burden' of women and 
persistence of sex-role stereotypes; welfare policies with redistributive as well as 
demographic aims; and conditions of only limited access to modern means of 
contraception. These elements were explicit in the policies of some Eastern 
European governments and implicit in the economic situation faced by all of 
them; and all had profound impacts on patterns of demographic change. It 
would be surprising, indeed, if the powerful and enduring features of the socialist 
system did not have a significant effect on reproductive behaviour. It is against 
this background that the demographic developments in Eastern Europe should 
be viewed and interpreted.
The experience of Eastern Europe clearly shows that a state-socialist 
transformation is, in contrast to what had been envisaged by the early Marxist 
writers, insufficient to bring about a smooth, efficient, and unperturbed pattern of 
demographic reproduction. The socialist regimes were not reluctant to directly 
intervene to modify individual reproductive decisions, and had a wide 
assortment of policy strategies at their disposal to interfere in nearly all aspects 
of their citizens' lives, and yet the reproductive processes of Eastern European 
populations did not proceed in 'desired' ways. There is an important lesson to 
learn for those who would argue that a strong political will and a vehement 
command is all that is required for corrective social policies to be effective.
At this point, it is appropriate to ask what was the role of induced abortion in 
post-war population change in Eastern Europe. How did abortion fit into the 
region's overall demographic picture? The next chapter surveys available 
evidence to answer this question, as well as to touch on a few related issues.
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Chapter 5: DEMOGRAPHIC SIGNIFICANCE OF INDUCED ABORTION
IN EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
5.1 Introduction
This chapter attempts to map out some of the major demographic 
consequences which appear to emerge from the available data on abortion in 
Eastern Europe. Appear is the only word appropriate. There is still much that is 
not known about induced abortion in particular Eastern European countries. The 
full range of demographically relevant evidence is not yet, and may never be, 
available. Indeed, the question of the differing quality and availability of data is 
important enough to deserve more detailed analysis in the opening section of 
the chapter. This is followed by a summary of annual abortion rates and a 
discussion of the impact of changing abortion legislation and practice on trends 
in reproductive behaviour. Finally, the effects on fertility of abortion and other 
proximate determinants are estimated for individual Eastern European countries, 
and compared with evidence from other populations.
5.2 Data problems
The registration of legal abortion is one of the most difficult areas of vital 
statistics. There are two main preconditions for effective registration: the 
induction of abortion has to be accompanied by a precisely defined registration 
duty; and there has to be an effective system of gathering vital or public health 
statistics within which abortions can be registered. When these two prerequisites 
are met, it is theoretically possible to demand the certification of all abortion 
cases — legally induced, illegally induced, and spontaneous — comparable to 
the registration of births. In practice, however, there is a degree of non-reporting 
and misreporting of statistical facts on abortions in every society, varying greatly 
according to the legality of abortion, the way in which laws and policies are 
interpreted, the climate of public acceptance of birth control and abortion, and 
the degree to which the authorities are motivated to determine the real extent of 
abortion.
Obviously many factors can produce inaccuracies in abortion statistics. The 
most fundamental of them is that certain abortions may pass unnoted or without 
requiring assistance by health professionals, and in consequence will not be 
registered by them. Some deficiencies in registration data may also stem from 
individual women's shame and fear of stigmatization with which abortions, like
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many events related to sexual behaviour and health, are often shrouded. 
Moreover, registering an abortion usually has none of the economic and social 
advantages that a live-born child or its family may later derive from registering its 
birth. In the case of unlawful abortions, intentional non-reporting may be 
presumed in all countries at all times. Some illegal operations may come to 
official notice if their consequences necessitated medical aftercare, but 
operations performed clandestinely by skilled medical practitioners are likely to 
escape such attention. Even when abortions are performed legally, though, 
doctors may have several reasons for not notifying them, the main ones being a 
desire not to be known as abortionists for fear of damaging their professional 
images or financial interests, and failure to fulfil all the legal requirements for the 
operation. In addition to underreporting, there may be false reporting of such 
personal characteristics of the woman as residence, marital status, number of 
previous births and abortions, week of gestation, or reason for abortion, 
especially if legal or financial considerations are involved. Reporting is probably 
least complete for abortions which had no contact with hospitals, including 
procedures performed in the private offices of medical practitioners. Generally, 
only records on induced abortions performed in accordance with the legally 
authorized procedure in an approved medical institution can be considered 
close to complete.
Apart from factors that influence whether or not individual cases are recorded, 
data are often further impoverished at the stage of publication. Induced abortion 
is customarily regarded as a politically sensitive topic, and publicizing its real 
dimensions may be deemed by the government or similar authority to be 
inappropriate. Politicians may fear that once actual figures are known, public 
debate leading to criticism of various levels of the political hierarchy may ensue. 
Controversies and tensions that surround the publication of data often represent 
a major complication for the objective study of abortion and related demographic 
problems. And, worse still, lack of reliable information can easily generate the 
feeling that no problems exist.
Depending on whether or not the circumstances mentioned above apply, 
published statistics on abortions in a country may be fairly comprehensive and 
complete, or sparse and lacking in precision. In Eastern Europe between the 
early 1950s and the late 1980s, the reliability and detail of available statistics on 
legal abortions have varied between these extremes, both from country to 
country and over time. At the risk of some oversimplification, it is possible to
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distinguish three groups of countries based on the quality and availability of their 
data on abortion:
(1) countries that collected and published relatively comprehensive statistics on 
abortion: Czechoslovakia and Hungary;
(2) countries that apparently established reliable systems of collection of 
abortion statistics, but did not publish detailed data: Bulgaria and East 
Germany;
(3) countries that failed to develop an effective system of monitoring abortion, 
and therefore usually did not provide reliable data on abortion: Albania, 
Poland, Romania, USSR, Yugoslavia.
In Czechoslovakia and Hungary, the committees for the authorization of 
abortions and the relevant obstetrical facilities were obliged to record in special 
registers personal data about women requesting abortions and particulars about 
each operation (David and McIntyre, 1981; Holub, 1987). The individual record 
consisted of the name of the woman, her age and address, the duration of her 
pregnancy, the reason abortion was requested, the decision of the committee 
and the grounds on which it was based, the place to which the pregnant woman 
was sent for the termination to be performed, and other details of a medical 
nature. Abortion committees acted as record-keepers until the obligation to 
consult a committee before aborting was removed from the law, which 
happened in 1987 in Czechoslovakia and in 1988 in Hungary. After this legal 
change, responsibility for reporting of abortions was essentially simply 
transferred to medical institutions where abortions were performed. Registers of 
abortion seekers were kept as official documents subject to professional 
secrecy, and information they contained could be communicated only to 
authorized persons.
Because abortion has largely not been considered socially stigmatizing, it might 
be assumed that Czechoslovak and Hungarian women had no grave 
psychological reasons to avoid the administrative formalities related to the 
operation. Abortions performed outside the network of public health facilities 
were generally prohibited, partly because private medical practices in both 
countries were tolerated but seen as undesirable. They were under strict 
administrative control that strongly discouraged any developments in the 
abortion area. Consequently, private medical offices were scarce, badly 
equipped, and thus virtually incapable of providing more difficult obstetrical
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services (Kaser, 1976). In all cases where abortion was not initiated or 
completed in a state establishment, the law required a detailed and thorough 
case history and immediate notification of competent legal and medical 
authorities. Physicians who failed to report unlawful abortion activities were 
liable to various disciplinary measures or even to criminal prosecution. Data on 
legal abortion have been continuously monitored, analysed, and published 
within the two national systems of vital statistics. Ranges of data on abortions 
and abortion seekers are available in national yearbooks.1 In many respects, 
these statistics are unique; elsewhere in the developed world data of similar 
quality and comprehensiveness are non-existent or only became available 
relatively recently.
In Bulgaria from 1956 and in East Germany from 1972, statistical recording of 
abortion was also based on directives included in abortion laws. According to 
these directives, the boards responsible for granting authorizations and the 
doctors who performed the operations in hospitals were required to submit 
periodic reports on all abortions that came to their notice. Thus, both the official 
requirements and the broader social and psychological circumstances of record­
keeping did not differ substantially from those in Czechoslovakia and Hungary, 
and the system was apparently capable of ensuring fairly reliable statistical data. 
Unfortunately, Bulgarian and East German statistical agencies seldom published 
much beyond simple abortion totals. In East Germany, national figures are 
lacking altogether for the years 1965-70, although rates from the Rostock area 
(about 5 per cent of the total population) may be taken as broadly representative 
of the whole country (Mehlan, 1988). Thus, Bulgarian and East German 
statistics are of little assistance to demographers, although some useful 
statistical series, apparently based on unpublished reports from national 
agencies, can be found in David and McIntyre (1981), Tietze and Henshaw 
(1986) and Blayo (1991a,b, 1993b), and in publications of the United Nations 
(1992b,c, 1993c).
In other Eastern European countries, registration of abortion appears to be 
substantially incomplete. In Poland, official data yield a considerable undercount 
as they include abortions registered in hospitals and clinics, but not those 
performed by private physicians. It is widely believed that the numbers of
1 See FSO (1991), IHS (1991), CSO (1992). Apart from the published materials, some 
unpublished data on abortion and fertility were obtained for the purposes of the present study 
from the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Budapest, and the Czech Statistical Office, Prague.
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abortions performed outside of public medical institutions have been significant, 
as many women preferred to avoid the public atmosphere in hospitals. Blayo 
(1993b) quotes a Polish estimate according to which the true number of 
abortions performed in 1987 was between 400,000 and 600,000, compared to 
122,536 officially reported. Underreporting of abortions in private facilities has 
been largely ascribed to doctors' tendency to falsify numbers of operations 
performed in order to evade taxes (Okolski, 1983, 1988). This underreporting in 
all probability distorted not only the total numbers of abortions performed but 
also the structural characteristics of abortion seekers, since not all women were 
able to pay for private medical services. Moreover, women from abroad were not 
itemized separately, which might further affect the quality of official statistics, 
particularly those for the 1960s and 1970s when Poland, through its permissive 
abortion regulations, attracted substantial numbers of abortion seekers from 
Sweden and other Western European countries (Francome, 1984).
Romanian statistics on abortion are also believed to be defective. The liberal 
abortion law that operated in Romania during 1957-66 required gynaecologists 
in hospitals to complete the same formalities for women who were to undergo an 
abortion as for other hospitalized patients, but data were usually not checked for 
veracity and completeness (David and Wright, 1971). Between 1966 and 1989, 
under Ceausescu's regime, health professionals and women who sought legally 
indicated abortions were closely watched by the authorities to ensure 
compliance with the extremely strict rules on birth control. Special registers were 
kept of legal abortion operations as well as of any findings indicative of criminal 
terminations of pregnancies. The Romanian State Security Police even 
established a special unit to investigate allegations of illegal abortion, posting 
agents in every maternity ward and obstetrical-gynaecological clinic (Kligman, 
1992). Yet despite governmental restrictions, there is little doubt that Romanian 
women could easily obtain clandestine abortions from private providers, both 
medical and non-medical, identified mostly by word of mouth (Hord et al., 1991). 
Some data on abortion were published, but they apparently represent both 
legally induced abortions and hospital admissions for treatment of complications 
of spontaneous as well as illegal abortions (Frejka, 1983); therefore they are not 
strictly comparable with data from the other countries. In addition, it is likely that 
official Romanian demographic data for the 1970s and 1980s, like most 
economic statistics published by the country's authorities in those years, were 
subject to deliberate manipulation aimed at concealing Romania's true socio­
economic situation (Kligman, 1992).
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In Yugoslavia, abortion was legalized in 1952, but compulsory registration of 
operations was introduced only in 1960 (Potts et al., 1977). Available data for 
the 1960s are considered to be very incomplete owing to substantial 
underreporting in the less developed areas. According to Rasevic (1990), in 
1960 only 65 per cent of abortion clinics passed their records on to the 
appropriate health statistics agency. In 1966 abortions were performed virtually 
without registration, except in a few medical institutions in Croatia and Serbia. 
Between 1969 and 1986, the Federal Public Health Institute of Yugoslavia 
attempted to centralize data on abortions performed in medical institutions 
throughout the country. However, this evidence is regarded as only very poorly 
reflecting the true incidence, partly because of vast regional differences in the 
quality of medical care and subsequent statistical reporting (Andolsek, 1988).
The lack of reliable information about abortion is most evident in the two 
remaining Eastern European countries: Albania and the Soviet Union. Albania 
has probably the poorest demographic statistics in Europe (Kirk, 1981; UN, 
1992b). Abortions were strictly prohibited until 1991. No data were officially 
published and, as a consequence, only a few abortion totals, based on medical 
statistics for the years 1980, 1985, 1989 and 1990, are available (Dumani, 
1993). It was only after adopting new regulations on abortion that Albanian 
authorities started to make legislative provision for obligatory reporting of 
pregnancy terminations (Blayo, 1993a).
In the Soviet Union before the advent of glasnost, central authorities were 
notoriously selective in publishing information about many significant aspects of 
Soviet society. There can be no doubt that they collected a substantial volume 
of data on social trends and conditions, but they were unwilling to publish facts 
which reflected badly on the government or the Communist Party.2 Data on 
abortions performed in state hospitals were virtually unknown to the public until 
1988, although they were allegedly collected by the USSR Ministry of Public 
Health (David, 1970; Avdeev, 1989). Fragmentary data on abortion published in 
the pre-1988 period were based solely on socio-hygienic and demographic 
sample surveys, on the estimates of experts, or on hypothetical reconstructions. 
The frequency of illegal procedures was apparently very high throughout the 
country, but their statistical dimensions were unknown even to Soviet
2 For example, over a number of years it was impossible to ascertain for the USSR a current 
infant mortality rate, a basic social indicator routinely available for most countries (Ryan, 1990).
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demographers (Popov, 1991). It was only recently that basic abortion data 
collected by the State Committee of the USSR for Statistics were published for 
the period 1979-88 (Avdeev, 1994). The supply of information on abortion in the 
Soviet Union is thus neither complete nor accurate, and is in general 
unsatisfactory for even the most modest demands of demographic analysis.
In spite of similar socio-political conditions and cognate legal provisions 
regarding induced abortion, the quality of statistical recording of abortion has 
been far from identical across Eastern European countries. With the possible 
exception of Czechoslovak and Hungarian data, less reliance can be placed on 
Eastern European statistics on abortion than would be expected from the strict 
wording of official record-keeping instructions. Available data are seldom the 
sort the researcher would wish to have. Moreover, as one pushes back in time, 
difficulties with both the quality and quantity of data increase rapidly. This 
imposes an obvious and insurmountable limitation on the discussion that 
follows.3
5.3 Levels and trends of induced abortion
During the period 1950-90, the levels of legal induced abortion in Eastern 
Europe were among the highest in the world (Table 5.1). Moreover, there are 
good reasons to believe that the true incidence of induced abortion in Albania, 
Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia and especially the Soviet Union was even higher 
than the official figures indicate, although by how much one can only speculate. 
Only a few countries outside Eastern Europe, notably Japan in the early 1950s 
and Cuba since the mid-1960s, seem to have experienced comparably high 
levels of legal abortion. But in most developed populations for which abortion 
data are available, the incidence of recorded abortion appears to have been 
considerably lower than in Eastern Europe.
3 Before this chapter was written, an attempt was made to assemble a comprehensive body of 
statistical information on abortion in Eastern Europe. National statistical offices in particular 
Eastern European countries, family planning organizations, and supranational institutions that 
gather international demographic data for comparative purposes were contacted: United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe in Geneva, Institut National d'Etudes D6mographiques in Paris, 
Alan Guttmacher Institute in New York, and Transnational Family Research Institute, Bethesda. 
Regrettably, with the exception of the Czechoslovak and Hungarian statistical offices, none of 
these institutions was able to provide more than total abortion figures and, for some countries, 
basic age-specific rates. Thus, abortion data used in this chapter come from heterogeneous 
sources, ranging from the United Nations Demographic Yearbook to country reports published in 
various journals. Basic abortion statistics for each of the nine Eastern European countries, to the 
extent to which data are available, are shown in Tables A5.1 to A5.9 in the Appendix.
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Table 5.1: Estimated total legal abortion rates for selected developed 
countries, selected years 1950-90
Region
and
country
1950 
or year 
as shown
1960 
or year 
as shown
1970 
or year 
as shown
1980 1990 
or year 
as shown
Albania13
Eastern European countries
0.1 0.2
Bulgaria 0.02 (1953) 0.9 1.9 2.3 2.3
Czechoslovakia 0.03 (1954) 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.4
East Germany 0.2 0.01 0.2 0.7 0.6 (1989)
Hungary 0.02 2.3 2.5 1.1 1.2
Poland3 0.01 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.2
Romania13 5.6 1.9 2.7 6.0
Yugoslavia3 0.5 1.3 1.8 2.1 (1986)
USSR3 0.4 (1955) 3.4 3.3 (1971) 3.1 2.6
Denmark
Some other European countries 
0.2(1954) 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.5 (1987)
England and Wales 0.1 (1968) 0.2 0.4 0.4 (1987)
Finland 0.1 (1951) 0.2 (1961) 0.4 0.4 0.4 (1987)
France3 0.4 (1976) 0.5 0.4 (1988)
Italy3 0.6 0.4
Netherlands 0.2 (1973) 0.2 0.2
Norway 0.1 (1964) 0.3 0.5 0.5
Sweden 0.1 (1954) 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.6 (1987)
West Germany3 0.0 0.01 (1968) 0.0 0.3 0.2
Australia
Some countries outside Europe
0.4 0.5 (1988)
Canada 0.1 0.3 0.3 (1987)
Cuba 1.2 1.4 1.7 (1988)
Israel13 0.5 0.4
Japan3 1.2 (1952) 1.3 (1962) 0.8 0.7 0.5
New Zealand 0.2 (1976) 0.3 0.4
USA 0.003 (1963) 0.5 (1973) 0.9 0.8 (1985)
Notes: Rates are estimated by multiplying legal induced abortions per woman aged 15-44 by 30. 
This is a standard approach yielding a lifetime rate per woman (see Frejka, 1983). 
a - reporting incomplete, b - completeness unknown.
Sources: Frejka (1983), Henshaw and Morrow (1990), UN (1992b,c, 1993c).
Within the Eastern European region, the incidence of legal induced abortion has 
varied widely overtime as well as between countries (Figure 5.1). In general, the 
lowest levels were recorded in the early to mid-1950s, when the total rate of 
legally induced abortion was between 0 and 0.2 in most countries for which data 
exist. By the mid-1960s, the total abortion rate had increased (temporarily) to 
over 7.5 in Romania, but remained negligible in East Germany. During the 
1970s and 1980s inter-country differences decreased somewhat, but by the
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Figure 5.1: Estimated total legal abortion rates 
Eastern European countries, 1950-90
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Hungary
■ ■ Romania
USSR
Year
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
• '  Poland
S  2 -
Yugoslavia
Notes: Rates are estimated by multiplying abortions per woman aged 15-44 by 30. 
Sources: See Tables A5.1 - A5.9 in Appendix.
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mid-1980s officially reported total abortion rates still varied appreciably, from a 
low of about 0.15 induced abortions per woman in Albania to a high of about 3 
per woman in the Soviet Union. Figure 5.2 depicts the trends in crude rates of 
registered legal abortions,4 births, and legal abortions plus live births (indicative 
of total pregnancies)5 for countries for which official data are available. Not 
surprisingly, the incidence and trends of legal abortion appear to have been 
substantially influenced by changes in abortion legislation. Therefore, it seems 
appropriate to discuss the evolution of abortion behaviour with reference to 
policy interventions.
5.3.1 Consequences of liberalizing legislation
Following liberalizing changes in legislation that nullified repressive abortion 
laws (in the USSR in 1955; in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland in 1956; in 
Czechoslovakia and Romania in 1957; in Yugoslavia in 1960; and in East 
Germany in 1972), the incidence of recorded legal abortion increased and 
became unprecedentedly high, although different in different countries. In a few 
populations, changes in abortion rates can be compared with levels that were 
recorded before liberalization. In many cases the increases appear to have been 
truly dramatic: between 1955 and 1958 the general abortion rate increased 
more than four times in Hungary, 18 times in Bulgaria, 28 times in 
Czechoslovakia, and 35 times in Poland.
However, in interpreting these figures it should be kept in mind that other policy 
measures and social trends may also have influenced demographic behaviour, 
confounding the effects of abortion legislation. Furthermore, there is no exact 
basis for statistical comparison, as there is no reliable information on the 
situation with respect to abortion in the early 1950s. Before the new abortion 
laws were implemented systematic registration of abortion was practically non­
existent, but a certain level of illegal (or, more generally, unrecorded) abortion 
presumably existed in all countries. Unfortunately, there are no accurate 
statistics on illegal abortion in any country. Various estimates put the number of 
unregistered induced abortions occurring in the period 1950-55 at approximately
4 Except for Romania, where the available data relate to all registered abortions, including legally 
induced, spontaneous, and illegal.
5 Total live births plus legally induced abortions is a substitute for total pregnancies occurring in a 
population, ignoring stillbirths and spontaneous and illegal abortions, for which data are extremely 
difficult to get.
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Figure 5.2: Rates per 1,000 population of total registered pregnancies, live
births, and legal abortions
selected Eastern European countries, 1950-90
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East Germany
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(cont.)
Czechoslovakia
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Figure 5.2 (cont.)
Poland
total pregnancies
live births
legal abortions
Yugoslavia
total pregnancies
3  25
live births
• '' legal abortions
Year Year
Romania*
total pregnancies
live births
total abortions
Sources: see  T ab les  A 5 .1 -A 5 .9
USSR
total pregnancies
co 50
legal abortions
3 30
live births
Note: * D ata  refer to total registered abortions.
183
50.000 to 60,000 a year in Czechoslovakia, 100,000 in Hungary, and 250,000 to
300.000 in Poland (Vojta, 1957; Frejka, 1983). Regardless of the exact 
numbers, it is apparent that illegal abortion must have helped produce the 
Eastern European transition to lower fertility, as this could hardly have been 
achieved using traditional methods of contraception alone.6 Almost immediately 
after the legalization of abortion, the numbers of illegal abortions were reported 
to have declined to no more than 3,000-5,000 in Czechoslovakia and 5,000-
6.000 in Hungary (Klinger, 1967). This suggests that the recorded increases in 
legal abortion were largely due to the conversion of backyard abortions into 
legal ones.7 But how much illegal abortion was replaced by legal abortion 
cannot be precisely stated.
Yet it would be wrong to interpret the rise in abortions after their legalization only 
as transformation of illegal terminations into legal ones. Another circumstance 
that needs to be taken into account is that abortions are associated with a 
shorter period of gestation and a more rapid return of fertility than are births 
(Potter, 1972). Thus, the recorded augmentation in abortion rates (and, 
consequently, in pregnancy rates; see Figure 5.2) has to be partly ascribed to 
the fact that the number of women exposed to the risk of conception increased 
once abortion became more commonly used. Furthermore, the extraordinarily 
rapid increase in the number of abortions recorded in some countries suggests 
that relaxation in the quantity or effectiveness of contraceptive practice, in 
addition to shifts of abortion from the illegal to the legal category and changes in 
the sizes of potentially fecundable populations, were responsible for many newly 
occurring induced abortions.
6 The existence of illegal abortion can be inferred from the objectives of the abortion laws of the 
1950s, where protection of women's health from the risks of illegal abortion was explicitly 
mentioned. Widespread resort to illegal abortion has also been suggested as one of the reasons 
for very low fertility levels in Western Europe and the U.S. during the 1920s and 1930s; see, for 
instance, Campbell (1973), Coleman and Salt (1992).
7 This assumption gains indirect support from the sharply declining numbers of maternal deaths 
related to abortion reported for the late 1950s. For instance, in Czechoslovakia there were 44, 37, 
37, 44, and 41 deaths associated with abortion (both legal and illegal) in the years 1953-57. For 
the period 1958-63, when abortions became broadly available, the corresponding figures were 19, 
10, 10, 12, 9, and 14 for illicit abortion, and 4, 4, 2, 1,2,  and 0 for legal abortion (Cemoch, 1964). 
Similar falls occurred in other Eastern European countries (Potts, 1967), presumably because the 
availability of legal and fairly safe terminations put many illegal abortionists out of business. 
However, although deaths from abortions became rare, the persistence of mortality related to 
abortion after the legalization of induced abortion signals that the transition from illegal and unsafe 
to legal and relatively safe abortion is a gradual process that does not necessarily result in the 
complete eradication of unlawful abortion activities. For of reasons of confidentiality and because 
of other social ramifications, some fringe of illegal abortion will continue in some societies.
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The most striking example of this phenomenon is Romania. In this country, the 
total annual registered number of abortions rocketed from 129,500 to 961,700 
between 1958 and 1962, an increase of 832,200,® whereas the annual number 
of births dropped from 390,500 to 302,000, a decline of only 88,500. Thus, the 
ratio of additional abortions to the decline in births was 832,200:88,500 or 9:1. If 
it is assumed that the ratio of the number of abortions needed to avoid one birth 
in Romania could not be more than 3:1,9 the observed figures indicate that as 
many as two-thirds of the additional abortions could have been due to a 
loosening in contraceptive practice. Although on smaller scales, reductions in 
contraceptive practice can be assumed to have happened in Yugoslavia, 
Hungary, and Bulgaria as well. Yugoslavian data for the period 1959-63 show a 
decline in the annual number of births of 16,900 and an increase in the number 
of legal abortions of 92,300, equivalent to a ratio of 6:1. In Hungary a 
comparison of 1960 with 1969 also gives a ratio of additional abortions to 
reduction in births of 6:1, while in Bulgaria the corresponding ratio for the period 
1955-59 is 3:1. As Frejka (1983) wrote, such grave disproportions would not 
have occurred had there been no change for the worse in the extent and 
efficacy of contraceptive behaviour. However, it remains unclear what, if any, 
role might conversions of abortions from illegal to legal have played in these 
developments.
The only solid facts on which to base an analysis of the demographic effects of 
liberal abortion laws are changes in fertility levels.10 Graphs in Figure 5.3 
compare total fertility rates observed in the years around the implementation of 
liberal abortion laws with hypothetical fertility trend lines obtained through linear 
extrapolation of trends over five-year periods before abortion laws were 
changed.11 Relatively short time intervals are chosen as bases for comparisons 
because trends occurring over longer periods are more likely also to reflect other
8 Although this figure included spontaneous abortions, it is nonetheless extraordinarily high.
9 This assumption is based on Potters (1972) calculations which demonstrate that in a population 
using effective contraception, 100 abortions will avert up to 89 births (or, about 1.2 abortions = 1 
averted birth), whereas in non-contracepting populations, 100 abortions will avert only 30-43 births 
(i.e., it takes about two to three abortions to avert one birth, depending upon the duration of 
breastfeeding).
10 Arguably, changes in fertility levels are the most significant factor in assessing the demographic 
influence of legalized abortion. Nevertheless, one might also consider other demographic 
consequences, such as shifts in the extent of out-of-wedlock or premaritally conceived births, 
marriages contracted as a circumstance of the woman's pregnancy, changes in contraceptive 
use, and changes in characteristics of aborting women. Regrettably, there are few relevant data 
available to analyse such issues for all Eastern European countries.
11 Calculations are not made for the USSR, where a reliable series of TFRs for the 1950s is 
lacking. Results of linear extrapolations are shown in tabular form in Table A5.10 in the Appendix.
185
Figure 5.3: Observed and expected trends in total fertility rates in the years 
around the liberalization of abortion legislation
selected Eastern European countries, various years
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(cont.)
Note: Expected TFRs are extrapolated, using linear regression, from the trends observed over 
five-year periods before liberalization of abortion laws (see Table A5.10 in the Appendix).
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Figure 5.3 (cont.)
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Note: Expected TFRs are extrapolated, using linear regression, from the trends observed over 
five-year periods before liberalization of abortion laws (see Table A5.10 in the Appendix).
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influences than just the modification of abortion laws. Obviously the 
comparisons should be treated as rough estimates of orders of magnitude, 
intended to highlight the extent to which changes in fertility in the years 
immediately following abortion law reform were consistent with pre-existing 
trends. The brief descriptive summary suggests that the effect of legalized 
abortion on fertility differed in different countries.
In Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, fertility rates observed in the first years after the 
liberalization of abortion are either marginally lower or even higher than the 
expected levels. On the basis of linear extrapolations of previous trends, it would 
be difficult to argue that the implementation of liberal abortion laws had any 
immediate suppressing impact on fertility levels in these countries. It may be that 
at first the law permitted formerly illegal abortions to be performed legally, 
without stimulating new aborters, although it is not clear why this would be so 
only in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.
For Poland, the comparison indicates that fertility levels started to deviate from 
their previous course not subsequently to the liberal abortion law of 1956, but 
rather in response to the introduction of more detailed and more permissive 
abortion regulations in 1959. Thus, the Polish case seems to show that it can 
take several years for the new practice of legalized abortion to become 
established, because of the time needed for the legislators to make facilities 
available for performing abortions, for the health professionals to extend 
relevant medical services, and for the population to become accustomed to the 
new legislation. The religious context may also have been an important factor for 
the Polish population's delayed demographic response to the new abortion law.
In the remaining countries of Eastern Europe for which data are available, the 
comparison of birth-rate trends in the years before and after abortion legalization 
suggests a more direct abortion effect (Figure 5.3). In Czechoslovakia and East 
Germany in the years following the legalization of induced abortion fertility 
declines were steeper than those predicted from the antecedent fertility trends. It 
can be hypothesized that the introduction of liberal abortion laws in these two 
countries substantially accelerated decreases in already falling birth rates. If 
legal abortions had merely replaced illegal abortions, then birth rates would 
almost certainly not have declined as rapidly as they did following liberalization 
of abortion laws.
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Finally, Hungary and Romania are countries where the trend lines shown in 
Figure 5.3 indicate the most substantial discrepancies between extrapolated and 
actual fertility levels. In Romania, the TFR was fluctuating between 2.8 and 3.1 
before the implementation of abortion laws, but this changed into a sudden 
decline as the restrictive abortion regulations were repealed. Because of the 
dramatic birth rate decline following the 1957 liberalization, it can be inferred that 
legal abortion was thereafter much more extensively used than illegal abortion 
had been before 1957. For Hungary, the extrapolation technique used produces 
unrealistically high estimates for the late 1950s,12 but the rather sharp decline in 
the Hungarian TFR (from 2.6 to 2.0 between 1956 and 1960) suggests that 
liberalization of abortion was, indeed, accompanied by an abrupt reduction of 
overall fertility.
In summary, differences in natality trends before and after the implementation of 
liberal abortion laws seem to be sufficiently striking to justify the conclusion, 
without more rigorous analysis,13 that the legalization of abortion depressed birth 
rates in most Eastern European countries, except perhaps in Bulgaria and 
Yugoslavia. Thus, it may be argued that measures simplifying legal availability of 
induced abortion produced important changes in demographic patterns in 
Eastern Europe. The truly significant factors seem to be the strength of 
motivation among the general public to adjust the number of children to the 
environment, and the extent to which abortion services were actually made 
available. The relaxation of laws governing abortion proved to be crucial 
governmental action that enabled the populations of Eastern Europe to regulate 
more effectively the numbers of children born. Before the introduction of 
permissive abortion laws they relied largely on traditional contraception as the 
main methods of family planning, and the desire for small family size was 
common. Presumably, it was this tension between increasing demand for fertility 
control and limited availability of the means of control that made for a large 
'unmet need1 for family planning. With easier access to induced abortion, socially 
sanctioned, reasonably safe, and provided cheaply or free by state medical 
services, the full costs of birth control were significantly reduced. Consequently, 
Eastern European women considerably modified their fertility behaviour.
12 Linear extrapolation for Hungary is based on the trends observed during 1951-55 and therefore 
is influenced by a marked increase in TFR between 1952 and 1954. However, this was clearly a 
transient phenomenon related mainly to the 1953 policy change that enforced existing laws 
against illegal abortion (Szabady, 1974).
13 Chapter 8 looks at fertility responses to abortion policy measures in Czechoslovakia using a 
more sophisticated approach.
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Apparently, many decided to terminate pregnancies that otherwise would have 
been carried to term, many resorted to legal (rather than illegal) abortion, and 
some even relaxed the use of contraception. In populations such as that of 
Romania which had only recently experienced rapid social change and had 
limited experience with more effective contraceptive methods, the tendency to 
relax contraceptive behaviour in favour of induced abortion was particularly 
marked. Throughout the region, legal induced abortion thus soon came to be a 
customary remedy for contraceptive failure and for people who wanted to avoid 
having more children than they desired. Some couples started to use induced 
abortion not just as a backup to contraception, but as the only birth control 
practised. It is important to emphasize that the extent to which legalized abortion 
came to be used in excess of the replacement of illegal abortion and 
contraception was of particular significance in shaping the demographic picture 
following legalization.
5.3.2 Consequences of restrictive legislation
As was pointed out by Moore-Cavar (1974) and Frejka (1983), to estimate the 
demographic consequences of restrictive measures is more difficult than to 
assess the consequences of liberalizing policies. Illegal abortions by definition 
are not registered and therefore their incidence is difficult to estimate. However, 
to some extent trends in illegal abortion can be deduced from data on abortions 
that were declared 'spontaneous'. The rationale behind this approach is that 
numbers in this category are likely to rise following restriction, because of the 
tendency to misclassify induced abortions when legal indications get narrower. 
Unfortunately, statistics on spontaneous abortions are always likely to include 
some induced abortions, irrespective of their legal availability, as some doctors 
for financial, psychological, or simply personal reasons prefer to conceal the true 
numbers of induced abortions performed. As the extent of this practice is 
generally unknown, any conclusions based on data on spontaneous abortion 
are bound to be tentative. Another intuitive method of analysing the effects of 
restrictive measures is to look at changes in fertility levels. But even estimates 
derived using this approach can be misleading, especially when abortion- 
restricting measures were promulgated together with policies to make 
childbearing and other aspects of family life more attractive to potential parents, 
as happened in Eastern Europe in the 1960s and 1970s.
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Among the countries of Eastern Europe, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and 
Romania at various points in time imposed significant restrictions on induced 
abortion. In all these countries, narrowing access to abortion brought immediate 
declines in the incidence of legal abortion and increases in the birth rate. 
However, often the effects were rather short-lived and, frequently with no further 
change in abortion laws, abortion and birth rates soon resumed their previous 
levels. Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, in particular, are countries where the 
narrowing of legal access had practically no long-term impact on levels of 
induced abortion (Figure 5.2). In both countries, restrictive measures 
promulgated during the 1960s and early 1970s did not prevent the abortion rate 
from quickly regaining, and later surpassing, levels attained during the early 
1960s under non-restrictive legislation. One reason the outcomes of 
conservative measures were not radical was that abortion remained quite widely 
available at comparatively low cost.
The Czechoslovak data show, however, that the incidence of 'other abortions', a 
category containing spontaneous abortions plus abortions of unknown origin, 
tended to rise in years of pronatalist and abortion-restricting measures, and to 
fall in years when the restrictions were relaxed (Figure 5.4). This is almost 
certainly an indication that the practice of registering induced abortions as 
spontaneous fluctuated in response to legal circumstances.
Figure 5.4: 'Other' abortions as a proportion of total abortions 
Czechoslovakia, 1958-90
0.35 n
3  0.25 -
0.15 -
Notes: a - abortion liberalized, b - abortion restricted. For definition of 'other1 abortions see text. 
Source: FSO (1991).
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The experience of Romania is the most impressive demonstration of what 
happens when a government suppresses legal abortion at to control the birth 
rate. After the 1966 decree that virtually prohibited abortion except for women 
who had borne four or more children, the incidence of legal abortion fell to less 
than one-quarter of its pre-restriction level and the total abortion rate plunged 
from 6.6 to 1.4 abortions per woman between 1966 and 1967.14 As this 
curtailment of abortion took place in a population that had only a fairly weak 
tradition of contraception, the TFR concurrently rocketed from less than 2 to 
more than 3.5; that is, to a level typical of populations half-way in the transition 
from high to low fertility. Without more detailed evidence, it is not possible to 
estimate what proportion of the additional births would not have occurred had 
the abortion law remained unchanged, but it is fair to assume that it was very 
high.15 Yet despite the extremely prohibitive measures the total abortion rate 
had already risen above 2 by 1971, and by 1972 the rate of abortions per 1,000 
population was more or less identical with the crude birth rate (Figure 5.2).
It was only in consequence of the unprecedentedly harsh pronatalist measures 
launched by Ceausescu's regime in the early 1980s that the officially reported 
proportion of total pregnancies terminated by induced abortion dropped below 
50 per cent. But even by 1987, when the pronatalist pressures were at their 
peak, the total abortion rate was still quite high: about 1.5. Apparently, not even 
extreme anti-abortion measures could stop large numbers of women from 
resorting to clandestine abortion. Indirect evidence of this, and perhaps the most 
telling testimony to the tragic consequences of the regime's reproductive 
policies, was the enormously high level of abortion-related mortality. As there 
was little opportunity for abortion procedures to become institutionalized, the 
ratio of abortion-related deaths per million women aged 15-44 rose from 14.3 in 
1965 to 97.5 in 1978, and by 1988 to a depressing 102.5 (Tietze, 1983; 
Jeanblanc, 1990). When the new Romanian government lifted the abortion ban
14 In addition to restriction of the abortion law (still more liberal, it should be noted, than most 
Western laws in those years), the government of Romania instituted several other measures to 
encourage fertility: punitive taxes for the unmarried and childless, reduction in taxes for families 
with three or more children, and difficult and expensive divorce. Consequently, the 1966 policy 
change affected not just fertility trends. For instance, divorces dropped from 25,000 in 1966 to 
only 48 in 1967 (David, 1970).
15 According to David and Wright (1971), fertility increases were particularly high among women 
over age 30 at live-birth orders three and four. For instance, third and fourth births to women aged 
35-39 increased threefold between 1966 and 1967. However, it seems clear that even in the 
absence of legal abortion large numbers of births were being averted by other means, probably by 
illegal abortion, contraception, or abstinence. Had all the induced abortions performed in the pre­
restriction period been transformed into live births, a much higher TFR (5 or more) would have 
resulted.
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in December 1989, officially registered abortions increased abruptly. The total 
number of induced abortions reported in 1990 was more than five times the 
1989 figure; the number of maternal deaths attributable to abortion per million 
women of reproductive age decreased to 34.5, almost a 70 per cent drop from 
the 1988 level (Hord et al., 1991); whereas the number of live births decreased 
by only 15 per cent. There is little likelihood that these facts can be interpreted 
otherwise than as evidence that large numbers of unreported abortions were 
taking place before 1990. It is almost certain that the enormous increase in 
recorded abortion in 1990 was primarily the result of improved hospitalization 
and statistical registration of abortions following the liberalization.
Hungary is perhaps the only Eastern European country where restrictions on 
induced abortion, introduced in 1974, seem to have been followed by a 
permanent reduction in the volume of abortions. To be sure, the abortion rate 
had been declining since 1970, and so the restrictive policy appears to have 
accelerated, rather than initiated, the trend (Figure 5.2). But by Eastern 
European standards the shift was remarkably brisk. Between 1969, the peak 
year, and 1974, the year abortion regulations were tightened, the number of 
induced abortions more than halved and the proportion of known pregnancies 
terminated by abortion dropped from 53 to 32 per cent. It seems clear that such 
a change would hardly have been possible without the influence of the 
pronatalist socio-economic measures adopted by the Hungarian regime of that 
time. Another important factor was the series of public health provisions that, 
starting in 1967, dramatically improved use of modern oral contraceptives by 
making them available, only by prescription, to virtually all women over 18 years 
of age (Szabady, 1974).
In general, the experience of Eastern European countries shows that policies 
intended to reduce the incidence of induced abortion as a rule had only limited 
and transitory success. Because abortion played a dominant role in family 
planning compared to other means of birth control, changes in abortion 
legislation often had dramatic short-term effects; however, their 'macro- 
demographic' impact tended to be rather modest, depending upon the degree of 
restriction. Seemingly, couples were in most instances able to adjust their family 
planning practices to what was possible and feasible under the new 
circumstances. Although analysis of variations in the incidence of abortion in 
response to policy measures is complicated by the influence of other policies 
implemented to affect decisions related to fertility, there seems to be little doubt
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that the effect on a population of tightening abortion policy was primarily 
dependent on the country's previous experience with pregnancy termination.
The Eastern European case as a whole thus demonstrates that fertility control 
patterns, once well established, are not easily changed by governmental 
decision alone. Official law and policy constitutes merely a formal basis, while 
practice develops in its own way. A ban on legal abortion is a prohibition of a 
method of fertility control; since it is not directed at the reason for desiring and 
attempting to have small families, substitute measures will be found wherever 
the desire remains. The lack of systematic connection between abortion 
practices and abortion laws contradicts the idea that abortion policy can be used 
effectively as an instrument of population policy. The finding that the practice of 
abortion remained largely unaffected by anti-abortion policies in Eastern Europe 
echoes Koya's observation, made almost 30 years ago, that once a population 
becomes accustomed to abortion, it is difficult for it to change to other methods 
of fertility control (Koya, 1967). Thus, there are few demographic surprises in 
Eastern Europe's experience with abortion legislation.
It seems that to change abortion trends requires changing significantly the 
socio-economic environment, which is much more difficult than experimenting 
with abortion legislation. It was only when policy-makers combined restrictive 
abortion laws with positive incentives to fertility and with measures promoting the 
use of modern contraceptives that enduring reductions in abortion levels 
followed. Making abortion a criminal offence, even when backed up by 
Draconian sanctions and a ban on contraceptives, did not result in a decrease in 
the abortion rate and a lasting revitalization of the birth rate; instead it led to bad 
abortion practice, with disastrous effects on maternal health. Hungary is an 
example of the former, Romania of the latter type of situation.
5.4 Fertility-inhibiting effects of abortion and other factors compared
Although relatively simple and transparent in outcome, human fertility is a 
complex process, affected by numerous determinants ranging from physiological 
influences such as sexual and breastfeeding customs to social, economic, and 
behavioural factors. Demography has a long tradition of analysing fertility 
change by separating out the determinants of marriage, conception, gestation, 
and foetal mortality. In a classic paper, Davis and Blake (1956) proposed a 
classification of 11 intermediate variables through which, and only through
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which, all influences on fertility operate. However, quantifying the associations 
between these intermediate variables and fertility proved to be difficult. Using a 
simplified variant of the Davis-Blake framework, Bongaarts (1978, 1982) 
developed a model to compute the relative importance of four major factors 
related to fertility: marriage patterns, contraceptive use, abortion, and 
infecundability following childbirth. The fertility-inhibiting effects of these four 
factors are measured by the indexes Cm, Cc, Ca, and Cj, respectively. Each of 
these may vary from 0 when the inhibiting effect of the factor is complete, to 1 
when the factor is absent; the lower the value of any index, the greater its 
fertility-suppressing effect. The product of these indices reduces the assumed 
maximum possible level of fertility in a population (labelled 'total fecundity' by 
Bongaarts, and suggested to be 15.3 births per woman) to the average number 
of births per woman (i.e., the total fertility rate). The following equation 
generalizes the essential relationships of this model:
TFR = TF x Cm x Cc x Ca x Cj (5.1)
where TFR is the total fertility rate; TF is total fecundity; Cm is the index of the 
proportion of women who are married; Cc is the index of contraception; Ca is the 
index of abortion; and Cj is the index of postpartum infecundability.16
Some results of applying the Bongaarts model to estimate the proximate 
determinants of fertility in selected countries of the world are shown in Table 5.2. 
The majority of these data are taken from previously published analyses, notably 
from Frejka (1983, 1985) and Avdeev (1994). Only the calculations for 
Czechoslovakia in 1991 and Hungary in 1986 are original, being based on 
national fertility surveys and vital statistical data. Total abortion rates, calculated 
from general abortion rates, are also included in Table 5.2 (in the last column) to 
show the levels of officially reported abortion incidence associated with 
particular fertility-inhibiting effects.
The most important conclusion suggested by these calculations is that, in nearly 
all cases, contraceptive practice is the most influential fertility-inhibiting factor. 
Marriage behaviour tends to rank second, and the fertility-modifying effect of 
legal induced abortion seems usually to be third in order of influence. Only when 
the total abortion rate equals 2 or more (as in Hungary in 1966 and in the USSR
16 For a more detailed explanation of the four indices, as well as for discussion of the techniques 
used to compute them, see Bongaarts (1978).
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Table 5.2: Estimated indices of fertility-inhibiting factors, implied and 
actual total fertility rates, and total abortion rates, selected countries,
selected years 1959-91
Country
and
region
Year Indices of fertility inhibiting 
factors (x 100)
Cm Cc Ca Cj
Implied
TFRa
Actual
TFR
Total
abortion
rateb
Bulgaria 1976
Eastern European countries 
64 35 63 93 2.04 2.25 1.9
Czechoslovakia 1959 61 36 80 93 2.46 2.39 0.9
1970 58 34 76 93 2.13 2.07 1.0
1991 65 30 67 93 1.86 1.92 1.4
Hungary 1966 61 41 53 94 1.93 1.88 2.5
1977 64 27 73 95 1.91 2.17 1.2
1986 63 25 75 95 1.72 1.83 1.1
Poland 1972 52 41 88 95 2.74 2.24 0.5
Yugoslavia 1970 60 36 75 95 2.36 2.29 1.3
USSR 1985-86 49 65 55 87 2.33 2.46 3.2
Denmark 1970
Some other countries 
56 27 94 93 2.03 1.95 0.3
Finland 1971 51 17 89 93 1.11 1.70 0.6
Israel 1982 45 34-45 82-84 93 2.13 3.13 0.9
USA 1965 61 31 100 93 2.72 2.91 0.0
1973 57 22 95 93 1.67 1.87 0.5
Cuba 1972 69 52 79 90 3.89 3.55 1.6
Rep. of Korea 1970 58 77 82 66 3.81 4.07 1.5
Notes: a - implied TFR = 15.3 x Cm x Cc x Ca x Cj (see discussion in text), b - TARs are 
estimated by multiplying legal induced abortions per woman aged 15-44 by 30.
Sources: Frejka (1983, 1985), CSO (1992), Ketting etal. (1992), UN (1992c,d), Avdeev (1994).
in 1985-86) does the inhibiting effect of abortion rise to a higher rank. However, 
the results for Hungary in 1966 imply that even when the incidence of abortion is 
high and contraceptive practice rather primitive (consisting mostly of the use of 
coitus interruptus and the condom), abortion may still be substantially less 
important than contraception. Thus, only in the Soviet Union in 1985-86 does 
the calculation yield a larger fertility-limiting effect for abortion than for 
contraception, a result that is not surprising for a society where contraceptives 
were notoriously in short supply, contraceptive use was low, and abortion was 
easily available for several decades.17 Furthermore, comparison of the series of 
period-specific calculations for Czechoslovakia and Hungary reveals interesting
17 However, Avdeev's (1994) calculations suggest a great deal of regional variation, with abortion 
being a major fertility-reducing factor in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kirgizia, Moldavia, and Russia; and 
a secondary one in Lithuania, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia. In general, abortion had a strong 
influence in the high-fertility regions.
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differences in mechanisms underlying fertility change in these two countries. 
Czechoslovakia is an example of a country where, with the passage of time, 
both abortion and contraception appear to have increased their effect on fertility, 
but the relative importance of the two factors remained constant. In Hungary, on 
the other hand, the once extensive use of abortion seems in more recent years 
to have been largely offset by more widespread use of effective contraception.
Certainly, the calculations in Table 5.2 underestimate the fertility inhibiting 
effects of abortion in Poland and Yugoslavia. However, the difference between 
the estimated effects of contraception and abortion is so wide that it is unlikely 
that the use of more accurate abortion data would change the overall pattern. 
Regrettably, the lack of appropriate data for Romania prevents application of the 
Bongaarts model to that country. Frejka (1983) attempted to reconstruct the 
required indices for Romania by using incomplete data for 1966 and analogies 
with other countries for which the relevant information exists. According to his 
calculation, Romanian indices for the period 1958-66 were: Cm = 0.7; Cc = 
0.5-0.6; Ca = 0.3; Cj = 0.9. In other words, in Romania by the mid-1960s the 
fertility-inhibiting effect of abortion may have been about twice as large as that of 
either contraceptive use or marriage patterns. If these rough estimates are right, 
the Romanian case is another illustration that, under exceptional conditions, the 
fertility-reducing impact of abortion may surpass that of contraception.
The relatively great demographic importance of abortion in regulating fertility in 
Eastern Europe is highlighted when indices of induced abortion for these 
countries are compared with corresponding estimates for Western Europe and 
the United States (Table 5.2). While indices for Eastern European populations 
are typically between 0.6 and 0.7, those for Western European countries are 
about 0.9, and figures estimated for the USA imply an even lower effect of 
induced abortion on fertility. On the other hand, indices of contraceptive use are 
between 0.2 and 0.3 in developed Western countries, but between 0.3 and 0.4 
in most of Eastern Europe. Thus, the application of Bongaarts's approach offers 
a clear view of what can be broadly termed 'Eastern Europe's abortion culture'. 
In particular, it can be seen that this 'culture' substituted in part for the reduced 
fertility-inhibiting effect of contraception. Among other things, this finding also 
means that the abortion rate is not the complement of the birth rate, but rather 
the complement of the rate of contraceptive use.
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5.5 Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to assess the importance of the role of induced 
abortion as a factor modifying demographic change in Eastern Europe. While 
the softness of the available data and the limitations of the analytical 
approaches applicable to them are recognized, the findings presented in this 
chapter show that the role of induced abortion has been significant and its 
demographic consequences far-reaching; at the same time, however, its overall 
fertility-inhibiting effect seems to have been, as a rule, less than that of 
contraception. Thus, the overview of the experience of the European socialist 
countries not only yields useful information and clues to broader understanding 
of Eastern Europe's recent demographic past, but also furnishes insights into 
the capacity of changes in social policies to affect population phenomena.
Of course, the relationship between social organization, policy-making, and 
reproductive patterns is a vast and complex subject. The notion that the former 
socialist governments in Eastern Europe controlled all social and economic 
processes is common. Because of this conventional wisdom concerning the 
influence of an authoritarian regime on society, investigations that result in 
contrary interpretations are often regarded as controversial and iconoclastic. In 
contrast to this, the conventional wisdom among demographers is that 
governmental actions aimed at influencing population phenomena are generally 
not very effective, and policy, in most instances, is to be considered a not-too- 
important factor in explaining demographic change.
With respect to Eastern European developments in abortion between the mid- 
1950s and 1990, is the demographer's view of policy confirmed? Yes and no. 
On the one hand, the conclusion is inescapable that, as seems to be the case 
elsewhere in the world, the explicit anti-abortion policies of Eastern European 
socialist regimes — which were almost always associated with pronatalist 
economic and social measures — were not very effective. This was because 
trends in human reproduction tend to be closely related to and reflect the socio­
economic environment and local mores. On the other hand, however, there is no 
doubt that the socialist system had profound repercussions for the individuals 
who lived under it. In particular, the anomalous and somehow extreme 
tendencies in the demographic behaviour of Eastern European populations — 
frequent resort to induced abortion coupled with the persistence of relatively 
high levels of fertility and nuptiality, and contraceptive practices weighted heavily
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toward high-risk methods — appear to characterize populations that lack not 
only material well-being but also personal autonomy, and that are preoccupied 
with relative social comforts and conveniences, and a belief in the self-evidence 
of protective practices and legislation.
The preceding tour through Eastern European countries should have made it 
evident that there have always been significant differences among them in 
trends and patterns of social change. Perhaps the most striking feature of the 
evidence presented in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 is precisely the extent of 
intercountry differences. Therefore, it seems appropriate to narrow the focus and 
turn the attention to the patterns of abortion in one country for which the most 
data are available: former Czechoslovakia.
199
Chapter 6: DEMOGRAPHIC DIMENSIONS OF ABORTION IN THE CZECH 
REPUBLIC AND SLOVAKIA, 1960-90: A PERIOD PERSPECTIVE
6.1 Introduction
This chapter is concerned with cross-sectional patterns of abortion in the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia during the years 1960-90. It starts with a discussion of 
possible sources of differences in abortion patterns between the Czech and 
Slovak populations. This is followed by a short reflection on the styles of 
demographic measurement applicable to available data; the rationale behind, 
and the limitations of, various approaches to cross-sectional analysis. 
Subsequent sections examine the main demographic dimensions of abortion. 
Abortions may be registered and analysed in relation to a wide range of 
characteristics and background variables, demographic and non-demographic. 
In this chapter, the dimensions considered are: ages of women; historical time; 
marital status; and parities of abortion obtainers. To conclude the chapter, a 
simple typology of abortions based on the combined demographic 
characteristics of abortion seekers is applied.
6.2 The Czech Republic and Slovakia compared
Much of this chapter is concerned with differences in abortion behaviour 
between women in the Czech Republic and Slovakia.1 Therefore, it seems 
appropriate to begin with a short overview of Czech-Slovak disparities in areas 
relevant to reproductive behaviour.
With the exception of the interlude during World War II, when Hitler gave the 
Slovaks formal independence, the two nations have lived as a common state for 
most of the twentieth century. Czechoslovakia emerged as a state in 1918 on 
the demise of the multi-ethnic Austro-Hungarian Empire, in which the Czech 
lands had formed part of the territory of the Austrian section of the Dual 
Monarchy, but Slovakia was part of the territory ruled by the Hungarian Crown
1 There are no agreed labels for the two parts of former Czechoslovakia. From 1918 until 1948 
(except for the period of Nazi occupation) its western part was called the Czech or 'Historical' 
Lands (i.e. the former Kingdom of Bohemia, the Margravate of Moravia, and the Principality of 
Silesia). From 1948 to 1968 the official term was the 'Czech regions', corresponding to the 'Slovak 
regions' for the eastern part of the state. As from January 1, 1969, Czechoslovakia was converted 
into a federal republic of two constituent parts: the Czech Socialist Republic and the Slovak 
Socialist Republic. On January 1, 1993, the federation split into what are now the independent 
Czech and Slovak Republics (see Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1). For the sake of brevity, the terms the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia are used throughout. It needs to be stressed, however, that this is 
not to imply any kind of inequality or asymmetry.
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from Budapest. Linguistic kinship was, and still is, a very important link enabling 
easy mutual contact between Czechs and Slovaks at any level of education. 
Real bonds, however, in the sense of common feeling and value orientation, 
often have been hampered because of a different social and cultural heritage 
which in turn was intimately interconnected with different socio-economic 
structures. From the beginning of the Czechoslovak state, Czechs and Slovaks 
were two separate nations, distinct in their cultural traditions and lifestyles.
Many of the old social and economic differences between the two nations 
survived until 1948, when the communists came to power. Although the 
communist government was emphatic in its efforts to eradicate all disparities 
between the two republics, differences in socio-economic structures, 
employment opportunities, standards of living, and modes of behaviour 
persisted. Table 6.1 shows a few indicators, chosen to characterize some 
aspects of the growth in socio-economic maturity, or modernization, in the two 
republics during the post-war years. First, the data reveal the considerable 
economic progress and social restructuring that Slovakia accomplished during 
this period. In 1950, Slovakia still had a predominantly peasant economy; in 
1991 it was a fully developed country with highly qualified labour, a high 
proportion of persons employed in services, and health indicators and living 
standards not much inferior to those of other advanced countries of the world. At 
the same time, however, Table 6.1 makes it clear that most advantages 
remained with the Czech Republic.
That Slovakia came socially and economically considerably closer to the Czech 
Republic over just 40 years resulted from a deliberate policy of the central 
government. This policy was guided by a belief that bringing Slovakia to the 
same level of macro-economic maturity as the Czech Republic would 
automatically reduce the socio-political relevance of all other differences. The 
underlying objective was to make people more class-conscious and less 
concerned with their national identities as such. Consequently, the change in the 
position of Slovakia relative to the Czech Republic has been most dramatic in 
the area of industrialization. However, although post-war Slovakia has been an 
industrially booming region, its development failed to bring employment rates 
and efficiency up to levels reached in the Czech Republic. In 1948, the national 
income of Slovakia was 18 per cent of the total Czechoslovak national income, 
compared to a 28 per cent share of the national population. The corresponding 
figures for 1970 were 27 and 32 per cent; and in 1983 these percentages
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were 30 and 33, respectively (FSO, 1982, 1991; OECD, 1994). Thus, although 
the gap was greatly narrowed, Slovakia continued to lag behind.
Moreover, while Slovakia benefited from rapid capital investment and a Soviet- 
style strategy of industrialization, socialist policies, coupled with a concern for 
strategic and security issues, left the country with an economy skewed 
massively towards basic and heavy industries, and a relatively underdeveloped 
modern sector. Perhaps these features of the Slovak economy helped to 
preserve the traditional socio-cultural pattern and fostered a less stratified social 
hierarchy. It might be inferred that economic factors produced sociologically 
relevant effects: they probably delayed the advent of a consumer society by 
producing in Slovakia an environment which offered relatively few incentives in 
terms of prospects for 'better living' and elevation in social status. In other 
words, Slovaks probably had different frames of reference from Czechs 
concerning their social and economic aspirations. However, the relatively late 
emergence of the independent Slovak nation has rendered it difficult to identify 
distinct national characteristics. One observer put it thus:
When one looks for more systematic evidence concerning Slovak 
national character, one finds frustration. There are the inevitable cliches 
drawn from laymen's comparisons of Slovaks with Czechs. The Slovaks 
prefer wine to beer, suggesting a greater tendency to sociability... They 
are more emotional than Czechs, but their emotionalism is expressed on 
a personal level rather than turned outward into society. In contrast to 
Czechs, they are religious, modest, backward, distrustful of others, and 
lacking in messianic impulses; by way of drawing similarities with 
Czechs, it has been said that they are generally dovish, industrious, 
amply intelligent, and have a tendency toward discord. Obvious 
exceptions can be made to these generalizations, and the fact that they 
have not been confirmed by either hard evidence or scholarly repetitions 
leaves them rather unsatisfactory as descriptions of the national 
character (Paul, 1979: 219-220).
As for cultural life, the Roman Catholic Church has played an important role in 
the history of the Slovak nation; moreover, 'Slovak Catholicism is of a peasant 
variety, closely connected with the lives of believers and therefore more difficult 
to root out' (Turnock, 1989: 81). The Czechs, on the other hand, have in 
substantial numbers inclined to Protestantism2 and, in contrast to the
2 Already the Hussite rebellion of the fifteenth century had identified the Czech national cause with 
resistance to Catholicism, and the Counter-Reformation set in motion by the Habsburgs from 
1620 onwards failed to extinguish this latent hostility. After 1918, the Czech leadership of the new 
Republic of Czechoslovakia identified its national identity with Hussitism and showed unmistakable 
antipathy toward the Catholic church to the point of limiting ties with the Vatican in 1925 (Scarfe, 
1984).
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fundamental religiosity of Slovak people, secularizing forces have drawn many 
of them away from a religious outlook altogether. During the post-war period, the 
fact that all churches were under direct control of the communist government, 
that all aspects of religious life were officially condemned, and that churchgoers 
were harshly harassed, has caused many outside observers to consider 
Czechoslovakia one of the most atheistic countries in Europe. It is true that the 
extent of religiosity, as indicated by the proportion of population claiming to have 
some religious affiliation, has declined over the years. But the anti-religious 
propaganda did not result in complete secularization of the society. Particularly 
in Slovakia, religiosity has remained fairly widespread to the present day, 
probably partly because the pull of tradition in Slovakia's less urbanized society 
was stronger and partly because religious loyalty was commingled with 
nationalist sentiment.3
The extent to which religious belief has persisted can be illustrated by findings 
from the population censuses of 1950 and 1991, the only post-war censuses in 
which the proportion religious was surveyed. While in the Czech Republic the 
proportion of believers dropped from 94.1 per cent in 1950 to only 44.1 per cent 
in 1991, in Slovakia the decline was from 99.7 per cent in 1950 to 72.8 per cent 
in 1991 (Kucera, 1992). As Table 6.2 shows, Slovak society has remained not 
only more religious than Czech society, but what matters more, predominantly 
Catholic, and therefore more affected by traditional religious behaviour in its 
everyday life.4 Moreover, it may be presumed that the special stringencies that 
the religious suffered — lessened educational opportunities, job discrimination, 
and so on — stiffened the attitudes of those who really adhered to Catholic 
principles. Protestant churches, being in essence national, i.e. autonomous, 
bodies, with greater participation of the laity in their organization, were not so 
much suspected of international dependence and subversive tendencies; 
therefore they were less exposed to communist pressure.
3 Many Czechs and Slovaks were dissatisfied with the union of their nations. While Czechs 
insisted that the Slovak economy was heavily subsidized, Slovaks asserted that the Czechs had a 
patronizing attitude and exploited their land. This somewhat amorphous and latent discontent 
existed from the 1920s up to the 1990s and was no doubt fuelled by the Catholic clergy of 
Slovakia, which frequently presented itself as the only champion of Slovak national interests. For 
interesting accounts of this complex problem, see Krejci (1972), Steiner (1973), Paul (1979), and 
Wolchik (1991, 1994).
4 According to data for 1984, 53 per cent of all weddings and 81 per cent of all funerals in 
Slovakia were religious, compared to only 16 and 51 per cent in the Czech Republic. Similarly, 72 
per cent of children in Slovakia but only 31 per cent of those in the Czech Republic were baptized 
(Wolchik, 1991).
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Table 6.2: Religious affiliation in the Czech Republic and Slovakia,
1950 and 1991
Denomination Czech Republic Slovakia
1950 1991 1950 1991
Roman Catholic
Population in thousands: 
6,792 4,039 2,623 3,179
Greek Catholic 33 9 225 180
Protestant 511 247 561 414
Czechoslovak Hussite 947 173 3 0
Orthodox 50 20 8 34
other Christian, 
Jewish & unknown 44 53 12 29
atheists 519 4,088 10 511
not answered n.a. 1,670 n.a. 922
total 8,896 10,299 3,442 5,269
Roman Catholic
Relative distribution (%): 
76.3 39.2 76.2 60.3
Greek Catholic 0.4 0.1 6.5 3.4
Protestant 5.7 2.4 16.3 7.8
Czechoslovak Hussite 10.7 1.7 0.1 0.0
Orthodox 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.7
other Christian, 
Jewish & unknown 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.6
atheists 5.8 39.7 0.3 9.7
not answered n.a. 16.2 n.a. 17.5
total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: The two censuses applied different approaches to answers concerning religiosity; hence 
the category 'not answered' in the 1991 census.
Sources: Kucera(1991, 1992).
Dissimilar levels of religiosity may consequently have been among the reasons 
why approaches towards fertility, birth prevention, and particularly abortion, 
differed in the two populations. A survey conducted in 1990 found that 59 per 
cent of respondents in the Czech Republic agreed that a woman is fully 
competent to decide on the outcome of her pregnancy, while in Slovakia such a 
view was held by only 49 per cent of respondents. Correspondingly, 15 per cent 
of Slovaks but only 9 per cent of Czechs were of the opinion that induced 
abortion should be permitted only in life-threatening circumstances (Kobylkova, 
1990).5 These differences cannot be explained in terms of disparities in the legal 
accessibility of abortion or in the levels of enforcement of relevant policies. 
During the period 1945-92, the Czech and Slovak populations shared not only 
one state and hence a single ideology, but also common political structures, and 
identical legal and health care systems.
5 The sample comprised 726 persons and was representative of the Czechoslovak population 
over 15 years of age.
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Demographically, Slovakia's fertility transition started later than that in the Czech 
Republic, lasted longer, and, like the transitions in Hungary and especially the 
Balkans, resulted in somewhat higher post-transitional levels of overall fertility. 
The Czech population, on the other hand, followed in many respects the 
demographic patterns of the more developed populations of the West, 
particularly the German population, including a propensity to more modern 
modes of behaviour such as lower nuptiality and relatively frequent divorce 
(Table 6.3). Differences in divorce may have been among the factors 
underpinning differences in abortion: more divorce in the Czech Republic signals 
greater social instability, a circumstance much less typical for Slovakia.
Table 6.3: Selected demographic indicators for the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, annual averages, successive periods 1921-25 to 1985-89
Period Czech Republic Slovakia
total
fertility
rate
marriages 
per 1,000 
pop'n.
divorces 
per 1,000 
pop'n.
total
fertility
rate
marriages 
per 1,000 
pop'n.
divorces 
per 1,000 
pop'n.
1921-25 2.75 10.3 0.5 4.52 9.1 0.2
1926-30 2.22 9.5 0.4 3.71 8.7 0.2
1931-35 1.85 10.6 0.6 3.08 10.9 0.2
1946-49 2.98 10.6 1.2 3.21 10.7 0.2
1950-54 2.69 8.9 1.2 3.54 9.4 0.5
1955-59 2.42 7.5 1.4 3.33 8.2 0.7
1960-64 2.22 8.0 1.5 2.94 7.4 0.6
1965-69 1.95 8.0 1.8 2.56 7.3 0.6
1970-74 2.13 9.6 2.4 2.50 8.6 0.9
1975-79 2.34 9.0 2.6 2.48 9.1 1.3
1980-84 2.01 7.7 2.8 2.28 7.9 1.4
1985-89 1.92 7.9 3.0 2.17 7.3 1.6
Sources: FSO (1982, 1991), Pavlik (1991a), TERPLAN (1992).
Some of the most revealing facts about demographic differentials between the 
two populations can be extracted from fertility surveys. Their results suggest that 
Slovak married women were always inclined to plan more children than Czech 
women. This was reflected both in differences in average ideal family sizes and 
in distributions of family size preferences (Table 6.4 and Figure 6.1). Specifically, 
Slovak couples have been traditionally more willing to have three or more 
children than their Czech counterparts, although regional differences in family- 
size preferences apparently diminished substantially during the 1970s and 
1980s.
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Table 6.4: Average ideal family size in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, 
results of selected fertility surveys
Year of survey Czech Republic 
(a)
Slovakia
(b)
Difference
(b)-(a)
1970 2.42 2.83 0.41
1977 2.39 2.71 0.32
1981 2.16 2.39 0.23
1985 1.79 1.98 0.19
Notes: Data refer to the number of children considered ideal in a family similar to that in which the 
respondent lives. For more details about particular surveys, see Chapter 4, Section 4.6. 
Sources: FSO (1971, 1978, 1979), Kraus (1987).
Figure 6.1: Distribution of family size preferences among married women 
in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, 1959,1970, and 1985 fertility surveys
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Note: For more details about particular surveys, see Chapter 4, Section 4.6.
Sources: Srb et al. (1961), FSO (1971), Kraus (1987).
Another major dissimilarity between Czechs and Slovaks relates to patterns of 
contraceptive use. A fertility survey conducted in 1985 found that both 
populations rely predominantly on ineffective means of pregnancy prevention, 
but that Czech women resort to contraception more often and use more 
effective means of fertility regulation than Slovak women (Table 6.5). Similar 
results already had been reported in 1959 and 1977, but detailed comparisons 
are made impossible by differences in the ways that questions relating to 
contraception were asked in individual inquiries. Not much is known about the 
reasons why Czechs appear to be better contraceptors than Slovaks. Obviously, 
part of the explanation is that Slovaks on average prefer bigger families and are 
therefore relatively less frequently confronted with the need to effectively 
regulate fertility. A parallel explanation is that religious objection to fertility
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Table 6.5: Patterns of contraceptive use in marriage in the Czech Republic
and Slovakia in 1985
Main method Czech Republic Slovakia
of contraception N % N %
condom, pill, IUD 1,551 35.8 424 23.0
regularly some other form 212 4.9 100 5.4
irregularly some other form 565 13.0 222 12.0
wishing to get pregnant 301 6.9 178 9.7
not using contraception 1,188 27.4 675 36.6
woman is pregnant 449 10.3 196 10.6
woman is sterile 59 1.4 36 2.0
not answered 15 0.3 13 0.7
total 4,340 100.0 1,844 100.0
Note: The survey sample comprised first married women aged 18-39. 
Source: Kraus (1987).
regulation has been stronger in the more religious, and Catholic, Slovak 
population.
The post-war process of urbanization and convergence of rural and urban 
patterns of life tended to be stronger in the Czech Republic. Patterns of village 
life no longer dominate Slovak society, but the gap between more modern and 
more traditional localities has remained a salient factor there. Paradoxically, the 
near equalization of the two republics in economic conditions has had only a 
mild impact on national relations. Intermarriage among Czechs and Slovaks 
remained relatively rare, and migration from one part of the country to the other 
was likewise limited and became ever more so throughout the communist period 
(FSO, 1991). It is thus fair to say that Czech or Slovak nationality was one of the 
most important socio-cultural cleavages in the former Czechoslovakia.
Certainly, much of the available information concerns regional differences and 
does not allow direct comparison of the Czechs and Slovaks as such. The 
boundaries of the Czech and Slovak Republics have not corresponded perfectly 
to ethnic settlement patterns, for there have been many Czechs living in 
Slovakia and many Slovaks residing in the Czech Republic. As Table 6.6 shows, 
however, Czechs were during the post-war years always by far the dominant 
group in the Czech Republic, as were Slovaks in Slovakia. This means that 
regional data do, indeed, provide a good estimate of the extent of Czech-Slovak 
differences. The data in Table 6.6 also indicate that although the post-war
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Table 6.6: Ethnic compositions of the Czech Republic and Slovakia,
selected years 1950-91
Nationa- Czech Republic Slovakia
lity 1950 1961 1970 1980 1991 1950 1961 1970 1980 1991
Czechs 8,344 9,023
Population in thousands: 
9,270 9,734 9,773 40 46 47 57 58
Slovaks 258 276 321 359 308 2,983 3,560 3,879 4,317 4,512
Germ ans 160 134 81 58 48 5 6 5 3 5
Hungarians 13 15 19 20 20 354 519 552 560 567
Ukrainians 19 20 16 15 9 48 35 42 39 31
Poles 71 67 64 66 59 2 1 1 2 3
others & 
unknown 31 37 36 39 82 10 7 11 13 93
total 8,896 9,572 9,808 10,292 10,299 3,442 4,174 4,537 4,991 5,269
Czechs 93.8 94.3
Relative distribution (%): 
94.5 94.6 94.9 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1
Slovaks 2.9 2.9 3.3 3.5 3.0 86.7 85.3 85.6 86.5 85.6
G erm ans 1.8 1.4 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Hungarians 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 10.3 12.4 12.2 11.2 10.8
Ukrainians 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.4 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.6
Poles 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
others & 
unknown 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 1.8
total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: Numbers in individual categories may not add to the total because of rounding. The 1991 
census applied a slightly revised classification of nationalities; hence the high figures in 
category ‘others & unknown'.
Sources: FSO (1982); Kucera (1992).
period brought about a homogenization of the ethnic compositions of the two 
republics,6 members of other nationalities continued to exist within their borders.
Undoubtedly, the Romany sub-population (Gypsies) also has played a part in 
overall demographic differences evident between the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. Although not officially regarded as a separate nationality, and 
therefore not statistically registered, the Romanies have been the largest, or 
second largest, minority in the state. By the late 1980s, numbers of 
Czechoslovak Romanies were variously estimated at between 290,000 and 
840,000 (Wolchik, 1991; Zammit and Ghai, 1992).7 In 1958, a law was
6 The death of most Czechoslovak Jews at the hands of the Nazis, the expulsion of the Sudeten 
Germans and the forced repatriation of much of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia during 
1945-47, and the annexation of part of the Sub-Carpathian Ukrainians by the Soviet Union in 1945 
were the major factors which reduced Czechoslovakia's ethnic diversity.
7 The estimates vary because some Romanies may not be registered at all, while others may 
consider themselves to be members of other nationalities, mainly Hungarians. Some do not speak 
the Romany language, while many do not speak Czech or Slovak well or even at all.
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promulgated which deprived Romanies of the freedom to live their nomadic style 
of life, forcing them to work in factories or in agricultural co-operatives. But for 
many Romanies adaptation to new cultural and social norms was difficult, and 
they were alienated by the policy of forced assimilation. About two-thirds of this 
fast growing, socially backward and widely ostracized ethnic group has been 
concentrated in Slovakia (Srb, 1992). Interestingly, Romanies living in Slovakia 
have maintained a very high fertility: by the early 1980s, the average number of 
children of Romany women aged 45-49 was estimated to be more than six; that 
is, at least three times that of the Slovak population as a whole (Srb, 1984). In 
the Czech Republic, where the Romanies have been less numerous and at the 
same time surrounded by a demographically more advanced, low-fertility 
majority, their fertility is believed to have declined to somewhat lower levels.
All in all, it may be concluded that differences in socio-economic conditions 
between Slovakia and the Czech Republic have been a legacy of the different 
histories of the two populations dating back well into the nineteenth century. The 
historical experience of the Slovaks has tended to produce a culture only 
marginally comparable to that of the Czechs — more recently and less 
profoundly influenced by modernist strains of thought, less volatile and more 
tradition-oriented, more conservative. Traces of the past were to a significant 
degree reduced, but not completely curbed, during the communist period, 
because the communists were unwilling to acknowledge the true depth of the 
issue. In fact, it seems that many contrasts, divergences in social trends and 
latent political tensions between Czechs and Slovaks were artificially swept 
beneath the surface of communist rule, only to erupt in the post-communist 
period.8 Thus, disparities between Czech and Slovak women in the incidence of 
abortion may be seen as a result of, and at the same time a component and 
perhaps also a perpetuating agent in, this broader picture of socio-demographic 
duality within the former Czechoslovak federation.
6.3 Styles of measurement applicable to available data
Styles of demographic measurement are responsive to types of data collection 
as well as to conceptualization of the phenomenon being analysed. Ideally, 
conceptualization should inspire the measurement style, but practical 
considerations often are dominant. The abortion information available to a
8 Immediately after the so-called Velvet Revolution of November 1989, a serious debate on all 
levels of public life developed about the question of Slovak autonomy. This resulted, by January 1, 
1993, in the formation of the two independent Czech and Slovak states.
210
Student of demographic change in former Czechoslovakia is a by-product of the 
official registration system. The system was designed to provide a 
comprehensive coverage of abortion practice, in theory encompassing all 
women who experienced an abortion after January 1, 1958 (Srb and Kucera, 
1963). Starting in 1960, extensive annual data were published. Consequently, 
one-year periods are the obvious choice for summarizing the data temporally, 
and the period mode is the natural mode of analysis applicable to such data.
With registration data, one begins with the occurrence of an event, and then 
records characteristics of the person to whom the event occurred. Thus, one 
focuses on the set of circumstances surrounding the event. The measurement 
process begins where the personal experience ended, recording, processing, 
and aggregating it into a statistical report. The task, then, is to work backwards 
in time to reconstruct and interpret the circumstances that marked sums of 
personal experiences. Aggregate analysis of this kind is a demographic tradition. 
Part of the philosophy underlying this approach is the concept of reproductive 
behaviour as a function of an array of socio-cultural and other kinds of 
explanatory variables.
The obvious next step in the analysis is to calculate abortion rates and ratios. 
The aim is to make measurements of what may be called intensity (incidence) 
and tempo (distribution in age-time or duration-time) of abortion, with the 
intention of identifying changes in such measurements over time. In this context, 
time has two separate meanings. The first, reflected in the concept of tempo, is 
the location of abortions occurring to individuals by reference to the time 
elapsed since some reference event earlier in their lives. That lapse of time is 
customarily called age if the reference event is birth. A comprehensive measure 
of the intensity of abortion is a cumulation of the abortion experiences across all 
reproductive ages. The second concept of time is historical time, as reflected in 
the calendar dates associated with occurrences of abortion.
In order to produce period indices which summarize abortion episodes in a given 
calendar period, the synthetic cohort device can be employed, combining 
information on the behaviour of several successive real cohorts within a defined 
period of time. The aim is to identify a synthetic experience characterizing 
abortion behaviour in a given year. The synthetic cohort approach is feasible in 
all situations when exposure rates are available for women of all the relevant 
(childbearing) ages in the period in question. The rationale behind use of this
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strategy is that it is not only necessary (since data for real cohorts are much 
more difficult to get), but also analytically attractive. This is because the 
experiences of a number of successive real cohorts, collectively covering all 
possible stages of the reproductive life course, are treated as if they were the 
consecutive experiences of a single cohort. Thus, the case for the synthetic 
cohort is that it permits a 'total life cycle' type of statement about reproductive 
behaviour in a cross-sectional perspective; the case against it is that synthetic 
cohorts can produce exaggerated levels and trends of demographic phenomena 
when compared to real cohorts because the integrity of life experiences of real 
cohorts is disregarded.
There are several well known problems with analysis based on registration data. 
First, the data available for research generally consist of aggregate tabulations, 
the design of which is the outcome of decisions of national statistical authorities 
about the number and detail of categories of the characteristics monitored. 
Usually, there is no access to the original information at the individual level. 
Second, it is well known that vital registration is never absolutely complete. To 
ignore this fact can easily lead to a misinterpretation of observed trends in vital 
processes: for instance, a decline in the degree of incompleteness of 
registration may be wrongly interpreted as a rise in the incidence of the 
phenomenon in question, and vice versa. Third, registration data provide only 
the numerators for abortion rates; the denominators have to come principally 
from enumeration sources. However, any measurement requiring data from 
more than one source is possible only to the extent to which classifications used 
in these sources are comparable. The registration system may yield abortions 
classified by more than age of the woman, but such more detailed information is 
of little use in demographic measurement unless reliable denominators of the 
same detail are available. Similarly, one can have the requisite denominator but 
not the information to produce the required numerator. The range of 
characteristics which may be adequately analysed is thus restricted by the 
structures of data identifying the amount of abortion and the amount of exposure 
to risk of an abortion. Moreover, enumeration data are rich with socio-cultural 
and socio-economic information for census years, but for intercensal years data 
have to be estimated from a census base.
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6.4 Ages of abortion seekers
Age is a pivotal concept in demographic thinking. One practical reason for the 
ubiquity of the age variable in demographic analysis of abortion is that it is 
relatively easy to determine and record. The value of the age variable is 
primarily to mark the approximate beginning and end of the reproductive span, 
and to facilitate definition of particular stages that occur between these 
physiological limits. The biological features of the age pattern of reproduction 
are well known: after menarche, the ability to reproduce increases with age to a 
plateau in the twenties, and then declines at an accelerated pace until 
menopause. Thus, whatever may be the explanation for reproductive behaviour 
in some deeper, not only biological sense, that behaviour may be expected to 
be related to the individual's age.
However, aside from the fact that most data sources provide age as an 
important covariate of reproductive behaviour from a biological standpoint, there 
are several other reasons for taking it into account. Age is an indicator of life- 
cycle stage, a surrogate for associated socio-economic and socio-psychological 
changes, and a predictor of social relations. Age also is associated with 
reproductive behaviour because of the role it plays in the formation of 
reproductive intentions and, in particular, in a couple's decision about when to 
postpone or terminate childbearing. While in its simplest form this proposition 
refers to a decision process about whether or not a child is desired, it also 
applies to other factors that affect the probability of another pregnancy, such as 
the choice of contraceptive method and the vigilance with which contraception is 
practised.
In modern societies, the sociological meaning of age influences reproductive 
behaviour more directly than the biological one. This is because people 
increasingly are inclined to think about their reproduction not only in terms of 
their own ages, but also in terms of prescriptions regarding the appropriate 
'timing' of various steps in life as they are represented in the popular culture by 
television and press, and reflected in the expectations and the actual experience 
of their peers, friends, colleagues, and family members.9 In most instances, 
however, the age-relatedness of demographic behaviour is an incidental by­
product of more immediate causal influences that have a tendency to surface at
9 For an excellent discussion of the sociological component of the age effects on reproduction, 
see Rindfuss and Bumpass (1976).
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particular times (ages) in people's lives. Thus, one may well ask how much there 
would be left of the significance of age as a correlate of reproductive behaviour 
if those more directly relevant pieces of information, such as time of departure 
from the educational system, time of marriage, start of economic activity, time of 
birth of the last intended child, and cultural definitions of the appropriate timing 
of these, were available for analysis.
6.4.1 Age-specific abortion rates
Figure 6.2 gives age-specific abortion rates (ASARs) for the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, calculated using five-year age groups.10 These rates are raw 
indicators, in the sense that they do not reflect the fact that, in each age group, 
some women are not at risk of abortion because they are physiologically unable 
to conceive. Because the proportion sterile is likely to increase with age, ASARs 
for older age groups to a certain extent underestimate the true incidence of 
abortion, as they assume unrealistically large populations at risk. With this minor 
limitation in mind, the graphs in Figure 6.2 can be regarded as providing a 
general picture of the trends in age-specific levels of abortion over the 30 years 
studied. Not surprisingly, the incidence of abortion differed substantially between 
women in different age groups. In both populations it was low among women 
aged 15-19 and 40-49; that is, at the beginning and at the end of reproductive 
life, where ASARs as a rule were below 20 per 1,000. The age group 35-39 
recorded what might be called an intermediate level of abortion, with ASARs 
oscillating around 30-40 per 1,000 during most of the 1960-90 period. The 
highest levels of abortion, and at the same time the biggest variations over time 
in its incidence, can be found among women aged between 20 and 34 years. 
Underlying patterns of fecundity, sexual activity, contraceptive behaviour, family 
formation and family building explain the concentration of high abortion rates 
among women in this age range. Ages 20-34 are the prime childbearing years at 
which the overwhelming majority of pregnancies occur, and hence the greatest 
potential for resort to abortion exists, especially in a population where access to 
reliable contraception is limited.
Figure 6.2 also reveals some important differences between the two populations 
compared. In the Czech Republic, ASARs for the age groups 20-24, 25-29, and 
30-34 have followed similar trajectories, although on different levels,
10 For a tabular presentation of ASARs for the Czech and Slovak populations during 1960-90, see 
Tables A6.1 and A6.2 in the Appendix.
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Figure 6.2: Age-specific period abortion rates 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, 1960-90
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Sources: FSO (1981, 1991), IHS (1991).
characterized by steep falls in 1961-63 and 1969-73, and increases in 1963-69 
and especially 1973-90. In Slovakia, women aged 20-24 exhibited lower levels 
of abortion, and changes over time in abortion behaviour at ages 20-34 were 
less dramatic. In the early 1960s, the Czech Republic had much higher levels of 
abortion among women under 25 years of age than Slovakia, while Slovakia
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recorded higher incidences of abortion among women over 40 years old. As 
time passed, these differences tended to diminish, mainly because Slovakia was 
'catching up' with the abortion levels in the Czech Republic. By the mid-1970s, 
differences in abortion rates had dropped to low levels for most age groups, the 
only exception being ASARs for women aged under 25 years which remained 
significantly higher in the Czech population. The period between the mid-1970s 
and mid-1980s in Slovakia was one of relative stability in abortion levels among 
women in this age range, in contrast to increases in the Czech Republic. After 
1986, contrasts between the two republics intensified, this time because of more 
pronounced increases in abortion among Czech women, but the resulting 
disparities in ASARs were much less significant than those observed in the 
1960s. In general, stable or upward trends in period ASARs have been typical at 
most ages in both populations during most of the three decades for which data 
are available.
The age patterns of abortion of the two populations are depicted in Figure 6.3. 
The period-specific curves shown in the graphs are averages for periods 
comprising several calendar years, and as such they conceal more subtle year- 
to-year variations in ASARs. Both the Czech and Slovak populations exhibit bell­
shaped abortion curves, indicating that abortion has been spread over the entire 
reproductive life span, but with low levels among women under 20 and over 40 
years of age and high levels among women between their mid-twenties and late 
thirties. This pattern is characteristic for all time periods between 1960 and 
1990. The curves for Slovakia are flatter than those for the Czech Republic, and 
the trend observable over time is one of a shift towards more abortion at 
younger ages. Most of that change took place in two stages: between 1960-64 
and 1965-69, and then between 1980-84 and 1985-89. In the Czech Republic, 
on the other hand, the time trends are less pronounced and the picture is more 
one of oscillation between two types of situation: those of 'low abortion' and 
'high abortion'. Finally, 1985-89 stands out in both populations as a period when 
abortion attained extremely high levels. In the Czech Republic, ASARs reached 
historic maxima at all ages during this period; in Slovakia, they reached peak 
values at young ages, but rates for women aged over 40 continued to shift down 
from levels recorded in preceding years. In general, the most remarkable feature 
of the 1985-90 period is the unprecedentedly high level of abortion among 
women in their mid-twenties. For instance, between 1985 and 1990, of all 25 
year-old women on average 7.7 per cent in the Czech Republic and 5.7 per cent
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Figure 6.3: Annual average age-specific rates of abortion, 
successive periods 1960-64 to 1985-90
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in Slovakia experienced abortions. The corresponding annual averages for 
1980-84 had been only 5.3 and 4.5 per cent.
6.4.2 Median age at abortion
Change in the period age structure of women having abortions depends on 
changes in the tendency of women in each age group to abort and on the age 
composition of the population at risk. The former is of more relevance here. One 
way of analysing these changes is to look at trends in median ages at abortion. 
Median ages at childbearing and abortion are calculated here from ASFRs and 
ASARs, to avoid the distorting effects of the changing age structure of women in 
childbearing ages.11 Figure 6.4 gives a comparison of median ages for abortion 
and childbearing for both constituent republics of the former Czechoslovakia. 
The prevailing trends during 1960-90 were decreases in the median ages at 
both abortion and childbearing, although these trends were neither equal, nor 
linear over time. The shifts proceeded on two distinct levels, the median age at 
abortion being typically some four to six years higher than that at childbirth. This 
considerable time lag reflects sharp differences between the age distribution of 
women in relation to the planned and unplanned components of reproduction: 
obviously, at younger ages 'mistakes' in family planning can more easily be 
rationalized, and the pregnancies resulting from them accepted, because they 
do not conflict with planned ultimate family sizes. Another important difference 
between trends in the timing of childbearing and of abortion is that those 
towards earlier fertility were more temporally consistent. In Slovakia, the 
reductions were quite smooth, even if the intensity of change tended to diminish 
with time: the median age at childbearing dropped from 26.7 years in 1950 to
25.2 years in 1960, 24.7 years in 1970, and 23.9 years in 1980. In the Czech 
Republic, a similar decline was also under way, the corresponding figures being 
25.7, 23.9, 23.5, and 23.2; but the mid-1960s and mid-1970s brought significant 
disruptions in the progression towards earlier childbearing. By 1990, median 
ages at childbearing had stabilized in both populations at similarly low levels: 
23.4 years in the Czech Republic and 23.7 years in Slovakia.
11 The median age may be thought of as the age which divides the age range into two parts, each 
of which produced exactly one half of the total period fertility rate, or the total period abortion rate, 
recorded in a given year. An alternative interpretation is that median age corresponds to the 50th 
percentile in the distribution of ASFRs, or ASARs, in a cohort experiencing at particular ages 
throughout its lifetime the incidence of childbearing, or abortion, recorded in the given year. The 
standard formula for obtaining median is given in Shryock and Siegel (1971: 233).
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Figure 6.4: Median ages at abortion and childbearing 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, 1950-90
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Compared to trends in fertility, changes in median ages at abortion were more 
dramatic (Figure 6.4). Between 1960 and 1963, they increased sharply: in the 
Czech Republic from 28.6 to 30.0 years, and in Slovakia from 30.5 to 31.6 
years. A swift decline between 1963 and 1966, and stabilization in the late 
1960s and early 1970s followed. During the latter period, median ages of 
abortion oscillated around 28.5 years in the Czech Republic and 29.5 years in 
Slovakia. The declining trend recommenced only in the late 1970s, first in the 
Czech Republic and with a short time-lag also in Slovakia. By 1990, median 
ages at abortion were just below 28 years in both republics. Thus, the median 
age of abortion seekers appears to have been peculiarly sensitive to period 
changes. This characteristic of abortion behaviour becomes even more striking 
when it is compared to the corresponding evidence for fertility.
6.4.3 Relative concentration of abortion rates by age
Measures such as the median age at abortion adequately identify the 'mid­
points' of age distributions of demographic data, but do not capture dispersion of 
abortions along the age dimension. The pattern of heterogeneity, or the degree 
of dispersion in the age distribution of abortion seekers, can be very effectively 
described by means of concentration analysis. The best known indicators of this 
kind are the standard deviation, the Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient.12
12 For a discussion of concepts and measures used in concentration analysis, as well as for some 
examples of its application, see Chapter 3, Section 3.3.2.
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Regrettably, none of these devices is perfect. The Lorenz curve gives the most 
complete picture of the extent of concentration, but in most instances one would 
prefer to have that extent described by a single quantitative indicator. The Gini 
coefficient sums up all the information given by the Lorenz curve, but is rather 
difficult to interpret. What does a Gini coefficient for the distribution of abortions 
of, say, 0.6 tell us in terms of the fraction of the reproductive age range which 
accounted for a specified proportion of all abortions performed? The standard 
deviation has the same shortcoming. For these reasons, it seems desirable to 
introduce some more telling indicator of concentration.
For measuring the relative concentration of fertility with respect to age, Lutz 
(1987, 1989) has suggested so-called fractiles. Fractiles indicate what 
proportion of women in the narrowest continuous age range encloses 75 per 
cent, 50 per cent, etc. of all children. These proportions may be calculated for 
any proportion of vital events that occur in a real or synthetic cohort, providing 
that the data are categorized by age. In contrast to the Gini coefficient and the 
standard deviation, fractiles are very intuitive measures. Arguably, the most 
appropriate is the fractile which refers to 50 per cent of the relevant total; it 
identifies the peak of the distribution and therefore is equally sensitive to the 
level of concentration both 'before1 and 'after' that peak. In the present case, 
period ASARs and ASFRs were ranked in descending order according to their 
magnitudes, and the calculation was made of what proportion of women in the 
reproductive ages produced one half of the corresponding total period rate, 
taking single-year age groups for the fertile ages (15-49) as the producing units. 
The aim was to isolate the narrowest continuous age range that embraces 50 
per cent of the relevant total rate. As the summing of ranked ASARs and ASFRs 
rarely yielded a neat 50 per cent of the total abortion rate (TAR) or total fertility 
rate (TFR), the required fractiles were approximated using linear interpolation 
between the upper and lower age limits of the 'cut-off' age group. Naturally, the 
closer to 50 per cent the proportion of the reproductive years needed to produce 
50 per cent of the total rate, the lower the degree of concentration, while the 
further the proportion moves below 50 per cent the higher the degree of 
concentration.13
13 If 10 per cent of the 35-years long (from 15 to 49) reproductive life span produces 50 per cent 
of the total rate, this means that half the total rate is generated by only 3.5 years of reproductive 
life (3.5 contiguous single-year age groups). Similarly, 50 per cent would indicate that half the rate 
is generated by 17.5 years of reproductive life. In terms of absolute numbers of single-year age 
groups needed to produce 50 per cent of the relevant total rate, the indicators shown in Figure 6.5 
vary between 10.5 (abortion - Czech Rep., 1973) and 5.3 (fertility - Czech Rep., 1982).
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Figure 6.5 shows what proportion of the reproductive life span produced half the 
TAR and TFR recorded in particular calendar years. The graph demonstrates 
that the concentration of fertility with respect to age was always higher than was 
that of abortion. In particular calendar years, the proportion of years of 
reproductive life needed to produce half the TAR varies between 29.9 per cent 
and 26.3 per cent, whereas the corresponding figures for TFRs range between 
only 24.2 per cent and 15.1 per cent. Furthermore, indicators based on ASFRs 
display a clear trend over time, pointing to increasing concentration of fertility
Figure 6.5: Proportion of reproductive life span that produced 50 per cent
of the relevant total period rate
Czech Republic and Slovakia, 1950-90
abortion - SI. 
abortion - CR  
fertility - SI. 
fertility - CR
Sources: FSO (1981, 1991), IHS (1991).
with respect to age. This process was initially more rapid in the Czech Republic 
than in Slovakia and, consequently, the Czech population exhibited relatively 
more concentrated distributions of its period ASFRs. Indicators based on 
abortion rates, on the other hand, show little temporal change. Compared to 
Slovakia, the Czech population appears to have been characterized by a 
somewhat lower concentration of abortion in relation to age. The years 1963-64, 
the mid-1970s and the late 1980s are characterized by rather low levels of 
concentration, and the years 1965-69 and 1978-82 by short-lived increases in 
concentration of abortion, but these temporal trends do not seem to be very 
significant. Except in 1960, the indicators based on the Slovak ASARs are lower 
than those for the Czech Republic, and vary within a narrower range. This was 
the case particularly during the 1970s and 1980s, when the proportion of 
reproductive ages producing 50 per cent of the TAR in Slovakia fluctuated only
35% n
30% -
25% -
1 5 %  -
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Years
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between 26.3 per cent and 27.7 per cent. This implies that the age 
concentration of period ASARs was higher in the Slovak population, and did not 
change much over the years studied.
6.4.4 Age-specific abortion ratios
The ASARs and the measures derived from them are not the only indicators that 
can be used to detect period age patterns of abortion. An alternative approach 
is to look at age-specific proportions of identifiable pregnancies resulting in 
abortion. The logic underlying this mode of analysis is analogous to that of 
abortion rates. As in abortion rates one relates abortions to a measure of all 
women who could have experienced one, so in abortion ratios they are related 
to a measure of all statistically recorded pregnancies that could have led to 
abortion. The types of information obtained by these two approaches are 
different but complementary: abortion rates indicate the relative frequency of the 
occurrence of abortion within a given population of women in a specified period 
of time, while ratios of abortions to total known pregnancies identify to what 
extent pregnancies that might have ended in abortion actually did so end.
One problem related to the calculation of abortion ratios is that pregnancies 
leading to induced abortions generally began at other times than those resulting 
in stillbirths or live births. There are estimating procedures that make it possible 
to relate induced abortions to the total of pregnancies generated by the same 
cohort of conceptions. With respect to live births, this can be achieved by 
relating abortions performed during a given period, such as a calendar year, to 
births occurring during a period of equal duration starting and ending six months 
later.14 Similar adjustments can be made for other forms of pregnancy outcome. 
However, empirical evidence suggests that such 'adjusted' abortion ratios differ 
only slightly from the ratios obtained simply by relating abortions to the sum of 
pregnancies recorded in the same calendar period (Tietze, 1983). Therefore, the 
problem that, in annual data, different pregnancy outcomes pertain to different 
cohorts of conceptions seems to be of little importance and may be ignored 
when calculating abortion ratios.
Age-specific abortion ratios per 100 known pregnancies for the period 1960-90 
are displayed in Figure 6.6. These ratios were computed by relating induced
14 This is based on the assumption that, on average, abortions occur three months and live births 
nine months after the conception.
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abortions obtained by women at given age in a given year to the total of 
recorded pregnancies (defined as the sum of induced abortions, spontaneous 
abortions, stillbirths, and live births) experienced by the same age category of 
women in the same calendar year. The pattern is quite different from the pattern 
of abortion rates (compare Figures 6.2 and 6.6). Abortion ratios tend to rise from 
relatively low levels at ages 15-24 to the highest levels at ages 35-49. At all
Figure 6.6: Age-specific abortion ratios per 100 known pregnancies 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, 1960-90
Czech Republic
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Sources: FSO (1981, 1991), IHS (1991).
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ages, Czech women had a more pronounced tendency to terminate their 
pregnancies by abortion than their Slovak counterparts.
In both populations, abortion ratios are low in age group 20-24. In 
Czechoslovakia, this was the age when most women were already married and 
the overwhelming majority of pregnancies were planned or at least accepted if 
they occurred. Women aged 15-19 often recorded higher proportions of aborted 
pregnancies than those aged 20-24, however. In the Czech Republic this was 
typical for the whole 1960-90 period. In Slovakia, this pattern existed only during 
1970-76 and in other periods women aged 15-19 recorded similar abortion ratios 
to those aged 20-24. Apparently, in the Czech population, more pregnancies 
occurring to teenagers were perceived as unwanted than was the case with 
pregnancies of the 20-24-year-olds. In Slovakia, women aged 15-19 aborted 
their pregnancies to about the same extent as women in their early twenties, 
and teenage pregnancies were in general much less likely to end by abortion 
than was the case in the Czech Republic. These findings invite several 
interpretations: either teenage conceptions in Slovakia were more often 
intentional; or Slovak teenagers more often encountered intervention from their 
parents urging them to carry the pregnancy to term; or an abortion was for them 
less acceptable or accessible than for their counterparts in the Czech Republic. 
It seems that it was mainly the cultural and religious differences between 
Czechs and Slovaks, rather than differences in accessibility of abortion, that 
produced these regional contrasts in teenage behaviour.
The generally high ratios for women over 40 years of age are likely to be a 
product of several factors: less regular sexual activity resulting in more 
accidental conceptions; declining contraceptive prevalence during the years of 
quickly vanishing fecundity; fear of birth defects; and, perhaps most importantly, 
a vehement determination to prevent births by all possible means, including by 
abortion. It is interesting that abortion ratios for women aged 45-49 were 
frequently lower than those for women aged 40-44 or even 35-39. Part of the 
explanation is that women over 45 years of age are exposed, when they 
become pregnant, to higher risks of spontaneous abortion, a circumstance that 
obviously reduces their demand for induced abortion.15
15 During 1960-85, annual proportions of pregnancies resulting in spontaneous abortions varied 
among women aged 45-49 between 22 and 31 per cent in the Czech Republic, and between 10 
and 33 per cent in Slovakia. In the age groups 20-24 and 25-29, these proportions varied between 
only 5 and 9 per cent in the Czech Republic, and between 3 and 7 per cent in Slovakia (FSO, 
1981, 1991; IHS, 1991).
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During the 1960-90 period there were overall increases in abortion ratios at all 
ages (Figure 6.6), but the changes were not absolutely consistent and the 
generally upward trends were several times interrupted by short-term declines. 
One important difference between the two populations is the manner in which 
age-specific abortion ratios varied over time. The Czech Republic was 
characterized by more distinctly period-specific changes than Slovakia, 
particularly between 1960 and 1975. As was the case with ASARs, shifts in 
abortion ratios coincided with changes in the political and socio-economic 
climate of reproduction in Czechoslovakia.
The preceding analysis suggests that the incidence of abortion in the Czech and 
Slovak populations was to a substantial degree related to the ages of the 
women involved. In terms of age-specific rates of abortion, those who aborted 
were predominantly women in their twenties and early thirties, while teenagers 
and women over 40 years of age experienced relatively low levels of abortion. 
Abortion rates fluctuated over time, and this variation was more pronounced 
among women at high-abortion ages. Temporal changes in age patterns of 
ASARs indicate a moderate trend towards earlier abortion, but this tendency 
was less marked than the concurrent fall in median ages at childbearing. 
Furthermore, abortion rates appear to have been relatively little concentrated 
with respect to age, with the peak exposure rates covering slightly less than 30 
per cent of the potentially fecundable age range. This finding is in contrast to the 
generally higher, and over the years clearly increasing, concentration of 
childbearing into a comparatively short portion of the reproductive life span. In 
terms of abortion ratios, the extent to which existing pregnancies were 
terminated by abortion was greatest among women over 35 years of age, while 
pregnancies to women aged 15-24 resulted much less frequently in abortions.
6.5 Ages of abortion seekers and historical time
6.5.1 3-D plots of age-specific abortion rates
For the simultaneous consideration of the two major demographic dimensions of 
exposure rates — age (individual time) and time (historical time) — a three- 
dimensional perspective is required to visualize the data. There are several 
possible ways to present three-dimensional data, but none is free of problems. 
Figures 6.7 and 6.8 display the trends in age-specific abortion rates in the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia over the years 1960-90 in the form of 3-D plots.
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Figure 6.7: First view of 3-D plot of age-specific abortion rates 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, 1960-90
Czech Republic
■ 60-90
□ 30-60
□ 0-30
Slovakia
45
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Sources: FSO (1991), IHS (1991).
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Figure 6.8: Second view of 3-D plot of age-specific abortion rates 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, 1960-90
Czech Republic
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Slovakia
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Sources: FSO (1991), IHS (1991).
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This kind of presentation has both advantages and disadvantages. The major 
pitfall is that the plots do not show the complete array of data, because part of 
the information is obscured by the 'hill' formed by the high abortion rates of the 
age groups 25-29. This shortcoming can be overcome by presenting each graph 
twice, the second time with the age scale in reverse order. A further difficulty has 
to do with the fact that it is hard to trace back the exact numerical values 
defining most of the points on the graph. On the other hand, 3-D plots furnish a 
vivid picture of this relatively long time-series of abortion data, which is 
especially helpful when one's aim is to understand fluctuations along the age 
and period dimensions simultaneously.
The data in Figures 6.7 and 6.8 show the whole abortion histories of the Czech 
and Slovak populations from an age-period-specific perspective. In the graph for 
the Czech Republic, several major phases can readily be seen: a period of 
relatively high abortion in 1960-62; a decline in 1963; a temporary increase in 
abortion levels during the mid- to late-1960s; gradually declining abortion levels 
from 1969 till 1972; a distinct fall in 1973 followed by a stabilization; a phase of 
gradually increasing abortion from about 1977 to the mid-1980s; and, finally, the 
emergence of extremely high abortion rates in 1987 and thereafter. In the 
picture for Slovakia, no such distinct periodicity is apparent, except perhaps for 
the drops in 1963 and 1973, and increases in abortion rates in the late 1960s 
and then from 1987 onwards. One interesting feature is a much more fractured, 
uneven 'topography' in the Slovak graph between the late 1960s and the early 
1980s. In general, however, the 3-D views for Slovakia appear to portray a 
relatively more stable abortion situation than the graphs for the Czech Republic. 
Another important characteristic clearly visible from the graphs is the persistence 
in both populations of a relatively rigid age pattern of abortion. This pattern is 
characterized, broadly speaking, by low levels in the early and late childbearing 
ages, and peaks in the age group 20-34. The more subtle temporal changes 
and regional differences in age patterns of abortion, however, are more readily 
identifiable in measures such as the already discussed median age at abortion 
than in somewhat intricate 3-D plots.
6.5.2 Total abortion rates
Period fluctuations in abortion can best be illustrated in terms of changes in total 
abortion rates (TARs). The main advantage of TARs is that they summarize the 
extent of abortion practices in a given period across all age groups, and thus
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highlight overall differences between populations compared. Figure 6.9 shows 
that trends in TARs in the Czech and Slovak Republics during 1960-90 closely 
correspond to findings captured in the 3-D plots. Between 1960 and 1972, both 
populations experienced fluctuations between regimes of 'high' and 'low' 
abortion. But this variation proceeded on two quite different levels, with Slovakia 
having usually a lower and generally less variable overall incidence of abortion 
than the Czech Republic. Even when the TAR in the Czech Republic dropped 
from 1.1 in 1961 to 0.8 in 1963, the resulting 'low' level of abortion was still 
roughly equal to that which Slovakia experienced during periods of 'high' 
abortion in 1961-62 and 1966-72.
Figure 6.9: Total abortion rates 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, 1960-90
Czech Republic
Slovakia
«  1.2 -
o 0.8 ■
1970 -
Year
Sources: FSO (1981, 1991), IHS (1991).
Beginning in the early 1970s, the overall amount of recorded abortion declined, 
and as these reductions were somewhat larger in the Czech Republic, 
disparities between the two republics tended to fade (Figure 6.9). By 1973 both 
populations attained TARs of slightly less than 0.8. However, the situation of 
similar regional abortion levels lasted only four years. From 1977, the overall 
incidence of abortion started to rise again, but the increase was substantially 
larger in the Czech Republic. Consequently, within less than a decade a 
substantial gap between levels of abortion in the two regions re-emerged. By the 
mid-1980s, the TAR for the Czech population reached 1.1, whereas the 
corresponding figure for Slovakia was 0.9 — almost 20 per cent lower. During 
the two following years, both populations registered sharp increases, but the 
relative difference between their TARs remained largely unchanged. By 1990,
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the TAR in the Czech Republic reached 1.56 and in Slovakia 1.23, which 
corresponds to 100:79. Whereas the two peaks in the early and late 1960s may 
be referred to as 'waves' of abortion, the more recent trends might be called 
incoming 'tides'.
What factors account for the considerable temporal variation in levels of total 
abortion in the populations of former Czechoslovakia? Part of the explanation 
may rest in developments in the legal availability of abortion.16 The first law 
dealing explicitly with abortion was introduced in Czechoslovakia in December 
1957. As the law permitted terminations of pregnancy not only for medical but 
also for social reasons (on the condition that these were previously examined 
and approved by a special committee), massive growth in the incidence of 
registered legal abortion resulted. Some of this increase can be seen in the 
higher TARs for 1961 and 1962 than for 1960 (Figure 6.9). In 1962 a set of new 
government ordinances came into effect, implementing several pronatalist as 
well as anti-abortion measures in order to increase births of second and third 
children in families. Apparently, the declines in TARs in 1963 were a direct 
consequence of these measures. However, the pronatalist policy of 1962 turned 
out to be only a weak intervention in demographic terms. Its effects were only 
transitory, and as the late 1960s brought significant deterioration in material 
standards of living, TARs returned step by step to their previous levels.
In 1968, the Czechoslovak government launched a series of elaborate pro- 
family policies, designed once more to promote fertility of married couples. 
These measures were predominantly positive in their nature, and it was only in 
1973, towards the end of this period of explicit pronatalism, that access to 
abortion was partly restricted for women under 40 years of age or with fewer 
than three children. The largely gradual decline in TARs over the period 1969-75 
has to be interpreted mainly against the background of this wave of 
predominantly non-compulsory policies. Between 1973 and 1986, the 
government did little to directly influence demographic trends. No significant new 
policies were introduced, but the old ones came to be less emphasized, both in 
propaganda and in practice. As in the late 1960s, the Czech and Slovak 
populations faced palpable declines in material well-being and, as then, they 
reacted by resorting increasingly to induced abortion. In November 1986, 
abortion appeared again on the Czechoslovak government agenda. This time,
16 More detailed discussions of the development of Czechoslovak laws concerning abortion and 
their social ramifications can be found in Chapters 2 and 4.
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the law was substantially relaxed to allow more flexible administrative dealing 
with abortion applications, thus to reduce the medical risks and health care 
problems associated with abortion performed in later stages of pregnancy. 
Perhaps the most important change was the complete elimination of abortion 
committees, a move that transferred virtually all the authority concerning 
abortion to women themselves. This is clearly reflected in the ample increases in 
(already high) abortion levels between 1986 and 1987. This change, however, 
was not absolutely clearcut; it is possible to detect, especially in Slovakia, a 
phase of perhaps anticipatory increase in TARs in 1986, followed by a short­
term peak in 1987-88, and then a slight decline to more stable levels in 1989 
and 1990. How did the anticipatory increase in 1986 take place? One possibility 
is that abortion committees in Slovakia became more liberal as the new abortion 
law was announced in the media several months before it actually came into 
force. However, the question remains why the same phenomenon did not occur 
in the Czech Republic.
It would be simplistic, however, to view the law as the sole explanatory factor 
behind temporal variation in abortion levels in the Czech and Slovak 
populations. To be sure, abrupt year-to-year changes in demographic time 
series are always difficult to explain otherwise than by sudden modifications in 
underlying political and socio-economic conditions, rather than as pure 
behavioural shifts. Yet abortion is too many-sided a subject to be left without an 
attempt to clarify it by taking into account other aspects of social reality than just 
the legal ones. One particularly interesting question concerns the sources of 
contrasts between the trends in abortion in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia. 
Therefore, one of the aims of the following sections is to shed some light on the 
nature of Czech-Slovak differences in abortion.
6.6 Marital statuses of abortion seekers
Each of the major components of human reproduction is the result of individual 
behaviour of people in particular marital status groups. Marital status obviously 
affects the likelihood and timing of demographic events. The establishment of a 
relationship, sexual intercourse, conception, the decision to have a baby or to 
abort, and the actual ending of that pregnancy are but a few examples of events 
which may have very different ramifications depending on the marital situations 
of the persons who experience them. In most societies, procreation is closely 
linked to the institution of marriage. Marriage means the foundation of a family,
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which in almost every society is the major institution where children are born and 
socialized. Family, at least in its traditional sense, usually also implies close and 
relatively stable relationships among its members, a well established division of 
social roles and responsibilities, and a feeling of economic and emotional 
security. Traditions, customs, and broader socio-cultural context may be 
expected to play important roles in family life. Being single, divorced, or widowed 
has usually very different social implications, although these may differ from 
society to society, between cohorts, as well as between age groups within one 
cohort. For all these reasons, marital status as a circumstance of demographic 
behaviour deserves special attention.
Like many concepts in demography, however, the distinction between particular 
marital statuses is problematic in several respects. In theory, marital status 
denotes the place of an individual on the scale single — married —  divorced —  
widowed; in practice, however, this placement is complicated both by the 
ambiguity of the four categories and by the frequent reluctance of persons to 
place themselves in them. Clearly, persons who are 'spouseless' are not 
necessarily 'partnerless', and sometimes the living arrangements and life style of 
those who are legally unmarried may be very similar to those of the legally 
married. Furthermore, some observations may be distorted by pregnant women 
changing their marital statuses during pregnancy. More valid comparisons would 
be between women of comparable marital status at the time of conception, 
rather than at the time of abortion or birth, but available data are frequently 
unsuited to making such adjustments.
6.6.1 Percentage distribution by marital status
Most abortion data available for Czechoslovakia are classified for only two 
marital status categories: married and single. The figures for divorced and 
widowed can be derived by subtracting abortions of married and single women 
from the relevant totals, but there is no way of distinguishing these two marital 
status groups within this residual. Figure 6.10 shows annual percentage 
distributions of abortions by marital status for the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
during 1960-90. In both populations, the general pattern indicated by these 
graphs is very similar: the proportion of women who were married when they 
obtained their abortions is by far the highest, whereas the proportions single, 
and divorced or widowed tend to be much lower. In the Czech Republic, the 
marital portion of total recorded abortion oscillated over the years between 75
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Figure 6.10: Annual percentage distributions of abortions by marital status 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, 1960-90
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Source: IHS (1991).
and 80 per cent, and only in 1971-73 and 1990 did it drop any lower. In 
Slovakia, the marital portion declined from more than 85 per cent in 1960-67 to 
about 80 per cent in following years. In other words, during most of the period 
under consideration, eight to nine of every ten women seeking an abortion were 
currently married.
Compared to the married part of the female population, the contribution of single 
women to total recorded abortion was generally much lower, although it
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increased somewhat over time. In the Czech Republic the proportion of 
abortions obtained by single women increased from around 12 per cent in the 
early 1960s to more than 15 per cent in 1987-90; in Slovakia the increase was 
from less than 10 per cent in the early 1960s to about 14 per cent in 1987-90. 
The proportion of abortions obtained by the divorced or widowed was, during 
most of the 1960-90 period, low but rising: in the Czech Republic it increased 
from about 7 per cent in 1960-64 to roughly 9 per cent in the late 1980s, and in 
Slovakia from 3 per cent to 5 per cent during this calendar period. Thus, the 
major impression from the graphs in Figure 6.10 is that abortion in both 
populations was predominantly a matter for married women.
6.6.2 Decomposition of TARs by marital status
The overall differences in abortion between different marital status categories 
may be summarized by decomposing period TARs into portions attributable to 
married, single, and divorced or widowed women.17 Table 6.7 presents results of 
such a decomposition analysis for four different calendar periods.18 The 
calculations confirm that, in each period and in both populations compared, 
abortion within marriage was responsible for the overwhelming majority of the 
TAR. In each marital status group, the components for Czech women were in 
absolute terms higher than those for Slovakia. Also, the structure of total 
abortions differed in the two populations: in the Czech Republic, marital abortion 
played a relatively less important role, and the non-marital portions thus 
contributed comparatively more to TARs than in Slovakia.
Over the years, however, the proportions of TARs ascribable to marital abortion 
declined in both populations, leaving relatively more room for abortion among 
the single, and the divorced or widowed. Between 1980 and 1990, the period 
during which abortion became available on request, TARs went up in both parts 
of the former Czechoslovak federation, but the overall increases resulted 
primarily from increases in marital abortion. In the Czech Republic, the change 
in marital abortion accounted for 68 per cent of the overall increase; the change
17 If the ASAR for age group i = aj( then TAR = Z aj (for i = 15-19, 20-24......  45-49). If marital
status is taken into account, the TAR is determined by the age-specific proportions of females 
married (nij), single (nj), and divorced & widowed (Oj), and their respective age-specific abortion 
rates (pjt qj, q): TAR = Z nijPj + I  n^j + Z o^. The three additive terms in the latter equation 
represent the contributions of married, single, and divorced or widowed women to total period 
abortion.
18 The 'population-at-risk' data specific for age and marital status necessary for these calculations 
were taken from census data for 1961, 1970, and 1980 (CCPCS, 1965; FSO, 1974, 1985), and 
from an intercensal estimate published for 1990 (FSO, 1991).
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Table 6.7 Decomposition of period total abortion rates with respect to
marital status
Czech Republic and Slovakia, selected years 1961-90
Year Period Portion of TAR attributable to:
TAR married women single women divorced & 
widowed women
abs. % abs. % abs. %
1961 1.096 0.887
Czech Republic 
81.0% 0.142 12.9% 0.067 6.1%
1970 1.029 0.800 77.7% 0.149 14.5% 0.080 7.7%
1980 0.914 0.724 79.2% 0.112 12.3% 0.077 8.5%
1990 1.551 1.159 74.7% 0.250 16.1% 0.141 9.1%
change between 1980 and 1990: 
+0.637 +0.434 68.2% +0.138 21.7% +0.064 10.1%
1961 0.818 0.715
Slovakia
87.4% 0.079 9.7% 0.023 2.8%
1970 0.886 0.739 83.4% 0.110 12.4% 0.038 4.2%
1980 0.835 0.686 82.2% 0.105 12.6% 0.044 5.2%
1990 1.227 0.978 79.7% 0.185 15.0% 0.065 5.3%
change between 1980 and 1990: 
+0.393 +0.292 74.4% +0.079 20.2% +0.021 5.4%
Note: Components may not add to sums, and percentages may not add to 100, because of 
rounding.
Sources: CCPCS (1965), FSO (1974, 1985, 1991), IHS (1991).
in abortion among single women accounted for 22 per cent; and the change 
attributable to abortion among the divorced and widowed accounted for only 10 
per cent. In Slovakia, 75 per cent of the increase in the TAR during 1980-90 was 
due to change in marital abortion; 20 per cent was due to change in abortion 
among the single; and merely 5 per cent was due to change in abortion among 
the divorced and widowed. Thus, the abortion law of 1986 strengthened the use 
of abortion among all groups of women, but especially among those who were 
married.
6.6.3 Abortion rates specific for age and marital status
The crucial problem in measuring period abortion with respect to marital status 
lies in the conversion of observed status-specific numbers of abortions into rates 
specific for age and marital status simultaneously. The trouble is that for most 
calendar years the 'population at risk' data required for such calculations are not 
available. It is only since 1987 that population data cross-tabulated 
simultaneously by five-year age groups and marital status have been processed 
and published for Czechoslovakia (FSO, 1991). For preceding periods, the only
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sources providing this type of data are the Czechoslovak population censuses of 
1961, 1970, and 1980 (CCPCS, 1965; FSO, 1974, 1985).
The obvious problem with using censuses as bases for the calculation of period 
rates is that vital registration data should be related to mid-year populations at 
risk, whereas censuses usually refer to different dates.19 In order to bring the 
numerators and denominators closer to each other, one may either try to adjust 
the denominators (the enumeration figures) or to re-group appropriately the 
numerators (the vital statistics data). In this analysis, the first of these 
alternatives was used, leaving numerators unchanged and estimating relevant 
denominators. The rationale behind this approach is that, in the case of a 
relatively rare phenomenon such as abortion, it is mainly differences and 
changes in the sizes of numerators that dictate differentials and trends in 
demographic rates. The required denominators were estimated by applying the 
census marital status distributions for each five-year age group to mid-year age 
distributions for individual census years. However, the results should be 
regarded merely as estimates of true age-marital-status-specific rates, not as 
'true1 rates.
Figure 6.11 gives the estimated abortion rates specific for age and marital 
status.20 Dramatic differences among the rates manifest the explanatory 
strength of the variables used. The age patterns of abortion of the three groups 
of women distinguished in the graphs are very dissimilar, although differences 
between them tend to diminish with increasing age. Single women clearly have 
the lowest age-specific rates: their pattern is marked by relatively low levels 
among women under 19 and over 35 years of age, and higher rates in the age 
groups 20-24 and 25-29. Comparisons of the data for 1990 with those for 
preceding years show marked increases in abortion among the single as well as 
shifts of the peak rates from age group 25-29 to age group 20-24. The former 
change was especially pronounced in the Czech Republic, where between 1980 
and 1990 the age-specific abortion rates of single women aged 20-24 and 25-29 
doubled.
The age pattern of abortion of married women is similar in its general shape to 
that of single women, but at a significantly higher level (Figure 6.11). Compared 
to Slovakia, married women in the Czech Republic had much higher levels of
19 The three Czechoslovak censuses were taken on March 1, 1961, December 1, 1970, and 
November 1, 1980.
20 These rates are given in Tables A6.3 and A6.4 in the Appendix.
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Figure 6.11: Abortion rates specific for age and marital status, 
selected years 1961-90
Czech Republic
1961
1980 1990
Slovakia
1961 1970
1980 1990
divorced & widowed
Sources: CCPCS (1965), FSO (1974, 1985, 1991), IHS (1991).
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abortion at ages 15-19, and usually also 20-24; at older ages, however, levels of 
marital abortion in the two populations were roughly equivalent. As was the case 
with single women, the peak rates for married women moved over the years 
from older age groups to age group 20-24, thus marking a gradual shift to earlier 
abortion within marriage. The shapes of the age-specific abortion curves for 
divorced and widowed women reveal a very different behavioural pattern as well 
as marked differences between women living in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia. In the Czech population, the divorced and widowed typically had 
extremely high abortion rates, often approaching or surpassing 120 abortions 
per 1,000 women, at ages 20-24, and sharply declining rates at older ages.21 
The corresponding age pattern in Slovakia was similar, but at each age the 
rates for divorced or widowed women were substantially lower than in the Czech 
Republic. Naturally, divorced and widowed women represent two very different 
groups, and their reproductive behaviour may be expected to differ sharply, not 
only because of differences in age structures. Clearly, divorced women are 
much more likely than widowed ones to quickly establish new potentially 
reproductive relationships. With the data at hand, the two categories cannot be 
distinguished. However, since widowhood tends to be of minor importance 
across the reproductive age range, it seems safe to assume that women in the 
'divorced or widowed' group are overwhelmingly divorced.
Census data make it possible to calculate reasonably reliable estimates of age- 
marital status-specific abortion rates for census years, but similar rates can be 
estimated for the intercensal years, too. Again, the basic assumption here is that 
it is mainly changes in recorded numbers of abortions that drive trends in 
abortion rates. One way of estimating the required 'population-at-risk' figures is 
to use published estimates of annual mid-year age distributions for females and 
to estimate marital status distributions in each five-year age group by applying 
linearly interpolated census distributions to individual intercensal years. This 
procedure obviously affects the fine detail of rates for intercensal periods, but it 
is unlikely to generate fictitious trends or to suppress significant ones.
The results of the calculations of annual abortion rates for married and 
unmarried women are shown in Figure 6.12. The considerable period variation 
during 1960-90 in the trend lines for ages 20 to 34 reflects behavioural 
responses to changing demographic policies and socio-economic conditions.
21 Abortion rates for divorced and widowed women aged 15-19 were excluded from the analysis 
because of low numbers of events recorded. During 1960-90, annual numbers of abortions in this 
group varied between 5 and 60 in the Czech Republic, and between 2 and 20 in Slovakia.
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Figure 6.12: Age-specific abortion rates for married and unmarried women,
1961-90
Czech Republic
Unmarried women
Slovakia
Married women Unmarried women
25-29
/ / ^ 30-34
20-24
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Sources: CCPCS (1965), FSO (1974, 1985, 1991), IHS (1991).
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The variation was more pronounced for married women than for unmarried 
ones, a phenomenon not very surprising for a country whose demographic 
policies were always focused on the family. The graphs also highlight the 
generally higher levels of abortion within marriage than outside of it. In most 
calendar periods, the difference between marital and non-marital abortion was 
most noticeable at ages 15-19 and 20-24, at which married women recorded 
abortion rates several times higher than their unmarried counterparts. Rates for 
Slovakia differ from those for the Czech Republic in several respects. In the 
Czech population, the overall contrasts between marital and non-marital 
abortion were smaller than in Slovakia; married women under 25 years of age 
experienced much higher levels of abortion; and the variability of abortion rates 
in response to period influences was larger than was the case in Slovakia. 
However, the Czech-Slovak differentials in levels of marital abortion dropped 
considerably following the 1986 policy change, partly because of sharp 
increases in abortion among Slovak married women aged 15-19 and 20-24 
between 1986 and 1987.
6.6.4 Decomposition of regional differences in TARs
What was the role of the unlike levels of marital and non-marital abortion in 
producing the overall differences in abortion levels between the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia? Obviously, part of the long-lasting regional disparity in TARs 
within the former Czechoslovakia may have resulted not only from dissimilarities 
in abortion patterns within particular marital status groups, but also from 
differences between the two populations in proportions married at different ages. 
A useful method to distinguish between these types of influence is the 
'components of difference' technique. Figures in Table 6.8 are an attempt to 
quantify the separate contributions of dissimilarities in age-specific proportions 
married, marital abortion rates, and non-marital abortion rates to the differences 
between the Czech and Slovak period TARs in Table 6.7. The calculations are 
based on the technique of multiple standardization.22
22 This method might be briefly illustrated with data for 1961:
Source of data: Resulting
TARdistribution by marital status marital ASARs non-marital ASARs
Czech Rep. Czech Rep. Czech Rep. 1.096
Slovakia Czech Rep. Czech Rep. 1.096
Czech Rep. Slovakia Czech Rep. 0.926
Czech Rep. Czech Rep. Slovakia 0.988
Slovakia Slovakia Czech Rep. 0.928
Slovakia Czech Rep. Slovakia 0.986
Czech Rep. Slovakia Slovakia 0.818
Slovakia Slovakia Slovakia 0.818
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Table 6.8: Components of difference in total abortion rates between the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, selected years 1961-90
Factor ______________________ Period______________________
1961 1970 1980 1990
___________________abs. % abs. % abs. % abs %
TAR:
Czech Republic 1.096 n.a. 1.030 n.a. 0.915 n.a. 1.551 n.a.
Slovakia 0.818 n.a. 0.886 n.a. 0.835 n.a. 1.227 n.a.
Total difference: 
(Slovakia-Czech R.) -0.278 100% -0.144 100% -0.080 100% -0.323 100%
Difference due to: 
distribution by 
marital status 0.000 0% -0.004 3% -0.007 9% -0.014 4%
marital 
abortion rate -0.169 61% -0.051 36% -0.017 21% -0.142 44%
non-marital 
abortion rate -0.109 39% -0.088 61% -0.056 70% -0.167 52%
Notes: TARs shown in this table may not wholly agree with those in Table 6.7, and components 
may not add to total differences, because of rounding.
Sources: see Table 6.7
The results in Table 6.8 suggest that differences in non-marital abortion were 
generally more important than those in marital abortion. It was only in 1961 that 
the overall difference in regional TARs was due primarily to dissimilar levels of 
marital abortion: as can be inferred from Figure 6.12, the Czech-Slovak 
difference was largest for married women aged 15-19 and 20-24. In the 
remaining periods, dissimilar levels of non-marital abortion accounted for about 
50 to 70 per cent of differences in regional TARs, and were thus the principal 
explanatory factor for the discrepancy in overall abortion levels between the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia. Regional contrasts in the distribution of women by 
marital status had a negligible effect in 1961, but in later periods they accounted
The difference in the TAR to be apportioned to the three factors is the Slovak TAR less the Czech 
TAR: 0.818-1.096=-0.278 (all calculations are rounded to three decimal places). The difference 
due to dissimilarities in the distribution of women by marital status is 1.096-1.096=0. The 
difference due to dissimilarities in marital abortion alone is 0.926-1.096=-0.169. The difference 
due to dissimilarities in non-marital abortion alone is 0.988-1.096=-0.108. The difference 
accounted for by the three factors operating independently is 0+(-0.169)+(-0.108)=-0.277. The 
difference due to the interaction of factors is -0.278-(-0.277)=-0.001. The difference due to the 
interaction of marital status and marital abortion is 0.928-1.096-(-0-0.169)=0.001. The difference 
due to the interaction of marital status and non-marital abortion is 0.986-1.096-(0-0.108)=-0.002. 
(There is no interaction between marital and non-marital abortion rates.) The total difference due 
to dissimilarities in marital status is 0+0.5x(0.001)+0.5x(-0.002)=0. The total difference due to 
dissimilarities in marital abortion rates is -0.169+0.5x(0.001)=-0.169. The total difference due to 
dissimilarities in non-marital abortion rates is -0.108+0.5x(-0.002)=-0.109. Note that interactions 
are allocated equally to the factors involved. For more information about this technique, as well as 
an example of its application, see Gibson (1976).
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for about three to nine per cent of the differences in TARs between the Czech 
and Slovak populations.
6.6.5 Some explanations
As might be expected, there is a rather strong association between the 
incidence of abortion and the marital statuses of women. In both the Czech and 
Slovak populations, abortion within marriage accounted for the overwhelming 
majority of abortions registered over the period studied. However, the 
percentage distributions obscure significant inter-group differences. When the 
numbers of persons in different marital status categories are taken into account, 
large differences among the exposure rates make it evident that the overall level 
of abortion has been highly dependent on how the occurrence of abortion was 
distributed by marital status. These findings indicate different lifestyle patterns, 
and different attitudinal and information conditions, as well as specific types of 
behaviour among women in different marital status groups, in areas such as 
sexual activity and co-operation with the sexual partner, timing and planning of 
pregnancies, awareness of the need for fertility control, and knowledge and use 
of contraception.
Clearly, currently married women may be expected to engage more frequently in 
sexual intercourse, and thus to have a higher risk of conceiving unintentionally, 
than those who are single. Contraceptive failure, coupled with human error in 
contraceptive practice, or the feeling that presently available contraception is 
inconvenient, can be common among married couples experiencing unwanted 
pregnancies. However rationalized, inconsistency in contraceptive use, 
combined with the perceived need to keep family size within certain limits, can 
be expected to be major determinants of undesired pregnancies among married 
women. But some married women may resort to abortion because their 
marriages have broken down and they anticipate that the relationships which 
produced their pregnancies will soon be ended by divorce. Especially in the 
Czech Republic, where marital breakdown has been more widespread than in 
Slovakia, such pre-divorce abortions may not have been infrequent. The fact 
that the state of being separated is not captured in the available data further 
complicates the interpretation of marital status differentials. Separated women 
are legally married, and most of them are likely to have been recorded 
accordingly when seeking abortion. In terms of actual lifestyle and behavioural 
patterns, however, these women are much closer to divorced ones: they also
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tend to live without a permanent partner and therefore may be afraid of 
economic or social difficulties likely to occur after the birth.
Previously married women are more likely than currently married ones to have 
abortions, presumably because their unstable personal circumstances more 
easily lead to situations where a pregnancy becomes unwanted. For instance, a 
woman may have discontinued contraception to become pregnant, but changed 
her mind after pregnancy began because the relationship with the partner had 
broken down. Women who are suddenly abandoned may in particular wish to 
avoid a birth in order to escape a wide spectrum of economic, emotional, and 
psychological difficulties, threatening both their immediate and long-range 
interests. An explanation for the extremely high levels of abortion among 
divorced and widowed women under 25 years of age is perhaps that early ages 
at marriage have selected women who are both more fecund and less effective 
contraceptors, and that these factors continue to operate even after the 
marriage has ceased to exist. Inconsistent contraceptive use may be another 
major determinant, especially for women who are older or engage in sexual 
intercourse only sporadically. Irregular coitus may well significantly elevate the 
risk of accidental conception per coital act by fostering inefficient contraception. 
In general, the degree of dyadic commitment in a heterosexual relationship may 
be one of the principal determinants of whether and how often contraceptives 
are used: the weaker the involvement the less likely it is that contraception will 
be practised. In a casual relationship, the man may not feel an obligation to 
prevent the consequences of unprotected sex and, therefore, may ignore the 
woman's possible request to practise contraception. A more stable relationship, 
on the other hand, may foster communication between sexual partners and thus 
greater control over sex. Naturally, not all aborted pregnancies of divorced and 
widowed women began after the end of their marriages. In fact, an unwanted 
pregnancy may often accelerate an already existing marital crisis and hasten 
divorce. Because legal abortion was generally known to be more readily 
available to divorced women, it is also quite possible that some separated, but 
legally still married, women whose husbands left them pregnant could have 
declared themselves 'divorced' when seeking abortions.
There is little doubt that the relatively low abortion rates for single women are 
primarily a result of widespread celibacy. Increasing levels of abortion among 
the single over the period studied are largely a consequence of increasing non- 
marital sexual activity. But the process can also be viewed as a reflection of
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increasing unwillingness to have children while single, a tendency evidently 
precipitated by the abolition of abortion committees in 1986; or a manifestation 
of an increased recognition of the responsibilities of parenthood, leading single 
women to choose abortions when they are unable to secure the relationship that 
resulted in their pregnancies and to establish a complete family. Low overall 
prevalence of abortion among the single may also indicate the possibility that 
having never been married somehow leads to greater attention to the intrinsic 
efficacy of the contraceptive method chosen, as well as to greater care and 
regularity in use of that method. In some single women, successful fertility 
regulation may, in fact, have been the chief instrument by which marriage was 
avoided. In other cases, however, the reality of being single combined with the 
relatively infrequent use of abortion may simply reflect low fecundity.
Thus, it can be concluded that abortion involves a host of social, economic, and 
psychological considerations which interact in various ways with the marital 
statuses of individuals. It seems very likely that variations in the incidence of 
abortion are attributable to variations in rates of unplanned pregnancy: other 
things being equal, women who seek more abortions may be expected to have 
been subject to higher probabilities of unplanned conception. In this context, two 
more general questions concern the extent to which unplanned pregnancies are 
to be regarded as mere accidents which could have been reduced by more 
responsible individual behaviour, and the extent to which society's institutional 
arrangements — such as reluctance by state authorities to promote modern 
methods of contraception and to provide adequate services — present genuine 
external barriers which prevent individuals from effectively avoiding unwanted 
pregnancies. The truly epidemic proportions of abortion in the Czech and Slovak 
populations, and in the former socialist regimes in Eastern Europe as a whole, 
strongly suggest that the latter may have been more than a second-order 
determinant.
6.7 Parities of abortion seekers
The objective of the analysis of abortion is to understand behaviour which is 
occurring as a consequence of intentional interference with the reproductive 
process. One possible way to proceed is to consider an abortion decision as 
rooted in choices made after some previous childbearing experience, which 
modifies subsequent reproductive behaviour. The essential concept behind 
measuring abortion in relation to previous reproductive performance is that
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individual women may have a tendency to avoid childbearing, and consequently 
to resort to abortion, based on their already attained parities. In other words, 
abortion is regarded as parity-dependent behaviour. Moreover, there is ample 
empirical evidence (Sachdev, 1981; Tietze, 1983) that the study of abortion in 
relation to socio-economic circumstances requires consideration of behaviour by 
parity rather than, as in the foregoing sections, comprehensively across all 
groups of women of childbearing age.
Reproductive events such as prior conceptions and births interact with abortion 
incidence in more complex ways than other variables such as age and marital 
status. Setting aside medical motives, dominant in situations where the foetus is 
abnormal or pregnancy endangers the mother's life, abortion can be used either 
for the postponement, spacing, or termination of childbearing. Thus, women may 
opt for abortion because they do not want a child at a given time in their lives; or 
they do not want a child by the male responsible for their pregnancy; or they do 
not want any more children. The first and second of these motives may often go 
together, but all motives may operate at any parity. However, the relative 
importance of these motives, and the circumstances giving rise to pregnancies 
that invoke them, undoubtedly vary among abortion-seekers of different parities. 
For instance, childless women may tend to have abortions because they are 
young, engage in sexual intercourse irregularly, and are thus more exposed to 
the risk of accidental conception than women living in marriage or permanent 
partnership. On the other hand, women with three or more children may have 
abortions because they already have the number of children they desire, but are 
bad contraceptors or have limited access to contraception. As the incidence of 
unplanned pregnancies and the cultural concept of how people should cope with 
them can vary from subgroup to subgroup within the population, so can abortion 
rates. In any case, to analyse abortion in relation to parity without controlling for 
characteristics such as age and marital status might be misleading, as the 
effects of these two variables are powerful.
The problem with analyses focusing on parity is that in demographic statistics 
the term is often used ambiguously: in some circumstances 'parity' denotes prior 
confinements; in others, prior live births; and in still others, co-resident living 
children. Czechoslovak abortion statistics for the period 1960-86 contain data 
classified by the number of living children the women had at the time of the 
abortion. This definition of parity changed substantially when the 1986 abortion 
law was enacted. Beginning in 1987, statistics refer to the total number of live
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births of the woman. Birth statistics and census data, on the other hand, 
classified women by birth order according to the number of previous live births 
they had had. The difference between the pre-1986 abortion data concept and 
the concept used in birth and census data is obvious; but equally obvious is the 
impossibility of retrospectively converting the Czechoslovak demographic data to 
one uniform basis. However, experience shows that 'where infant and later 
childhood mortality are low, these differences [in the definitions of parity] are of 
little importance' (Tietze and Henshaw, 1986: 59).23 In the following pages, 
therefore, the term parity is used without more detailed specification, simply to 
stand for the previous childbearing experiences and parental situations of 
aborting women.
6.7.1 Abortion ratios specific for parity, age, and marital status
Figure 6.13 gives parity-specific abortion ratios for the Czech and Slovak 
populations, as recorded during 1960-90 among married and unmarried women. 
The specification 'currently married' or 'currently unmarried' is all that the 
available parity-specific abortion statistics contain. Because available data on 
spontaneous abortions and stillbirths are not classified by parity, the required 
total numbers of pregnancies were estimated by combining the numbers of 
abortions to women of parity N and the numbers of concurrently occurring live 
births of birth order N+1. The great differentiating effect of parity reflected in the 
graphs is by itself a convincing demonstration of the importance of that variable 
for the analysis of abortion-obtaining behaviour. The graphs indicate that women 
were much more likely to abort when pregnant at some parities than at others, 
and that this association was particularly strong among married women. In both 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia, married women who were childless or had 
only one child were much less inclined to terminate their pregnancies by an 
abortion than those who already had two or more children. Apparently, in
23 That infant and childhood mortality was relatively low in Czechoslovakia during the post-war 
period can be documented by the numbers of survivors to exact age 15 (/J5) from period life tables 
(FSO, 1982, 1991):________________________________________________________________________
1949-51 1960-61 1970 1980 1990
males - Czech R. 91,217 96,778 96,937 97,504 98,286
males - Slovakia 85,853 95,759 96,176 96,889 98,127
females - Czech R. 92,927 97,746 97,725 98,182 98,764
females - Slovakia 87,727 96,652 97,010 97,776 98,584
These figures indicate that the changed definition of parity in abortion statistics from 1987 
onwards probably had little influence on comparability with previously collected data. Because the 
levels of mortality under 15 years of age were already very low by 1970, it is unlikely that the 
numbers of live births reported by abortion seekers in the late 1980s differed substantially from 
the numbers of actually surviving children.
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Figure 6.13: Parity-specific abortion ratios per 100 known pregnancies 
for married and unmarried women, 1960-90
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families with fewer than two children, most pregnancies were planned or at least 
were accepted when they occurred. In childless families, that acceptance was 
nearly universal and changed little over the years, except for the post-1986 
period when the abortion ratio of zero-parity married women reached three per 
cent in the Czech Republic and two per cent in Slovakia. Married women with 
one child were more likely to resort to abortion than childless ones, especially 
when they became pregnant during the late 1960s and 1970s or the late 1980s. 
But abortion never became a prevailing outcome of pregnancies of married 
women with one child, and only in 1986-90 did abortion ratios for this category 
reach 28 per cent in the Czech Republic and 20 per cent in Slovakia. Thus, in 
the early reproductive stages when the number of children was low and most 
reproductive goals had not yet been reached, abortion remained relatively little 
used by married women for the purpose of child-spacing.
The lowest parity at which the abortion ratio is higher than 50 per cent 
corresponds to the number of children beyond which additional births are 
rejected by a majority of pregnant women. The rather high abortion ratios for 
married women at higher parities probably reflect a common factor: the well- 
established small-family norm. In the Czech Republic the ideal of a two-child 
family clearly prevailed throughout the period between 1960 and 1990, and the 
majority of pregnancies following the birth of the second child within marriage 
appear to have been unwanted. Indeed, it was only during two short periods, 
1963-64 and 1974-75, that abortion ratios for women of parity two in the Czech 
Republic fell below 50 per cent. In other years, Czech married women who had 
given birth to two or more children mostly terminated their next pregnancies by 
abortion, and by the late 1980s the proportion of pregnancies resulting in 
abortion in this group of women was nearly 80 per cent. In Slovakia, on the 
other hand, the small-family norm appears to have been relatively recent. Until 
about the mid-1970s, married women of higher parities did not form a 
substantial group rejecting childbearing when pregnant. In 1975-90 there were 
noticeable increases in abortion ratios of high-parity married women in Slovakia. 
By 1990 more than 60 per cent of pregnancies of married women with two or 
more children ended in abortion, but this was still substantially less than in the 
Czech Republic. These findings largely correspond to the Czech-Slovak 
differentials in family-size preferences reported in fertility surveys, particularly to 
the fact that proportionately more Slovak than Czech women interviewed in 
these surveys considered as ideal three or more children in a family (see Table 
6.4 and Figure 6.1).
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The substantial period variation in abortion ratios for Czech married women of 
parities 2 and 3+ is another important finding from Figure 6.13. There is little 
doubt that this is largely attributable to changing socio-economic and political 
conditions and their effect on married couples with more than two children. In 
particular, the pattern reflects the relatively restrictive abortion practices resulting 
from legal changes in 1962 and 1973, which made terminations of pregnancy 
less easily obtainable by women who had smaller families. In general, however, 
the abortion ratios for married women suggest widespread, and over the years 
even increasing, reliance on abortion as a way of stopping childbearing within 
marriage. Although information on repeated abortion is largely lacking, it might 
be assumed that repetitious resort to abortion has not been rare among 
Czechoslovak women and that it increased over time.24
The graphs in Figure 6.13 for unmarried women show a different type of parity- 
specific abortion behaviour. The basic observation can be stated simply: 
unmarried women were generally more inclined to terminate their pregnancies 
by abortion than married women, and the likelihood of such an outcome was 
less dependent on their parity. The prime explanation is that unmarried women 
usually engage in sexual intercourse for recreational rather than procreative 
purposes, so that if pregnancy does occur there is a high probability that it is 
outside of a committed relationship and unplanned. Interestingly, abortion ratios 
for unmarried women of parities zero to two in the Czech Republic exhibit a 
pattern of variation over time similar to that of abortion ratios for married women 
with two children or more. This may imply that more low-parity unmarried women 
decided to carry their pregnancies to term when socio-economic conditions 
became favourable; but it may equally mean that these women were not so 
successful in avoiding births when abortion became difficult to obtain. Although 
both factors might have contributed to the observed pattern, the sharp declines 
in abortion ratios for unmarried women in 1962-63, and to a lesser extent in
24 Only since 1987 have abortion seekers been required to report the number of their previous 
induced abortions. Although the data are most probably incorrect because of women's reluctance 
to frankly report previous reproductive histories, they nevertheless indicate that repeated use of
abortion was frequent (IHS, 1991):____________________________________________________
Number Czech Republic (all women) ___________ Slovakia (all women)
of previous 
abortions
1987
(%)
1988
(%)
1989
(%)
1990
(%)
1987
(%)
1988
(%)
1989
( % )
1990
(%)
0 55.0 53.0 51.3 49.9 63.8 61.0 58.4 57.8
1 28.9 29.4 29.6 29.5 25.5 27.2 27.9 28.0
2 11.4 12.0 12.7 13.4 8.0 8.5 10.0 10.1
3+ 4.7 5.6 6.4 7.2 2.7 3.3 3.7 4.1
total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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1973-74, indicate that the abortion-suppressing effects of restrictive policies 
were the dominant force behind the observed trends. The corresponding figures 
for Slovakia demonstrate that abortion was used less to terminate non-marital 
pregnancies, especially at parities one or more, and that this practice was 
comparatively little influenced by continuing changes in political and socio­
economic conditions. A possible explanation is that in the early 1960s non- 
marital abortion was for religious reasons not as acceptable in Slovakia as it was 
in the Czech Republic. However, as the religious objection to abortion gradually 
diminished, social acceptability of abortion increased. This factor may have been 
strong enough to overshadow all other circumstances, including the effects of 
changing abortion policies.
The fact that abortion ratios for unmarried nulliparous women, compared to 
unmarried women at other parities, are relatively moderate seems to be yet 
another feature of abortion in the two populations (Figure 6.13). Certainly, 
women of parity zero were during the 1960s and early 1970s the most likely 
among the unmarried to turn to abortion when pregnant, especially in Slovakia; 
but during 1975-86 their abortion ratios were relatively stable, in contrast to 
increases in ratios for unmarried women at parities one and two. This may mean 
either that the demand for abortion among pregnant unmarried women of zero 
parity was really not much different from that displayed by women at other 
parities, or that many non-marital conceptions of childless women ended in 
marital births. Available evidence suggests, however, that the latter explanation 
is more plausible: apparently, the majority of young childless women who 
conceived non-maritally decided to marry and give birth.25
Finally, it seems worth noting that abortion ratios for unmarried women of parity 
3+ were in both populations relatively low, in strong contrast to the very high 
levels of these ratios among married women. Perhaps the condition of being
25 This argument gains indirect support from the rather high proportions of legitimate live births 
occurring within the first nine months after the marriage of parents (FSO, 1982, 1991):___________
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Czech Republic (%) 20.7 23.4 27.7 24.4 25.9 30.8 31.1
Slovakia (%) 10.4 13.2 17.7 20.2 21.7 23.3 24.5
Although most of the available data are classified neither by birth order nor by age of the mother, 
it may be assumed that the proportions of first marital births preceded by a premarital conception 
were generally higher; in 1990, for instance, these proportions were 57.6% in the Czech Republic 
and 55.5% in Slovakia (FSO, 1991). It can be hypothesized that these figures represent not just a 
high prevalence of premarital pregnancies, but a specific pattern of family building: a pattern in 
which the wedding is not a prerequisite for, but rather a consequence of, conception. The 
explanation of this phenomenon surely involves an environment with little opportunity for individual 
achievement: becoming a young parent was one of the few legitimate ways of taking one's life into 
one's own hands.
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unmarried and, at the same time, the mother of at least three children 
distinguished women with high levels of individual reproductive goals, low 
efficiency of contraceptive use, high fecundity, low capacity to avail themselves 
of abortion services, and possibly also religious or other objections to abortion. 
In addition, some of these women may have been inclined to be in second and 
subsequent relationships and therefore have been desirous of having a child by 
a new partner.
6.7.2 Abortion rates specific for parity, age, and marital status
The logical next step in the analysis is to construct age- and parity-specific 
abortion rates. Technical problems related to such an undertaking are similar to 
those mentioned in connection with the calculation of abortion rates specific for 
marital status: population-at-risk data are scarce, and those available are not 
entirely suitable. Parity-specific abortion rates estimated using census data and 
applying a method analogous to that described in section 6.6.3 are shown in 
Figure 6.14.26 In a sense, the graphs represent two snapshots of the main 
demographic aspects of abortion-seeking behaviour, taken ten calendar years 
apart. Several distinct patterns emerge, suggesting that the chance of having an 
abortion was dependent on the combined effects of age, current marital status, 
previous childbearing experience, and region of residence of the woman in 
question. Among married women, it appears that the fact of being of lower parity 
tended, at all ages, to produce a significantly lower recourse to abortion. The 
abortion rates for married women of zero parity were particularly low, indicating 
that most married couples were inclined to have the child from the first 
conception. It also seems that those who wanted to live in a childless marriage 
were usually able to achieve this objective without having to seek abortion. 
However, that interpretation clearly depends on what the level of voluntary 
childlessness was; it is conceivable that it was so low that the low abortion rates 
at parity zero still meant that every couple wishing to remain childless went 
through an abortion to achieve that objective. The incidence of abortion among 
married women of parity one was also relatively low, although the somewhat 
elevated rates for those under 30 years of age imply that some young couples 
were using abortion to postpone the birth of their second child to later stages of
26 The rates are calculated only for periods 1970 and 1980 because published abortion data for 
the early 1960s are not specified for parity: and population-at-risk data for the late 1980s are 
unavailable. To avoid the problem of dealing with extremely small numbers, rates for women aged 
15-19 were calculated only when the number of abortions at a given parity exceeded 50. The 
rates displayed in Figure 6.14 are also given in Tables A6.5 and A6.6 in the Appendix.
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Figure 6.14: Age-parity-specific abortion rates for married and unmarried
women, 1970 and 1980
Czech Republic
Married -1970 Unmarried -1970
Married -1980 Unmarried -1980
Slovakia
Married-1970
Married -1980 Unmarried -1980
Sources: FSO (1974, 1985), IHS (1991).
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their lives, while for others the major reason may have been to refrain from 
further childbearing altogether. Yet it is also possible that some of these 
abortions were obtained by de facto separated women who had conceived 
before their marriages broke down but were still legally married when 
undergoing the procedure. In general, however, the rates show that abortion 
was used relatively little to prevent first and second births of currently married 
women.
In contrast to this, abortion rates for married women of parity two or more reflect 
a fairly extensive use of abortion (Figure 6.14). The rates are particularly high at 
younger ages, which confirms the sometimes cited observation (Anderson et al., 
1992) that the longer the duration of a woman's future life during which she 
anticipates being exposed to the risk of conception but not wanting children, the 
higher are the chances of a pregnancy being regarded as unwanted, and the 
stronger may be the tendency to request an abortion. The argument may also 
be stated inversely: the longer the period of expected exposure to risk of 
conception, the longer the woman can wait for favourable conditions to carry a 
pregnancy to term. A range of other circumstances may account for the 
underlying behavioural pattern, including factors such as a strong motivation to 
keep the number of children in the family within feasible limits; perceived 
emotional as well as economic advantages of the two-child family; and low 
efficiency of contraceptive use. The pattern of frequent abortion within marriage 
is thus consistent with the interpretation that East European women sought 
abortion because of an unmet demand for contraception. Certainly part of the 
explanation is that communist morality did not particularly stigmatize abortion for 
family limitation purposes, provided that the couple already had some offspring. 
Consequently, the Czechoslovak abortion law of 1957 was liberal towards 
abortion seekers with more than two children, and remained largely so even 
during the later periods of explicit pronatalism. No wonder, then, that the 
practice of abortion among married women of higher parities remained so 
widespread, and changed so little between 1970 and 1980.
Unmarried women obviously encounter unwanted pregnancies for different 
reasons from the married, and their previous childbearing histories may further 
shape the extent of their abortion use. While the risk of abortion for married 
women tended to be positively associated with parity and negatively with age, 
unmarried women were likely to have an abortion mainly during their twenties 
and early thirties while being of parity one or two (Figure 6.14). Childless women
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usually experienced the lowest risks of non-marital abortion. This is not very 
surprising, because being unmarried and at the same time of zero parity implies 
by itself abstinence from, or irregularity in, sexual life, possibly combined with a 
high willingness to marry in event of pregnancy, or a high ability to effectively 
avoid pregnancy. Therefore, less sexually active women and highly effective 
users of contraception are likely to be overrepresented in the zero-parity group.
A related explanation may be that permanent childlessness typifies women with 
strong career goals who are less willing to allow any childbirth to interfere with 
their education or work. However, the relatively low abortion rates for young 
childless Czech and Slovak women suggest that the practice of using abortion 
to postpone motherhood, and often also marriage, was rather rare.
The opposite extreme in the incidence of abortion outside marriage is unmarried 
women with one child (Figure 6.14). Here, the risks seem to have been 
especially high at the middle reproductive ages. For instance, among Czech 
unmarried women aged 30-34 with one child as many as 20 per cent 
experienced an abortion during 1980. These rates imply relatively high levels of 
sexual activity among unmarried mothers with one child. Many of these women 
may be living in consensual partnerships and thus exposed to equally high risks 
of unwanted conception as legally married women. Unanticipated intercourse, 
as in resuming a broken relationship or in establishing a new relationship, 
followed by an unanticipated pregnancy, may have preceded many abortions 
requested by this category of women. In addition, some of these abortions may 
have been the results of conceptions occurring to married women but declared 
non-marital because those who had them anticipated divorce, or wanted to hide 
the fact that the male responsible for the conception was not their legal 
husband. Moreover, many unmarried women with one child may have wished to 
marry or remarry, in which case their prospect of having a second child before 
the wedding could be regarded as likely to reduce their 'competitiveness' in the 
marriage market. Unmarried women of higher parities were at most ages 
exposed to much lower risks of abortion, probably as a result of their less 
intensive sexual lives, more effective contraceptive use, or because they lived in 
more stable consensual unions.
6.8 Types of abortions according to circumstances
The preceding sections should have made it clear that age, marital status, and 
parity are the most powerful demographic correlates of abortion in the Czech
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and Slovak populations that can be extracted from the available data. However, 
the evidence also suggests that abortion-obtaining behaviour has not been 
static over time within the various segments of the female population exposed to 
risk, but rather fluctuated as laws changed and socio-economic conditions 
varied. Pinpointing the subgroups of women who, at particular points in time, 
experienced more abortions, is a natural task for demographic analysis. This 
section introduces a simple four-part typology of abortion-obtaining behaviour 
based on the circumstances in a woman's life that accompanied the use of this 
birth limitation method. It also explores the relative frequency of each of these 
types of behaviour in the two populations during the period 1960-90.
According to the relevant literature,27 four major types of pregnancies can be 
distinguished that are at risk of being aborted for non-medical reasons.28 Each 
of these types implies a distinct motivation for pregnancy termination which 
often may be expected to prevail during a particular period in the woman's 
reproductive career.
(1) 'Unpartnered' pregnancies — those to unwed mothers or to wives whose 
husbands are not the fathers. In other words, it is primarily the relational 
context in which the pregnancy occurred that prompts the woman to seek an 
abortion. Among unmarried women, the absence of a stable relationship may 
often be the main motive for seeking a termination of pregnancy. Obviously, 
married women with extramarital pregnancies cannot be detected in any 
standard abortion statistics.
(2) 'Untimely' pregnancies — those occurring to married women and taking 
place at an inconvenient time or too rapidly after a previous birth, but before 
the woman has borne the number of children she ultimately desires. 
Abortions in this circumstance terminate pregnancies which otherwise are 
likely to complicate a family's situation by occurring too early. They are 
therefore abortions motivated by parental desire to time births and space 
children, rather than to achieve desired family size. Strictly speaking, the 
proportion of women who chose to abort a pregnancy because it occurred too
27 Luker (1975), Hogue (1976), Potts eta!. (1977), Sachdev (1981).
28 All pregnancies carry some risk of being aborted for therapeutic reasons. However, this risk is 
so slight that, when abortion is generally available, only a small minority of abortions are 
attributable to medical indications, while some 'therapeutic' abortions may rather reflect the 
tendency on the part of women or doctors to justify abortions in a way conforming with the law. 
Furthermore, therapeutic abortion is a form of medical prevention, motivated differently from 
pregnancy avoidance by use of contraception. For these reasons, abortions of medical necessity 
will be subsumed under other definitions in this typology. Likewise, the few abortions following 
rape or incest will not be separately identified.
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soon after the previous one cannot be estimated unless both abortion status 
and preferences concerning birth intervals are known, which is rarely the 
case.
(3) 'Excess' pregnancies — those occurring within marriage after the desired 
family size has been achieved. When a married woman experiencing a 
pregnancy has already borne as many children as she wants, she can 
choose between giving birth to an unwanted child or aborting her pregnancy. 
Of course, when the abortion data are drawn from registration statistics — 
instead of, say, appropriately specified sample surveys — the identification of 
abortions attributable to this type of pregnancy is contingent upon 
assumptions about the average desired family size.
(4) 'Late' pregnancies — pregnancies occurring when a woman considers 
herself too old for having a baby. The corresponding abortions are those 
requested by women who, primarily because of their age, either are afraid 
that to carry the pregnancy to term would jeopardize the offspring's healthy 
development, or feel unfit to care for a newly born child. Again, the exact 
proportion of abortions ascribable to 'late' pregnancies is impossible to 
assess unless reliable information is available on reasons lying behind 
individual decisions to abort.
Table 6.9 summarizes operational definitions of the above four types of 
abortions. These definitions are designed to accord with the classifications used 
in the available abortion statistics for Czechoslovakia, and are therefore based 
on a number of simplifying assumptions. For instance, it is assumed that each 
individual abortion fits only and precisely in one category; that all abortions to 
unmarried women under 35 years of age reflect 'unpartnered' pregnancies; that 
the ultimate reproductive goal of all married women is to have precisely two 
children; that married women aged 15 to 34 years experience only ill-timed, not 
'unpartnered', pregnancies; and that the female age at which a birth is perceived 
to be no longer appropriate, for social and health grounds, is 35 years, 
irrespective of the marital status and parity of the woman in question. Each of 
these propositions can be questioned for a number of reasons, although some 
(especially those referring to the desired family size) gain indirect support from 
the results of Czechoslovak fertility surveys conducted between the years 1956 
and 1985.29 The truth is that individual women resorting to abortion can be put 
into particular categories only on the basis of their expressed motives, and these
29 Most of these surveys reflect the preference for a family with two children. For a broader 
discussion of the Czechoslovak fertility inquiries, see Chapter 4, section 4.6.
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Table 6.9: Circumstances of abortion: operational definitions
Abortions arising from: Characteristics of the women:
age marital status parity
'unpartnered' pregnancies 15-34 unmarried 0+
'untimely' pregnancies 15-34 married 0 &  1
'excess' pregnancies 15-34 married 2+
'late' pregnancies 35-49 unmarried & married all parities
may be numerous and interconnected.30 Naturally, the main purpose of the 
classification sketched in Table 6.9 is to provide a workable basis for 
demographic measurement, not to accommodate all possible circumstances of 
abortion-seeking behaviour.
Figure 6.15 displays the relative frequency of these four types of abortions in the 
Czech and Slovak populations in the period 1962-90. The calculations indicate 
what fractions of total recorded abortions obtained by women aged 15-49 in a 
given year are attributable to particular categories of abortion seekers. Because 
the available data for 1960 and 1961 do not provide a relevant classification of 
abortions, data are shown only for the years 1962 onwards. As can be seen, in 
both republics the clearly predominant category of abortion obtainers comprised 
women experiencing 'excess' pregnancies. During the 1962-86 period, 40 to 53 
per cent of abortions in the Czech Republic and 47 to 56 per cent in Slovakia 
were attributable to 'excess' pregnancies; by 1990 these proportions were 40 
per cent and 49 per cent, respectively. Temporal changes in the frequency of 
'excess' abortions suggest, consistently with previous analyses, that abortion 
behaviour of younger married women with more than two children was to a 
significant extent affected by period influences, such as variations in abortion 
policies and changes in socio-economic conditions. In particular, it appears that 
the pronatalist policies of the period 1968-73 reduced somewhat the relative 
frequency of this type of abortion, as did the introduction of the 1986 law which 
made abortion available on request. The regional comparison indicates that the 
proportion of 'excess' pregnancies among abortions was generally higher and 
more stable in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic.
30 For instance, the inconvenience of the timing may often be a function of the type of relationship 
that produced the pregnancy: it is not so much that a child is unwanted at a given time as that it 
would not be born into a stable, committed relationship.
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Figure 6.15: Relative frequency of abortions according to circumstances 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, 1961-90
Czech Republic60% i
50% - 'excess' pregnancies
S 40%
'late' pregnancies30% -
'unpartnered' pregnancies
10%  - 'untimely' pregnancies
Year
Slovakia60% -|
'excess' pregnancies
50% -
£  40% - 'late' pregnancies
30% -
§  20%  - 'unpartnered' pregnancies
1 0 %  -
'untimely' pregnancies
Year
Source: IHS (1991).
Further, the graphs in Figure 6.15 show that terminations of pregnancies 
classified as 'late' tended to be the second most frequent type; 'unpartnered' 
pregnancies were usually third; and 'untimely' pregnancies as a rule occupied 
the fourth position. As regards changes over time, relative frequencies of these 
three types of abortion differed quite significantly. The proportion of abortions 
which terminated 'late' pregnancies increased in the Czech Republic from 26 to 
30 per cent and in Slovakia from 31 to 34 per cent between 1962 and 1963, 
apparently in response to the 1962 policy change that reduced the chances of 
young women obtaining an abortion and thus increased the share of older 
women among abortion obtainers. But after 1963 the proportion of 'late'
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pregnancies declined sharply, and from 1970 onwards it oscillated around 20 
per cent in both populations. Proportions of abortions ascribable to 'unpartnered' 
pregnancies increased between the late 1960s and mid-1970s, from 17 to 23 
per cent in the Czech Republic and from 11 to 21 per cent in Slovakia. The 
period 1975-90 was then characterized by moderate declines, with terminations 
of 'unpartnered' pregnancies representing about 20 per cent of total abortions in 
the Czech Republic and 17 per cent in Slovakia. The pattern of abortion 
attributable to 'untimely' pregnancies reflects increases during the early to late 
1960s, from 11 to 20 per cent in the Czech Republic and from 6 to 12 per cent in 
Slovakia, followed during later years by relatively stable levels of about 13 and 
10 per cent, respectively. Regionally, there were some disparities between 
Czech and Slovak women in the contribution made by particular types of 
abortion seekers to the total amount of abortion. The major difference was that 
proportions of abortions terminating 'untimely' pregnancies were considerably 
higher in the Czech Republic than in Slovakia; otherwise, the structure of 
abortion in the two regions was not dissimilar.
The simple classification of abortions applied in this section highlights the nature 
of abortion use in former Czechoslovakia. It appears that by far the most 
numerous abortion seekers were women experiencing what can be termed, with 
some simplification, 'excess' pregnancies. This confirms earlier findings 
according to which the most usual reason for abortion in the two populations 
was a married woman's desire to stop childbearing, rather than to postpone 
parenthood or to space births. These other motives were not entirely absent, but 
women who might be assumed to have had them formed smaller proportions of 
total abortion seekers.
6.9 Conclusion
As Lutz (1989: 39) has pointed out, 'to speak of demographic dimensions is still 
uncommon among demographers'. Demographic analysts traditionally 
considered the time at which the event took place (historical time) and the age 
of the mother (individual time) as the basic demographic dimensions of abortion, 
while other dimensions have received much less attention. Findings discussed 
in this chapter show that the rather general concept of a demographic process 
as occurring in a universe defined by various demographic and non­
demographic dimensions is indeed very helpful. Specifically, this broader 
approach makes it possible to portray abortion in the former Czechoslovakia as
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being closely related not only to women's ages, but also to their marital statuses 
and, even more importantly, to their previous childbearing experiences. It has 
been found that abortion was rarely used to postpone the beginning of 
childbearing; the majority of women who ever had an abortion used it only to 
stop childbearing, while some used it for some combination of spacing and 
stopping. Only a minority of women having abortions were single, divorced, or 
widowed, while the married contributed disproportionately to the high incidence 
of abortion. Thus, it appears that Czech and Slovak women were not simply 
having abortions as they proceeded through their childbearing ages, but 
progressively resorted to abortion as they were confronted with the possibility of 
adding unplanned children to their families. A related observation is that intra­
country differences played a very important role, because the state boundary 
united two distinct populations, dissimilar in their histories, traditions, and 
institutional arrangements as well as modes of behaviour. Finally, because 
resort to abortion was fairly frequent in former Czechoslovakia, information 
about women who had an abortion is not as selective as it would be in many 
other settings. Therefore, studying abortion-obtaining behaviour tells us 
something about what life looked like in the entire society.
Throughout this chapter, abortion has been conceptualized and analysed as 
simply the number of interruptions of pregnancy over calendar time given by the 
vital registration data. This is the conventional way in which data are organized 
for the study of change over time, in a style that Ryder (1982) calls the period 
mode of temporal aggregation. An alternative, and perhaps preferable, style of 
measurement would be to view abortion as a process occurring to individuals in 
personal time, with survey data providing a framework for description of that 
process. In this approach, the analysis would be based on comprehensive 
records of the reproductive histories of respondents, with the events recorded 
successively by date. While the period mode of aggregation is oriented to the 
time of occurrence of abortions, the analysis of survey data would be oriented to 
the time of onset of exposure of abortion. The most important variables would 
be temporal differences between the time of occurrence of abortion and a 
relevant exposure-initiating event, such as date of last marriage of the woman, 
date of her last confinement, and so on. Naturally, the dates associated with 
these events would signify personal as well as historical time, because 
respondents could be easily ordered in time by reference to the calendar 
periods within which particular phases of their personal histories began. Thus, 
survey data would be potentially useful to accomplish the same objectives as
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traditional measures based on vital registration, as well as several other 
meaningful objectives that are out of the reach of a conventional cross-sectional 
analysis.31
To combine vital registration and survey evidence would be an ideal way of 
writing a comprehensive demographic history of abortion in the Czech and 
Slovak populations. Regrettably, no survey data on abortion behaviour and its 
covariates at the individual level are accessible for the period of time studied. 
Consequently, there is no other possibility for a student of demographic change 
than to analyse the phenomenon within the tradition of aggregate analysis, and 
to accept all the limitations that this approach entails. However, although the 
argument can be made that an analysis of the determinants of abortion framed 
in terms of individual characteristics would be preferable, the fact that this 
cannot be undertaken may be a less dissatisfying conclusion than it sounds. A 
legitimate alternative concept is that reproductive behaviour is a collective 
characteristic, a statistical manifestation of a cultural model. From this viewpoint, 
the individual is a representative of a culture or subculture; the statistically 
reported information about the acts, practices, and conditions underlying the 
occurrence of a particular reproductive behaviour is a description of the 
reproductive pattern characteristic of the culture or subculture; and the pattern in 
its entirety is to be interpreted in relation to other features of that culture or 
subculture. Thus, one may regard the output of the measurements presented in 
this chapter not merely as imperfect summary statements about individual 
abortion behaviour, but as measurements of abortion as a collective 
characteristic, appropriately studied at the macro-analytic level.
31 However, sample surveys focusing on abortion are beset with their own research problems. For 
instance, responses are frequently unreliable because abortion tends to be a sensitive subject for 
respondents; see Acsadi (1969), Jones and Forrest (1992), Anderson et at. (1994). Another 
obvious difficulty is the selectivity of sample surveys.
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Chapter 7: ABORTION BEHAVIOUR OF CZECH AND SLOVAK WOMEN:
A COHORT PERSPECTIVE
7.1 Introduction
Most of what demographers know about abortion in various populations is 
based on changes in variously specified abortion rates over calendar time. 
Typically, analyses start with a table of data which are specific for time and age. 
To summarize such a table with respect to changes over calendar time, it is 
customary to compute indices which combine measurements over the entire 
span of ages, and to study the time series of such indices year by year. This 
was the approach applied in the preceding chapter. Interpretations of abortion 
rate fluctuations arrived at using this methodology may all be called 'period1 
explanations in that they suggest as causes conditions which coincide 
temporally with fluctuations in the rates themselves.
However, while the cross-sectional view is an important perspective for an 
analysis of abortion behaviour, many interesting questions can be asked which 
are not focused on calendar time only. One alternative approach is concerned 
with the measurement of abortion patterns of real cohorts. The basic source of 
information may be the original table of measurements, re-organized as age- 
specific measurements for a series of real cohorts. The cross-sectional view and 
the cohort approach do not necessarily represent distinct theoretical or 
methodological perspectives; rather they tend to coalesce around available data 
which in turn dictate the determinants that are given particular emphasis. 
Unfortunately, insights gained from one approach have not always informed 
work using the other, thus limiting understanding of the totality of the process of 
demographic change.
What are the pros and cons of the cohort approach to studying abortion? Have 
there been substantial differences between individual Czech and Slovak female 
cohorts in their use of abortion? If so, to what extent was the resort to abortion 
conditional upon membership of a particular cohort? Compared to cohorts born 
earlier in the century, how frequent was abortion in more recent cohorts? At 
what ages was inter-cohort heterogeneity most visible? How did the period 
influences affect the abortion experiences of particular generations of women? 
Did the differences between cohorts reflect anything more than the encountering 
of particular period conditions, and changes in conditions, at particular life cycle 
stages? These questions indicate the topics to be addressed in this chapter.
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7.2 Theoretical considerations
Up to World War II, demographic phenomena were studied almost exclusively 
by years or by periods of a few years; that is, in the form in which data were 
collected and published. Few studies were devoted to the succession of 
demographic events through the lifetime of a generation. An early large-scale 
empirical study of fertility from the cohort, or life cycle, point of view was that of 
Depoid published in 1941. Shortly thereafter a number of studies appeared 
almost simultaneously in several countries. Among English-speaking scholars, 
Hajnal (1947), Whelpton (1949, 1954), and Ryder (1951, 1965, 1969) were 
among the first who drew attention to the limitations of the period approach and 
advocated the need for studies focusing on generations. They argued that 
analyses for cohorts have as much formal legitimacy as those for successive 
periods and, moreover, that the factors underlying demographic change are 
likely to operate primarily through cohort behaviour.1 The intuitive plausibility and 
attractiveness of these propositions slowly gained ground. From the late 1960s 
onwards, the cohort approach became generally regarded as an important, and 
in certain circumstances indispensable, perspective in population research. 
However, it is probably fair to say that cohort analysis has never taken over as 
the pre-eminent way of analysing demographic change.
A real (as opposed to a synthetic) cohort is commonly conceptualized as 
comprising those persons within a geographically or otherwise delineated 
population who experienced the same significant life event within the same time 
period and who are followed thereafter as one group. Cohort boundaries are 
arbitrarily defined, since the 'same time period' may be of any length; most 
frequently, however, a real cohort is defined as a group of persons born in a 
given calendar year — a birth cohort. At the core of the cohort approach is the 
notion of the longitudinal reproductive cycle as an aggregate analogue of 
individual life histories. From the moment of birth onward, the members of a real 
birth cohort are exposed to the likelihood of dying and to the processes of
1 Proponents of the cohort approach also argued that period indicators might overstate short-term 
fluctuations in reproductive processes. Some authors were inventive in describing this 
shortcoming of conventional cross-sectional analysis. For instance, Notestein wrote that measures 
which use the concept of a synthetic cohort are hypothetical values
like the readings on a car's speedometer. The latter does not tell you how far you have come 
during the last hour, or how far you will go in the next hour. It gives you the highly 
hypothetical information that if you had travelled during the past hour at precisely the rate you 
are travelling now you would have by the end of an hour, travelled the indicated distance 
(Notestein, quoted by Frejka, 1973: 30).
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socialization, biological maturation, and aging. However, it is not only these 
processes that shape a cohort's reproductive cycle. The real significance of the 
cohort perspective is that it brings into a single framework both the universal 
physiological and psychological determinants associated with age, and the 
socio-cultural influences stemming from a particular life experience. Throughout 
its life, a particular cohort encounters demographically relevant events and 
conditions under circumstances that may not be duplicated by cohorts born at 
different times.
Among the factors affecting a cohort's life may be short-term or other temporal 
fluctuations in political, legal and socio-economic conditions, or fundamental 
changes in technology, cultural practices, public attitudes, and private efforts 
relevant to childbearing and fertility control. In consequence of these influences, 
a cohort may, for instance, marry and therefore be at risk of marital conception 
at ages or in proportions which may distinguish it from cohorts that precede or 
follow it. The desire to plan and time important events in life, the motives for that 
timing, and the efficacy with which the plans are realized may also differ from 
cohort to cohort. Some cohorts may wish to marry and start families relatively 
early, and therefore to stop childbearing early also. Others may prefer to enjoy a 
somewhat prolonged period of freedom from parenthood early in their lives, and 
the inclination to avoid childbearing may therefore prevail throughout their 
reproductive cycle. If a particular timing pattern is prescribed by social 
convention, or is directly or indirectly promoted by an abortion policy effective at 
a given time, then cohorts that lived under such conditions are likely to have 
different abortion rates from cohorts that were subjected to different influences. 
Beyond such demographic considerations, there are many other respects in 
which cohorts may differ from one another: in their distributions by years of 
schooling completed, in their proportions born in urban and rural settings, in their 
attitudes toward contraception, and so forth. Because economic context may 
fluctuate a great deal, each cohort is also likely to be influenced by the 
economic situation it has experienced. These forces may not all act uniformly in 
one direction; they may encourage abortion at some life cycle stages and 
discourage it at others.
Furthermore, the behaviour of a cohort at any time is determined not solely by 
conditions of the moment, but also by its cumulative experience up to the 
present and by conditions anticipated to lie immediately ahead. One can thus 
think of the abortion behaviour of a cohort over a period of time as the outcome
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of interaction between characteristics of the cohort and its members, or the 
heritage of previous experience it brings to the period; and the environment 
peculiar to the period itself. The effects of the past experience may diminish with 
time, as some experience becomes less relevant with its passage and with 
advancing age. The magnitude of these delayed effects, relative to that of 
current influences, may vary from one situation to another.2 In any case, the 
abortion experience of any cohort in one period is unlikely to be independent of 
its experience in other periods. This may be the case both in the short term, as it 
is probable that abortion will be used in times which individual members of the 
cohort perceive as unfavourable for childbearing; and in the long term, because 
the pattern of abortion within a distinct stage of the life cycle may reflect a 
reproductive strategy embarked upon in early adult years and applied 
throughout the cohort's life span.
The cohort approach is not unequivocally accepted. Critics claim that a cohort in 
a pure state is hardly more than a statistical fiction. To some extent, this seems 
to follow from a number of empirical studies3 which failed to identify clear-cut 
cohort effects and instead have shown that age and period influences are 
generally more important sources of variation in vital rates. Stated otherwise, 
there is little evidence of consistency in the behaviour of individual cohorts at 
different points in time. This seems to be particularly the case with demographic 
phenomena that are especially susceptible to legislative change, such as 
divorce and abortion. Another objection is that analyses elaborated in the cohort 
mode tend to overlook intra-cohort heterogeneity; that is, differences existing 
within cohorts. These may play an important role and may further diminish a 
cohort's distinctiveness. It is, however, interesting to note that even one of the 
most energetic opponents of the cohort approach, Ni Bhrolchain (1992), does 
not reject altogether the usefulness of insights arrived at through it; rather, she 
portrays the controversy surrounding the concept as an open question and 
admits that the cohort approach is likely to retain its attractiveness as it offers a 
kind of demographic coherence and practical utility.
It is true that most of the influences that underpin demographic change are 
period-specific; after all, that is where one looks first for explanation. However, it
2 Thus, for example, early socialization experience probably has little effect on reproductive 
behaviour, since reproduction starts only later in life. Peer-group pressures, on the other hand, 
perhaps have more current effect on most behaviour and relatively less delayed effect. Admittedly 
these are speculations, but they serve as illustrations.
3 For an excellent overview of a large number of cohort-oriented studies focusing on fertility, see 
Ni Bhrolchain (1992).
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is also true that period influences can produce different life cycle experiences for 
different cohorts. Moreover, there is a valuable realism about the cohort 
perspective: real cohorts encounter events and conditions at particular life cycle 
stages whereas the synthetic cohort approach pretends that some cohorts 
encounter them throughout their lives while others avoid them altogether. If one 
agrees with Henry (1976: 4) that the two essential tasks of demographic 
analysis are 'to isolate the phenomena in their "pure state"' and 'to separate the 
factors on which the observed phenomena depend', then the use of cohort 
analysis as a supplement to the cross-sectional analysis presented in the 
previous chapter needs no further justification; with this orientation the cohort 
approach seems almost a logical necessity.
7.3 Computation of cohort measures from period data
In Chapter 6 it was shown that the Czechoslovak abortion registration system 
makes it possible to calculate a complete set of rates over all ages, for all female 
cohorts that were capable of childbearing, for each period in which the system 
was in operation. This material suffers from the disadvantage of presenting 
period cross-sections of what essentially is a generational or cohort process. 
Because the available time series of age-specific registration data is sufficiently 
long, covering the period 1960-90, cohort measures can be developed through 
a rearrangement of the period-specific format of published data from which the 
conventional period-by-age rates were derived. One problem with this approach 
is that the available registration data give information about abortions specific 
only for age of the women and period of occurrence of abortion, leaving the 
cohort identification implicit and overlapping. In other words, the registration 
sources give data on women who experienced an abortion at the completed age 
x in the calendar year t, but these events obviously related to women of two 
different calendar year birth cohorts.
When information as to precise cohort membership is missing, less exact 
procedures must suffice. One solution to this well-known difficulty is to assume 
that events occurring to women of age x in year t belong half each to the cohorts 
born in years f-xand t-x-1. The Lexis diagram in Figure 7.1 illustrates the points 
to be made. The square BCFE represents the abortions recorded among 
women aged x in year t. From the graphical presentation it is evident that the 
easiest way to approximate the events relating to the two respective birth 
cohorts k and k+1 is to divide this square of the Lexis diagram into halves,
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Figure 7.1: Lexis diagram illustrating the estimation of cohort-specific
measures from period data
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corresponding to the triangles BCE and CFE. A similar procedure can be 
applied to all other squares of the Lexis diagram.4
Having thus estimated the numbers of abortions specific for age of woman, 
period of occurrence, and cohort membership simultaneously, we can calculate 
cohort-specific abortion rates. Two types of cohort-specific rates can be 
considered: rates for one-year time periods, and rates for single-year age 
groups.5 From Figure 7.1 it is obvious that the rate defining the incidence of 
abortion in cohort k and period t-1 pertains to two age groups, x-1 and x, and is 
given by the ratio:
a /c,M  = abortions in the parallelogram DBEG / the total number in DE (7.1)
4 This process of extracting cohort data from cross-sectional tabulations has the effect of 
smoothing year-to-year fluctuations by a moving average technique. It is possible that the often 
noted smoothness of cohort measures is partly a result of the mode of deriving the data.
5 For more technical information on the calculation of different types of cohort-specific vital rates, 
see Wunsch and Termote (1978: 145-146).
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where DE is an estimate of the number of person-years lived during the period 
t-1 by female members of cohort k, or the number of women in cohort k reaching 
exact age x. Similarly, the rate defining abortion in cohort k at completed age x 
relates to two periods, t-1 and t, and can be calculated as:
A/c x = abortions in the parallelogram BCED / the total number in BE (7.2)
where BE is the number of women in cohort k aged x at the end of the period 
t-1. Theoretically, both these measures should be equally simple to calculate. 
Under the conditions of actual statistical observation, however, we have no 
means of knowing directly the size of a cohort attaining any given exact age 
(such as the number in DE). All we know is the size of a cohort (and, more 
generally, of a population) at a given instant as indicated by a census or an 
estimate; in other words, we only know the flow across vertical segments of the 
Lexis diagram, such as BE or CF. Apart from this, there are also theoretical 
reasons for computing cohort-specific rates for age groups rather than for time 
periods: the cohort approach is a life cycle approach, and years of age are 
intuitively more natural parts of the life cycle than are years of time. For these 
reasons, cohort-specific abortion rates in this chapter are calculated using the 
second of the above equations (7.2).6
The incidence of abortion in a real cohort may be expressed in two principal 
ways: (a) its age-specific abortion rate A^*, as reflected in the number of 
abortions in a particular year of age per 1,000 person-years of exposure to risk; 
or (b) its cumulative abortion rate, i.e. the sum of relevant age-specific abortion 
rates aggregated from the beginning of the childbearing life span up to a certain 
age. In terms of the Lexis diagram, the cumulative abortion rate can be 
imagined as a series of observations from exact age 15 to some later exact age. 
When all members of the cohort have passed through the childbearing span, the 
cumulative abortion rate becomes the completed generational abortion rate, or 
the number of abortions per woman experienced by the birth cohort in its 
lifetime.
6 Naturally, the raw data for single years can be arranged into age groups, cohort groups, or 
segments comprising several calendar periods, and rates can thus be calculated for broader 
categories. Some argue that aggregating data for more cohorts, more ages, or more periods 
tends to spoil the information that is uniquely derivable by the cohort approach, and should 
therefore be avoided. However, it is also possible for an analysis to become unhelpfully detailed. 
The ideal approach is obviously a matter for judgement in individual cases.
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An obvious obstacle in calculating cohort rates from registration data is that, in 
any time series of such data, some cohorts have incomplete records for the 
beginning or for the end of their reproductive spans. The former is the more 
debilitating problem, as it precludes calculation of any cumulative rates. Since 
the available material for Czechoslovakia covers only the three decades from 
1960 to 1990, most cohorts are only partly captured. The longest series of 
abortion rates can be calculated for the 1945 birth cohort: from age 15 up to age 
44, or for nearly the whole of the cohort's fertile span. For the cohorts of birth 
years 1916 to 1944 it is possible to calculate only rates for older ages, to the 
extent that their reproductive histories continued after January 1, 1960. For the 
cohorts of birth years 1946 to 1974, abortion rates for early childbearing ages 
can be calculated, but information for older ages is lacking. Women of these 
generations may not have completed their childbearing careers by December 
31, 1990, and were at risk of experiencing abortion beyond this the latest date 
covered by the available data.
In drawing conclusions from the various rates and distributions presented in this 
chapter, two qualifications should be kept in mind. The first is that they are 
approximations of the true figures. The second is that they do not give all the 
details that would be helpful; for example, they do not take into account the 
marital statuses of the women in each cohort or their distribution by parity, even 
though in the previous chapter it was demonstrated that these variables are 
powerful correlates of abortion in the Czech and Slovak populations. The 
necessary retrospective data on the composition of female cohorts by age, 
marital status, and parity are not available for the former Czechoslovakia.
7.4 Age-patterns of cohort abortion rates
Age-schedules of abortion for ten selected generations of Czech and Slovak 
women, ranging from the cohort born in 1925 to the cohort born in 1970, are 
shown in Figure 7.2.7 All cohorts, depending on how completely they are 
captured in the available data, display a similar bell-shaped distribution of age- 
specific abortion rates. Part of the explanation is obviously biological, related to 
the fact that the probability of conceiving ranges from nil before menarche, to a 
peak in the twenties and early thirties, and then declines again to zero by 
menopause. A second feature found in Figure 7.2 is conspicuous variation from 
cohort to cohort, which clearly suggests the influence of non-biological factors.
7 These rates are presented in Tables A7.1 and A7.2 in the Appendix.
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Figure 7.2: Age-specific abortion rates for selected birth cohorts, 1925-70
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Sources: FSO (1981, 1991), IHS (1991).
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This is evident from substantial differences among cohorts not only in the levels 
of abortion at particular ages but also, more importantly, in the degree to which 
the age-schedules depart from what otherwise might have been smooth curves.
Probable reasons for these disturbances are not difficult to find in period-specific 
influences, once they are put in a proper time perspective. As discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 6, among the most important changes to the context in which 
abortion decisions were made were the restriction in 1962 of the previously fairly 
permissive abortion law; the series of pronatalist policies introduced during 
1968-73, enhanced by more strict abortion regulations in 1973; and the law of 
1986 making abortion available on request. As can be inferred from Figure 7.2, 
cohorts tended to react to these stimuli by deviating from the trajectory of 
abortion rates they had pursued earlier. Whether such deviation was 
considerable, insignificant, or non-existent depended on the stage of the 
reproductive cycle particular cohorts had reached when the environment 
relevant to abortion-seeking behaviour changed.
That the 1962 restriction of abortion provoked genuine behavioural changes 
seems to be the most natural explanation for the abrupt declines in abortion 
levels in the 1930 cohort after age 32; in the 1935 cohort after age 27; and in 
the 1940 cohort after age 22. Women belonging to these generations reacted 
similarly both in the Czech Republic and in Slovakia, although the declines were 
somewhat more pronounced in the Czech population. Another way to describe 
these shifts is to say that legal conditions relevant to abortion changed 
markedly8 and those in the fertile years responded to the modified legal context. 
Women born in 1935 (and also those of neighbouring generations) were 
apparently the most severely affected. However, the drop in abortion levels was 
not long-lasting, and by the time it reached age 30 (that is, about three years 
after the abortion legislation was altered) the 1935 cohort had levels of abortion 
hardly different from what might have been predicted for that generation on the 
basis of its pre-restriction experience. Similar increases in abortion levels can be 
observed in the curves for the 1930 and 1940 cohorts.
8 Specifically, abortion commissions were reconstructed to include, in a new initiative, 
representatives of local administration (in addition to medical professionals); the possibility of 
submitting a request for abortion was limited to the woman's place of residence; and a charge for 
abortion for non-medical reasons was introduced. Simultaneously, the categories of eligibility for 
maternity benefits were broadened, and maternity leave was extended.
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Generations born in 1925 and 1945 show no response to the 1962 policy 
change. This is not surprising given that the officially proclaimed aim of the 
newly introduced regulations was to reduce abortion among women aged 20 to 
36 who experienced their first pregnancies (Koubek, 1981). In 1962, members 
of the 1945 generation were still teenagers and thus largely entitled to abortions 
on the grounds of being too young to start a family. In contrast, those born in 
1925 were nearing the end of their reproductive years and therefore too old for 
their abortion behaviour to be significantly influenced. However, Czech and 
Slovak women of the 1925 cohort are interesting in another sense. The striking 
feature of their reproductive experience is that they had, at ages over 35, as 
high abortion rates as, for instance, members of the 1945 cohort who reached 
the same ages 20 years later. This fact indicates that women born during the 
1920s were by no means slow in adopting abortion as a method of fertility 
control once this option became easily available; and by doing so, they set the 
pattern for those who succeeded them.
Just as specific peculiarities in the abortion experience of cohorts born between 
1930 and 1940 can be explained by the effect of the abortion restrictions of 
1962, so the abortion histories of certain cohorts can be interpreted in relation to 
the wave of pronatalist policies between 1968 and 1973.9 The oldest 
generations likely to have been affected by this wave were those of birth cohorts 
1930 and 1935, comprising women who were about 40 and 35 years of age 
when the policies came into effect. However, as can be seen from Figure 7.2, 
these generations underwent hardly any sudden, unforeseeable changes in 
abortion levels when passing through their late childbearing ages. Again, this 
seems to be linked to the nature of the policies introduced. They were clearly 
focused on women in the initial and intermediate stages of the family building 
cycle; that is, on those who might realistically have been expected to react 
positively to the improved socio-economic climate, to change their fertility plans, 
and have more children (Koubek, 1990).
9 Some of the major interventions of the 1968-73 period were: prolongation of paid maternity 
leave from 22 to 26 weeks, and to 35 weeks for unmarried mothers and multiple births; increased 
lump-sum birth allowance; provision of higher maternity grants and monetary family allowances, 
especially for second and third children; and introduction of a new loan scheme with very low 
interest rates for married couples under 30 years of age. In June 1973, the previously broadly 
outlined indications for induced abortion were re-defined to include: protection of health of the 
woman; age of the woman over 40; serious health condition of her husband; and housing or 
financial shortage of the family. Married childless women or women having one child were eligible 
for abortion only as a special exception. The interval required between two consecutive abortions 
was extended from six to 12 months.
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Arguably, the prime target of the pronatalist interventions of that time was the 
generation born between 1940 and 1950. Indeed, abortion rates for these 
cohorts exhibit remarkable declines at the pertinent ages: the 1940 generation 
experienced such a drop around the time it reached age 30; the 1945 
generation around age 25; and the 1950 generation around age 20. In other 
words, the fact that these cohorts were exposed to pronatalist pressures when 
they were in their twenties and early thirties significantly affected their abortion 
behaviour. However, except perhaps for the Czech cohort of 1950, there seems 
to be little evidence that the declines in abortion levels induced by pronatalist 
interventions substantially influenced cohort behaviour in the long term. Most 
cohorts returned to the 'usual' levels of abortion practice later in their lives. For 
instance, the Czech cohort of 1945 exhibits a rather strange age pattern of 
abortion: a very fast increase in abortion rates up to age 23, an equally swift 
decline to age 28, followed by a plateau between ages 29 and 35, when at all 
ages women had abortions at about the same rate. Why did the abortion rate 
not decline smoothly between ages 23 and 35? A possible explanation is that 
these women, while in their late twenties, participated in the pronatalistic 
atmosphere of the 1968-73 period, but then suddenly realized that abortion was, 
after all, accessible, practicable, and useful. If accurate, this explanation would 
be yet another example of strong period influences on cohort abortion.
But what of the anomaly of the cohort comprising Czech women born in 1950? 
The abortion rate fell significantly as this group entered its early twenties, 
concomitantly with the 1968-73 promulgation of pronatalist policies. The abortion 
rate resumed an upward trend after age 24, but the increase was only moderate 
and the incidence of abortion remained low and hardly variable up to the time 
when the cohort reached its mid-thirties — a major departure from the trends 
observed in older cohorts. It was only at ages 34 and above that this cohort 
attained higher abortion levels than its predecessors. This record of the 1950 
birth cohort suggests that if a generation is on the threshold of its highest 
reproductivity when pronatalist policies are promulgated and access to abortion 
is restricted, then members of that generation are forced to rely less on abortion. 
This probably leads to a widespread adoption of alternative strategies of fertility 
control. The acceptance of such strategies is likely to foster an enduring retreat 
from abortion practices, persisting even when the chances of obtaining an 
abortion improve later in the cohort's life, and eventually producing a low life­
time abortion rate. Another way of thinking about this phenomenon is to 
compare it to a career pattern. People tend to continue in careers to which they
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become accustomed early in their adult lives. Similarly, women carry over their 
whole reproductive lives the impress of political and socio-economic conditions 
which marked their entry into the childbearing period.
But this cohort explanation also indicates that the discrepancy between 
expectations and actual life has probably been a greater source of difficulty for 
the 1950 Czech cohort than for any other generation before or since. It seems 
as if members of this cohort, throughout their lives, found themselves endowed 
with ideas and beliefs about abortion which were less realistic, and less flexible 
in the face of changing political reality. To some, the distinctive history of 
abortion in the 1950 cohort of Czech women may indicate that even in the 
conditions of socialist Czechoslovakia, where effective contraceptives were 
notoriously in short supply and abortion 'culture' was widespread, those who 
were motivated could manage without pregnancy terminations. Alas, this 
hypothesis obviously does not hold universally. The abortion record of the 
Slovak cohort of 1950, for instance, shows few signs suggesting the effect of 
1968-73 pronatalist policies. Reasons for this disparity are not clear, but it is 
probable that the explanation could be sought in differences in family size 
preferences and patterns of contraceptive use in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia.
The antinatalist forces prevailing from the mid-1970s onwards are undoubtedly 
responsible for the noticeable cohort-to-cohort increases in abortion rates 
among the most recent generations. The simplification of access to legal 
abortion in 1986 apparently caused a moderate upward drift in abortion among 
members of the 1950 generation at ages 35 to 37. In contrast to this, the 
cohorts born in 1955, 1960, and 1965, whose members had just passed the 
ages 30, 25, and 20 when the new law became effective, reacted much more 
dramatically. This can be seen from the sharp rises in the abortion curves for 
these cohorts in Figure 7.2. It is as if the relaxed regulations uncovered a new 
threshold of social acceptability of abortion. The abortion rates experienced by 
the 1970 cohort were the highest ever recorded at ages reached until 1990.
7.5 Age-specific differences between cohort abortion rates
Figure 7.3 offers another view on cohort aspects of abortion in Czechoslovakia; 
it displays abortion rates at selected ages by birth cohort. The trend lines show 
similar fluctuations, reflecting behavioural responses to the abortion-relevant
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Figure 7.3: Cohort-specific abortion rates for selected ages
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Sources: FSO (1981, 1991), IHS (1991).
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environment at the time of observation — in other words, to period phenomena. 
Clearly, women belonging to different cohorts reacted similarly to the prevailing 
environment, largely regardless of the content or quantity of their past 
experience. However, period factors did not affect all age groups in individual 
cohorts to the same extent. Although the rates at all ages from 18 to 35 exhibit 
very similar patterns of variation over time, the rates at age 25 years appear to 
have been extra-sensitive to environmental shifts, and this is therefore the main 
age group in which cohort experiences differ. This is not surprising. The age of 
25 marks for most Czech and Slovak women the end of their prime childbearing 
years; this is the youngest age at which large proportions of women seem to 
become strongly motivated to prevent further conceptions and births, and in the 
absence of reliable contraception, a great potential for experiencing unplanned 
pregnancies exists. In Czechoslovakia, in such cases, an abortion customarily 
has been regarded as a normal, and socially non-stigmatizing solution; however, 
its actual availability was largely dependent on changes in population policies. 
Overall, given that both Czech and Slovak women tended to have abortions in 
their twenties and thirties rather than in their early teens or forties, the curves for 
the selected single ages 18 to 35 exhibit not only higher levels but also much 
higher absolute cohort-to-cohort variation than those for the ages 15, 40 and 44 
years.
There are several possible explanations for the low absolute differences in 
abortion rates between cohorts at ages 15, 40 and 44 years, in contrast to the 
high differences at the intermediate ages. Naturally, the most important factors 
are differential fecundity and sexual activity by age. At extreme ages within the 
childbearing span, biological capacity to conceive as well as levels of sexual 
activity are relatively low, thus imposing checks on inter-cohort variability in the 
incidence of abortion that do not operate as strongly at other ages. As for the 
lowest of those ages, an additional reason for the absence of significant cohort 
differentials may be that at the beginning of its reproductive life, a cohort is still 
socially immature, scarcely influenced by any significant life experience, and 
therefore hardly distinguishable from other cohorts when at the same age. A 
parallel explanation is that abortion among teenagers was simply against the 
prevailing social norms in Czechoslovakia and therefore its incidence remained 
relatively low, leaving little room for individual cohorts to demonstrate their 
uniqueness. As cohorts get older, their individualities come into prominence, 
reflecting heterogeneous experiences. Cohort identities may be clearly 
maintained across considerable age spans, but towards the end of the
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reproductive cycle they tend to blur again. By the time age 44 is attained, 
proportions infertile are high and levels of sexual activity probably are low in 
every cohort of women, irrespective of their previous life experience. Given 
these biological determinants, women immediately before menopause seem to 
have much in common, and this predisposes them to experience similar levels of 
abortion.
Table 7.1 summarizes the inter-cohort differences in age-specific abortion 
displayed in Figure 7.3. The lowest abortion rates can be found predominantly 
among cohorts born during the 1930s and 1940s. However, cohort membership 
seems to be of only secondary relevance, as most of these minima are 
ascribable to the legal restrictions on abortion introduced in 1962 and 1973, and 
to the effect these measures had on women in their prime childbearing years. 
Similarly, the highest levels of abortion seem to be simply a response of nearly 
all cohorts of then fertile women to the abolition of abortion committees in 1986. 
The only exceptions here are the maxima at ages 40 and 44 for Slovakia, which 
show that levels of abortion at older ages were higher among women born
Table 7.1: Comparison of minimum and maximum age-specific abortion 
rates recorded for cohorts during 1960-90
Age Minimum Maximum Difference
(years) rate
(a)
cohort
(b)
period
(c)
rate
(d)
cohort
(e)
period
(f)
abs.
(d)-(a)
relat.(%)
(d-a)/(a)
15 1.1 1949
Czech Republic 
1964/65 3.4 1972 1987/88 2.3 221
18 13.8 1945 1963/64 41.8 1969 1987/88 28.1 204
20 22.3 1943 1963/64 68.6 1968 1988/89 46.3 208
25 36.3 1938 1963/64 86.3 1962 1987/88 50.0 138
30 36.9 1943 1973/74 73.8 1959 1989/90 36.9 100
35 29.1 1940 1975/76 54.4 1953 1988/89 25.3 87
40 16.3 1935 1975/76 26.7 1948 1988/89 10.4 64
44 3.1 1925 1969/70 7.0 1945 1988/89 3.9 127
15 0.2 1948 1963/64
Slovakia
2.1 1973 1988/89 1.9 929
18 4.0 1945 1963/64 23.9 1969 1987/88 19.9 500
20 10.0 1943 1963/64 47.4 1968 1988/89 37.4 376
25 26.0 1938 1963/64 72.4 1962 1987/88 46.4 179
30 36.3 1933 1963/64 66.2 1957 1987/88 29.8 82
35 31.8 1944 1979/80 46.2 1953 1988/89 14.4 45
40 17.0 1938 1978/79 23.6 1920 1960/61 6.6 39
44 3.3 1934 1978/79 9.1 1918 1962/63 5.8 178
Sources: FSO (1981, 1991), IHS (1991).
277
before 1920 than for any subsequent generation. Calculations in Table 7.1 also 
show absolute and relative measures of inter-cohort differences in abortion 
incidence. In absolute terms, differences are highest at age 25, and inter-cohort 
variation is generally more pronounced among Czech than among Slovak 
cohorts. In relative terms, however, the cohort differential in abortion levels is 
greatest at ages under 20 and, except for ages 30 to 40, the disparities between 
older and younger cohorts are more evident in Slovakia than in the Czech 
Republic.
To what extent is the abortion rate at a particular age related to the cohort's 
previous fertility experience? As an example, Figure 7.4 compares abortion
Figure 7.4: Cumulative fertility rates to exact age 27.5 and abortion rates at
ages 25-29 for cohorts 1935-60
Czech Republic
Birth cohort
Slovakia
20 fc
Birth cohort
] cumulative fertility rate at age 27.5 ------------------abortion rate at ages 25-29
Sources: FSO (1981, 1991), IHS (1991).
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rates in the age group 25-29 years and levels of cumulative fertility to exact age 
27.5 for cohorts born between 1935 and I960.10 The data indicate that there is 
a very loose association between abortion rates recorded by particular birth 
cohorts during their late twenties — that is, at a life-cycle stage when ASARs 
tend to reach maximum levels — and the corresponding cumulative fertility 
rates. Cohorts differ much more in abortion rates than in levels of already 
'accumulated' fertility experience. For Czech cohorts, cumulative fertility rates to 
age 27.5 range from 1.39 to 1.62 live births per woman, but abortion rates for 
the age group 25-29 vary from 39 per 1,000 to 73 per 1,000; for Slovak cohorts, 
cumulative fertility rates vary from 1.62 to 1.83, but abortion rates from 34 per 
1,000 to 65 per 1,000. Similar levels of cumulated cohort fertility are associated 
with very different levels of age-specific cohort abortion. It is evident that, at 
least for the generations 1935-60, the inter-cohort variation in abortion rates in 
the age group 25-29 years cannot be explained merely in terms of variation in 
cumulative fertility to age 27.5. Similar observations apply also to ages 20-24 
and 30-34 (data not shown). However, it is quite possible that these findings 
reflect a declining trend in family size preferences from cohort to cohort: as 
mean ideal family size was falling, a given level of fertility accumulated to exact 
age 27.5 may have represented for younger cohorts an increasing incentive to 
abort.
It seems that the explanation of changes in abortion patterns in particular 
cohorts must focus on the relation between abortion levels at specific ages and 
the political and socio-economic environment corresponding to particular stages 
of those cohorts' lives. The series of age-specific measurements of abortion for 
Czech and Slovak cohorts displayed in Figure 7.3 can be explained by the 
disruptive effects of political interventions and the changing legal and social 
context of abortion as judged by subsequent experience. The most important 
finding is clear enough: period conditions are of overwhelming importance. 
However, changes in legal access to abortion, while the most easy to 
characterize, represent only one aspect of the abortion-relevant context. Social 
and economic changes in other guises also are likely to be important. If some of 
the relevant environmental conditions change sharply then the abortion 
response can be substantial.
10 The required cohort fertility rates were estimated using birth data for the period 1950-90 and 
applying the procedure described in section 7.3.
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A second major finding from Figure 7.3 is that the high levels of abortion among 
more recent cohorts have been preceded by a series of cohort-to-cohort 
increases which were significantly, but nevertheless only temporarily, disrupted 
by pronatalist policies and anti-abortion interventions during the 1960s and 
1970s. The abortion behaviour of more recent cohorts, however, can hardly be 
fully explained by objective features of the political and socio-economic 
conditions of the 1980s. Instead, the increases in abortion levels may be 
attributable to the way in which people assessed the times in which they lived. It 
can be argued that individuals do not necessarily judge the present objectively 
but rather use the not too distant past to interpret it.11 Thus, women in more 
recent cohorts may not have compared their childbearing environment to that of 
the 1950s or 1960s; rather the 1970s may have been the reference point. 
Economic conditions were relatively good in the early 1970s, partly owing to the 
generous pronatalist policies of that time. In view of such a comparison, and 
continually rising expectations with regard to the standard of living that one 
ought to achieve, the social and economic climate of the 1980s can safely be 
characterized as unfavourable to people with large families. To keep pace with 
the worsening economic environment, and to counteract the feeling of economic 
deprivation relative to the West, many Czech and Slovak couples apparently 
chose a small-family strategy. This, and the fact that modern contraception was 
notoriously in short supply, underpinned the use of abortion as a long-term 
method of avoiding childbearing.
Furthermore, the continual increase in abortion levels has in itself been a 
significant social change, and likely to have altered the popular image of 
pregnancy termination by reducing the perceived social and psychological 
'costs' attached to it. Once innovative behaviour was adopted by some, it could 
have altered the environment for all. Certainly, the abolition of abortion 
committees in 1986 played an instrumental role in the increase of abortion 
levels: it eliminated what apparently was a major bureaucratic disincentive to 
women using abortion services. Yet it is perhaps no accident that most current 
abortion obtainers were raised by parents who had encountered a fairly 
permissive abortion regime for most of their reproductive lives. If this is correct, 
then the explanation for the rising tide of abortion in more recent cohorts 
involves one important concept: socialization.
11 For a similar argument, expressed in relation to fertility patterns of white U.S. cohorts, see 
Rindfuss, Morgan, and Swicegood (1988).
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7.6 Differences in cohort abortion ratios
To what extent did members of particular birth cohorts, when experiencing 
pregnancies, resort to abortion? Age-cohort-specific ratios of abortions per 100 
known pregnancies displayed in Figure 7.5 provide the answer to this 
question.12 All curves in the graphs follow roughly similar trajectories, 
characterized by elevated ratios at the youngest childbearing ages, low ratios at 
ages 18 to 22, and gradual increases at subsequent ages, leading to very high 
ratios for women aged 40 and over. However, different cohorts deviate in 
different degrees from a smooth age pattern. For instance, data for generations 
born between 1930 and 1950 exhibit noticeable disruptions in their age-specific 
trends of abortion ratios. Individual cohorts experienced such disruptions at the 
same ages as the already discussed 'disturbances' in abortion rates. Sudden 
declines in abortion ratios affected the 1930 cohort after age 32; the 1935 cohort 
after age 27; the 1940 cohort after ages 22 and 30; the 1945 cohort after age 
25; and the 1950 cohort after age 20 years. It seems clear that legal changes in 
1962 and 1973 restricting the availability of abortion reduced the resort to 
abortion among pregnant women in a way that would not have happened 
otherwise. Although some women may have genuinely changed their 
reproductive intentions in response to the altered childbearing environment, a 
more probable explanation is that some pregnancies were carried to term which 
in the absence of legal changes would have been aborted.
Compared to abortion ratios for Czech cohorts, those for Slovak cohorts are 
lower and much less influenced by continuing changes in abortion policies. 
Another major regional difference is in the way the ratios for ages under 18 and 
over 25 differ for more recent cohorts from those for older generations. In 
Slovakia, the main inter-cohort trend is one towards more frequent resort to 
abortion at older ages. For instance, the proportions of pregnancies ending in 
abortion among 35-year-old women increased in Slovakia from 34 per 100 in the 
1925 cohort to 65 per 100 in the 1954 cohort; in the Czech Republic, the 
corresponding proportions were higher, but increased only from 60 per 100 in 
the 1925 cohort to 75 per 100 in the 1954 cohort. Czech-Slovak differences can 
also be seen in cohort abortion ratios for the youngest childbearing ages. In 
strong contrast to Slovak cohorts, Czech cohorts tended to terminate their
12 Numbers of live births necessary to calculate these ratios were estimated by applying the 
procedure described in section 7.3 to birth registration data for the period 1960-90. In the absence 
of adequately classified data for spontaneous abortions and stillbirths, the sum of registered 
abortions and live births was used to represent total pregnancies.
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Figure 7.5: Age-cohort-specific abortion ratios per 100 known pregnancies,
selected cohorts 1925-70
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Sources: FSO (1991), IHS (1991).
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teenage pregnancies by abortion rather than by birth. At age 15, for instance, 
the overwhelming majority of Czech cohorts experienced more abortions than 
births; the only exceptions were women born in 1949 and 1950 who at that age 
recorded 48 abortions per 100 known pregnancies, but in most other cohorts 
ratios were between 55 and 65 per 100, and in cohorts born after 1970 they 
surpassed 75 per 100. Slovak cohorts born between 1945 and 1949 recorded at 
age 15 abortion ratios of only 7 to 13 per 100; in cohorts born during 1950-70 
these ratios oscillated between 20 and 27 per 100; and only in cohorts born in 
1971-74 did they increase to over 40 per 100. One possible explanation for 
these considerable regional disparities is different levels of religiosity in the two 
societies. In Slovakia, the religious disapproval of teenage abortion was 
apparently much stronger, although it probably became weaker in more recent 
cohorts; in general, however, marriage, not abortion, was regarded as an 
appropriate response to unintended pregnancy in Slovakia. In the Czech 
Republic, religiosity already was low in older generations, and teenage abortions 
were therefore not less acceptable than teenage births. The generally higher 
abortion ratios in Czech cohorts born in the pre-war period also may have 
played their role; for younger generations, they constituted a generational 
precedent and thus might have provided justification, and, in the form of parental 
intervention, created even a certain incentive, to resort to abortion when 
experiencing unwanted pregnancies.
Cohort trends in abortion ratios at selected ages are shown in Figure 7.6. The 
graphs highlight the already mentioned differences between the two 
populations: generally higher, but more fluctuating, abortion ratios for Czech 
cohorts; far less frequent resort to abortion during pregnancy at age 15 among 
Slovak cohorts; substantial cohort variation at most ages in the Czech Republic; 
and comparatively high and nearly linear cohort-to-cohort increases between 
ages 30 and 44 years in Slovakia. In an abbreviated form, the regional 
dissimilarities are analysed in Table 7.2. Again, the contrasts between measures 
of absolute and relative differences between minimum and maximum age- 
specific abortion ratios across cohorts are substantial. This is true especially for 
ages under 25, where absolute differences are often moderate, but proportional 
differences are considerable. Comparison of Tables 7.1 and 7.2 reveals a high 
degree of agreement between minima and maxima for age-cohort-specific 
abortion rates and for abortion ratios. The match is not absolutely perfect, but for 
ages 15 to 35 years the results are congruent: the cohorts experiencing at 
particular ages the lowest, or highest, abortion rates also had the lowest, or
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Figure 7.6: Cohort-specific abortion ratios per 100 known pregnancies
for selected ages
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Sources: FSO (1991), IHS (1991).
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Table 7.2: Comparison of minimum and maximum age-specific abortion 
ratios per 100 known pregnancies recorded for cohorts during 1960-90
Age
(years)
Minimum Maximum Difference
ratio
(a)
cohort
(b)
period
(c)
ratio
(d)
cohort
(e)
period
(f)
abs.
(d)-(a)
relat.(%)
(d-a)/(a)
Czech Republic
15 48 1949 1964/65 78 1973 1988/89 30 63
18 15 1945 1963/64 35 1969 1987/88 20 135
20 11 1943 1963/64 28 1968 1988/89 17 160
25 17 1938 1963/64 38 1963 1988/89 21 122
30 31 1943 1973/74 57 1958 1988/89 25 80
35 51 1940 1975/76 75 1953 1988/89 24 47
40 69 1924 1964/65 89 1949 1989/90 20 29
44 72 1920 1964/65 94 1944 1988/89 22 31
Slovakia
15 7 1948 1963/64 43 1973 1988/89 36 526
18 6 1945 1963/64 25 1971 1989/90 19 343
20 5 1943 1963/64 21 1968 1988/89 16 348
25 12 1938 1963/64 32 1964 1989/90 20 171
30 24 1933 1963/64 50 1957 1987/88 26 111
35 34 1925 1960/61 65 1953 1988/89 31 90
40 45 1924 1964/65 80 1947 1987/88 35 78
44 50 1916 1960/61 89 1944 1988/89 38 76
Sources: FSO (1991), IHS (1991).
highest, abortion ratios. In other words, the forces which produced extreme 
cohort rates appear to be identical with those behind extreme cohort ratios. 
However, the apparent cohort-specificity of the peaks and troughs in abortion 
ratios (and abortion rates) is of only secondary importance. Making the age- 
cohort measurements specific for periods indicates that such extremes occurred 
not because certain groups of women were members of particular birth cohorts, 
but because they were exposed at particular stages in their lives to a certain 
abortion-relevant environment. The restrictions of abortion in 1962 and 1973 
and the abolition of abortion committees in 1986 seem to be the major 
determinants of cohort minima and maxima in abortion ratios (and abortion 
rates).
7.7 Differences in cumulative cohort abortion rates
All the above discussed differences between abortion rates for individual cohorts 
can be expressed in a condensed form by means of cumulative rates: in this 
way all or part of the abortion history of a cohort can be summarized. Naturally,
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construction of cumulated rates makes sense only for those cohorts which are 
covered from the beginning of their reproductive cycles in the available data 
sets. This is the case for all post-World War II generations, commencing with 
that born in 1945. Figure 7.7 shows the levels of cumulative abortion these 
cohorts had attained at selected exact ages. The curves trace the mean 
numbers of abortions per 1,000 women experienced by successive cohorts up 
to specified ages. The major impression from the graphs is that cumulative 
levels of abortion are as a rule lower in older and higher in younger generations. 
Only a few cohorts born in the late 1940s and early 1950s, which were exposed 
to the pronatalist measures of 1968-73 when in their twenties, have lower 
cumulated levels than the generation of 1945. By contrast the generations born 
after 1960 had already achieved fairly high abortion levels at exact ages 20 and 
25 years. These newer cohorts have not experienced any restrictive abortion 
policies, and are following a different path from their predecessors. Another fact 
evident from the graphs is that Czech women attained at all ages higher levels 
of cumulated abortion than Slovak women of the same generation. Differences 
are more pronounced for younger cohorts and at younger ages. This suggests 
that contemporary Czech women are much more inclined to have abortions 
before age 25 than Slovak women.
Figure 7.8 displays curves of cumulative abortion rates for selected generations 
born between 1945 and 1970. It shows differences in the way individual cohorts 
'accumulated' abortion experience throughout their childbearing ages. For most 
cohorts, the observations are incomplete, covering only certain portions of their 
fertile life spans, but the contrasts and similarities are nevertheless obvious. For 
the Czech Republic, the peculiarity of the 1950 cohort is confirmed, especially 
between ages 25 and 35, where it experienced abortion levels that so far are 
the lowest recorded by any post-war generation. For Slovakia, the sequence of 
cohorts seems to be more 'orderly': except for the 1950 and 1945 cohorts 
between ages 25 and 30, every successive cohort attained higher levels of 
abortion up to a given age than the cohorts before. This is because the abortion 
behaviour of Slovak cohorts was generally less influenced by changes in 
political and socio-economic conditions, and the prevailing trend was one of 
increasing period, and therefore also cohort, abortion. Czech generations, on 
the other hand, reacted more sensitively to period influences, and this is why 
inter-cohort heterogeneity in cumulated abortion has been greater in the Czech 
population.
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Figure 7.7: Cumulative abortion rates to specified exact ages 
post-war Czech and Slovak birth cohorts 
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Figure 7.8: Cumulative abortion rates 
selected post-war Czech and Slovak birth cohorts
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An important difference between the two graphs in Figure 7.8 occurs where the 
lines for the 1945 generations run relative to others. In the Czech Republic, the 
1945 cohort behaved up to age 30 similarly to the 1960 generation, 
accumulating higher abortion levels than the cohorts born in 1950 and 1955; but 
at higher ages it recorded lower cumulative rates than the 1960 and 1955 
generations, and at age 40 its cumulative rate equalled that of the 1950 cohort. 
The cumulative abortion rate which the Slovak cohort born in 1945 reached at 
age 30 was not much different from those of the generations 1950 and 1955, 
and substantially lower than that of the 1960 generation; but at ages over 35 the 
cumulative rates attained by the 1945 generation were relatively low and will 
probably be surpassed by most younger generations. Thus, although all women 
born in 1945 were exposed to the same period phenomena, their experiences 
differed in the two populations. As can be seen in Figure 7.2, part of the 
explanation is that Czech members of the 1945 generation recorded fairly high 
abortion rates at ages 20 to 25 but, in response to the pronatalist policies of 
1968-73, they substantially reduced their resort to abortion at ages 25 to 30 
years. In contrast, the Slovak cohort of 1945 recorded lower absolute declines in 
abortion rates following the 1968-73 policy interventions, and its total abortion 
experience was thus more evenly spread throughout its reproductive cycle. Of 
course, the real sources of differences are to be sought in dissimilar social and 
psychological characteristics of Czech and Slovak women born in 1945, 
particularly as regards their family size preferences, patterns of contraceptive 
use, and attitudes to abortion.
What about the long-run abortion prospects in the generations which by 1990 
had not yet reached the end of their reproductive period? With respect to the 
future, one has to take into account that differences in cohort abortion are the 
cumulative results of period factors. Vital rates at certain ages are highly 
responsive to these factors and this makes predictions of a cohort's future 
abortion behaviour, based on its behaviour to date, extremely difficult. Period 
factors have substantially altered the trajectories of past cohorts, and it is not 
unreasonable to expect the same to occur in years to come. Only if period 
conditions remain constant will such predictions for incomplete cohorts be 
reliable. History suggests that this is an unlikely prospect, but there is no reliable 
way of predicting the future. No serious speculation about the prospect of 
reproduction in the Czech and Slovak populations can evade the fact that 
women are used to turning to abortion virtually throughout their reproductive 
years. But it is possible that the underlying relationships could change. For
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instance, younger generations may use more contraception and therefore adopt 
a different pattern of abortion that would substantially distinguish them from 
older cohorts. Given such possibilities, predicting levels of completed abortion 
for cohorts still passing through their childbearing years is a potentially error- 
prone exercise; and the more years of childbearing remaining, the greater the 
possible error.
Nevertheless, given the pace of change in the relevant political and socio­
economic factors, some reasonable short-term projections can be made. 
Abortion rates were relatively high in cohorts entering their early and mid­
twenties during the 1990s. These were also very large cohorts, comprising 
women born during the pronatalist early 1970s; their reproductive behaviour is 
therefore likely to influence the media and popular culture, not to mention health 
services. Without a substantial change in the climate relevant to fertility control, 
continued high abortion rates may be expected among those entering their 
thirties. In short, relatively frequent resort to abortion is likely to continue in the 
near future.
The long-term prospects are much less clear. They largely depend on trends in 
socio-economic and political conditions, and these are difficult to predict. Judged 
by developed-country standards, current levels of fertility in the Czech and 
Slovak populations are relatively high. However, cohorts at young and mid-adult 
ages now lead lives similar to those of younger generations across the 
European continent: they face strong competition for good jobs; they are keen to 
enjoy recreation and entertainment; they aspire to comfortable housing and 
other lures of a high-consumption society — cars, second homes, vacations 
abroad, and so forth. For most female members of these cohorts, employment 
outside the household is an economic necessity, but children represent a 
second, equally demanding job within the household. Thus, the living conditions, 
values, and aspirations of the younger generations are likely further to reduce 
their demand for children. The conditions of a generally depressed economy, 
where the housing and — newly — the job markets are in a state of acute crisis, 
may intensify the antinatalist tendencies. Does this mean that younger 
generations will experience high levels of unplanned pregnancies and, given the 
behavioural pattern set by their predecessors, of abortion as well?
Not necessarily. The changes that swept through Eastern Europe after 1989 
formed a major political watershed. The environment became quite different. On
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a psychological level, one of the most important changes is an increased sense 
of personal freedom, a general feeling of better opportunity for career building, 
social participation, and individual self-expression, fostering in turn personal 
responsibility and self-discipline. Ultimately, of course, the future course of 
abortion is likely to depend on the situation regarding contraception. In this 
respect, a major change is the transition from a socialist, free-of-charge health 
care system to one based principally on private health insurance. With the 
renaissance of market principles, abortion as well as contraception has become 
more expensive, but prices are developing clearly in favour of the latter. 
Moreover, major Western producers of contraceptives are entering the market, 
and particularly the supply of contraceptive pills is improving dramatically (Uzel 
and Wynnyczuk, 1994). Another important factor is the emergence of national 
family planning organizations in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, which have 
set as their task not only improving the quality of family planning services, but 
also providing training to health professionals and information to the general 
public (Chudikova, 1993; Thomas, 1993). Furthermore, the revival of religion, 
freedom of critical thought, and the widespread sentiment that older generations 
made mistakes that are not to be repeated, are likely to move public opinion and 
social norms in an anti-abortion direction. To be sure, there is also some 
possibility that the resort to abortion will be limited by new government 
measures. Politicians in the now independent Czech and Slovak Republics may 
opt for different abortion policies, as they have already opted for different 
economic strategies in undertaking post-communist reform. This could amplify 
demographic dissimilarity between the two populations and thus further 
complicate predictions of their futures. However, although this reflection on long- 
run perspectives of abortion must inevitably end with a question mark, it seems 
safe to say that there are reasons to anticipate substantial declines in abortion 
levels among the next Czech and Slovak generations.13
7.8 Conclusion
Abortion responses of particular birth cohorts to environmental stimuli, such as 
changes to the existing abortion law, or turns in the economy, depend on the
13 To some extent, this trend is already suggested in abortion data for the Czech Republic for 
1990-92 (Uzel and Wynnyczuk, 1994):________________________________________________
year total induced 
abortions
rate per 1,000 
women aged 15-44
ratio per 100 
live births
1990 109,361 48.3 83.4
1991 103,124 45.8 79.4
1992 93,435 41.5 76.5
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stage of the reproductive cycle at which members of a cohort are subjected to 
the stimulus. The evidence from the Czech and Slovak populations suggests 
that the abortion behaviour of individual cohorts has been particularly sensitive 
to transformations of the political and social world during the young and mid­
adult ages of 20 to 34 years. This demonstrates a considerable capacity for 
cohort response to temporarily unfavourable or favourable political and socio­
economic conditions. However, these responses were usually short-term and 
rarely had persistent effects on subsequent abortion behaviour, apparently 
because the need for abortion remained high. Cohorts outside the 20-34 years 
age span reacted much less when any stimulus occurred, as evidenced by small 
absolute changes in their abortion rates following changes in the abortion­
relevant environment. Consequently, different cohorts have different abortion 
histories because they have accumulated different sets of period experience.
These findings support the proposition that age-period interactions may be 
expected in a cohort analysis, because different abortion determinants come 
into prominence at different stages of the reproductive cycle. Why has abortion 
in the age groups 20 to 34 been so responsive to environmental shifts? 
Apparently because these ages mark the prime childbearing years during which 
levels of sexual activity are high and the risks of unintentional conception are 
substantial. When an unintended pregnancy occurs to a woman of this age, the 
prospect of having a child has to compete with several other real or perceived 
possibilities: career opportunities, investments in the family's living standards, 
leisure pursuits, or simply a reluctance to make significant changes in her life. 
Resort to abortion is likely, providing that this way of pregnancy termination is 
easily accessible, not socially stigmatizing, and in line with cultural conventions. 
In periods when the negative implications of continuing to term are less severe, 
and at the same time there are fewer chances of obtaining abortions legally, 
then women in these 'critical ages' exhibit lower abortion rates. Whether this is 
because in periods favourable to childbearing unintended pregnancies are rare 
or because they are more likely to become subsequently 'wanted' is not 
completely clear, but the second explanation seems to be more probable. 
However, apart from the changes in levels of abortion resulting from changes in 
political and socio-economic conditions, all Czech and Slovak cohorts exhibited 
an underlying base incidence of abortion that reflects strong demand for fertility 
control, irrespective of prevailing environmental conditions. The persistence of 
relatively high abortion rates thus clearly signals that most generations 
experienced low levels of modern contraception, and had limited access to it.
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The important fact about the measures of abortion assembled from the same 
data set for a succession of synthetic cohorts and for a succession of real 
cohorts is that the two modes of analysis tell different but interdependent stories 
about temporal variation in abortion. To analyse changes in age-specific 
abortion from one period to another without recognizing that persons of age x in 
time fare those who were age x-1 in time t-1 (Ryder, 1965)14 would be to ignore 
important information. The results presented in this chapter seem to confirm that 
demographers have a good deal to gain by bringing the cohort dimension into 
the picture. This is not to deny that abortion is highly responsive to period- 
specific influences; in fact, period effects are evident and undeniable. But the 
period influences are likely to be 'filtered' by the previous histories of cohorts, 
and therefore should not be studied in isolation.
14 Ryder's original notation is a for age; the symbol xis  chosen here for reasons of consistency.
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Chapter 8: ESTIMATING FERTILITY RESPONSES TO ABORTION POLICY
MEASURES IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC AND SLOVAKIA
8.1 Introduction
The noticeable variation in period levels of both fertility and abortion is one of 
the most noteworthy and interesting features of demographic developments in 
the former Czechoslovakia in the years following World War II. This variation 
seems to be partly related to a series of policy measures that were introduced 
by the government between the early 1950s and late 1980s. Although not all of 
these measures were openly declared to be population policies, their impact on 
reproductive processes in what are now the independent Czech and Slovak 
Republics was apparently substantial. This chapter examines some aspects of 
the seemingly strong causal association between abortion policies introduced in 
1957 and 1986 and subsequent changes in demographic behaviour. Going 
beyond the usual measurement procedures, it applies a more rigorous approach 
to estimating fertility responses to abortion policy measures.
8.2 Policies relevant to fertility and abortion: a recapitulation
During the more than 40 years of its existence (1948-89), the communist 
government of former Czechoslovakia took a number of measures which may be 
listed under the rubric ’active population policies'. An overview of the main policy 
interventions relevant to population reproduction in Czechoslovakia is presented 
in Table 8.1. The broader political, socio-economic, and demographic 
circumstances of these measures are discussed elsewhere in this thesis (see 
Chapters 2 and 4).
Table 8.1: Main policy interventions relevant to fertility and abortion 
implemented in Czechoslovakia between 1950 and 1990
Year_________ Policy______________________________________________________
1950 new criminal law: abortion declared a criminal offence
1956 measures to assist mothers and larger families: maternity leave benefits 
extended, birth grants introduced
1957 first abortion law: abortions permitted on medical grounds or for other 
reasons deserving 'special consideration', provided that the request was 
previously approved by the local abortion committee
1959 prices for children's clothes and shoes greatly reduced; family 
allowances raised for third and subsequent children
1960 textbooks and educational supplies in schools supplied free of charge
(cont.)
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Table 8.1 (cont.)
Year Policy
1962 new administrative regulations on abortion: restrictions imposed for 
married women experiencing their first pregnancies
1964 differential pensionable age for women implemented, dependent on the 
number of children raised; rent reductions introduced in state-owned 
housing according to the number of children in a family; maternity leave 
extended to 22 weeks
1968-73 a series of massive pronatalist policy measures: higher family 
allowances and maternity grants, maternity leave extended to 26 weeks, 
lump-sum birth allowance and low-interest loans for newlyweds 
introduced
1973 new administrative guidelines concerning abortion: restricted access for 
women aged under 40 or with fewer than three children
1977 new legal regulation on contraceptives introduced, prescribing a complex 
system of compulsory examinations and check-ups in relation to intra­
uterine and hormonal contraception
1979 price subsidies on children's clothes and shoes abolished; childcare 
allowances increased
1982 introduction of higher prices for selected consumer goods and household 
energies (fuel, power); family allowances increased; vacuum-aspiration 
introduced as an abortion technique
1986 second abortion law: abortion committees abolished, abortion made 
available on request; intra-uterine and hormonal contraceptives provided 
free of charge
1987 maternity leave extended to 28 weeks, higher maternity allowance 
introduced
1988 qualifying conditions for family allowances made less stringent
1990 series of policies following the collapse of communist regime: 
decentralization of economy, introduction of market principles, 
shortening of military service, etc.
Sources: Heitlinger (1976, 1987), Koubek (1981, 1984), Pavlik (1985, 1991a), Andrle and Srb 
(1991).
8.3 General trends in fertility, abortion, and conception rates
Both Czech and Slovak fertility rates have generally declined in the post-war 
years. In 1950, the total fertility rate (TFR) was 2.8 in the Czech Republic and 
3.6 in Slovakia; by 1990, the corresponding figures were 1.9 and 2.1. However, 
the overall decline was interrupted several times by short-term increases in 
period fertility levels (Figure 8.1 ).1
1 Total fertility, abortion, and conception rates are also given in Table A8.1 in the Appendix.
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Figure 8.1: Total period fertility and abortion rates 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, 1950*90
Slovakia
C 2.5
Czech R.
2 1.5 -
Czech R.
abortion
Slovakia
Year
Note: Calculated using age groups 15-44.
Sources: FSO (1981, 1991), IHS (1991).
During the 1950s, the decline in period fertility levels was rather fast, reflecting a 
swift withering away of the post-war recovery of birth rates. In 1960, the TFR in 
the Czech Republic had fallen to 2.1, while in Slovakia the corresponding figure 
was 3.1. These declines reflected the major socio-political changes in the 1950s, 
but also the introduction of the liberal abortion law of 1957. Subsequent 
changes in fertility levels may also be largely ascribed to gradual modifications in 
social policies. Thus, the temporary increase in period TFRs during 1963-64 
seems to have been the result of a more restrictive approach towards abortion 
seekers which started in 1962. Similarly, the renaissance of fertHity during the 
early 1970s may be interpreted as the outcome of the complex pronatalist policy 
measures initiated by the government in the years 1968-73.
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Trends in abortion show a similar pattern of association with political 
interventions (for a broader discussion, see Chapter 6, Section 6.5). Total 
abortion rates (TARs) recorded after 1960 establish three periods of increase 
(1960-61, 1964-69, 1975-90) and two complementary periods of decline in both 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia. When abortion and fertility trend lines are 
compared (Figure 8.1), it is easy to see that troughs in abortion levels tend to 
correspond with peaks in fertility. It may be concluded that policies which 
stimulated an increase in abortion levels usually had a suppressing impact on 
fertility, and policies that stimulated fertility suppressed abortion.
It is not very surprising that the shifts in TFRs and TARs were accompanied by 
changes in the age-specific structures of these two processes. The statistical 
evidence suggests that population policies had different effects on different age 
groups in the population. In both the Czech Republic and Slovakia, fertility rates 
for women younger than 22 years of age were far more stable over time than 
those for older age groups. In the Czech Republic, fertility levels among women 
older than 25 years of age declined steadily during the 1950s (Figure 8.2). By 
the early 1960s, they were much lower than corresponding figures for Slovakia. 
After 1960, age-specific fertility rates in the Czech Republic fluctuated markedly, 
apparently in response to changing demographic policies.
The picture for Slovakia, on the other hand, reflects a different dynamic, 
characterized by a slow but steady decline in fertility among all women over 25 
years old (Figure 8.3). This process was, it seems, only marginally influenced by 
continuing modifications in population policies. Although the two populations 
experienced rather dissimilar trends in fertility levels in the 1950s and 1960s, in 
more recent decades the differences tended to diminish. By the late 1980s, the 
age distribution as well as the total quantum of period fertility in the Czech 
Republic was not much different from that in Slovakia (Figure 8.4).
In comparison with the data on fertility, age-specific abortion rates seem to have 
been no less sensitive to policy measures. Especially noticeable is the sharp 
overall increase induced by the 1986 abortion law (Figures 8.3 and 8.4). But the 
decreases and increases in age-specific abortion levels were always more 
equally distributed across the age spectrum than was the case with fertility. In 
other words, Czechoslovak government policies had distinctly age-specific 
impacts on fertility, but not so much on abortion.
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Figure 8.2: Shaded contour maps of age-specific fertility and abortion rates
Czech Republic, 1950-90
ASARs:
Sources: FSO (1981, 1991), IHS (1991).
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Figure 8.3: Shaded contour maps of age-specific fertility and abortion rates
Slovakia, 1950-90
ASARs:
Sources: FSO (1981, 1991), IHS (1991).
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Figure 8.4: Age-specific fertility and abortion rates, selected years 1950-90
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Because live births and induced abortions may be expected to represent most of 
the reproductive performance of a population,2 it is possible to use the data on 
these vital events to estimate age-specific proportions of women who became 
pregnant, and thus to approximate total annual conception rates. There are 
several possible ways of calculating such rates. The simplest is to add to the 
total fertility rate an appropriate total abortion rate; a total conception rate of that 
kind may be called an 'aggregated1 rate. However, such a calculation ignores 
the fact that abortions and births recorded in one year are not necessarily the 
result of pregnancies conceived in that year. If a woman conceives at completed 
age x in calendar year t, her pregnancy may end (a) in year t at age x; (b) in 
year fat age x+1] (c) in year t+1 at age x; or (d) in year t+1 at age x+1.
A useful technique for estimating the true age-period-specific numbers of 
conceptions from the births recorded in all relevant age-period units of 
observation was developed by Carmichael (1985). Using the assumptions of the 
Lexis diagram, Carmichael inferred that the number of conceptions to women 
aged xin year t which lead to live births can be approximated by taking 7.36 per 
cent of births recorded in the age group x in year t, 19.77 per cent of births 
recorded in the age group x+1 in year t, 19.77 per cent of births recorded in the 
age group x in year t+1\ and 53.11 per cent of births recorded in the age group 
x+1 in year t+1. This calculation is based on the assumption that births occurred 
after exactly 38 weeks of gestation and that they were evenly distributed within 
calendar years and by exact age within single-year age intervals. Using similar 
logic, and assuming that all abortions took place after exactly eight weeks of 
pregnancy,3 the number of conceptions to women aged x in year t which 
resulted in induced abortions may be estimated by taking 71.67, 12.99, 12.99, 
and 2.35 per cent of abortions recorded in the four respective age-period units 
of observation (a), (b), (c), and (d). Combining these two estimating procedures, 
one can compute 'adjusted' annual conception rates which reflect more
2 The structure of pregnancies (in %) according to the means of their termination in 
Czechoslovakia between 1960 and 1990 was as follows (FSO, 1991):_________________________
1960 1970 1980 1990
live births 65.0 64.3 65.9 53.5
induced abortions 26.4 28.1 26.5 40.6
spontaneous abortions and stillbirths 8.6 7.6 7.6 5.9
total recorded pregnancies 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
3 According to the published Czechoslovak data, the average period of gestation at which induced 
abortions were performed was 8.65 weeks in 1965, 8.66 weeks in 1975, 8.23 weeks in 1985, and 
7.22 weeks in 1990 (IHS, 1991).
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realistically the period-specific frequencies of conceptions resulting in live births 
and induced abortions.
Figure 8.5 displays both the aggregated and adjusted total conception rates for 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia in the period 1960-90. Differences between 
the two estimates are small, although the adjusted rates change more smoothly 
than the aggregated rates. In general, the figures show rather contrasting 
patterns for the two constituent republics of the former Czechoslovak federation. 
The estimates for Slovakia suggest a fairly uniform decrease in total conception 
rate, from about 3.7 in 1960 to 3.1 in 1985. The curve for the Czech republic, on 
the other hand, reveals some variation in the total conception rate, with relatively 
high levels (of about 3.2) in the early 1960s and mid-1970s and low levels (2.9 
or less) in 1967-68 and 1980. After 1986, the year when the new abortion law 
was promulgated, estimated total conception rates increased rapidly in both 
republics, and in 1988 they reached levels of 3.5 in the Czech Republic and 3.4 
in Slovakia. However, in interpreting data such as these it is important to 
remember that, because of the length of the non-ovulatory period associated 
with abortion, it takes one to three abortions to avert one birth, depending on the 
frequency and efficiency of accompanying contraception (Potter, 1972). In other 
words, person-years of exposure to the risk of conception are likely to rise when
Figure 8.5: Estimated total conception rates 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, 1960-90
«  3.6
~  3.4 ■
CR agg. -------------- SI. agg. — - — - — OR adj. ..................SI. adj.
Note: For definition of aggregated and adjusted total conception rates, see text. 
Sources: FSO (1991), IHS (1991).
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abortion becomes more easily available. Thus, part of the estimated increase in 
the total conception rates following the relaxation of abortion regulations in 1986 
needs to be ascribed to this phenomenon.
8.4 An APC approach to analysing demographic change
Demographers have made many attempts, at varying levels of sophistication, to 
ascertain the fertility effects of demographic policies in general, and abortion 
policies in particular.4 The approach most often found in the literature is a rather 
intuitive one in which conclusions are drawn from examining annual series of 
fertility or pregnancy rates. If there is a temporal coincidence between a policy 
intervention and a change in fertility rates shortly thereafter, this is taken as 
direct evidence of an effect of the policy measure under consideration. A 
quotation from Buttner and Lutz (1990: 541-542) contains the main objection 
that may be levelled against analyses of this kind:
This descriptive-intuitive approach may convince us that the policy had 
some effect; but it cannot give us a quantitative measure of the extent of 
the effect... because we do not know how fertility would have behaved in 
the absence of the policy. It might have declined, remained the same, or 
it might have increased, possibly even more than was actually 
experienced. ... [In such analyses] there is no standard to serve as a 
reference in comparison ... through which the extent of the impact 
generated by the change from the old policy regime to the new one could 
be estimated.
More formal analytical procedures using statistical models have been used to 
create the missing standard of comparison. Some analysts have attempted to 
assess the impact of population policies by modelling the trajectory of fertility in 
the hypothetical absence of a policy change and comparing this estimate with 
the actual level. One possible way to quantify what effects period-specific 
changes had on the trends in fertility, and to calculate appropriate hypothetical 
estimates, is to use an age-period-cohort (APC) type of model.
The basic idea of an APC approach is that the incidence of a demographic 
phenomenon in a particular population at a particular point in time may be 
viewed as a product of the age structure of the population in question; the
4 For examples of analyses focusing on the fertility outcomes of abortion policies, see Muramatsu 
(1960), Klinger (1967, 1985), McIntyre (1972a,b), Omran (1975), Tietze (1975), Frejka (1983, 
1985), Hogan (1984).
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differences in demographic behaviour between different cohorts within that 
population; and temporal change in socio-political conditions relevant to 
demographic change. The most important statistical assumption of the APC 
approach is that a series of appropriately specified demographic rates could be 
modelled in a multivariate setting using three explanatory variables. These 
variables, with their rationales for inclusion, are (a) the current age of the 
woman, as a proxy for exposure to physiological and social factors; (b) the year 
in which the demographic event occurred, as a surrogate for historical conditions 
of the time; and (c) a factor that is specific for each birth cohort, as a proxy for 
each cohort's historical experience.
Hence, age, period, and cohort are used in APC models as three proxies for 
possible underlying causes of demographic change. These three dimensions 
are of interest not as such, but because they are capable of representing the 
latent mechanisms of demographic change. In this sense, modelling in an APC 
framework is the reverse of the typical analytical procedure in demography. 
Instead of taking a set of data and exploiting it for information about the 
underlying causal mechanisms, an analyst using an APC model takes those 
mechanisms for granted, and tries to show what consequences flow from them. 
Such an approach is useful only if one has previously specified and defined the 
possible latent causes and postulated the paths between causes and effects. A 
few comments on age, period, and cohort effects are therefore in order.
Age may be thought of as the most important source of variation in vital rates 
(see the discussion in Chapter 6, Section 6.5). Age influences are those related 
to different aspects of biological, psychological, and social aging, and to the 
various status-role transitions that accompany a person's progression through 
an age-graded life cycle. The age variable has value also as an indicator for 
cultural influences which may vary with age but which are difficult or impossible 
to measure, such as the factors related to family and career building. A method 
that incorporates the age variable explicitly into a model allows the 
determination of the combined influence of all the effects for which age is a 
proxy. Age models have been used quite extensively in demographic analyses 
of fertility, beginning with Henry's (1961) classic work on age patterns of fertility 
in the absence of deliberate control. Of the three sources considered in the APC 
approach, age is the one for which it is most plausible to argue for a direct 
effect.
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Cohort effects occur whenever the past, accumulated experience of individuals 
exerts an influence on their later behaviour. There is much discussion among 
researchers as to what role cohort effects play in demographic change, 
particularly in trends in fertility (see Chapter 7, Section 7.2). An extreme view is 
that cohort influences are no more than 'a weighted average of prior period 
measures, and have no additional behavioural basis' (Lee, 1978: 7). An 
opposite view states that the circumstances under which people enter important 
stages in their lives (birth, marriage, first entering the labour market, beginning 
childbearing, etc.) may be so influential as to mark them with persistent features. 
Sociological arguments in favour of the cohort approach, although not always 
supported by empirical statistical evidence, have convinced many 
demographers that 'one could expect cohort effects for any kind of behaviour 
that touches deeply rooted values' (Wils, 1990: 12). Contrary, or perhaps in 
addition, to a traditional cohort approach, people's values and preferences may 
be perceived as not being fixed once and forever but changing over time (Lee, 
1977, 1980). Indeed, it would be difficult to imagine social change without 
malleable members of cohorts who react sensitively to present-day conditions. 
However, the concept of changing attitudes is a rather complex one; and among 
other things, it presents many technical problems for statistical modelling 
(Menken, 1981).
Period effects involve people of all ages in all cohorts, although some period 
influences, such as those relevant to nuptiality and fertility, may be of little or no 
importance for individuals who are, at a given point in time, too young or too old. 
Period of occurrence itself clearly does not affect vital rates; it is the events and 
conditions during the period which do. The well documented fact that 
fluctuations in demographic time series often correspond to changes in political 
or social conditions that are profoundly period-specific (e.g., wartime, economic 
cycles, innovations in technology) is the best possible illustration of the 
importance of temporal circumstances. These are typically external to the 
individuals, not influencing their situation immediately, like social movements or 
changes in laws and policies, but they could also be the result of people's 
adaptability throughout their lives. Period effects may sometimes be produced 
by changes in measurement techniques or incompleteness of statistical 
evidence; in most analyses, however, these are considered to be distorting 
influences, not true period effects.
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The above discussion may be put into a broader theoretical perspective by 
distinguishing three types of demographic analysis: cross-sectional, longitudinal, 
and time-lag. With some oversimplification, it is possible to say that cross- 
sectional analysis looks essentially at differences between younger and older 
cohorts at one point in time; longitudinal analysis looks at differences between 
early and later measurements on the same cohort; and time-lag analysis looks 
at differences between an older cohort at an earlier point in time and a younger 
cohort at a later point in time which is the same age as the older cohort was at 
the earlier time. The quantification of effects may then be based on the fact that 
each of these differences is composed of two, and only two, of the three 
possible effects of age, period, and cohort. Thus, cross-sectional differences 
contain age as well as cohort effects; longitudinal differences contain period as 
well as age effects; and time-lag differences contain period as well as cohort 
effects. Age, period, and cohort effects are therefore abstractions which cannot 
be observed directly, but which can be inferred under certain conditions and 
assumptions. Of course, the main issue for an analyst is how to separate and 
estimate the values of these three effects, and then to impute causes to them. A 
useful discussion of these topics can be found in Palmore (1978), who carefully 
distinguishes particular levels of analysis, and defines essential terms, 
observable differences, inferred effects, and the causes of the effects. It seems 
useful to reproduce one diagram and one summary table from Palmore (1978) 
which capture the basic theoretical concepts relevant to APC analysis (Figure 
8.6 and Table 8.2).
To summarize, demographic knowledge suggests that people's demographic 
behaviour is shaped by their biological as well as their social past, and that they
Figure 8.6: Observable differences within an APC framework
Measurement time
Early Later
1 = longitudinal diff. (B—A)
Younger A <- 1 -> B
71 2 = cross-sectional diff. (C—A)
Cohort 2 3
4/  v. 3 = time-lag diff. (B—C)
Older C
Source: Palmore (1978: 284).
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Table 8.2: Levels of analysis within an APC framework
I. Differences
A. Longitudinal: time 2 measurement on a cohort minus time 1 measurement on 
same cohort
B. Cross-sectional: time 1 measurement on older cohort minus time 1 
measurement on younger cohort
C. Time-lag: time 2 measurement on younger cohort minus time 1 measurement 
on older cohort
II. Effects
A. Combination of effects:
1. longitudinal difference = age + period
2. cross-sectional difference = age + cohort
3. time-lag difference = period — cohort
B. Separation of effects:3
1. no significant difference (neither longitudinal, nor cross-sectional, nor 
time-lag) = no effects
2. two significant differences = one pure effect
3. three significant differences = two unequal effects, or three effects.
III. Causes
A. age effects = biological, psychological, and/or social role changes
B. period effects = changes in environment, measurement, and/or practice
C. cohort effects = genetic shifts, and/or interaction of historical situation
________with age of cohort_________________________________________________
Note: 3 According to Palmore, it is impossible to have only one significant difference because 
each difference is related to the other two. Thus, any one significant difference necessitates at 
least one other significant difference.
Source: Palmore (1978: 294).
are at the same time responsive to changes in the broader socio-political 
environment. Therefore, the question to be asked is not whether the factors of 
age, period, and cohort influence demographic processes (it is known that they 
do), but rather to what extent the observed changes in demographic behaviour 
can be attributed to the underlying age, period, and cohort determinants. 
Analysis in an APC framework allows one to estimate the net quantitative effects 
of the age, period, and cohort factors, and hence to understand better the 
structure of cross-classified data in which age, period, and cohort effects are 
present simultaneously. Specifically, since the changes in period effects may be 
seen, under circumstances discussed later in this chapter, as a reflection of 
political interventions, APC analysis seems to be a potentially effective tool for 
research aimed at assessing the demographic effects of public policies.
8.5 An age-period-cohort model
The majority of demographic work on models which include age, period, and 
cohort effects is based on the assumption of linear relationships between the
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age, period, and cohort parameters (Hobcraft and Gilks, 1984). APC models are 
conventionally written as:
,<FW  = u + a* + Pf+C* + e xtfc (8.1)
where is the age-period-cohort specific rate; f ( ) is a simple transformation 
(e.g., linear, logarithmic, or logit), u is an overall constant; ax, p  ^and c^are the 
effects for age group x, period t and cohort k, respectively; and ex^  is a random 
error term. Statistically speaking, the observed rate for persons aged x, in year t, 
and belonging to the annual birth cohort k is treated as consisting of a 
systematic component attributable to three variables (age, period, and cohort) 
and a random component. The term u + ax + pj + c^ is a quantitative 
representation of the systematic component.
Virtually all APC models have two senses in which they enhance our 
understanding of a set of data. One of these refers to the relative quality of the 
fit; that is, the extent to which observations agree with expectations, calculated 
from models that include terms in some or all of the three dimensions. The 
evaluation of fit comes through a case-by-case comparison of modelled values 
with observed values of the explained variable, and also through some 
comprehensive measure of the adequacy of the model which shows whether it 
requires terms in all three dimensions. APC work aiming to assess relative 
goodness-of-fit is usually referred to as 'exploratory' or 'descriptive' analysis. 
However, fitting a model also involves estimating the effects included in the 
systematic component. Thus, the second type of interpretative device that may 
be derived from an APC model is a set of coefficients, which are estimates of 
the parameters of the model (ax, p^ , c^). Estimating parameters of the model 
can be conceived of as a first step towards explaining the actual sources of APC 
variation. Analyses concerned with explanation are called 'analytic' or 
'explanatory'.
As is obvious from equation (8.1), conventional APC models allow for the main 
effects of age, period, and cohort, but not for any interactions among these 
variables. Conventional APC models thus rest on three basic assumptions that 
are worth elaborating:
(a) The age effects, which indicate the age-graded character of the demographic 
phenomenon in question, are homogeneous across periods and cohorts.
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Thus, no allowance is made for the possibility that cohort- and period-specific 
influences alter the demographic experience of different age groups in 
different ways.
(b) The period effects are homogeneous across age and cohort. There is only 
one parameter that governs the entire influence of a given period's condition 
on observed demographic processes, and this parameter exerts its influence 
independently of age or cohort.
(c) The cohort effects of the model are homogeneous across age and period. 
Thus, cohort characteristics do not change as cohorts get older, and do not 
adjust to the specific period experiences which cohorts encounter as they 
age. This implies, in fact, that any cohort or lifetime influences occur earlier in 
life.
It is not difficult to assert that these assumptions are often, if not usually, 
unwarranted in social and behavioural research. For instance, the concept of 
cohort effects which are fixed early in life and remain unaffected by subsequent 
events is certainly less than perfectly applicable to modern developed 
populations, where, for instance, changes in lifestyle and contraceptive 
technology have made it increasingly possible to pursue individual reproductive 
strategies in order to achieve economic, educational, and career goals.
Apart from their insensitivity to possible interactions between explanatory 
variables, a fundamental difficulty which arises in models that are linear in age, 
period, and cohort is the so-called 'identification' or 'estimability' problem. This is 
caused by the linear dependency of age, period, and cohort dimensions, which 
may be expressed through the equation:
cohort year =  period of observation —  age at observation.
Since a cohort is logically identified by a fixed difference between time of 
observation and age at observation, one of the explanatory variables of an APC 
model is in fact a perfect function of the other two explanatory variables: period 
of observation is a perfect function of cohort membership and age, age is a 
perfect function of cohort and period, and cohort is a perfect function of age and 
period. The crucial implication of this is that, since any one of age, period, or 
cohort can be viewed as a form of interaction between the other two variables, it 
is logically incorrect to treat age, period and cohort as distinct dimensions. This 
does not prevent fitting of the model, but it makes it extremely difficult to
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attribute unique effects to all the three variables, and therefore to estimate and 
interpret their parameters.
Demographers interested in APC research have made various attempts to 
circumvent the identification problem, although their aim was not always stated 
in these terms. Mason et al. (1973) advanced a particularly strong argument 
that, although after two dimensions in an APC analysis have been defined the 
third is unequivocally fixed, it is possible to carry out analyses that distinguish 
between, and assess the effects of, age, period, and cohort on an explained 
variable. Mason et al. argued that each of the three effects can vary 
independently of the other two.5 The strategy they suggested to estimate the 
effects is (a) to treat each of the effects as a set of dummy variables estimable 
by a dummy variable regression analysis, and (b) to make a simplifying 
assumption that the coefficients of at least two categories of either age, cohort, 
or period (two age groups, two birth cohorts, or two calendar periods) have 
identical effects on the explained variable, or bear some other specific 
relationship to one another. Thus, perhaps for the first time in demographic 
literature, a widely applicable methodology was proposed where is was 
potentially possible to discriminate among all three of age, period, and cohort.
The ideas of Mason et al. inspired a number of subsequent studies to attack the 
identification problem in APC analysis in various ways.6 It must be emphasized 
that these efforts have not led to a general solution of the age-period-cohort 
puzzle, and that there have remained sceptics who maintain that a technically 
correct solution to the identification problem is logically impossible and, 
consequently, that use of the APC framework can seldom if ever be justified.7 
Unfortunately, critics of APC analyses rarely understand the practical needs 
which motivate the quantification of age, period, and cohort effects in 
demographic data series. Moreover, the existence of these effects has been 
convincingly demonstrated by many authors, using a number of data sets and a 
variety of approaches available within the APC modelling context. The results of
5 To use an example, income may tend to increase with age (say, to about age 60) regardless of 
cohort effects and period effects; period effects on income may be present owing to inflation or 
recession regardless of age and cohort effects; and cohort effects on income may be present 
because of past historical events affecting cohorts differently (Mason eta/., 1973).
6 For examples of APC analysis, including comments on its logic, see, for instance, Pullum (1977, 
1980), Knoke and Burke (1980), Clogg (1982), Hobcraft, Menken, and Preston (1982), Smith, 
Mason, and Fienberg (1982), Hobcraft and Gilks (1984), Willekens and Baydar (1984), Fienberg 
and Mason (1985), Wilmoth (1989), Halli and Rao (1992), Wunsch (1993).
7 For the main arguments against the APC approach, see Glenn (1976, 1977, 1981), Goldstein 
(1979), Rodgers (1982). Among other things, these critics reprehend Mason et al. (1973) because 
the second of their assumptions assumes an answer to part of the very question that the method 
is supposed to test: whether there are age, period, or cohort effects.
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these efforts may not always be statistically rigorous, but they are by and large 
demographically plausible, and so disarm much of the criticism. So long as the 
analyst does not make the mistake of thinking that each of the accounting 
dimensions is indistinguishable from its theoretical meaning for a specific 
substantive phenomenon, there is no logical impediment to APC modelling. 
Thus, it seems safe to say that APC analysis is a workable component of cohort- 
oriented research which, although its application is not necessarily routine, can 
provide extremely useful results.
A well tried strategy of modelling using the APC framework is to combine 
empirical inference and tried statistical procedures. In the spirit of this tradition, a 
particularly elaborate and promising technique was proposed by Willekens and 
Baydar (1984). The first key element in the Willekens-Baydar approach is the 
premise that the problems related to identification that usually make the 
application of APC models difficult are not intrinsic to these models, but are 
basically problems of measurement and data specification. Age, cohort, and 
period variables may be measured either in exact time (continuous time) or in 
completed time (discrete time units). When exact time is used, any two of the 
three time measures uniquely identify the third one, in accord with the equation 
cohort = period — age. However, the introduction of discrete period, age, and 
cohort intervals invalidates this firm relationship between the three variables. For 
instance, persons who experience the event at completed age x during the time 
period t cannot be assigned to a particular cohort because they might have 
been born during either the year t-x-1 or the year t-x. The avenue which leads to 
the solution of the identification problem of the APC approach, then, is the use 
of proper data. Once observations are adjusted to fit a three-dimensional form 
(i.e., they are classified simultaneously for age, cohort, and period, and 
measured in discrete time units), the identification problem ceases to exist. 
Secondly, Willekens and Baydar treat log-linear APC models as special cases of 
generalized linear models. This is advantageous, as the parameters of log-linear 
APC models can be estimated using computer packages such as GLIM 
(Generalized Linear Interactive Modelling), which was especially developed to fit 
these models.8
8 For a good discussion of the use of generalized linear models in demography, see Little (1978). 
For more information about statistical modelling in GLIM, see Neider and Wedderbum (1972), 
Healy (1988), Aitkin et al. (1989).
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In line with the Willekens-Baydar approach, a model was chosen for this study 
which is given in the formula below. Using a logarithmic transformation, the 
model can be expressed as:
'°9 Rxtk = u + Z  ax A x + S P( Pf +S ck Ck + extk (8.2)
where
is the observed fertility (or abortion) rate for completed age x, time t, and 
cohort k ;
u is a constant (overall effect); 
ax is the age effect (effect of the x-th age category); 
pf is the period effect (effect of the f-th time period); 
c^ is the cohort effect (effect of the /c-th birth cohort);
Ax, Pf, and are dummy variables equal to unity if their subscripts fit the 
respective xf/c-value of the dependent variable, and zero otherwise; 
eXf^ is a random component.
Making statistical assumptions about the random component or the error 
structure is an important part of the process of building an APC model. 
Unfortunately, there is little conceptual agreement on this point in the literature 
on APC models, and the same may be said about model specification and 
estimating procedures in general. The analysis of Czech and Slovak data 
undertaken here assumes a normal distribution of the random variable.9 In 
Willekens and Baydar (1984) there is a thorough discussion of the APC 
methodology from which most of the statistical rationale used was adopted, 
especially as regards the random component of the model, link functions used, 
fitting procedures, and parameter estimation procedures.
8.6 Data
The data necessary for specifying the model applied in this chapter were taken 
from official Czech and Slovak statistical publications. Specifically, they 
comprised statistics on births by completed age of mother for the years 1950-90, 
statistics on induced abortions by completed age of woman for the years 
1960-90, and statistics on population composition, giving the size of the female 
population by age at the beginning of each calendar year from 1950 to 1991.
9 The assumption of normality was tested by examination of residuals from the models. Similar 
tests were applied for Poisson and binomial distributions. On the basis of these tests, the normal 
distribution was chosen as the most appropriate.
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The age-period-cohort models discussed below are based only on data for 
women aged 18 to 35. On average, during the period under consideration, 
women belonging to this age group gave birth to more than 90 per cent of all 
children and had 80 per cent of all induced abortions performed in former 
Czechoslovakia. It is not conceptually difficult to include more data in the 
analysis, but doing so would complicate calculations and bring many additional 
technical problems. Most importantly, if all available age- and period-specific 
data (single-year age groups 15-54, years 1950-90) were to be used, it would 
not be possible to use the GLIM package because the amount of calculation 
required to estimate the models would exceed its computing capacity.
As was discussed above, to avoid the identification problem, doubly classified 
data are required as input in the APC analysis. That is, both fertility and abortion 
rates for each calendar year should be categorized by age of woman in 
completed years (age at last birthday) and also by the birth cohort to which the 
woman belongs (her calendar year of birth). Unfortunately, Czechoslovak 
statistics on fertility and abortion provide data classified only by completed age 
of woman and period of observation, not by the woman's year of birth. 
Therefore, it was necessary to calculate the required rates using estimating 
procedures.
Following a method similar to that described by Willekens and Baydar (1984) 
and applied, for instance, by Buttner and Lutz (1990) and Wils (1990), fertility 
and abortion rates were first estimated specific for age and cohort (F *^  and 
Ax,/c)-10 The computations were based on the simplifying assumption that 
underpins the use of Lexis diagrams: that births and abortions were uniformly 
distributed over the age-period observation interval in which they occurred. From 
the Lexis diagram shown as Figure 8.7, it is easy to see that the number of 
demographic events pertaining, for instance, to women of completed age x who 
were born in year k, i.e. in the parallelogram PQSR, is roughly equal to one-half 
of the events in square OQRP (events occurring to women aged x and recorded 
in calendar year t-1) plus one-half of the events in square QSTR (events 
occurring to women aged x in year t):
PQSR = 1/2QQRP + 1/2QSTR (8.3)
10 For a more detailed definition of age-and-cohort-specific rates of fertility, see Wunsch and 
Termote (1978: 144-147).
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The approximation of the number of births to women of age x and belonging to 
birth cohort k (B ^ ), which is the numerator of an age-and-cohort specific fertility 
rate, is therefore:
^x,k~  V2&x,t-1 + V2&x,t (8 -4)
(with t = k + x), where B i s  the number of births to women in completed age 
x in year t-1, and Bxj  is the number of births to women of completed age x  in
Figure 8.7: Lexis diagram illustrating age, period and cohort 
arrangement of demographic data
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year t. The age-and-cohort-specific fertility rate ( F ^ )  may then be estimated as 
the ratio of the number of births assumed to have occurred during the age- 
cohort observation interval to the time spent in this interval by the population at 
risk:
Fx,/c-Bx,/c/Px,/c (8*5)
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where is the number of person-years lived between exact ages x and x+1 
by female members of birth cohort k. P *^  may be estimated by the number of 
lifelines crossing the segment QR in Figure 8.7, or the number of women of 
completed age xa t the beginning of year t. Naturally, the values of P^ ^may be 
taken from the available data on the population composition at midnight on 31 
December each calendar year. Age-and-cohort-specific abortion rates (Ax )^ can 
be estimated in an analogous way; that is, by applying equations (8.3), (8.4), 
and (8.5) to the data on abortion.
Since each age-and-cohort-specific rate relates to two periods of observation, it 
is possible to use these data to estimate the rates for each triangle of the Lexis 
diagram (i.e. specific for age, period, and cohort), avoiding interaction between 
the three dimensions. To approximate the required rates, one has to accept the 
assumption that the incidence of the demographic phenomenon in question was 
uniformly distributed over the age-cohort observation interval, so that:
According to the logic of equations (8.6) and (8.7), every age-and-cohort-specific 
rate was used twice in an APC model: first, as a proxy of the behaviour of cohort 
/cat completed age xin year t-1 (triangle QRP in Figure 8.7); second, as a proxy 
of the behaviour of the same cohort k at the same age x, but in year t (triangle 
SRQ in Figure 8.7). Of course, this method is not applicable for half the triangles 
making up the initial and the last calendar year for which the analysis was done 
(1950 and 1990 for fertility, 1960 and 1990 for abortion) as there were not 
available data on births in the years 1949 and 1991, and on abortions in the 
years 1959 and 1991. In these cases, the situation was as if the age-period- 
cohort-specific rates for triangles QRP and SRQ in Figure 8.7 were to be 
calculated only from observations made in years t-1 and t, respectively. When 
the equations (8.3), (8.4), and (8.5) were not applicable through the lack of 
appropriate observations, the required rates were estimated using the following 
equations:
Fx,k~ px,t-1,k -  Fx,t,k (8 .6)
Ax,/c~ Ax,M,/c~ Ax,f,/c (8.7)
Fx,t-1,k = 1/2Bx,M  ! 1/2Px,/c 
Fx,t,k = 1/zBx,f / 1/2Px,/c
(8 .8)
(8.9)
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8.7 Fitting the model
The traditional question asked in an APC analysis may be stated as follows 
(Smith, 1986): Is the demographic phenomenon in question best conceptualized 
as having occurred predominantly among certain age groups (an age effect), or 
was its incidence changing in similar proportions for all age groups across time 
(a period effect), or was the incidence of the phenomenon concentrated among 
specific birth cohorts (a cohort effect)? One may well add two other important 
questions (Pullum, 1980): (1) What happens statistically when all three 
dimensions (age, period, and cohort) are applied simultaneously, rather than just 
two of them, to a series of vital rates? (2) When all three dimensions are 
included, is it possible to determine their separate roles?
To answer these questions, various statistical models were estimated using as 
variables to be explained the doubly classified fertility and abortion rates 
calculated for the Czech Republic and Slovakia separately. The explanatory 
variables were age (A), period (P), and cohort (C). All models presented in this 
and the following sections of this chapter were estimated using the GLIM 
computing package. The modelling framework employed was the classical 
regression procedure. In the regression framework, the total variance in the 
dependent variable is viewed as a sum consisting of two components: 
regression variance (explained variance) captured through the independent 
variables in the regression equation; and residual variance, which was not 
explained by the regression model. The appropriate testing criterion is the 
F-statistic. Two quantitative measures are most often used to describe the 
quality of fit of the regression. These are the coefficient of determination (R2), 
which measures the proportion of variance explained; and the adjusted 
coefficient of determination (adj. R2), which, in comparison with a simple R2, 
takes into account the number of variables in the regression equation.11
The simplest regression model of the time series of age-, cohort- and period- 
specific rates is a model which includes only one explanatory variable: the mean 
of the rate. This is known as the null model, since no effects of age, cohort or 
period are included. The null model is usually a poor form of statistical 
description; but even if it is not an adequate representation of the data, it may 
serve as a benchmark for evaluating the relative explanatory contributions of the 
variables age, cohort and period when they are used in subsequent models.
11 For more detailed definitions of R2 and adj. R2 see, for instance, Greene (1991).
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The results of applying different explanatory variables to the Czech and Slovak 
data are given in Tables 8.3 to 8.6. Tables 8.3 and 8.4 present a summary for 
different models, while Tables 8.5 and 8.6 show the successive improvements in 
fit when one, two, or three independent variables are added to the model. The 
most important observation from these tables is that for all four data sets, Czech 
fertility rates, 1950-90, Slovak fertility rates, 1950-90, Czech abortion rates, 
1960-90, and Slovak abortion rates, 1960-90, the full A+P+C models provide 
remarkably good fits. Related observations may be summarized as follows.
(a) The inclusion of the age variable (age-only models, or A-models) reduced 
the unexplained variation in the data radically, although not equally in the four 
separate data sets. For instance, incorporating age into the regression 
equations explains 90 per cent of the variation in Czech fertility rates, but less 
than 50 per cent of the variation in Czech abortion rates. Generally, ignoring the 
age variable in the regression equation means a markedly less satisfactory fit of 
the model. This is not very surprising; the superiority of A-models obviously 
reflects the reality that vital rates vary much more from row to row of the Lexis 
diagram than they do from column to column or from diagonal to diagonal.
(b) It is important to differentiate between the fertility models, where the age 
effect is overwhelming, and the abortion models, where it still dominates, but 
period effects (and, in Slovakia, cohort effects as well) play substantial roles.
(c) When considered independently, cohort and period variables (C-models and 
P-models) seem to have smaller explanatory potential than has the age variable. 
On the other hand, C-models and P-models fit the data significantly better than 
corresponding null models. The only exception is abortion rates for Slovakia, 
where the incorporation of the cohort variable had no statistical significance 
when tested against the null model.
(d) In the case of fertility rates, the inclusion of cohort variables into regression 
models appears more useful than the inclusion of period variables. In both the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, an age-cohort model of fertility is quite adequate 
and preferable to an age-period one, although the differences are relatively 
small. Therefore, cohorts may be seen as being more explanatory for fertility 
behaviour than are periods.
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Table 8.3: Summary of various models of fertility rates > I
Model Residual Regression Statistics of fit
SS D.F. SS D.F. R2 adj.R2 F-stat. P
Null model 606.15 1439
Czech Republic 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
A 58.26 1422 547.90 17 90.4 90.3 786.7 <0.001
C 565.79 1383 40.36 56 6.7 2.9 1.8 <0.001
P 577.41 1399 28.74 40 4.7 2.1 1.7 <0.001
A + C 16.49 1366 589.66 73 97.3 97.1 669.2 <0.001
A + P 29.51 1382 576.64 57 95.1 94.9 473.7 <0.001
C + P 197.03 1343 409.12 96 67.5 65.2 29.0 <0.001
A + P + C 2.54 1326 603.61 113 99.6 99.5 2784.9 <0.001
Null model 434.30 1439
Slovakia
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
A 82.61 1422 351.69 17 81.0 80.8 356.1 <0.001
C 406.46 1383 27.84 56 6.4 2.7 1.7 <0.001
P 387.30 1399 47.00 40 10.8 8.3 4.2 <0.001
A + C 15.37 1366 418.93 73 96.5 96.3 510.1 <0.001
A + P 35.61 1382 398.69 57 91.8 91.5 271.5 <0.001
C + P 215.55 1343 218.75 96 50.4 46.9 14.2 <0.001
A + P + C 3.29 1326 431.01 113 99.2 99.2 1537.2 <0.001
Table 8.4: Summary of various models of abortion rates - I
Model Residual Regression Statistics of fit
SS D.F. SS D.F. R2 adj.R2 F-stat. P
Null model 107.71 1079
Czech Republic 
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
A 55.28 1062 52.44 17 48.7 48.1 59.3 <0.001
C 95.00 1033 12.71 46 11.8 9.0 3.0 <0.001
P 59.39 1049 48.32 30 44.9 43.7 28.5 <0.001
A + C 23.90 1016 83.81 63 77.8 76.8 56.6 <0.001
A + P 6.95 1032 100.76 47 93.5 93.3 318.4 <0.001
C + P 46.55 1003 61.16 76 56.8 54.4 17.3 <0.001
A + P + C 3.40 986 104.31 93 96.8 96.6 325.0 <0.001
Null model 257.28 1079
Slovakia
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
A 69.36 1062 187.92 17 73.0 72.7 169.2 <0.001
C 249.18 1033 8.10 46 3.1 0.02 0.7 n.s.
P 205.50 1049 51.78 30 20.1 18.5 8.8 <0.001
A + C 22.28 1016 235.00 63 91.3 91.0 170.1 <0.001
A + P 17.58 1032 239.70 47 93.2 92.9 299.3 <0.001
C + P 112.07 1003 145.21 76 56.4 54.0 17.1 <0.001
A + P + C 5.65 986 251.63 93 97.8 97.7 472.4 <0.001
Note: n.s. = not significant
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Table 8.5: Summary of various models of fertility rates - II
Model R2 Increase in R2 after adding to the row model:
A C P A + C A + P C + P
A 90.4 n.a.
Czech Republic 
6.9 4.7 n.a. n.a. 9.2
C 6.7 90.6 n.a. 60.8 n.a. 92.9 n.a.
P 4.7 90.4 62.8 n.a. 94.9 n.a. n.a.
A + C 97.3 n.a. n.a. 2.3 n.a. n.a. n.a.
A + P 95.1 n.a. 4.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
C + P 67.5 32.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
A 81.0 n.a.
Slovakia 
15.5 10.8 n.a. n.a. 18.2
C 6.4 90.1 n.a. 44.0 n.a. 92.8 n.a.
P 10.8 81.0 39.6 n.a. 88.4 n.a. n.a.
A + C 96.5 n.a. n.a. 2.7 n.a. n.a. n.a.
A + P 91.8 n.a. 7.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
C + P 50.4 48.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Table 8.6: Summary of various models of abortion rates - II
Model R2 Increase in R2 after adding to the row model:
A C P A + C A + P C + P
A 48.7 n.a.
Czech Republic 
29.1 44.8 n.a. n.a. 48.1
C 11.8 66.0 n.a. 45.0 n.a. 85.0 n.a.
P 44.9 48.6 11.9 n.a. 51.9 n.a. n.a.
A + C 77.8 n.a. n.a. 19.0 n.a. n.a. n.a.
A + P 93.5 n.a. 3.3 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
C + P 56.8 40.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Slovakia
A 73.0 n.a. 18.3 20.2 n.a. n.a. 24.8
C 3.1 88.2 n.a. 53.3 n.a. 94.7 n.a.
P 20.1 73.1 36.3 n.a. 77.7 n.a. n.a.
A + C 91.3 n.a. n.a. 6.5 n.a. n.a. n.a.
A + P 93.2 n.a. 4.6 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
C + P 56.4 41.4 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
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(e) Judging from the contribution of the period variables to the amount of 
variation explained by different regression models, abortion in both the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia seems to be a more period-dependent phenomenon than 
is fertility. In comparison with fertility rates, abortion rates in the two populations 
varied much more along the period dimension than along the cohort dimension. 
This seems to support the hypothesis that people (couples) have fairly fixed 
fertility goals and that period effects are unlikely to stimulate more than just 
compensatory cohort adjustments in childbearing behaviour. On the other hand, 
women do not have 'ideal numbers of abortions' as they are likely to have 'ideal 
numbers of children', and so period effects are more influential for the variation 
in abortion rates.
8.8 Separating APC effects
Earlier in this chapter it was shown how APC models are formulated in terms of 
a set of parameters or effects. When the models are fitted, estimates of these 
effects are calculated. Any regression equation is not only an assistance in 
statistical analysis, but also an expression of how the explanatory variables 
influence the dependent variable. Therefore, the numerical make-up of an APC 
model is another important source of information that may be derived from an 
APC analysis.
Obviously, differences are expected in the ability of each explanatory variable to 
influence the variation in the vital rates under examination. In the context of this 
analysis, the hypotheses proposed for investigating the APC effects may be set 
as follows.
(a) Age effects should be more pronounced on fertility than on abortion as 
people tend to plan to have children at certain ages, but do not 'plan' 
abortions. A woman's probability of having an abortion may be dependent on 
the stage she has reached in the family life cycle (which is not the same as a 
simple age effect), but it seems unlikely that this factor influences abortion 
more than fertility behaviour.
(b) Since the availability of abortion is much more influenced by demographic 
policies and economic conditions than is the possibility of having a child, 
period effects may be expected to be responsible for the variation in abortion 
levels more than in fertility.
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(c) The cohort effects are more difficult to hypothesize. One could perhaps 
anticipate cohort effects being more important for variation in abortion rates, 
as social acceptability of abortion may change more rapidly from cohort to 
cohort than the social status of parenthood. An opposite hypothesis could be 
that cohort effects are more important for fertility behaviour, because the 
reality of couples' fertility goals is likely to promote cohort adjustments to 
ongoing period effects in a way that is less likely with abortion.
8.8.1 Age effects
Figure 8.8 gives the age effects (values ax) estimated by the APC models using 
Czechoslovak fertility and abortion data. To make the results easily 
understandable, in each data series the effect for age 22 was set to 1.0. For 
example, a value of 1.5 for age 27 indicates that, at that age, the phenomenon 
in question was 1.5 times more frequent than at age 22. The age patterns 
shown in Figure 8.8 are averages reflecting the experience of all cohorts and 
periods considered in the models. The graph indicates that the age effects tend 
to have a different structure for fertility than for abortion. The age parameters
Figure 8.8: Estimated effects on fertility and abortion from APC models 
plotted against age (effect for age 22 is set to 1.0)
Czech Republic and Slovakia, 1950-90
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of fertility follow a distribution similar to that which is known to be typical of age- 
specific fertility rates, and there is not much difference between the estimates 
based on Czech and Slovak fertility data. Such a distribution may be considered 
the result of changing socio-economic and physiological dispositions towards 
childbearing as women move through the life cycle. The way in which the age 
variable affects abortion is very different, and hardly attributable to physiology, 
so its interpretation has to be sought rather in the social conditions that surround 
reproductive behaviour. Data plotted in Figure 8.8 also show some marked 
differences between the Czech and Slovak populations as far as abortion is 
concerned. Abortion rates in the Czech Republic seem to be much more equally 
distributed among age groups than in Slovakia.
8.8.2 Cohort effects
In interpreting estimated cohort effects (values c^), one substantial limitation 
must be accepted. Because the fertility rates are available only for the calendar 
years 1950-90 and abortion rates only for the years 1960-90, one is necessarily 
dealing with incomplete reproductive histories for some of the cohorts under 
examination. In the present analysis, a cohort may be observed at most for 18 
years; that is, at all ages between 18 and 35. Yet such 'complete1 sets of fertility 
rates are available only for the 1932-55 birth year cohorts; similarly, 'complete' 
abortion histories are available only for the 1942-55 birth year cohorts. 
Information about fertility rates at young ages is lacking for cohorts born before 
1932 (in the case of abortion, born before 1942), and both fertility and abortion 
rates at older ages are lacking for cohorts born after 1955. There is no way of 
assessing the 'complete' cohort effects for these incompletely observed cohorts. 
What can be estimated using the available data are 'partial' cohort effects which 
represent incomplete fertility or abortion histories of these cohorts. For some 
cohorts, such as those born during 1915-23 or 1963-71, the available data 
contain only very few observations (nine or fewer age-specific fertility rates), so 
very little can be learned about their childbearing experience. These restrictions 
necessarily limit the overall quality of results.
Figure 8.9 displays the values of estimated cohort effects, relative to the effect 
for the 1945 birth year cohort. The data seem to indicate the relatively elevated 
levels of fertility for women born in the 1910s and 1920s, and also comparatively 
high levels of abortion for women born after 1960. Compared to cohorts born
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Figure 8.9: Estimated effects on fertility and abortion from APC models 
plotted against birth cohort (effect for 1945 cohort is set to 1.0)
Czech Republic and Slovakia, 1950-90
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before 1945, more recent cohorts typically have somewhat lower cohort 
parameters of fertility and rather higher cohort parameters of abortion. This 
variation in cohort effects seems to evidence changing attitudes towards 
childbearing and fertility regulation from generation to generation, with apparent 
dissimilarities between Czech and Slovak cohorts in both fertility and abortion. 
However, some of the estimated inter-cohort differences need to be interpreted 
cautiously: as manifestations of the incomplete reproductive histories for certain 
cohorts, rather than as indications of true cohort phenomena. For instance, the 
relatively high levels of effects estimated for the oldest cohorts considered are 
probably related to their high fertility at older reproductive ages in the 1950s.12 
But this might have been partly a compensation for low fertility performance 
during the demographic depression of the 1930s and World War II. 
Unfortunately, fertility levels before 1950 are not captured in the available data, 
and therefore do not influence the values of the pertinent cohort effects
12 Where cohort data are partial, the APC procedure measures a cohort effect relative to the 
equivalent portion of cohort experience in other cohorts represented in the data. Thus, the large 
fertility effects for older cohort mean that those cohorts had high fertility at advanced ages 
compared to younger cohorts.
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estimated by APC models. For reasons discussed in the previous paragraph, 
only the cohort effects representing the 'completely' captured childbearing 
behaviour of the 1932-55 cohorts and 'completely' captured abortion behaviour 
of the 1942-55 cohorts are fully comparable. It is certain that in the presence of 
all relevant data on fertility and abortion, the estimated effects for the 1915-31 
and 1956-71 birth year cohorts would be different, and the inter-cohort 
differences perhaps less pronounced than in Figure 8.9.
8.8.3 Period effects
Finally, Figure 8.10 presents the period effects (values p^ ) on fertility and 
abortion, expressed in relation to the effect estimated for the year 1970. The 
plotted data are averages for all ages and cohorts. As the graph shows, the 
effects varied markedly over time, and may be largely interpreted as behavioural 
responses to population policies. The period parameters of fertility increase up 
to the introduction of the abortion law in 1957. Period 1957-74 is then 
characterized by several rises and falls, which coincide roughly with major policy 
interventions. Thus, the decline of period effects after 1957 seems to be related 
to the introduction of the first abortion law; the rise during 1962-64 may be 
interpreted as the immediate (but not very lasting) consequence of the restrictive 
abortion regulations implemented in 1962; and the sharp increase of these 
effects during the period 1968-74 appears to be the result of the pronatalist 
policies, in those years newly administered by the government. After 1974, the 
period parameters of fertility decrease without interruption in both parts of the 
former Czechoslovak federation, though relatively faster in the Czech Republic. 
This seems to denote a gradual withering away of the demographic significance 
of the once effective pronatalist incentives. Apparently, beginning with the late 
1970s, the effects of these measures were suppressed by opposing forces and, 
consequently, they ceased to be perceived by the population as fertility- 
stimulating incentives.
In this context, it is also interesting to note that the fertility behaviour of Czech 
women over calendar time exhibits a much higher degree of sensitivity to policy 
changes than does that of the Slovak population. An explanation for this 
phenomenon could perhaps be sought in the overall fertility trends that 
distinguished the two populations from each other over the four decades under 
consideration. As Fialova et al. (1990) and Monnier and Rychtarikova (1991) 
have pointed out, the demographic transition proceeded differently in the Czech
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Figure 8.10: Estimated effects on fertility and abortion from APC models 
plotted against period (effect for year 1970 is set to 1.0)
Czech Republic and Slovakia, 1950-90
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Republic from its course in Slovakia. In the Czech Republic, period fertility rates 
already had dropped to a relatively low level in the late 1950s. What followed 
during the 1960s and 1970s was in essence a series of temporary booms and 
busts, explainable largely as compensatory behavioural responses of basically 
low-fertility cohorts to changing economic and political conditions. On the other 
hand, demographic developments in Slovakia during the period 1950-90 were 
by and large characterized by a massive decline in fertility levels. This process 
evolved from much higher post-World War II fertility levels, and reflected 
Slovakia's gradual industrialization, urbanization, and general modernization of 
the underlying socio-economic structures. Given that overall trend, the 
procreative behaviour of Slovak women was to a much lesser extent affected by 
changes in demographic policies.
Compared to the trends in period effects on fertility, changes in period effects on 
abortion closely resemble a mirror image. Marked declines in the period 
parameters of abortion in the years 1961-64 were replaced by steep increases 
in the late 1960s. These were interrupted in 1968, apparently by the introduction
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of the pronatalist policies. What followed were declines in period parameters of 
abortion that lasted in Slovakia until 1986. In the Czech Republic, however, the 
lessening of period effects of abortion had reversed to become an increasing 
trend by 1975. After the introduction of the second abortion law in 1986 the 
period parameters of abortion changed markedly in both republics, in an upward 
direction.
8.9 Estimating demographic responses to abortion policies implemented 
in 1957 and 1986
The fact that series of fertility and abortion rates may be, with acceptable 
statistical accuracy, approximated by a regression equation from an APC model 
has a number of interesting implications. One of them is that the APC model 
may be used as a standard of comparison to assess the net effects attributable 
to different period influences.13 This possibility is based on the assumption that 
the course of fertility in the hypothetical absence of a particular period-specific 
circumstance may be adequately described by the age and cohort effects 
estimated by an APC model. The hypothetical levels of fertility can be calculated 
in terms of total fertility rates, using an APC model that allows for age and cohort 
effects, and in some way controls for period effects. The difference between 
such a hypothetical level of fertility and the level estimated by the full APC model 
serves as an estimate of the effect of changing period-specific conditions, such 
as demographic policies.14
Of course, public policies are not the only period phenomena of relevance. 
Period effects estimated by an APC model may also be the result of economic 
trends, changes in the availability of contraceptives, shifts in lifestyles, or 
processes of socio-demographic modernization in general. However, in 
situations where a non-trivial change in estimated period effects corresponds in 
time, and seems logically related to, the introduction of a particular policy 
measure, it is possible to adopt the simplifying, but not unreasonable, 
assumption that it is primarily the outcome of that policy intervention.
The demographic history of the Czech and Slovak populations offers a number 
of opportunities to use the APC framework for estimating the impact of 
population policies on fertility trends. Two policy interventions seem to be of
13 That there are numerous analogies between standardization and techniques of linear modelling 
has been shown, for instance, by Pullum (1978) and Lane and Neider (1982).
14 For an application of this methodology to East German fertility data, see Buttner and Lutz 
(1990).
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particular importance. The first was the abortion law promulgated in December 
1957, that made abortion available on social grounds, but at the same time 
instituted abortion committees which had the right to reject a woman's request 
for abortion if it did not fit legal directives. The second policy change was the 
abortion law issued in November 1986, making abortion available on request 
from 1 January 1987. Each of these measures represented in its time a 
considerable change in the legal system and had broader social significance; 
and each of them may have induced substantial changes in the patterns of 
reproductive behaviour.
In all societies, legalization of abortion produces changes in the numbers of 
pregnancies that are recorded, and in the proportion terminated by abortion and 
by live birth. Other things being equal, one would expect a decline in the level of 
fertility, because at least some women who would have been deterred from 
seeking abortions (illegal or legal) would want to terminate their pregnancies by 
abortion if it were more easily available. The decline in births depends on the 
number of unintended pregnancies that occurred before legalization and the 
extent to which abortion remains unacceptable to some people even after it has 
become more readily obtainable. To the extent that unintended pregnancies are 
terminated by legal abortions, the frequency of recorded abortions is likely to 
increase subsequent to legalization. Because a higher incidence of abortion 
enables more women to return to the fecundable state sooner than if they had 
carried their pregnancies to term, more than one abortion is required to replace 
one birth (Potter, 1972). Thus, the total number of pregnancies may be expected 
to rise. Some of these pregnancies may be perceived as unwanted, and steps 
may follow to terminate them by means of legal interruption, further increasing 
the level of recorded abortion. The question is whether or not the legalization of 
abortion is likely to result in a relaxation of contraceptive practices or a 
deterioration of contraceptive effectiveness. If this were the case, the 
replacement of contraception by abortion would increase the number of 
abortions, but it would not affect the level of fertility. Of course, in the real world 
'other things' are never equal, and these seemingly simple transfers in the 
amount and structure of reproduction may be complicated by other influences, 
such as cohort processes.
Table 8.7 presents some data and calculations related to the 1957 policy 
change. Column 1 displays the observed total fertility rates for the age group 
under consideration (women aged 18-35 years of age) in the years 1955-62.
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Column 2 presents a simple comparison of these TFRs, taking the value 
observed in 1957 as a base. Judging from these indicators, it would be possible 
to conclude that the level of fertility of women aged 18-35 decreased over the 
five years after the implementation of the new abortion policy by about 12 per 
cent in the Czech Republic and by almost 16 per cent in Slovakia. Columns 3 
and 4 contain TFRs estimated by the APC models. Column 3 gives the TFRs 
calculated from the full APC model, using previously estimated values of ax, c^, 
and pf for each particular age, cohort and period. Column 4 presents 
hypothetical TFRs, constructed from pertinent values of ax and c^, but a 
constant pf, which is equivalent to the period effect estimated by the APC model 
for the year 1957. In fact, the figures in column 4 outline a hypothetical trajectory 
of fertility rates calculated by the APC model for the years 1958-62 without 
taking into account the change in period parameters after 1957. The last column 
of the table estimates the net changes in fertility levels that occurred in the post­
policy years 1958-62.
Table 8.7: Observed total fertility rates for age group 18-35, corresponding 
estimated TFRs derived from APC model, and estimated policy effects,
1955-62
Observed Difference Estimated TFR: Estimated
TFR for in TFR A+P+C model, policy effect:
women relative full period effect diff. between
aged to 1957 A+P+C constant at cols. (3) and (4)
18-35 level model 1957 level as percent.
(1) (2) (3) (4) of col.(3)
Czech Republic
1955 2.324 +2.6% n.a. n.a. n.a.
1956 2.320 +2.4% n.a. n.a. n.a.
1957 2.264 0% 2.257 2.257 0%
1958 2.126 -6.5% 2.125 2.229 -4.9%
1959 1.984 -14.1% 2.001 2.217 -10.8%
1960 1.985 -14.1% 1.980 2.219 -12.1%
1961 2.005 -12.9% 2.014 2.230 -10.7%
1962 2.022 -12.0% 2.092 2.245 -7.3%
Slovakia
1955 2.997 +1.1% n.a. n.a. n.a.
1956 3.018 +1.8% n.a. n.a. n.a.
1957 2.964 0% 2.962 2.962 0%
1958 2.863 -3.6% 2.861 2.905 -1.5%
1959 2.734 -8.4% 2.766 2.864 -3.5%
1960 2.752 -7.7% 2.704 2.837 -4.9%
1961 2.664 -11.3% 2.646 2.821 -6.6%
1962 2.563 -15.7% 2.625 2.812 -7.1%
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In the reconstructed values of the TFR given in Table 8.7, the net impact of the 
post-1957 period effects on fertility is still apparent. Yet in comparison with the 
development of observed period fertility rates, the calculations of the net effects 
of the newly emerging period influences look less dramatic, and also differently 
distributed over time. After adjustment for the age and cohort dimensions of 
fertility, the decline in the TFR between 1957 and 1962 that can be ascribed to 
period influences may be estimated at about 7 per cent, for both the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia. The somewhat bigger shrinkage of the actual TFRs 
during this period appears to be the result of differences in childbearing 
behaviour between cohorts. As younger generations with lower levels of fertility 
were gradually replacing older cohorts with higher levels of fertility, the total level 
of fertility was decreasing. It seems safe to say that the TFR would probably 
have declined considerably even in a hypothetical case of constant period 
effects.
Table 8.8 shows the results of an analogous analysis of real and fictitious trends 
in fertility made for the period 1984-90. Again, the change in observed period 
fertility rates can be compared with a series of hypothetical measures, which
Table 8.8: Observed total fertility rates for age group 18-35, corresponding 
estimated TFRs derived from APC model, and estimated policy effects,
1984-90
Year Observed Difference Estimated TFR: Estimated
TFR for in TFR A+P+C model, policy effect:
women relative full period effect diff. between
aged to 1985 A+P+C constant at cols.(3) and (4)
18-35 level model 1985 level as percent.
(1) (2) (3) (4) of col.(3)
Czech Republic
1984 1.880 +0.3% n.a. n.a. n.a.
1985 1.875 0% 1.870 1.870 0%
1986 1.854 -1.1% 1.856 1.859 -0.2%
1987 1.830 -2.5% 1.847 1.848 -0.1%
1988 1.861 -0.8% 1.842 1.835 +0.4%
1989 1.798 -4.3% 1.822 1.819 +0.2%
1990 1.816 -3.3% 1.809 1.810 -0.1%
Slovakia
1984 2.131 +0.1% n.a. n.a. n.a.
1985 2.128 0% 2.116 2.116 0%
1986 2.082 -2.2% 2.078 2.083 -0.2%
1987 2.031 -4.8% 2.044 2.054 -0.5%
1988 2.037 -4.5% 2.022 2.027 -0.2%
1989 1.973 -7.9% 1.996 2.001 -0.3%
1990 1.979 -7.5% 1.983 1.989 -0.3%
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simulate the absence of the actual period parameters in APC models. According 
to the calculations presented here, the fertility-suppressing impact of the post- 
1986 changes in period effects was very low. In fact, the estimated net policy 
effects are close to zero in both populations and in all five calendar years for 
which the calculations were made. It seems that the actual decline in period 
fertility rates that occurred between 1986 and 1990 cannot be attributed to the 
newly emerging period influences, but rather to continuing changes in cohort 
fertility. Had there been no change in abortion regulations, actual fertility levels 
would probably have decreased anyhow, owing to lower levels of fertility in 
younger generations. This finding fits well with the impression given by Figure 
8 . 1.
Finally, Table 8.9 gives the TARs and corresponding hypothetical estimates of 
abortion trends for the period 1984-90. Observed values of TARs attest a sharp 
increase of almost 30 per cent in the period abortion rate following 1986, the 
year when a more liberal abortion policy was introduced. At first glance, this
Table 8.9: Observed total abortion rates for age group 18-35, 
corresponding estimated TARs derived from APC model, and estimated
policy effects, 1984-90
Observed Difference Estimated TAR: Estimated
TA R  for in TAR A +P+C  model, policy effect:
women relative full period effect diff. between
aged to 1985 A +P+C constant at cols.(3) and (4)
18-35 level model 1985 level as percent.
(1) (2) (3) (4) of col.(3)
1984 0 .862
Czech Republic 
-5 .6%  n.a. n.a. n.a.
1985 0 .910 0% 0.902 0 .902 0%
1986 0.923 +1.4% 0.996 0 .969 +2.7%
1987 1.237 +26.4% 1.170 1.044 +10.8%
1988 1.293 +29.6% 1.277 1.125 +11.9%
1989 1.275 +28.6% 1.283 1.211 +5 .6%
1990 1.273 +28.5% 1.278 1.255 +1 .8%
1984 0.687 -6 .1%
Slovakia
n.a. n.a. n.a.
1985 0.729 0% 0.735 0 .735 0%
1986 0.816 +10.7% 0.841 0 .782 +7.0%
1987 1.026 +28.9% 0.982 0 .838 +14.7%
1988 1.057 +31.0% 1.040 0 .906 +12.9%
1989 1.012 +28.0% 1.025 0 .984 +4 .0%
1990 1.010 +27.8% 1.013 1.027 -1 .4%
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abrupt rise seems fully ascribable to the relaxation in abortion regulations. 
However, a hypothetical reconstruction of TARs, based on the assumption of 
period effects remaining at their 1985 level, suggests that the change in abortion 
behaviour was probably only partly a result of changing period effects. Even in 
the absence of any alteration in period-specific conditions, the levels of abortion 
were likely to have risen markedly, as indicated by hypothetical values of the 
TAR of 1.3 in the Czech Republic and 1.0 in Slovakia for the year 1990. Such a 
trend was probable, for the cohorts newly entering the childbearing ages were 
typified by higher cohort-specific characteristics of abortion (or, using the 
terminology of APC models, by higher values of c^). According to the 
calculations in Table 8.9, the net impact of the post-1985 period effects on the 
incidence of abortion culminated in 1987 and 1988, when these influences seem 
to have precipitated an increase in the TAR of 12-15 per cent from its 1985 
level, with some differences between the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
Estimates in Table 8.9 also suggest that the increase in abortion rates that 
occurred with the change in period conditions during 1985-90 had a different 
tempo in the two parts of the former federation. In the Czech Republic, the 
policy effect estimated for 1986 is relatively slight, and the major change in the 
incidence of abortion appears to have happened in 1987. In Slovakia, on the 
other hand, the net policy effect estimated for 1986 is already notable, implying 
that the period influences operated here in a rather different fashion from those 
in the Czech Republic. With the data at hand, it is impossible to say categorically 
what the causes of these differences between the two republics might have 
been. However, it may be important to note that the new legislation was already 
being discussed in the media throughout 1986, and was approved by the 
parliament in November that year (Harant, 1986). Perhaps individuals, families, 
abortion committees, and medical practitioners started to behave differently well 
before the new law became officially effective. This may have already resulted 
during 1986 in a more liberal approach to abortion seekers, and at the same 
time may have provoked a certain relaxation of contraceptive practices. Why 
such demographic anticipation of the forthcoming change in abortion policy was 
substantially more widespread in the Slovak than in the Czech population is a 
question that cannot be answered by relying solely on an APC analysis of the 
data. Intuitively, one would expect the differential to be in the opposite direction: 
an anticipatory increase in the Czech Republic, and a delayed, post­
liberalization increase in Slovakia. Part of the explanation why this was not the
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case may lie in the nature of the 1986 policy change: the removal of 
bureaucratic controls had more effect in the more conservative, predominantly 
Catholic Slovak society, because it permitted more private access to abortion 
and reduced fears of unwanted publicity. In the more secularized Czech 
Republic, abortion was commonly already regarded as a private matter well 
before 1986.
8.10 Analysing components of difference
Calculations presented in the previous section may be seen as a special case of 
the 'components of difference' method of analysing differences between 
demographic rates. This technique was introduced into demographic analysis by 
Kitagawa (1955), and subsequently used in a number of contexts and 
developed in a number of modifications.15 The 'components of difference' 
approach was elaborated primarily as an extension of the technique of direct 
standardization. Standardization and decomposition are in fact two alternate 
approaches to the same problem: eliminating the influence of a compositional 
variable that might be distorting a comparison, thus rendering demographic 
conclusions more meaningful. Decomposition, in addition, makes it possible to 
break down the difference between two summary measures into components, 
one of which indicates the nature and extent of the difference in the underlying 
level of the phenomenon of interest.
In the context of this analysis, the same principles as underlie Kitagawa's 
decomposition procedure can be applied to subdivide the contributions of period 
and cohort variables to differences between total rates estimated by different 
APC models. Such an exercise can be useful especially when an APC model of 
one set of vital rates is used as a means to simulate alternative scenarios of 
period and cohort effects. In this case, there are three meaningful scenarios that 
are worth elaborating in the APC framework: (1) a scenario that takes into 
account all the true (previously estimated) effects of age, period, and cohort; (2) 
a scenario that accounts for the true effects of age and cohort, but introduces 
specific assumptions about the period effects; and (3) a scenario that considers 
true age effects, makes assumptions as in (2) about the period effects, and 
adopts certain additional assumptions about cohort effects.
15 For examples, see Coale (1969), Das Gupta (1978), Roy and Nair (1983), Kim and Storbino 
(1984), Gray (1991).
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The first scenario corresponds to a full APC model, the second to an APC model 
that controls for p^ , and the third scenario to an APC model that controls for both 
p^and c/f Application of these three alternative scenarios to one APC model of 
vital rates for which relevant ax, pf, and c^are already known is likely to produce 
three different outcomes. It is obvious that simple differences between these 
outcomes can be used to measure the change in vital rates that would result if, 
in a hypothetical case, the underlying assumptions about pf and c^were actually 
fulfilled. In addition, this approach makes it possible to disentangle the 
influences of cohort and period factors and to identify the change in the total 
rate due to each of these factors separately. Three types of differences can be 
considered: the difference between the results ensuing from scenarios (1) and 
(3), which shows the effect of making certain assumptions about pf and about c^ 
simultaneously; the difference between the results of (1) and (2), which shows 
the effect of making assumptions about p^ ; and the difference between the 
results of (2) and (3), which shows the effect of making assumptions about c^
Table 8.10 displays the results of a decomposition analysis made for the Czech 
and Slovak fertility data for the years 1957-62. The first three columns are the 
fertility estimates calculated by applying scenarios (1), (2), and (3) to previously 
estimated APC models. Column (1) gives TFRs estimated by the full APC 
model, column (2) presents TFRs modelled as if period effects were constant at 
the 1957 level, and column (3) contains TFRs estimated under the assumption 
of both period and cohort effects constant at their 1957 levels. In other words, 
the second column is an APC-based estimate of how fertility rates would have 
progressed from 1958 to 1962 had the period effects in the model remained as 
in 1957; while the third column outlines a hypothetical course of fertility had 
there been after 1957 no change in period effects and no change in the 
composition of childbearing cohorts. The meaning and purpose of the fertility 
estimates which fit scenarios (1) and (2) have already been discussed in the 
previous section. When scenario (3) is adopted, the APC model anticipates a 
constant TFR for all calendar years under consideration. This is because this
APC model is based on a fixed set of age effects {a18, a ig, , a35), one
constant period effect equal to p 7957, and a fixed set of cohort effects 
representing the cohorts which in 1957 occupied particular childbearing ages.
Figures presented in Table 8.10 make it possible to see how periods and 
cohorts, when they are considered separately, affected the evolution of total 
fertility rates in the years 1957-62. Even the briefest inspection of these results
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Table 8.10: Total fertility rates for age group 18-35 derived from APC model 
under different assumptions, and components of difference between
estimated TFRs, 1957-62
Year Estimated TFR
A+P+C
Components 
of difference
Com ponents of diff. 
relative to full model (%)
full
A+P+C
model
(1)
A+P+C 
model, 
period 
effect 
at 1957 
level 
(2)
model, pe­
riod effect 
at 1957 le­
vel, cohort 
effects at 
levels as 
in 1957 
(3)
period
&
cohort
effects
(1W 3)
period
effect
(1W2)
cohort
effect
(2)-(3)
period
&
cohort
effects
(1)-(3)
* (1 )
period
effect
(1)-(2)
* 0 )
cohort
effect
(2)-(3)
*(1 )
1957 2.257 2.257
i
2.257
Czech Republic 
0 0 0 0 0 0
1958 2.125 2.229 2.257 -0.132 -0.104 -0.028 -6.2 -4.9 -1.3
1959 2.001 2.217 2.257 -0.256 -0.216 -0.040 -12.8 -10.8 -2.0
1960 1.980 2.219 2.257 -0.277 -0.239 -0.037 -14.0 -12.1 -1.9
1961 2.014 2.230 2.257 -0.243 -0.216 -0.027 -12.0 -10.7 -1.3
1962 2.092 2.245 2.257 -0.165 -0.153 -0.012 -7.9 -7.3 -0.6
1957 2.962 2.962 2.962
Slovakia
0 0 0 0 0 0
1958 2.861 2.905 2.962 -0.101 -0.044 -0.057 -3.5 -1.5 -2.0
1959 2.766 2.864 2.962 -0.196 -0.098 -0.098 -7.0 -3.5 -3.5
1960 2.704 2.837 2.962 -0.258 -0.133 -0.125 -9.5 -4.9 -4.6
1961 2.646 2.821 2.962 -0.316 -0.175 -0.141 -11.9 -6.6 -5.3
1962 2.625 2.812 2.962 -0.337 -0.187 -0.150 -12.8 -7.1 -5.7
shows that period effects account for a substantial proportion of the difference 
between estimated TFRs. In the Czech Republic, the drop in fertility attributed 
by the model to changing period influences between 1958 and 1962 is 
conspicuously greater than that attributed to changing cohort composition. In 
other words, fertility levels of the Czech population seem to have been 
influenced mainly by period effects. In Slovakia, decomposition of the estimates 
for 1958 and 1959 indicates that the decrease in fertility was due approximately 
equally to changes in both period and cohort factors; but beginning with 1960, 
period effects started to prevail in Slovakia as well. Thus, the calculations in 
principle appear to support the hypothesis that period-specific influences, rather 
than continuing changes in cohort composition, governed declines in the levels 
of Czech and Slovak fertility between 1957 and 1962.
Tables 8.11 and 8.12 present in the same format the estimates of fertility and 
abortion trends during the period 1985-90. Expressed this way, it can be seen
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Table 8.11: Total fertility rates for age group 18-35 derived from APC model 
under different assumptions, and components of difference between
estimated TFRs, 1985-90
Year Estimated TFR___________  Components Components of diff.
A+P+C of difference__________ relative to full model (%)
model, pe- 
A+P+C riod effect
model, at 1985 16- 
period vel, cohort 
full effect effects at
A+P+C at 1985 levels as
period
period &
& cohort period cohort
cohort period cohort effects effect effect
model level in 1985 effects effect effect (1 )-(3) (1)-(2) (2)-(3)
(1) (2) (3) (1W3) 0W2) (2W3) * 0 ) *0 ) *(1)
1985 1.870 1.870
i
1.870
Czech Republic 
0 0 0 0 0 0
1986 1.856 1.859 1.870 -0.014 -0.003 -0.011 -0.8 -0.2 -0.6
1987 1.847 1.848 1.870 -0.023 -0.001 -0.022 -1.3 -0.1 -1.2
1988 1.842 1.835 1.870 -0.028 -0.007 -0.035 -1.5 +0.4 -1.9
1989 1.822 1.819 1.870 -0.048 -0.003 -0.051 -2.6 +0.2 -2.8
1990 1.809 1.810 1.870 -0.061 -0.001 -0.060 -3.4 -0.1 -3.3
1985 2.116 2.116 2.116
Slovakia
0 0 0 0 0 0
1986 2.078 2.083 2.116 -0.038 -0.005 -0.033 -1.8 -0.2 -1.6
1987 2.044 2.054 2.116 -0.072 -0.010 -0.062 -3.5 -0.5 -3.0
1988 2.022 2.027 2.116 -0.094 -0.005 -0.089 -4.6 -0.2 -4.4
1989 1.996 2.001 2.116 -0.120 -0.005 -0.115 -6.1 -0.3 -5.8
1990 1.983 1.989 2.116 -0.133 -0.006 -0.127 -6.7 -0.3 -6.4
that the shifts in both fertility and abortion levels which occurred in the late 
1980s were much more a result of changing cohort compositions of childbearing 
populations than a response to period-specific factors. This observation applies 
not only to fertility rates, where all the relevant effects attributed by the APC 
model to periods are very close to zero, but largely also to abortion rates. 
Although the change in abortion levels attributable to period effects emerging 
between 1987 and 1990 is certainly not negligible, it appears to be generally 
less important than the contribution which the decomposition analysis assigns to 
cohort effects. The only exception to this rule is the results for Slovak TARs in 
1986 and 1987, as they allocate a higher fraction of the observed change in 
abortion to period effects. It needs to be stressed, however, that the prominence 
of cohort effects suggested by the APC procedure may partly be a result of the 
already discussed limitations of the underlying data. In fact, the elevated 
abortion effects for cohorts born after 1960 indicate that these cohorts recorded 
much higher abortion rates at younger reproductive ages than older cohorts
334
Table 8.12: Total abortion rates for age group 18-35 derived from APC 
model under different assumptions, and components of difference 
between estimated TARs, 1985-90
Year Estimated TAR___________  Components Components of diff.
A+P+C of difference__________ relative to full model (%)
full
A+P+C
A+P+C 
model, 
period 
effect 
at 1985
model, pe­
riod effect 
at 1985 le­
vel, cohort 
effects at 
levels as
period
&
cohort period cohort
period
&
cohort
effects
period
effect
cohort
effect
model level in 1985 effects effect effect (1)-(3) (1)-(2) (2)-(3)
(1) (2) (3) (1W3) (1M2) (2)-(3) -HD -HD -HD
1985 0.902 0.902
i
0.902
Czech Republic 
0 0 0 0 0 0
1986 0.996 0.969 0.902 0.094 0.027 0.067 +9.4 +2.7 +6.7
1987 1.170 1.044 0.902 0.268 0.126 0.142 +22.9 +10.8 +12.1
1988 1.277 1.125 0.902 0.375 0.152 0.223 +29.4 +11.9 +17.5
1989 1.283 1.211 0.902 0.381 0.072 0.309 +29.7 +5.6 +24.1
1990 1.278 1.255 0.902 0.376 0.023 0.353 +29.4 +1.8 +27.6
1985 0.735 0.735 0.735
Slovakia
0 0 0 0 0 0
1986 0.841 0.782 0.735 0.106 0.059 0.047 +12.6 +7.0 +5.6
1987 0.982 0.838 0.735 0.247 0.144 0.103 +25.2 +14.7 +10.5
1988 1.040 0.906 0.735 0.305 0.134 0.171 +29.3 +12.9 +16.4
1989 1.025 0.984 0.735 0.290 0.041 0.249 +28.3 +4.0 +24.3
1990 1.013 1.027 0.735 0.278 -0.014 0.292 +27.4 -1.4 +28.8
(see Figure 8.9). 'Partiality' of some cohort effects due to cohorts being 
observed for only fractions of their reproductive lives is one of the obvious 
problems of the APC approach. Given the nature of the available data, it is 
impossible to assess what influence this circumstance may have on the 
magnitude of estimated period and cohort effects. However, it is conceivable 
that the relative significance of cohort effects during 1985-90 would decline if the 
fuller experiences of younger cohorts were taken into account.
Decomposition analysis is helpful in understanding the sources of difference in 
fertility and abortion levels estimated by various APC models of Czech and 
Slovak data. Together with the calculations presented in Section 8.9, it 
illustrates the need to control for the influences of changing cohort participation 
in the analysis of demographic change. The results are interesting in that lack of 
awareness of cohort factors can distort one's interpretation of observed trends in 
vital rates. More specifically, the analysis shows that overlooking the cohort
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dimensions of fertility and abortion may lead to erroneously exaggerated 
conclusions about the demographic effects of period-specific influences.
8.11 Conclusion
In this chapter the age-period-cohort framework was applied to analyse trends in 
Czech and Slovak fertility and abortion rates. The substantive conclusions may 
be summarized as follows:
(a) each of the variables A, P, and C exerts effects on reproductive behaviour;
(b) the decrease in fertility levels after 1958 may principally be viewed as a 
response to the liberal abortion law of 1957;
(c) the change in abortion policy in 1986 appears to have had little to do with 
changes in fertility levels during 1987-90, as these were mainly the result of 
cohort phenomena;
(d) the increase in abortion rates during 1987-90 may also be linked largely to 
cohort effects, although policy effects apparently played a substantial role in 
producing the time trends observed;
(e) there are differences between the trends observed in the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia, and their causes can be related to the dissimilar timing of 
fertility transition in the two populations.
The methods used to arrive at these conclusions disentangled the influence of 
general age effects, cohort effects, and period effects, implying that the 
inferences drawn from them are in certain respects more rigorous than 
corresponding inferences made from ordinary period- and age-specific profiles 
of fertility and abortion rates. At the very least, these results can be used to 
justify the use of the age-period-cohort perspective in an analysis of 
demographic change. A narrow view geared towards explaining trends solely in 
terms of changing population policies is impossible to justify if cohort factors are 
to be considered.
However, a few cautionary notes are essential here concerning use of the APC 
framework. In a study that attempts to extract age, period, and cohort effects 
from continuous time-series of data and to measure the effect of population 
policies on demographic behaviour, choice of method becomes a major issue. 
There is no theoretically correct analytical technique, application of which would 
be straightforward and not require justification. The APC framework selected for 
this analysis is just one of many analytical approaches that can be used as an
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appropriate step towards a deeper understanding of the mechanisms which 
have generated the vital rates under examination. The conventional linear, 
constant-effects APC model can be criticized chiefly because it does not 
incorporate potentially meaningful interactions between independent variables 
(e.g., age-period or cohort-period interactions); and because there is a linear 
dependency between the age, period, and cohort variables. Furthermore, the 
APC model is necessarily of limited value to an explanatory analysis that is 
intended to explore causal relationships behind demographic processes. This is 
because 'age, period, and cohort are solely possible indicators of underlying 
latent causes and have no impact per se' (Wunsch, 1993: 56). Period and 
cohort simply denote time reference, not demographic phenomena. Thus, even 
if a component can be shown to have a statistical influence on the dependent 
variable, little can be concluded, on that basis, about causal relationships. 
Consequently, the sources of variation in vital rates cannot be determined with 
certainty merely by studying their age, cohort, and period dimensions. 
Nevertheless, it seems safe to say that the APC analysis is at least capable of 
providing a sounder basis for careful speculation as to underlying causes.
Throughout, the age-period-cohort approach as discussed by Willekens and 
Baydar (1984) has been relied on. The elegant form of their technique provides 
a broadly applicable way of modelling in the APC framework, and one which is 
theoretically valid for quite a general case. It may be argued that any 
appropriately cross-tabulated set of data where a disaggregation of age, period, 
and cohort effects makes sense is a potential candidate for this procedure. 
Moreover, application of this technique to a series of primarily age-period- 
specific rates is a way of using all the information available at the macro-level, in 
a manner which does not waste data. However, the method does not give 
something for nothing. The crucial problem with it is how it deals with the 
identification restriction in estimating the parameters of interest. Willekens and 
Baydar suggest that the identification problem may be removed by adapting the 
data to an appropriate form; that is, making them simultaneously specific for 
age, period, and cohort. But many analysts would object that this does not solve 
the problem, as it is not completely clear to what extent such an adjustment 
affects the results of the APC-GLIM model, and whether effects subsequently 
attributed to age, period or cohort can really be so identified. Which of these 
antagonistic views is more helpful to demographic research is largely a matter of 
opinion and taste, as there is no indisputable criterion for choice. Unfortunately,
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no major theoretical insights or empirical solutions seem to be surfacing in the 
substantive literature, despite the continued interest in APC analysis.
It is important to emphasize that the approach taken to analysing the series of 
Czech and Slovak fertility and abortion data from an age-period-cohort 
perspective is primarily descriptive, rather than explanatory. The notion that the 
age-period-cohort framework can best be thought of as a descriptive accounting 
scheme, a scheme that can be used when alternatives are unavailable or less 
appealing, has been quite effectively argued by Clogg (1982) in his study of 
women's labour force participation. Clogg's argument seems to be valid in the 
present case as well, and it probably holds true in general. After all, 'one 
chooses to work within the age-cohort-period framework precisely because one 
lacks sufficient knowledge of the relevant explanatory variables which might 
substitute for the age, period, and cohort proxies' (Wilmoth, 1989: 18). If the real 
explanatory variables could be measured, there would be no reason to take age, 
period, or cohort into account.
If all of the above-mentioned considerations are put together, one simply has to 
interpret the calculations presented in this chapter as an elaborate description, 
which suggests that the 1957 abortion law had a substantial fertility-suppressing 
effect, whereas the 1986 policy did not. This conclusion is based on the not 
implausible assumption that the period effects, as estimated, are good 
measures of the demographic impact of the two policy interventions under 
examination. In the case of other demographic policies that were introduced in 
former Czechoslovakia, especially when the implementation of the policy was 
gradual and cannot be so easily located in time, application of the APC 
methodology would probably lead to much less sound results.
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Chapter 9: RETHINKING EASTERN EUROPE'S ABORTION EXPERIENCE
9.1 Summary of previous chapters
Issues that must be confronted in any systematic attempt to give an account of 
demographic aspects of abortion in Eastern Europe were discussed in Chapter
1. It identified the geographic area in question, defined basic demographic terms 
and concepts related to abortion, reviewed the history of abortion from antiquity 
to modern times, and outlined the topics and problems to be addressed in 
subsequent chapters.
The development of Eastern European abortion policies was traced in Chapter
2. This process should be regarded as a chain of related events which started 
with the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 and was closely related to later political 
developments in the region: the harsh rule of the Stalinist period, the thaw of the 
Khrushchev years, and the growing diversity of country-specific policies 
throughout the Soviet bloc during the period 1960-90.
An overview of fertility change in Eastern European countries between 1950 and 
1990 was presented Chapter 3. A declining trend prevailed, but the differences 
among individual countries were substantial: some populations experienced 
uninterrupted decreases, others had long periods of relatively stable levels of 
fertility, and in still others the secular trend was even reversed and fertility 
increased over certain periods. In general, fertility trends in the region differed 
substantially from those recorded in the Western part of the developed world.
The main determinants of reproductive behaviour in Eastern European 
populations were discussed in Chapter 4. Plausible reasons for the peculiarity of 
post-war demographic change in the region were found in the political and 
economic climate of the 1945-89 period. The major factors were: the rapid 
transition to centrally planned economies; the establishment of oppressive 
political systems; welfare policies with redistributive as well as demographic 
aims; high levels of female participation in the labour force; and chronic 
economic hardship resulting in low standards of living, general acceptance of 
the 'double burden' on women, and the circumstance of only limited access to 
modern means of contraception.
The demographic significance of abortion in Eastern Europe was the subject of 
Chapter 5. Abortion levels were high throughout the region, although they varied
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markedly in response to changes in demographic policies. Overall, however, 
abortion appears to have played a very important fertility-regulating role.
Finally, Chapters 6 to 8 examined the main demographic aspects of the abortion 
experience of the Czech and Slovak populations. Users of abortion were 
predominantly married women with children; abortion was used as a birth­
spacing strategy by some, but the majority apparently resorted to it in order to 
avoid childbearing after their desired family sizes were achieved. Socio-cultural 
differences between Czechs and Slovaks resulted in different abortion levels, 
although these converged over time. Abortion rates and ratios varied over time 
as well as between birth cohorts, mainly because the conditions for obtaining 
abortion were from time to time changed by policy interventions. However, 
underlying the temporal variation was a certain base incidence of abortion which 
reflected a constant level of demand, irrespective of political and socio-economic 
conditions. Subsequent analyses of the interplay between trends in abortion and 
in fertility suggested that the Czechoslovak abortion law of 1957 had a 
substantial fertility-suppressing effect, whereas the 1986 policy did not.
Seen in a broader perspective, the results of this study illustrate the fruitfulness 
of examining the dynamics and differential aspects of abortion in Eastern 
European populations. In this respect, one of the important findings is that within 
the former Czechoslovakia there was substantial inter-group variation in levels 
and trends of abortion. Although the overall incidence of abortion was much 
higher in Czechoslovakia during 1960-90 than in most Western countries, the 
contrasts between the abortion levels of various categories of Czechoslovak 
women were at least as striking as the general East-West difference in abortion 
rates. Moreover, although both Czech and Slovak populations displayed a 
pattern of abortion use that was very different from, say, that in the United 
States, the two 'national' patterns were quite different from one another. 
Variations in abortion rates and ratios by age, marital status, parity, and ethnicity 
documented in this study thus show that very different attitudes towards the 
regulation of fertility and sexual behaviour may exist within one population. This 
suggests that individual characteristics, such as a woman's socio-economic 
situation, value orientation, psychological disposition, or approach to fertility 
control, are critical factors of abortion use.
Because the preceding analyses are rather detailed and address many different 
topics, some of the relations among the basic explanatory concepts may have
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been obscured. The purpose of this final chapter is to give an overview of these 
relations. A related aim is to present a comprehensive framework that could 
serve as a basis for future research.
9.2 Difficulties in explaining abortion experience of Eastern Europe
There are several competing explanations for the high levels of induced abortion 
in the populations of Eastern Europe. According to a 'low-cost-of-abortion1 
explanation, this phenomenon originated as a result of the very liberal abortion 
laws implemented almost universally throughout the region during the period 
1955-60; that is, before the mass introduction of modern technologies of 
pregnancy prevention. A 'high-cost-of-modern-contraceptives' explanation would 
stress the limited availability and 'bad press' of modern contraceptives, and the 
resulting notorious reliance of Eastern European populations on ineffective 
means of avoiding unwanted pregnancies. Yet another possibility is to interpret 
the high abortion figures as a reflection of the persistence of a pattern of fertility 
control that emerged in the late 1950s and proved to be largely resistant to 
social change under Soviet-style socialism — a change occurring in conditions 
of forcefully suppressed dynamics of social forces and conservatism in the 
institutional sphere. Obviously, there are elements of truth in all these 
propositions. The principal reason for this multiplicity of accounts is the 
intricacies involved in disentangling determinants of reproductive behaviour. 
Complexities of lifestyle decisions still pose significant puzzles for 
demographers. Like most social phenomena, abortion has many causes; this 
chapter seeks to assess their different roles and strengths.
The history of abortion in Eastern Europe demands a comprehensive 
framework; a synthesis of historical facts and sociological generalizations. The 
argument presented in this concluding chapter is that during the post-war period 
the heavy reliance on abortion in Eastern European populations evolved as a 
result of the interplay among several elements of social reality. It is argued that 
the trends in abortion partly reflect political developments and interventions and 
their impact on the institutional sphere, but that the crucial determinant was the 
prevailing social values and the subjective position of Eastern Europeans as 
citizens and individuals. Thus, realities of the socialist regimes generated a 
cultural pattern in which individuals felt themselves to be relieved of 
responsibility and initiative, while they were caught in a dependence upon the 
paternalistic state.
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In a sense, this chapter is concerned with Soviet-style socialism as a culturally, 
and therefore demographically, active force. This social order was planned from 
the beginning as an all-embracing power which sought not only to eliminate 
every threat to its existence, but also to regulate all aspects of life: ideology, 
economy, art, science, private life, and even styles of dress (Kolakowski, 1985). 
The vigour with which these principles were superimposed depended on the 
strength of regime leaders when confronted by the defensive reactions of 
individual societies. The lack of complete success in these efforts was more a 
consequence of weakness and instability on the part of ruling elites than of any 
noble intentions. The demographic situation is an interesting vehicle through 
which to speculate about how societies adapted themselves to the authoritarian 
methods of rule.
This chapter intentionally provides a somewhat simplistic, largely speculative 
explanation, deliberately omitting detailed consideration of regional variation, the 
various forms of behavioural responses exhibited by population subgroups, and 
similar subtleties of Eastern Europe's demographic history. Every powerful and 
important demographic process is in reality a highly structured phenomenon —  
a reflection of many chance occurrences and deliberate interferences, among 
them economic, political, and ideational forces, as well as of the characteristics 
and psychology of the individuals involved. To take full account of these factors, 
it would be necessary to discuss particular countries in detail and to make 
maximum use of both aggregate and individual data, rather than to rely primarily 
on secondary evidence. Nevertheless, even an analysis that is uncomplicated 
methodologically can identify important relationships. Such an approach is 
unlikely to explain the genesis of Eastern Europe's abortion culture in full detail, 
but at least it permits an understanding of the nature of its emergence, and thus 
elucidates the reasons why it has become so widespread and persistent. 
Analysis within this framework is necessarily an iceberg strategy, addressing 
only the most visible and dramatic part of the problem.
9.3 Policies
The real socialism of Eastern European regimes was founded on Soviet imperial 
policy and a denial of the subjectivity of individuals and non-state institutions. 
Communists always viewed social policy as an important instrument for the 
redistribution of the wealth created by society. Everyone was entitled to certain
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rights, guaranteed in the constitution of the socialist states: to work, to leisure 
after work, to health care, to security in old age and disability, and so on. The 
task of socialist social policy was to control the ways in which these rights were 
implemented. Social policy also had other functions, however. Above all, it was 
a convenient tool to purposefully reshape social reality to generate a productive 
and loyal workforce. Since the planned development of all aspects of social life 
was a basic tenet of Soviet-style socialism, social policy was naturally regarded 
as part of that plan, and as such it was not to be politically neutral. Thus, social 
policy was used in a frankly discriminatory way in favour of the working class 
and against remnants of the bourgeoisie; to encourage the collectivization of 
agriculture; and to influence the use and distribution of the labour force, by 
granting special benefits to particular groups. Social policy was likewise 
understood as a device to implement socialism's historic ideological commitment 
to full equality between the sexes. Obviously, with such a full agenda, the 
danger that it would sometimes work at cross purposes was considerable.
The period immediately following the communist assumption of power in Eastern 
Europe following World War II was characterized by an upheaval in general 
socio-economic conditions which seemed to provide impressive proof of the 
correctness of socialist reasoning. Changes were greatest in areas of life most 
amenable to formal institutional control, such as the economy and employment. 
Almost overnight, the relatively backward countries of Eastern Europe were 
transformed into highly industrialized states whose economies were effectively 
free from the influence of price fluctuations and trade boycotts. Masses of 
people were guaranteed work and an unprecedented level of social security. 
Economic emancipation of women reached a level which Western Europe and 
the United States of that time had still to match. At the same time, the goal of 
economic independence of women and the granting of legal equality to them 
were wholly in harmony with the need of the economies of all the socialist states 
for human resources. There was no room for the idea that socialist planning 
might have a built-in sex bias because it incorporated primarily male values and 
priorities. Nor was it recognized that for women, the fact of working eight hours 
each day, often in less skilled jobs and for less money than men, still meant that 
they would come home to more drudgery. 'Equality' of sexes was interpreted not 
in terms of 'difference' but rather in terms of 'identity'. Certain political steps were 
taken to lift some of the burden from family units, chiefly aiming to reduce the 
need for women's extra work, but these policies did not have much prominence 
until well into the 1960s, and even then they delivered generally low levels of
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benefits and sen/ices (see Chapter 4). The feeling on the part of individual 
couples that this hardship could be lessened by reducing the number of children 
may have been widespread.
Important areas of criticism were opened up by Stalin's death in 1953 and by the 
famous speech of Khrushchev, the speech given in 1956 to the twentieth 
congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which raised Stalinism in 
its entirety as problematic and thus paved the way for debate over the legitimacy 
of certain aspects of centralized communist rule. In most Eastern European 
countries, the permissive abortion laws emerged concomitantly with the start of 
the post-Stalinist era. There are various ways of assessing this historical 
coincidence. Chapter 2 offers one possible interpretation: one which regards the 
re-legalization of abortion for social reasons not as merely simultaneous with the 
political thaw, but essentially as its direct, politically motivated and therefore 
carefully premeditated product. By this move, it can be argued, Soviet 
authorities could exhibit their sensitivity to current social problems as well as 
their faithfulness to more permissive, egalitarian social norms. Most remaining 
Eastern European governments (the only exceptions being the East German 
and Albanian) quickly mimicked the Soviet model, as they were used to imitating 
almost everything that happened in that country in those years, often without 
regard for the social, historical and demographic peculiarities of their countries. 
However, socialist policies on birth control remained contradictory: the failure to 
develop adequate provision of contraception made women largely dependent on 
abortion as a method of birth control.
In the 1960s, the price to be paid for the early success in socialist reconstruction 
became fully apparent. Some of the causes of this predicament were rooted in 
the socialist economic system, which was obviously inefficient but nevertheless 
regarded as sacrosanct. The priorities assigned to heavy industry caused 
indefinite postponement of development of the service sector which, according 
to Marxist theory and the governments' early promises, was to take over 
women's household tasks. The lag in consumer goods industries, mistakes in 
economic planning, and failures in distribution made shopping for essentials a 
chore consuming several hours daily. Wages were such that families needed 
two incomes, and levels of female labour force participation were approaching a 
demographic maximum. The housing shortage meant that few young couples 
had immediate prospects for a place of their own. Moreover, women were forced 
to adopt the male norm of full-time employment throughout their adult lives,
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except for short interruptions due to maternity leave. The clearest evidence that 
women found it impossible to combine full-time paid employment with 
motherhood under these conditions was the precipitous decline in the birth rate 
which began in Eastern Europe in the early 1950s (see Chapter 3).
There could be no question of women returning permanently to the home. At the 
same time, economic objectives did not permit a massive re-allocation of 
resources to child care facilities and household services. Yet an increase in the 
birth rate was judged essential to ensure an expanding, rather than a shrinking, 
labour reserve. Thus, beginning in the early 1960s, all the East European 
governments began to take steps to encourage births by prolonging paid 
maternity leave or raising family allowances, or both. Although costly, these 
measures were politically profitable: they were likely to be received by 
populations not as crude manipulations to encourage them to have children they 
did not want, but rather as a welcome relief from the obstacles to childbearing 
they experienced. To some of the governments, however, it was evident that 
more radical measures were necessary if their political goals were to be 
realized. People's right to control their own fertility became identified as a 
necessary major casualty in the drive to meet economic targets. Consequently, 
several governments made it more difficult for women to obtain abortions. This 
was justified by an ideological stance that family planning was not a human 
right, but rather an inextricable part of socio-economic planning for which all 
individuals were responsible.
This is only half the picture, however. To describe the pronatalist policies of 
socialist states merely as government efforts to change demographic realities in 
the name of the communist future would obscure the organic connection 
between political means and political ends. The policies of socialist governments 
were always purposeful before they were social. Regardless of what aims these 
measures were officially proclaimed to serve, their origins were quintessential^ 
political and their introduction may, accordingly, be regarded as political moves 
par excellence. More specifically, there is little doubt that social policy played its 
role in the regime's strategy to check individual freedom and to eliminate the 
possibility of public unrest. Communist leaders sensed that authoritarianism in 
political relations is incompatible with tolerance of autonomy in matters related to 
citizens' personal lives in general, and their reproduction in particular. Measures 
adopted in consequence differed from country to country, depending on local 
culture and political mores. In some settings, new policies were introduced to
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restrict undesirable forms of behaviour by strengthening the family — an 
institution valued by most Eastern Europeans. Elsewhere, policies were set in 
force primarily to enable the regime to better control and discipline its citizens. 
Czechoslovak pronatalist polices of the 1968-73 period are an example of the 
first, Romania's under Ceausescu of the second type of intervention.
In the period from the mid-1970s to the end of the 1980s, social policies did not 
undergo dramatic changes in Eastern European countries. Policies were less 
and less oriented towards the transformation of society and more and more 
towards the system's conservation. 'Live and let live' became the regimes' 
overall approach to their citizens, applied so long as people did not openly 
challenge the system. Social policies continued to be highly integrated into the 
production process and consistently designed to promote production and to 
create and maintain its human capital base. The regimes largely kept their 
original promises and removed major social problems, though by hushing them 
up and suppressing them rather than by solving them. They supplied certain 
consumer pleasures to the citizenry; supported a high degree of female 
participation in the labour force; offered women job protection as well as 
financial security in motherhood; and, except in Romania and Albania, returned 
to the somewhat more permissive policies allowing fairly broad access to 
induced abortion. Thus, most Eastern European regimes apparently came to the 
conclusion that it made more sense to adapt to the consequences of long-term 
social trends than to invest in trying to reverse them; after all, such a strategy 
was likely to be more successful in maintaining political stability. Society paid for 
these genuinely comfortable social certainties with a forced abandonment of its 
ideas and with living at the expense of the future. Moreover, the comprehensive 
social welfare policies relieved individuals to a significant degree of responsibility 
for their own living conditions.
Ideologically, social policies continued to be based on male-centred concepts of 
society and the family. However generous and democratic the subjective 
intentions of the men who formulated them, they were essentially aimed at 
making a male-dominated society function better. While apparently bending over 
backwards to create conditions more favourable to women, they tended to solve 
problems at women's expense. Freeing women from onerous housework 
remained among the proclaimed goals of social policies, but very little progress 
was truly achieved. The opportunity to be a full-time mother turned into the 
'opportunity' to be a full-time housewife. Calls for the development and
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production of adequate supplies of effective contraceptives went largely 
unanswered. The problem was that sex equality was not facilitated by the actual 
policies chosen: measures were aimed at softening the double burden on 
women, not at the redistribution of that burden. The fundamental contradiction 
lay in a definition of women as workers and mothers without any parallel 
reconceptualization of men's role.
Just as individual people are able to develop certain ways of surviving in harsh 
conditions, so the Eastern European regimes adopted political strategies to 
prolong and possibly strengthen their power. The factors and circumstances that 
determined the interaction between political developments and social policies in 
Eastern Europe during 1945-90 were numerous. Timing was important, as were 
the personalities of the rulers, the example of the Soviet Union, economic 
conditions, correct or faulty assessments about the nature of emerging socio­
economic trends, and reaction to unforeseen occurrences. The politicization of 
social policies was reflected in the fact that population trends and 
demographically determined circumstances were not crucial and decisive by 
themselves. What really mattered were the perceived socio-economic and 
political needs of the ruling elites. However, analysis of the Eastern European 
states' experience with the politics of population policy-making should not 
portray these as unique and specific to Soviet-style regimes, and thus mask the 
comparative force of their legacy. It is not that the politicization of reproduction is 
peculiar to any region, but rather that the nature of that politicization reveals 
much about the polity in which it occurs. Eastern Europe offers a stark but not 
isolated case study. The comparative implications for the analysis of population 
policies of other authoritarian societies, such as Nazi Germany or communist 
China, are evident.
9.4 Institutional adjustments and non-adjustments
Abortion laws implemented in most Eastern European countries in the late 
1950s treated induced abortion as hardly more than a special type of surgery. 
The issue of artificial termination of newly conceived life was thus denied much, 
if not all, of its ethical and humanitarian dimensions. The widespread 
liberalization of abortion not only substantially altered the normative content of 
social policies, however. In its consequences it also affected the broader 
institutional context relevant to reproductive behaviour.
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9.4.1 Health services
The area of health services, in particular, underwent substantial changes during 
the 1950s. It is important to remember that in most socialist countries of Eastern 
Europe, with the exceptions of Poland, East Germany and Yugoslavia, the vast 
majority of health-care facilities were state-owned, and all legal and procedural 
parameters of medical practice were dictated directly by the government. 
Medical personnel had few options other than to act in conformity to directives 
from the centre; those who would dare not to co-operate were likely to suffer 
harsh consequences. The health service was thus capable of providing social 
control and discipline on a scale much greater than can be expected (or, for that 
matter, documented) in any pluralistic society.
Soon after the new abortion laws were enforced, the whole medical system 
adapted itself to new demands. In the Soviet Union, for instance, large numbers 
of clinical physicians started to work as full-time abortion providers (Remennick, 
1991; Popov, 1993). In Czechoslovakia, expertise in basic techniques of 
pregnancy termination became routinely required from doctors wishing to 
specialize in gynaecology and obstetrics (Havranek, 1982) — a powerful 
selective factor which meant that practically no individuals with strong objections 
to abortion could enter the profession. Once abortions were made accessible on 
demand or on easy-to-meet social criteria, similar institutional responses 
apparently occurred in the health-care systems of all Eastern European 
countries. The control of the process was placed in the hands of the medical 
profession, whose discretion in implementing government policy was thus 
confirmed. Abortions came to be regarded as services requiring a close policing 
and surveillance of doctors. In a sense, this was a component of the general 
political strategy of suppressing self-management and promoting management 
from above.
Although it would presumably be unfair to say that Eastern European doctors 
'liked' to perform abortions, their attitudes to pregnancy terminations were 
probably much less scrupulous than those of most medical professionals in the 
West. The surgical nature of abortion operations apparently appealed to doctors' 
idea of 'real' medical science and complemented their view of the necessity of 
medical experts managing birth control. The evidence for this is little more than 
anecdotal, but is nevertheless illustrative, especially of the contrasts in
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approaches to abortion and to contraception. Moore (1972: 4) quotes a 
Yugoslav physician as saying that
the psychological rewards to the physician — the gratitude of an abortion 
patient rescued from a crisis situation —  far exceed the routine 'thank 
you' the patient may offer on simply being supplied with a contraceptive 
prescription.
An example of a similar attitude is the entry in International Handbook on 
Abortion by Sracek (1988: 133), a prominent Czech gynaecologist. It lists a 
large number of clinical studies conducted in Czechoslovakia 'on better and 
safer techniques of abortion', but none dealing with the problem of how abortion 
can be replaced by contraception. Under certain circumstances, the physician's 
willingness to perform an abortion might even become a form of political 
statement. Kligman (1992) suggests that some Romanian doctors were inclined 
to confidentially meet the wishes of women seeking abortion during the 1970s 
and 1980s, as this also provided the doctors with an opportunity to demonstrate, 
in private, opposition to Ceausescu's demographic tyranny.
There is little doubt that Eastern European medical professionals played an 
important role as perpetuators of the abortion culture and legitimizers of the 
status quo. Part of this reality can be explained not just by the doctors' lack of 
interest in promoting alternative methods of birth control, but also by their 
isolation from contraceptive developments in the West, as well as by severe 
shortages of medical technology and up-to-date pharmaceutical products, 
including modern contraceptives. This interpretation certainly runs counter to 
official propaganda, but it follows from the well-documented low level of state 
budget expenditure allocated to health care in socialist countries (Ryan, 1991; 
Field, 1994) as well as from the personal experiences of some Western 
physicians with Eastern European health care (Prager, 1987).
9.4.2 Sex education
One would expect abortion laws, being integral parts of governmental population 
policies, to have become somehow mirrored in the official approach to sex 
education. That proposition, however, appears to be largely erroneous. For the 
first fifteen to twenty years post-war, sex education did not exist in Eastern 
Europe either in schools or in the media, partly because of the traditional 
antipathy of orthodox Marxism to the subject of sexology (Williams, 1994).
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Puritanism was a striking feature of Soviet-style communism, advocates of 
which were, in this respect, remarkably close to the traditional Christian position 
on sexual matters, while being diametrically opposed to it on all others. Official 
hostility to sex education was motivated by an attitude well-known elsewhere: 
the feeling that young people should be shielded from this sort of knowledge for 
as long as possible, because understanding might lead to increased sexual 
activity and promiscuity. Moreover, it was believed that it was the family that 
could deal with the matter most effectively.
During the 1960s and 1970s, however, all socialist countries in Eastern Europe, 
except Albania and Ceausescu's Romania, developed elaborate schemes for 
sex education, largely to complement the pronatalist policies introduced in those 
years.1 Characteristically, sex education was regarded as subordinate to what 
was variably termed 'parental' or 'familial' education, education 'for marriage and 
parenthood', or education 'for family life'. These educational strategies were 
designed to cover a vast number of topics, ranging from the biology of human 
reproduction, contraceptive knowledge, and readiness for a parental role, to 
propaganda about the place of the family in society and the social importance of 
childbearing. The extensive mandate of parental education was also reflected in 
its broad institutional delineation. In theory, education for parenthood was 
outlined as the task of not only the educational system, but also the family, the 
mass media, medical institutions, youth organizations, and even the army. 
However, such broad coverage and complicated organization proved hard to 
command: it was the schools that played the major role in education related to 
sex and parenthood.
Although the accounts of sex education in schools given by some Eastern 
European theorists appear to portray an almost flawless framework for providing 
knowledge to the young in the domains of sexuality and relationships 
(Wynnyczuk, 1974; Sas, 1978), the de facto situation was far from perfect. 
Implementation of educational programs relevant to sex and reproduction was 
probably greatest at the elementary school level. Sex education was typically 
given in natural science lessons during a course on human anatomy, 
physiology, and hygiene for 8 to 15 year-olds. Children were taught a little about 
the scientific side of human reproduction and generalities regarding family life, 
but this was confined to a very few lessons, and the emotional and moral
1 For more information on sex education in individual countries, see Pavlik and Wynnyczuk 
(1974), Kellogg, Kline, and Stepan (1975), Kozakiewicz (1977), David and McIntyre (1981), 
Roemer and Paxman (1985), Meredith and Thomas (1986).
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aspects of human sexuality were not included. In most cases, a narrow version 
of sex education prevailed which approached the subject as a second-rate 
pedagogical exercise in delivering basic facts of physiology, using mere 
description as the main method of instruction. Only scanty attention was paid to 
the training of staff capable, or more to the point willing, to teach sex education. 
Classes were frequently taught by school doctors, which meant that the 
teaching had a health emphasis rather than being put into a broader context of 
personal fulfilment.
Puritanical views and moral prejudices clearly dominated in sex education in 
schools. For instance, Muckle (1987) reports that in the standard syllabuses 
used in Soviet schools in the late 1980s the word 'sexual' was used rarely, 
always in passing, and often with the sole purpose of condemning the 
importance of sex. Education regarding the students' own sexuality, on topics 
such as first coitus and methods to avoid pregnancy, was largely dependent on 
the willingness of teachers to absorb these subjects into the curriculum. In 
Poland, a study conducted in 1978 revealed that the frequency of this type of 
sex education in the schools ranged from 'never' in 49 per cent of urban and 70 
per cent of rural schools to 'regularly' in only 19 per cent of urban and 9 per cent 
of rural schools (Kozakiewicz, 1978). The situation in the Soviet Union during 
the late 1980s was summarized in a youth-oriented weekly as follows:
All we have heard from the doctors is how stunned they are by the 
teenagers' low level of knowledge about sex. But what can we expect 
when adults are not well-versed in the subject either. Tenth form 
students laugh during classes on The Ethics and Psychology of Family 
Life because some aunt-like figure still reads from some old fashioned 
pre-perestroika book, preferring to enthusiastically recite poetry. The 
problem is that auntie doesn't tell these girls how to avoid becoming 
pregnant (quoted in Williams, 1994: 91).
Although sex education developed in individual countries in dissimilar ways, 
reflecting religious, legal, and other cultural differences, a low level of sex 
education was characteristic of Eastern Europe at large.
One particularly revealing feature of sex and parental education as administered 
in socialist schools was the way it dealt with gender differences and sex roles. 
Both sexes were addressed, but most remarks were directed towards girls. Male 
and female roles in relation to parenthood were evaluated differently: fathers 
were generally depicted as important, but mothers were regarded as 
irreplaceable. The insistence that sex differences in personality and social roles
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are in essence natural and inevitable, that men are basically providers and 
women home-makers, is well apparent from the following quotation from the 
official directive for Soviet teachers published in 1983:
The strength of woman lies not in her ability to curb her husband and 
direct him like a marionette, but in her 'weakness' — in femininity, in 
softness, sympathy and kindness. A woman must above all respect in 
herself these qualities, and manifest them ever more in family life. The 
husband, in turn, must try to be strong, masculine, active, decisive, and 
energetic. The formation of such relations between husband and wife is 
one of the most important paths of achievement of harmony in family life 
and family happiness (quoted in Attwood, 1987: 125).
With respect to abortion, socialist educators could have chosen between two 
extremes: they could either praise the provision of abortion laws as an early gain 
of the socialist system, or they could portray the phenomenon as legal but 
nevertheless alien to socialist morality and lifestyle. Both these positions were in 
certain senses justifiable, but they were also contradicted by the everyday 
reality: the well-known high incidence of abortions largely prevented black-and- 
white interpretations. The question was further complicated by the 
unpredictability of official population policy. Past experience with shifts in 
communist ideology, resulting in manipulations of social policies, suggested that 
access to abortion and contraception could be, almost at any moment, either 
more liberalized, or further restricted. Such changes, should they materialize, 
were obviously likely to render irrelevant any particular content of teaching. 
Political realities which subordinated education to the interests of the ruling 
elites were thus among the major factors which dominated the classroom 
context.
Given these circumstances, it is not surprising that little attention was devoted in 
school-based sex education to abortion and to the issues surrounding it. Among 
other things, the absence of adequate sex education in schools suggests that 
peer-led teaching was a powerful and probably essential component of 
individual maturation. Had the official attitudes to abortion and sex been more 
transparent and consistent, guidelines for school practice might have been more 
progressive and sex education in schools more successful.
9.4.3 Mass media
In pluralist democracies with uncensored media, the nation's abortion rate is 
likely to be a topic for critical debate in the press. Under Soviet-style socialism,
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however, the main propagandist goal of the media was not to generate 
discussion, but to create an ideologically correct environment, serving to impose 
full thought control and thus maintaining the system's hold on power. At the 
same time, the media and their political controllers had to respond somehow to 
the system's obvious inability to fulfil its promise of abundance and of full 
satisfaction of the people's needs. They did so in a variety of ways.
The best known, most often applied tactic was that of using the media not so 
much to present the truth but to replace it by providing the illusion of success in 
socialist building. In Czechoslovakia, the official term for the dissemination of 
desired half-truths was 'the beautification of information' (Ulc, 1979: 203). In 
effect, 'media content was to be a Potemkin village — not a representation of 
reality but an alternative reality' (Jakubowicz, 1992: 64). In line with this 
approach, journalists commonly saw themselves as social educators, with a 
strong awareness of the political nature of their jobs, guided more by 
consideration of their social role as set by their political sponsors than by the 
authenticity or attractiveness of their message for the audience. Most journalists 
preferred to present positive, tendentiously chosen patterns to create a myth of 
prosperity, rather than to depict social problems in their full complexity. In other 
words, they perceived themselves as agents of the communist system and 
helped invent its narratives.
In contrast to the practice in many Western countries, the values propagated by 
the socialist media did not conflict with those officially promoted by governments 
and taught during parental education courses in schools. Media, too, had 
'adjusted' to the fact of widespread resort to abortion by virtually ignoring it. This 
was because the issue of abortion was likely to damage national self-esteem 
and to have corrosive implications for the doctrinal legitimation of state power —  
overtones that would hardly fit the journalists' main task of convincing the people 
that they were being well-governed and need not worry. Moreover, publicizing 
matters related to sex might have been understood by the political censors as 
an attempt to disseminate Western-style ideas of sexual freedom.
It was only when the government's line required criticism of abortion as a social 
evil complicating the economic and demographic future of socialist countries that 
abortion was given more publicity. At such times, the media tended to give 
centre stage to morality and demography, rather than to sexuality and conditions 
of everyday life; in doing so, they used the old propagandist trick of ascribing
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social problems affecting national economies to poor interpersonal relations, not 
to poor governmental policies. One infamous example of such practices was 'the 
most elaborate, all-pervasive and obtrusive media campaign on behalf of 
increased fecundity [sic]' in Czechoslovakia during 1968-73 (Besemeres, 1980: 
263). But the most aggressive information policy was apparently that 
implemented in Romania during the Ceausescu era, when abortions were 
routinely sensationalized in the media, often highlighting horrifying details of 
what went wrong, to act as a deterrent (lonescu, 1987).
Ignorance, political tendentiousness, and lack of responsibility towards the 
public were thus the main characteristics of communist journalists' portrayal of 
issues related to reproduction and sex. Over the years, unwillingness to 
examine controversial questions, and indeed reluctance even to admit that in a 
socialist society such questions might be asked, reached dimensions of culpable 
negligence. The best illustration of this is the case of AIDS, a malady which until 
the late 1980s was unanimously regarded by Eastern European governments as 
a social problem afflicting only decadent capitalist societies; very little was done 
to inform the public or to take serious measures (Williams, 1994). One 
consequence of the 'oblivious' approach of the state-sponsored media to sex 
was that many people sought relevant information in unofficial sources, such as 
in erotic and pornographic literature. For instance, a 1988 survey of attitudes of 
95 female college students in the USSR showed a correlation between the 
development of sexual awareness and early familiarity with such unofficial texts, 
while exposure to the official press did not have any effect on the respondents' 
attitudes toward sex (Borisov, 1989). As a result of such factors, ignorance 
regarding sex and reproduction was widespread among lay people and, 
paradoxically, even among media workers. In 1994 representatives of the 
Bulgarian Family Planning Association still complained that many Bulgarian 
journalists did not understand such basic terms as 'contraceptives' or 
'reproductive health' (Chernev and Stamencova, 1994).
What were the real reasons for the lack of realism, the endurance of old 
puritanical values, and the absence of a meaningful attention to sex in the 
communist media? An American sociologist attributed this rigorous sexual ethic 
to 'the persistence of the values of a traditional peasant society' (Hollander, 
1973a: 207). An alternative explanation is provided by Kon, a leading Soviet 
sexologist, who argues that the main reasons were not cultural but political, and
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the whole matter thus fully captured in the words of George Orwell's novel 
Nineteen Eighty Four.
It was not merely that the sex instinct created a world of its own that was 
outside the Party's control and which therefore had to be destroyed if 
possible. What was more important was that sexual privation induced 
hysteria, which was desirable because it could be transformed into war- 
fever and leader-worship (Orwell: 1954: 109).
9.5 Behavioural adjustments
The occurrence and degree of 'positive' behavioural responses to social policies 
were an aspect of Eastern Europe's political and social culture. In this sense, 
the frequent resort to abortion is a case of its own. Most Eastern Europeans 
displayed a remarkable socio-psychological tolerance to induced abortion, 
poorly covered by a cloak of hypocritical silence at both individual and public 
levels. In the former Soviet Union, abortion was perceived for decades 'as a 
routine, although certainly unpleasant, medical procedure, comparable, say, to a 
removal of a decayed tooth' (Remennick, 1991: 844). For some observers, this 
may merely suggest moral erosion and destruction of religious consciousness in 
Eastern European societies. Was this really the case, or was the real reason to 
be found somewhere else? The following is an attempt to answer this question 
by focusing on social values and prevailing attitudes to fertility prevention.
9.5.1 Social values
Perhaps the best way to understand fully the abortion experience of Eastern 
European populations is to examine the habits and attitudes that developed 
during the years of communist rule. When the communists came to power after 
1945, they launched a frontal attack against the traditional value system. They 
dismantled the traditional value-generating institutions: churches, communities, 
associations, social movements. They persecuted the values of the previous 
economic and socio-political system, including values relating to private 
property, personal autonomy, freedom and responsibility. However, the idea of 
replacing these values with those of collective discipline, altruism, and 
revolutionary consciousness failed almost completely. It failed because the 
regimes stuck to their anachronistic revolutionary ideology in an age of socialist 
conservatism and cautious reformism; because the almost total inefficiency of 
their economies ruined working morale and generated negligence; because their
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authoritarian political systems excluded people from public life and created 
alienated, individualistic societies.
Among the most powerful factors shaping individual behaviour in Eastern 
European populations was the eclectic and somewhat incoherent set of social 
values which a group of Czech sociologists (Mares, Musil, and Rabusic, 1991) 
characterized as follows:
1. Society should not be overly differentiated; people's living standards 
ought to be as equal as possible.
2. Everyone must work, regardless of whether one's work is meaningful 
or productive.
3. State institutions know best how to satisfy people's needs; people 
need not care excessively for themselves.
4. The living standard need not be high, provided it is secure.2
The important features of the value orientation of Eastern Europeans were an 
almost normal distribution of value preferences within the society, with more 
extreme views receiving less support; small inter-group and generational 
differences, suggesting that the pattern generally prevailing within the 
population was only partly modified among sub-populations; a weak correlation 
between values and the demographic characteristics of the respondents; and 
substantial stability in the distribution of responses about values over time. 
Reflecting on this highly homogeneous and stable structure of values, one 
Polish sociologist remarked that, in Eastern Europe, it would probably be more 
appropriate to speak about one system of values than about systems, plural 
(Nowak, 1981).
It is not abnormal for most people in most countries to live non-public, apolitical 
lives and to focus most of their attention on the material well-being of 
themselves and their families. In Eastern Europe, however, consumerist values 
became extremely widespread during the years of communist rule.3 The gulf 
between these values and those of official Marxism-Leninism did not mean that 
the existence of, for instance, black markets and a popular desire for more and 
better consumer goods was necessarily a source of political instability. Many, 
though by no means all, unofficial economic activities actually helped the 
economies to work more smoothly than they otherwise would have. Moreover, 
an individual's preoccupation with standards of living could have been an
2 Based on a social survey performed in the Czech city of Brno in 1990.
3 For empirical evidence, see Hankiss (1990), Matejko (1991), Grad (1993).
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alternative to authentic political activity — an enterprise potentially dangerous 
for the system, and consequently for the individual as well. The attitude of 
communist leaderships within Eastern Europe to consumerism was, at first, one 
of ambivalence and, later, one of open approval. Over the years, attempts to 
satisfy the material demands of the consumer became one of the principal ways 
in which Eastern European leaderships could supplement a purely Marxist- 
Leninist appeal for support within their societies. Following political crises, such 
as in post-1956 Hungary, post-1968 Czechoslovakia, and post-1970 Poland, 
consumer booms were not only officially tolerated but deliberately created 
(Brown, 1979).
From the point of view of individuals, consumerism was a reaction to the 
difficulties of everyday life, marked by capricious shortages and sudden supplies 
of goods. Consumerism was intimately interconnected with 'familism', as many 
people evaluated their standard of living in terms of family welfare and displayed 
a strong pro-family orientation4. It was one of the great paradoxes of Eastern 
Europe that, proclaimed revolutionary goals notwithstanding, it was the 
possibility of living tranquil private lives that made the systems tolerable for a 
majority. It was said of East Germany that 'if you want to live a quiet life with 
your mind switched off, it is more relaxing than West Germany' (Davy, 1977: 15). 
This assertion was broadly applicable to Eastern Europe as a whole, even if 
basic foodstuffs and everyday household amenities in most countries of the 
region were in shorter supply than in East Germany.
The fact that consumerist attitudes and an orientation 'to possess' spread widely 
in Eastern European societies had many important consequences. First, 
consumerism provided a source of distraction from those spiritual aspects of life 
which ordinary people found frustrating and painful. It also pushed religious and 
other spiritual values down in the social value system: religion was consigned to 
the 'background', to be practised only in private and with the stress on ritual 
rather than spiritual experience or moral issues.5 Another implication was social
4 This can be illustrated by the results of the European Value Systems Study, which was 
conducted in more than twenty countries in 1982. Eastern Europe was represented by Hungary. 
Hungarians turned out to be much more family-oriented and individualistic than others. To the 
question 'Is there anything you would sacrifice yourself for, outside your family?1, for instance, 38 
to 64 per cent of English, French, Germans, Spanish and Italians answered 'No, I would not', but 
in Hungary the figure was 85 per cent. To the question 'Would you raise your children to have 
respect for other people?', the West European range of positive answers was between 43 and 62 
per cent, while the Hungarian figure was 31 per cent (Harding, Philips and Fogarty, 1986).
5 The best illustration is Poland, where being religious scarcely excluded the tendency towards 
being materially oriented (see Nowak, 1981).
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atomization: in people's minds, society became a mere 'confederation' of 
primary interest groups and closed family-like communities, identified through 
blood ties or shared economic goals and strong intra-group solidarity (Horowitz, 
1979). Individual action was guided mainly by short-term materialistic interests 
and by respect for the existing value system and power structure. For most 
individuals, the struggle to secure higher consumer standards was more 
important than a struggle for the solution of other problems, such as that of 
inequality between men and women.6 One consequence of this was the 
conservation of traditional structures, especially sex roles and family 
stereotypes.
Hand in hand with consumerism, perhaps the most important consequence of 
Soviet-style socialism in the realm of social psychology was a tendency to 
anonymity — the absence of any distinctive, forceful personal identity; the 
avoidance of initiative and responsibility. While in a community of free persons 
initiative and responsibility are required and valued, for surviving under 
oppression a low profile was ideal. For the unfree, initiative and responsibility 
were luxuries they could not afford, a potential source of conflict with the 
repressive political environment, and thus maladaptive. The best adaptive 
strategy was maximum flexibility in fitting into a context, governed by nothing but 
considerations of instantaneous advantage. Self-respect, self-discipline, the very 
idea of self, had no place. The mental habit of looking for easy solutions was 
accompanied by a 'learnt helplessness syndrome' (Ziolkowski, 1993: 119) — the 
passive demand for and expectation of protection and minimum social and 
economic security, provided by the state virtually regardless of individual's 
efforts. According to one Czech philosopher, this well-adapted, self-defensive 
behaviour of those living in the world of Soviet-style socialism came close, in 
effect, to what has been described in penal practice:
When first imprisoned, humans tend to refuse to acknowledge their new 
condition. Though in prison, they refuse to think, act, and respond like 
prisoners. Instead they cling to the habits and attitudes of freedom. Only 
gradually does reality set in and with it a stage of waiting and hoping. If 
the prisoners are released during this stage, they often return to ordinary
6 That the orientation of both sexes toward the private sphere of family life made them partners 
rather than competitors seems to be the most powerful explanation for the virtual absence of a 
genuine women's movement throughout Eastern Europe. Women had a tendency to subordinate 
their own individual needs to family goals, which they tried to achieve by using purely private 
methods: while being objectively disadvantaged, they did not feel the need for an institutionalized 
claim to self-determination (Einhorn, 1991, 1993; Corrin, 1992; Marody, 1993). More generally, 
one could argue that feminist arguments are essentially post-modern arguments, and that the 
East will have them when standards of living match those of the West in the late 1960s.
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life stronger and wiser for their experience. If however, the imprisonment 
lasts, prisoners tend to adapt to their condition, acquiring new skills, 
attitudes, and habits likely to enhance their chances of survival. They 
become jail smart, able to resist the system and to derive from it such 
benefits as it has to offer. What they tend to lose is the ability to function 
as free humans (Kohak, 1992: 199).
9.5.2 Contraceptive fatalism
Fatalism and a sense of powerlessness are antithetical to planning for a 
successful future. The fatalistic person believes that future happenings are 
inevitable, that one is not in control of one's life, that one is powerless to alter 
the course of events. A fatalist is unable to see his or her life in total perspective; 
life consists only of isolated events and episodes. The fatalist feels that the 
future will be whatever it will be, and that he or she has no power, or only limited 
power, to change it. The fatalist has little identity beyond the role he or she is 
forced to play.
Fatalism, inertia and alienation were the way of life for many Eastern Europeans 
(Kon, 1988; Taras, 1991). One of the causes of fatalism was that individual life 
goals and aspirations became unattainable for a large part of the society 
through legally available means (Kolarska-Bobinska, 1992). The blocking of the 
attainment of life goals was accompanied by a strong feeling that little could be 
achieved in a society whose functioning was chaotic, and resulted in the 
sentiment that one's actions do not make sense. One American observer 
described this aspect of the Soviet-type state:
Powerlessness is taken for granted among the population at large. 
Alienation is not a pressing public or private concern. There is little self- 
consciousness about it; a certain amount of alienation is probably taken 
for granted — as a more or less natural condition... alienation is not 
angry but resigned, not action-oriented but passive and fatalistic. It 
entails an untroubled acceptance... A genuine belief in personal 
ineffectiveness is expressed in abstention, withdrawal, and 
privatization... (Hollander, 1973b: 399).7
7 Some 'harder* empirical data on the prevalence of fatalist attitudes in Eastern Europe can be 
extracted from the International Social Survey Programme data, which come from a series of 
probability-based, nation-wide sample surveys conducted during 1990-93. For instance, the 
proportion of respondents agreeing with the statement There is little that people can do to change 
the course of their lives' tended to be higher in Eastern European samples than elsewhere. 46 per 
cent of respondents in Poland, 37 per cent in Slovenia, 31 per cent in Russia, and 30 per cent in 
Hungary said that they 'agree' or 'strongly agree' with the statement, compared to 28 per cent of 
respondents in Italy, 24 per cent in Austria and Israel, 23 per cent in Great Britain, the 
Netherlands, and Ireland, 21 per cent in West Germany, 15 per cent in New Zealand, 13 per cent 
in USA, and 12 per cent in Nonway. Interestingly, the corresponding figure for East Germany was
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Research focusing on the links between fatalism and reproductive behaviour is 
scarce and seldom meets acceptable scientific standards. The few existing 
studies on the topic have been largely empirical in their orientation, 
concentrating on the commonsense reasons reported by women for not using 
modern contraception, both for themselves and in general. Among the 100 
randomly selected women interviewed by Fukalova and Uzel (1975) in the 
Czech city of Ostrava, the second day after their abortion while they were still in 
hospital, 32 per cent answered that the majority of women never think about the 
issue of contraception, 24 per cent said that people are frivolous and 16 per 
cent attributed the failure to use contraception to an inherent ambivalence 
towards childbearing, which is often deliberately left to chance. Five per cent 
thought that people prefer 'unplanned' sex to careful planning, thus risking the 
possibility of conception. The remaining six per cent were divided equally among 
those who attributed failure to rely on contraceptives to a partner's refusal, and 
those who saw it as a punishment for excessive sexual activity.
Official Czechoslovak abortion statistics, which starting in 1987 record what kind 
of contraception the woman used immediately before she last became pregnant, 
also reflect a high degree of fatalism (IHS, 1991). During 1987-90, 93 per cent of 
abortion obtainers in the Czech Republic claimed they did not use any 
contraception, only 5 per cent used an IUD, and 2 per cent relied on the pill; for 
Slovakia, the corresponding figures were 96 per cent, 3 per cent, and 1 per 
cent. Taking the sum of statistically recorded pregnancies as a base, the annual 
proportion of those conceived in circumstances of a total absence of 
contraception and terminated by an abortion was 42 per cent in the Czech 
Republic and 36 per cent in Slovakia (FSO, 1991). These results indicate that 
abortions, at least in the former Czechoslovakia, were predominantly the result 
of contraceptive non-use rather than of contraceptive failure; lack of commitment 
to the regular use of contraception was a major problem.
Similar findings have been reported from other Eastern European countries. 
Popov (1990), reviewing the official Soviet statistics for the 1980s, estimates 
that as many as 25 per cent of the female population of Moscow adopted 
abortion-oriented attitudes and behaviour. The prevailing fatalism in 
reproductive behaviour of Soviet women is also stressed by Remennick (1991).
17 per cent, indicating a level of self-reported fatalism very low by Eastern European standards 
and moderate by Western standards (ZES, 1993).
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Kon (1993: 28) went a step further by arguing that, once fatalism, hypocrisy, and 
ignorance become widespread, they are likely to contaminate all aspects of 
behaviour related to sex and reproduction:
Thinking one thing, saying another and doing something else has 
become common for us in all areas of life, so one can imagine the 
situation with the intimate, shameful and forbidden subject of sex.
Research undertaken by Sabatello (1992) showed that the resort to abortion 
was likely to persist even when those born in Eastern Europe were 
subsequently exposed to a contraceptively more developed environment. 
Among Soviet-born female immigrants to Israel, age-specific rates of 
applications for abortion were significantly higher than among long-resident 
Jewish women, and continued to remain so even after 10-15 years of residence 
in Israel and exposure to its relatively modern patterns of family planning.
While these findings are interesting as well as indicative in themselves, they 
nonetheless need interpretation. One way to go about this is to relate them to 
existing theories about why women have unwanted pregnancies. Over the past 
20 years, there have been two grand theories espoused on this issue (Luker, 
1975). The first, commonly associated with the classic concept of demographic 
transition and preferred by family planning agencies and their supporters, 
suggests that women have unwanted pregnancies because they lack the 
contraceptive experience or technology to prevent them. The second, 
advocated by psychologists and psychiatrists, proposes that couples often have 
the contraceptive skills to prevent pregnancies but encounter psychological 
resistance or lack of motivation when it comes to using them. Psychic conflict 
regarding contraception is in a certain sense natural, as conscious and 
unconscious reasons for and against its use often exist simultaneously. For 
instance, many women may experience the conflict between wanting to be 
sexually attractive and 'feminine', but not wanting a child or being uncertain 
about the partner's commitment. Similarly common, among both men and 
women, may be conflict between the perceived inconvenience of a 
contraception technique and the relative convenience of spontaneous 
(unprotected) sexual intercourse. Contraception may seem especially 
inconvenient when the method needs to be used at the height of sexual 
excitement, such as is the case with coitus interruptus.
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Indeed, the disadvantages of contraception may be contrasted with certain 
advantages of abortion. As discussed by Moore (1971) and Dixon-Mueller 
(1993), from the individual's point of view, abortion may be sometimes 
preferable to contraception: it is a one-event procedure; it does not require co­
operation of the male partner; it is coitus-independent; it is almost always 
effective; it requires only hindsight, not foresight; it makes it possible to avert a 
birth which may have been desired at the time of conception but which, through 
changed circumstances, may later become unwanted. Contraceptive decisions 
(and non-decisions) are made by couples on the basis of balancing the costs 
and benefits of risky but spontaneous sexual intercourse, on the one hand, 
against the costs and benefits of pregnancy and its possible termination by an 
abortion, on the other hand. In essence, this concept of fertility-regulating 
behaviour is based on a basic insight of Durkheimian sociology: that the use of 
contraception and abortion, like all other forms of human behaviour, is a function 
of social values, conditions, and relations that bind individuals into the broader 
world.
Seen from this theoretical perspective, the widespread resort to abortion in 
Eastern Europe becomes somewhat easier to understand. It was not just an 
outcome of irrational behaviour, or the problem of erratic supplies (though it was 
both of these things), but also an outcome of prevailing value systems and 
social relations. Because abortion was relatively easy to get and largely socially 
acceptable, engaging in sexual intercourse without much regard for the 
consequences to oneself or one's partner was psychologically not so distinct 
from other kinds of behaviour in which people relied, consciously or 
subconsciously, on the protective capacity of the paternalistic state. Inexpensive 
and easily available abortion services, heavily subsidized foods and rents, full 
employment, and provision of free or cheap health care and education; all of 
that represented a type of welfare contract between the party-state apparatus 
and the people.8 The more individuals experienced 'society' as the guarantor of 
social-policy 'achievements', the less space remained for articulating and 
working through conflicts involving questions such as fertility regulation. Abortion 
clients, like all other welfare recipients, behaved more as objects of provisions 
rather than as active subjects capable of defining their needs. The opportunity 
for an individual to exercise influence either through the marketplace or the 
ballot box, or by direct consumer involvement, was entirely absent.
8 The notion of a contract between state and society has been widely discussed in the literature; 
see, for example, Breslauer (1982), Cohen (1985), and Silver (1987).
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Consequently, social benefits and services were so utterly taken for granted that 
they frequently did not figure in the calculation; they had no stimulating or 
motivating effects, and finally resulted in the prodigious passivity and resignation 
of the majority of the population.9
Thus, there was an intimate connection between lack of pregnancy prevention, 
abortion, and the perception of social welfare entitlements as compensating for 
the shortcomings of daily life. However, the state-father was not perceived by all 
people equally, and the opportunity to exercise individual initiative and to make 
choices evidently existed. This is clearly reflected by the substantial inter­
country and inter-group differences in abortion rates and ratios, discussed in 
preceding chapters. It might be hypothesized that underlying the differences in 
resort to various strategies of fertility regulation were differing attitudes and 
interpersonal relations; variation in these determined variation in the abortion 
rate. The findings presented in this thesis indicate that the impact of communist 
rule on family size and abortion was partly a function of factors such as religion, 
education, and history. In other words, selective attention to the risk of 
unwanted pregnancy, and preferences among different types of risk-taking (or 
risk-avoiding) behaviour, corresponded to cultural biases — to worldviews, 
ideologies, and deeply held values, beliefs, and normative presuppositions 
defending different patterns of action.10 A broader quantitative analysis of the 
various social outcomes from communism, and their differential effects by 
country, class, and so on, would be necessary to elaborate this hypothesis 
further.
9.6 Agenda for future research
The collapse of the communist regimes across Eastern Europe in 1989 and the 
replacement of the Soviet Union in December 1991 by a loosely co-ordinated
9 The same logic of explanation can be applied to the institutional sphere: some kinds of risk­
taking are perceived as 'reasonable risks' by social institutions, providing that large segments of 
the population engage in these risks or agree in general with the cost-benefit analysis that 
underlies them. Such an institutional tolerance may be considerable even in totalitarian societies, 
providing that people respect the existing system and do not attempt rebellion against it. The 
generally benevolent approach of legislators, medical professionals, and social workers to 
abortion seekers in Eastern Europe should be interpreted in these terms.
10 This 'cultural', rather than 'technological', explanation seems to be supported by Wildavsky and 
Dake (1990: 56-57) who, after reviewing a range of sociological and anthropological studies on 
risk perceptions in the U.S., conclude:
[These studies] reveal that the most powerful factor of predicting risk perceptions is trust in 
institutions or ideology.... risk perceptions and preferences are predictable given individual 
differences in cultural biases... individuals perceive a variety of risks in a manner that 
supports their way of life.
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body of newly independent states has brought to an end a particular type of 
political, economic, and welfare system. Most authors commenting on these 
events (Ash, 1990; Dahrendorf, 1990; Sword, 1990) arrived at the conclusion 
that the Eastern European revolutions of 1989 had an epochal meaning, but at 
the same time lacked the pathos of novelty, as their endeavour was to restore 
the ideas and claims of the Enlightenment, of the American and French 
revolutions, the rights of man and the citizen, and the sovereignty of the people. 
Most of the observers also agreed that what happened was the end of 
socialism, and that the restoration of democracy, liberalism, and capitalism 
would inevitably follow. Not surprisingly, many demographers were convinced 
that Eastern European populations would soon 'adopt' the demographic patterns 
of the West.
Today, there is much less certainty that the fall of socialist order automatically 
guarantees the introduction of liberal-democratic regimes. While statements on 
the death of Soviet-style socialism remain valid, those that deal with the return 
from bureaucratic state collectivism to liberalism appear to be dangerous 
simplifications. The probability of their realization differs substantially from one 
post-communist country to another. At the moment, there is no certainty that 
post-communist countries' development will be in the direction to democracy and 
a properly-ordered market economy. To establish permanent democracies in 
these countries will require considerable long-term effort, even when the internal 
and external conditions appear to favour such development. Post-communist 
societies may evolve in any number of directions: some may succeed in building 
the political and constitutional foundations of democracy, but may struggle with 
sluggish economic and social transformations; others may deteriorate into new 
forms of non-democratic, though not necessarily fascist, government; still others 
may almost undiscernibly emerge as new types of authoritarian 'quasi­
democracies' with strong governments or strong leaders, with dirigiste 
economies, displaying neonationalist features and accepting forms of mafia- 
style rulelessness.
One feature that has characterized the post-1989 era in Eastern Europe is the 
drama of self-discovery. Step by step, the post-communist states have been 
discovering that they are left with crippled societies, with the remnants of 
dogmatism, the inertia of state-centralist practices, the egalitarian-uniformist 
psychology, the proliferation of mediocrity and hypocrisy, and the absence of a 
long-range horizon for social action and motivation for people. Not surprisingly,
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issues bearing on population reproduction emerge as important topics of debate 
in all of these countries. Welfare policies are at a crossroad: the former, 
'socialist1 model is criticized and rejected in a wholesale way, but the future of 
social policies seems to be still open and largely dependent on progress in 
economic prosperity. 'Socialist' abortion laws are almost universally under attack 
in campaigns by the Catholic church and some, mostly male, politicians who 
assert new-old spiritual and moral values centred on the family and the 
traditional role of women. The only exception, at least for the time being, is 
Romania, where women were previously brutalized by the prohibition of 
abortion. In most other post-communist countries, restrictive legislative 
measures to reduce abortion have already been proposed, although it has only 
been in Poland and Hungary that new laws substantially limiting the availability 
of abortion for non-medical reasons have actually been adopted.11 A 
countervailing, 'abortion-rights' pressure stems from the emergence of new 
autonomous women's movements and 'pro-choice' organizations, but these 
appear to be relatively slow in ripening (Einhorn, 1993; Funk and Mueller, 1993). 
The potentially wider availability of non-surgical abortion (RU 486) is likely to add 
still another dimension to abortion debates in Eastern Europe; this technique 
reduces the risks associated with surgical abortion, gives women a greater 
sense of control and privacy, and lessens the contrast between contraception 
and abortion from many perspectives.
Clearly, a great deal of divergence in the politics of individual post-communist 
states is taking place as each country struggles to achieve economic and 
political stability. Regrettably, many issues in the sphere of policy which should 
be seen as primarily social or economic topics represent in reality delicate, 
highly symbolic political issues. Not incidentally, in political debates in Eastern 
Europe today abortion has a very different meaning from that in the 
contemporary United States, or in other regions of the world. Cultural 
conceptualizations about abortion are part of quite different discourses, less 
linked to sexuality, women's autonomy and the private sphere, but rather 
involving notions such as anti-communist moral philosophy, nationhood, 
demographic decline, and the defence of humanity, within the construction of 
the newly open arena of Eastern European politics. The abortion debate is thus
11 See Fuszara (1993), Nowicka (1993), Zielinska (1993), Berbik (1994), David and Titkow (1994), 
and Gal (1994) for more detailed reviews of restrictive abortion policies in Poland and Hungary. It 
should be stressed that the Polish case has been more serious: the campaign to criminalize 
abortion was accompanied by campaigns to outlaw sex education and to prohibit contraception, 
and has resulted in a near total legal ban on abortion. In contrast, the new Hungarian legislation 
retains moderately liberal provisions.
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one of the crucial sites in which much broader political arguments are being 
discussed. The difficulty is that this 'over-politicization1 tends to overshadow the 
true nature of the abortion problem and makes the necessary policy changes 
difficult and lengthy.
From the point of view of ordinary people, however, the effects of recent political 
changes appear to be somewhat less dramatic. The situation relevant to 
abortion is no exception. It is true that in countries like the former East Germany, 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Poland and Hungary, the supplies of modern 
means of contraception are now, thanks to the privatization of the consumer 
goods and pharmaceutical markets, much better that they were a few years ago. 
But there are still many spheres of reproductive life where individuals have not 
much choice. Institutional inertia is most evident in the area of health services, 
where it seems extremely difficult to shift professional attitudes away from 
curative to preventive health care in general, and from abortion to contraception 
in particular (Visser et al., 1994). Similarly, the tradition of public as well as 
private silence in sexual matters is unlikely to die easily, despite the fact that 
Western-style sex-oriented journalism and pornography has glutted Eastern 
European mass media, being greeted by some as a sign of the end of 
censorship. Moreover, it seems clear that inasmuch as children are the 
manifestation of the survival of their parents' identity and value systems, they 
may also carry the reproductive culture of previous generations. For more than 
40 years, people were brought up to expect protection from the state, and it is 
an open question when they will start to perceive the environment that 
surrounds them as entirely new and requiring new thinking and new behaviour. 
In short, the reasons for and the circumstances surrounding recourse to abortion 
as a substantial means of limiting family size have brought about a widespread 
societal pattern that is likely to pass away only gradually. Obviously, inter­
country differences in policy strategies and socio-economic conditions are likely 
to play a part in shaping the demographic futures of individual Eastern 
European populations. Thus, like the communist interlude itself, the post­
communist recovery from this aspect of the region's legacy promises to be an 
historic, unprecedented, and regionally highly diversified process.
There is still not enough attention paid by decision-makers, medical 
professionals and demographers to the problem of abortion in Eastern Europe 
as a socio-cultural phenomenon, given its scope and consequences for 
populations. Much still has to be accomplished to recognize the true dimensions
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of the abortion 'epidemics', and to reduce the demographic function of abortion 
to a 'last resort' — a back-up method for rare failures of normally efficient 
contraception, which many would agree is the only role it deserves in a civilized 
society. Bringing the issue out in the open and forcing societies at large to face 
the problem, instead of hiding it, has been only the first necessary step in 
moving towards a more acceptable birth control regime. It is clear that there is a 
great need for further demographic research. How should future research look? 
One could answer this question at length; the following is a summary of the 
main recommendations stemming from this study.
In the present fundamental social, economic, and political transformations of 
Eastern European societies, with shifts from command to market economies and 
from authoritarian to democratic forms of government, the study of abortion 
behaviour can be seen as a microcosm of the process and effect of social 
change itself. Eastern European populations are in a singular condition which 
would repay close monitoring. Some studies have already examined the 
economic and political aspects of the transition from communist rule, but the 
social and demographic dimensions have not yet received a great deal of 
attention. These dimensions are less immediately evident than the high politics 
of free elections and government changes or the spectacle of large-scale 
economic reforms, but they are nonetheless critical. Demographic data may 
provide a useful supplement, or even corrective, to the already available 
evidence for assessing the effects of changes in ideologies, cultural patterns, 
socio-political conditions, and levels of material welfare.
The end of the Cold War did not bring automatic ease of communication across 
the former East-West divide. On the contrary, just as the ignorance of some 
Western scholars about living conditions under Soviet-style socialism led to 
many oversimplifications in the past, so a lack of awareness of the great 
difference in life experiences of individuals in these countries from those in the 
West and from each other, leads to misunderstanding in the present. Not only is 
the supposed systemic congruence of the developments in the West and in the 
East a myth; in Eastern Europe, people's imaginings, hopes and perceptions 
about the current transformation process are very much conditioned by their 
experience of changes as well as by their differing histories and cultural 
backgrounds. The values, attitudes, and political, economic, and reproductive 
behaviour of these populations — which represent a bizarre combination of pre­
communist values, Marxist teachings, and the survival techniques that grew out
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of a culture of permanent scarcity — continue to influence the transition to a 
post-communist society. Similarly, some policies of the new Eastern European 
governments are reactions to the perceived failures of the old system, rather 
than results of autonomous political debates. Future research should take 
account of the heritage of the still recent past.
At this early stage in post-communist history, it is difficult to sort legacies of 
communism from pure aftermath. Technically, the term 'aftermath' refers to the 
condition of a field after the harvest; for grain, for example, it would consist of 
stubble, chaff, weeds, and gleanings. Conceptually, such leftovers are usually 
thought of as transient but potentially negative features. At present, the poor 
quality of preventive medical care and sex education throughout Eastern Europe 
may be regarded as parts of the social aftermath of Soviet-style socialism. A 
legacy, on the other hand, is usually conceived of as an enduring 
intergenerational transfer from the past to the present. Expectations of free, 
universal education, health and abortion services exemplify the legacies of 
communism. A natural task for future analysts is to assess the separate effects 
of aftermath and legacies on the demographic behaviour of the next 
generations.
Up to now, demographic analyses of abortion behaviour in Eastern Europe have 
been based almost exclusively on registration or large-scale survey data.12 
Methodologically and conceptually, the necessary step in future research is to 
leave the realm of aggregate analysis and to make use of the individual-level 
approach. As a monitoring activity, demography has not yet completed its job of 
supplying a comprehensive body of abortion numbers, rates, and ratios for 
individual Eastern European countries. But the essential task of future research 
is to make explicit the role of abortion in individual or family reproductive 
histories; to trace the pathways and time sequences that lead from establishing 
a sexual union to an unintended conception and later to an abortion, and thus to 
provide a clearer picture of the underlying behavioural process as well as the 
preference and choice problems that it entails. An important part of such 
research should include assessing attitudes towards various methods of fertility 
regulation, as well as attitudes to planning and taking the initiative rather than 
being fatalistic about life. The individual level is likewise the needed focus for a 
more subtle treatment of the demographic and cultural characteristics of
12 Among the few analyses based on individual-level data are the studies by Anderson (1987, 
1991) and Anderson et al. (1992) focusing on reproductive histories of Soviet female immigrants 
to the United States, and on Estonian women.
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abortion seekers, for an assessment of the cost-benefit decisions they make, 
and for the formulation of testable hypotheses which are indispensable for 
generating convincing explanations. There is still a lot of good demographic 
research waiting to be written on abortion in developed societies. Eastern 
European populations, with their still high abortion rates, rich opportunities for 
acquiring retrospective data, and hitherto low public aversion to micro-level 
surveying, are likely to provide an almost ideal environment for such research.
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Table A3.1: Total fertility rates for Eastern European countries, 1950-90
Year Albania Bulgaria Czecho­
slovakia
East
Germany
Hungary Poland Romania Yugo­
slavia
USSR
1950 6.01 2.94 3.04 2.41 2.60 3.71 3.14 3.74
1951 2.45 3.02 2.46 2.53 3.74 3.01 3.31
1952 2.44 2.97 2.42 2.47 3.67 2.98 3.61 2.82
1953 2.41 2.87 2.40 2.76 3.61 2.76 3.49
1954 2.35 2.83 2.38 2.97 3.58 2.98 3.33 2.90
1955 6.76 2.41 2.85 2.37 2.81 3.63 3.07 3.09
1956 2.36 2.83 2.30 2.60 3.50 2.89 3.02
1957 2.26 2.75 2.24 2.30 3.49 2.73 2.78 2.81
1958 2.23 2.57 2.22 2.18 3.36 2.59 2.79
1959 2.23 2.39 2.36 2.09 3.22 2.43 2.70 2.84
1960 6.52 2.31 2.39 2.35 2.02 2.99 2.34 2.75 2.80
1961 2.29 2.38 2.42 1.94 2.83 2.17 2.72 2.68
1962 2.24 2.34 2.42 1.79 2.72 2.04 2.69 2.60
1963 2.21 2.50 2.47 1.81 2.70 2.01 2.67 2.53
1964 2.19 2.51 2.48 1.82 2.59 1.96 2.64 2.46
1965 6.85 2.09 2.37 2.45 1.81 2.53 1.91 2.70 2.46
1966 2.02 2.22 2.39 1.88 2.43 1.91 2.64 2.43
1967 2.03 2.09 2.29 2.01 2.31 3.66 2.56 2.39
1968 2.28 2.01 2.25 2.06 2.25 3.64 2.48 2.37
1969 2.28 2.04 2.21 2.03 2.21 3.20 2.45 2.39
1970 5.16 2.18 2.07 2.17 1.97 2.23 2.89 2.29 2.44
1971 2.11 2.13 2.10 1.92 2.25 2.67 2.38 2.47
1972 2.04 2.22 1.79 1.93 2.24 2.55 2.37 2.43
1973 2.16 2.39 1.58 1.95 2.25 2.44 2.31 2.41
1974 2.30 2.50 1.55 2.31 2.26 2.72 2.29 2.41
1975 2.23 2.46 1.55 2.38 2.27 2.62 2.28 2.39
1976 2.25 2.43 1.64 2.26 2.30 2.58 2.27 2.37
1977 2.21 2.38 1.85 2.17 2.23 2.60 2.20 2.32
1978 2.15 2.37 1.90 2.08 2.22 2.54 2.16 2.29
1979 2.15 2.33 1.90 2.03 2.27 2.50 2.13 2.26
1980 3.62 2.05 2.15 1.97 1.93 2.28 2.45 2.14 2.25
1981 3.44 2.01 2.09 1.89 1.88 2.23 2.37 2.08 2.29
1982 3.56 2.02 2.10 1.88 1.79 2.34 2.17 2.13 2.37
1983 3.25 2.01 2.08 1.81 1.73 2.42 2.01 2.10 2.41
1984 3.38 1.99 2.07 1.76 1.74 2.37 2.19 2.11 2.41
1985 3.26 1.98 2.06 1.76 1.83 2.33 2.31 2.04 2.46
1986 3.11 2.02 2.02 1.72 1.83 2.22 2.40 2.01 2.53
1987 3.16 1.95 1.98 1.75 1.81 2.15 2.39 2.00 2.53
1988 3.03 1.97 2.00 1.67 1.79 2.13 2.31 1.98 2.45
1989 2.96 1.88 1.93 1.56 1.78 2.09 2.20 1.88 2.34
1990 3.03 1.74 1.94 1.41 1.83 2.05 1.83 1.84 2.27
Sources: UN (1977, 1992d, 1993b), Blayo (1987,1991a,b), Vishnevsky (1988), Dishnica 
and Galanxhi (1991), Ely (1991), Festy (1991), Meksi and laquinta (1991), Lutz and 
Scherbov (1994).
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Table A3.2: Age-specific fertility rates for Eastern European countries,
selected years, 1950-90
Country Year ___________________Age group___________________ TFR
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
Albania 1950 39.4 241.4 292.4 254.1 200.2 111.0 64.3 6.01
1955 56.8 245.8 306.0 304.5 240.7 119.9 77.8 6.76
1960 62.4 262.1 294.4 253.8 226.6 141.1 62.6 6.52
1965 67.0 285.2 325.0 275.1 212.3 141.7 64.2 6.85
1970 39.0 275.3 266.4 214.5 145.9 68.6 22.3 5.16
1980 21.9 188.7 223.2 158.5 93.6 32.8 4.7 3.62
1987 15.6 167.9 219.2 139.0 68.8 19.4 2.9 3.16
Bulgaria 1955 60.1 179.8 129.8 64.1 33.1 10.5 1.9 2.41
1960 75.0 187.2 120.1 51.3 19.7 7.2 1.0 2.31
1965 68.5 178.4 104.5 45.1 16.7 4.4 0.9 2.09
1970 71.5 189.2 111.6 45.0 14.8 3.2 0.4 2.18
1975 75.4 198.3 115.2 42.4 12.8 2.9 0.2 2.23
1980 81.2 192.9 92.8 32.2 9.7 2.1 0.2 2.05
1985 78.4 179.5 92.6 33.2 9.5 1.9 0.1 1.98
1987 77.1 178.1 91.0 32.3 9.9 2.1 0.1 1.95
Czechoslovakia 1950 50.7 194.1 169.1 108.8 62.5 21.5 1.8 3.04
1955 44.4 200.6 160.8 95.7 51.7 16.8 1.4 2.85
1960 46.0 198.7 131.8 63.8 29.1 8.8 0.6 2.39
1965 45.2 193.4 134.8 65.8 27.2 6.9 0.5 2.37
1970 45.6 180.5 113.9 51.5 18.6 4.5 0.3 2.07
1975 55.6 211.5 140.1 60.6 20.4 3.8 0.2 2.46
1980 51.3 199.5 116.0 46.0 14.8 2.9 0.1 2.15
1985 52.8 192.8 109.2 42.2 13.0 2.0 0.1 2.06
1990 44.8 178.9 109.3 40.7 12.6 2.0 0.1 1.94
East Germany 1950 28.9 159.1 141.6 88.9 46.1 14.8 1.7 2.41
1955 31.4 163.0 138.4 84.7 42.8 13.5 0.8 2.37
1960 36.5 167.1 139.0 77.6 37.4 10.9 0.7 2.35
1965 70.7 191.0 124.4 68.7 29.8 6.6 0.3 2.45
1970 77.6 171.8 106.2 53.1 22.1 3.2 0.1 2.17
1975 46.9 143.7 79.6 27.7 10.3 2.4 0.1 1.55
1980 37.4 185.6 114.8 44.8 9.6 2.2 0.2 1.97
1985 29.8 157.7 110.9 38.9 12.8 1.4 0.1 1.76
1988 22.6 145.6 110.8 40.8 11.9 1.9 0.1 1.67
Hungary 1950 51.2 169.8 139.8 88.7 50.4 18.6 1.6 2.60
1955 54.1 191.0 151.0 95.3 52.4 16.4 1.3 2.81
1960 52.6 159.4 105.4 52.9 25.0 8.0 0.5 2.02
1965 42.2 147.6 100.5 47.8 18.2 4.7 0.4 1.81
1970 50.4 159.3 110.3 51.4 18.4 4.3 0.3 1.97
1975 72.6 183.5 133.8 62.0 20.2 4.2 0.2 2.38
1980 68.7 158.6 100.0 40.9 13.7 2.9 0.2 1.93
1985 52.1 152.5 102.9 43.0 13.6 2.6 0.1 1.83
1990 39.5 147.2 115.4 46.9 16.4 2.6 0.0 1.83
(cont.)
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Table A3.2 (cont.)
Country Year ____________________ Age group__________________ TFR
_____ _______________15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
Poland 1950 39.0 193.8 209.5 157.4 99.8 38.0 3.9 3.71
1955 42.2 208.9 203.9 144.6 89.8 32.4 3.4 3.63
1960 31.2 195.5 172.4 108.7 63.2 25.2 2.5 2.99
1965 31.7 185.0 144.7 84.3 43.7 14.9 1.6 2.53
1970 29.7 162.0 131.5 73.3 36.9 11.3 0.9 2.23
1975 31.4 170.1 136.5 71.4 33.9 10.0 0.7 2.27
1980 32.9 179.6 136.4 69.1 28.9 7.5 0.6 2.28
1985 35.1 182.6 140.7 69.9 30.2 6.9 0.5 2.33
1988 22.5 159.9 135.6 69.8 29.1 7.9 0.5 2.13
Romania 1956 52.5 180.4 155.9 103.5 58.8 23.8 2.7 2.89
1960 59.1 165.8 122.0 67.9 39.7 13.7 1.5 2.34
1965 52.6 140.7 99.8 53.5 25.1 8.9 0.8 1.91
1970 66.0 201.4 151.6 94.9 48.8 13.8 0.9 2.89
1975 69.5 197.8 138.5 71.4 36.7 10.0 0.7 2.62
1980 72.9 200.4 126.8 58.3 25.0 6.5 0.5 2.45
1985 50.3 190.5 130.8 59.8 22.9 6.4 0.6 2.31
Yugoslavia 1950 38.7 198.4 201.2 160.4 92.3 46.1 10.8 3.74
1955 29.9 178.9 182.1 119.1 61.4 37.2 8.6 3.09
1960 36.6 169.8 161.8 99.6 52.1 20.6 5.7 2.75
1965 48.7 189.4 152.5 86.2 42.9 15.0 6.1 2.70
1970 51.8 161.9 125.2 72.2 34.2 10.8 2.0 2.29
1975 55.0 163.8 127.2 68.0 31.0 9.5 1.2 2.28
1980 48.2 161.9 120.6 62.7 26.1 7.5 1.0 2.14
1984 44.5 160.6 125.4 60.3 24.3 6.0 0.7 2.11
1987 40.7 150.9 124.2 57.1 21.5 5.5 0.6 2.00
USSR 1954 15.6 146.9 172.9 127.6 74.4 35.4 7.1 2.90
1960 35.2 164.8 160.7 110.0 60.7 23.5 4.8 2.80
1965 25.5 159.6 136.0 97.0 50.6 19.1 4.4 2.46
1969 30.4 163.9 128.7 88.1 48.5 15.3 2.9 2.39
1974 34.3 176.8 133.5 77.9 42.7 14.4 1.8 2.41
1980 41.0 177.8 124.5 66.9 29.6 9.3 1.4 2.25
1984 43.2 187.2 138.0 73.0 31.1 7.0 0.8 2.41
1988 46.8 191.0 138.8 73.9 31.1 7.9 0.6 2.45
Sources: Teitelbaum (1972), UN (1977,1992d), Vishnevsky (1988), Ely (1991),
FSO (1991), Meksi and laquinta (1991).
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Table A5.1: Births and abortions, rates and ratios: Albania, 1950-90
Live 
births 
Year (1,000s)
Legally
induced
abortions
(1,000s)
Other
abortions
(1,000s)
Total 
registered 
abortions 
(1,000s)
Rate per 1,000 
population 
live legal
births abortions
Rate per 1,000 Legal
women (15-44) abortions
live legal per 100
births abortions live births
1950 47.3 38.9 188.4
1951 47.8 38.5
1952 44.7 35.2
1953 53.3 40.9
1954 54.6 40.8
1955 61.3 44.5 209.9
1956 59.6 41.9
1957 57.2 39.1
1958 63.0 41.8
1959 65.2 41.9
1960 69.7 43.4 212.5
1961 68.5 41.2
1962 67.2 39.3
1963 69.0 39.1
1964 68.6 37.8
1965 65.7 35.2 175.2
1966 65.1 34.0
1967 69.3 35.3
1968 71.9 35.6
1969 73.5 35.3
1970 69.5 32.5 158.0
1971 72.8 33.3
1972 73.1 32.8
1973 69.4 30.4
1974 71.5 30.6
1975 70.2 29.4 148.4
1976 70.1 28.7
1977 73.1 29.3
1978 70.1 27.5
1979 72.1 27.5
1980 70.7 2.8 13.1 15.9 26.5 1.0 121.9 4.8 3.9
1981 72.2 26.5
1982 77.2 27.8
1983 73.8 26.0
1984 79.2 27.3
1985 77.5 4.2 16.3 20.5 26.2 1.4 118.2 6.4 5.4
1986 76.4 25.3
1987 79.7 25.9
1988 80.2 25.6
1989 78.9 3.6 19.7 23.4 24.7 1.1 108.4 5.0 4.6
1990 81.9 5.6 20.5 26.1 25.2 1.7 109.9 7.5 6.8
Sources: Dishnica and Galanxhi (1991), UN (1992c, 1993a), Dumani (1993).
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Table A5.2: Births and abortions, rates and ratios: Bulgaria, 1950-90
Year
Live 
births 
(1,000s)
Legally
induced
abortions
(1,000s)
Other 
abortions 
(1,000s)
Total
registered
abortions
(1,000s)
Rate per 1,000 
population 
live legal
births abortions
Rate per 1,000 
women (15-44) 
live legal
births abortions
Legal 
abortions 
per 100 
live births
1950 182.6 25.2 105.2
1951 152.8 21.1 87.9
1952 154.0 21.2 88.3
1953 153.2 1.1 16.3 17.4 20.9 0.2 87.6 0.6 0.7
1954 149.9 0.9 17.7 18.6 20.2 0.1 85.6 0.5 0.6
1955 151.0 2.2 16.9 19.1 20.1 0.3 86.2 1.2 1.5
1956 a 147.9 2.0 38.0 40.0 19.5 0.3 84.9 1.2 1.4
1957 141.0 31.7 14.5 46.2 18.4 4.1 81.2 18.2 22.5
1958 138.3 38.1 17.4 55.5 17.9 4.9 79.2 21.8 27.5
1959 136.9 46.2 18.2 64.4 17.6 5.9 78.0 26.3 33.7
1960 140.1 51.0 23.9 74.9 17.8 6.5 79.7 29.0 36.4
1961 137.9 62.5 26.9 89.4 17.4 7.9 77.5 35.0 45.3
1962 134.1 75.1 23.4 98.5 16.7 9.4 73.9 41.5 56.0
1963 132.1 81.0 22.8 103.8 16.4 10.0 71.3 44.1 61.3
1964 131.0 91.5 20.8 112.3 16.1 11.3 69.7 49.0 69.9
1965 125.8 96.6 19.4 116.0 15.3 11.8 66.4 51.0 76.8
1966 123.0 101.5 19.6 121.1 14.9 12.3 64.7 53.5 82.5
1967 124.6 108.5 21.4 129.9 15.0 13.0 65.8 57.2 87.0
1968 b 141.5 89.2 24.3 113.5 16.9 10.6 74.7 47.1 63.1
1969 143.1 106.9 22.8 129.7 17.0 12.7 75.6 56.4 74.7
1970 138.7 119.7 22.6 142.3 16.3 14.1 73.4 63.2 86.3
1971 135.4 131.3 22.4 153.7 15.9 15.4 72.4 69.5 97.0
1972 131.3 132.2 22.2 154.4 15.3 15.4 69.8 70.2 100.7
1973 c 139.7 112.3 25.1 137.4 16.2 13.0 74.4 59.7 80.4
1974 d 149.2 121.7 22.8 144.5 17.2 14.0 79.6 64.8 81.5
1975 144.7 120.4 23.1 143.5 16.6 13.8 77.4 64.3 83.2
1976 144.9 121.1 21.2 142.3 16.5 13.8 77.7 64.9 83.6
1977 141.7 121.6 20.1 141.7 16.1 13.8 76.4 65.4 85.8
1978 136.4 127.8 19.9 147.7 15.5 14.5 73.8 69.0 93.7
1979 135.4 128.5 19.4 147.9 15.3 14.6 75.5 69.6 94.9
1980 128.2 136.3 19.6 155.9 14.5 15.8 73.8 76.7 106.3
1981 124.4 132.7 19.6 152.4 14.0 15.4 68.2 74.9 106.7
1982 124.2 129.4 18.4 147.8 13.9 14.9 68.2 73.1 104.2
1983 123.0 116.0 18.2 134.2 13.8 13.4 67.3 65.7 94.3
1984 122.3 112.6 18.5 131.1 13.6 12.6 66.6 61.9 92.1
1985 119.0 112.2 19.8 132.0 13.3 12.5 64.7 61.1 94.3
1986 120.1 114.3 20.4 134.7 13.4 12.8 65.8 62.7 95.2
1987 116.7 113.0 20.8 133.8 13.0 12.6 63.0 61.0 96.9
1988 117.4 111.7 13.1 12.4 63.0 60.0 95.1
1989 112.3 111.0 21.0 132.0 12.5 12.4 59.9 59.2 98.9
1990 e 105.2 127.6 17.0 144.6 11.7 14.2 56.0 77.0 121.3
Notes: a - abortion available on request (April 1956); b - abortion restricted for childless women 
(January 1968); c - restrictions further tightened (April 1973); d - restrictions somewhat re­
laxed; (February 1974); e - first trimester abortions available on request (February 1990) 
Sources: David and McIntyre (1981), Tietze and Henshaw (1986), Blayo (1991a, 1993a), UN (1992c)
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Table A5.3: Births and abortions, rates and ratios: Czechoslovakia, 1950-90
Legally Total Rate per 1,000 Rate per 1,000 Legal
Live induced Other registered population women (15-44) abortions
Year
births
(1,000s)
abortions
(1,000s)
abortions
(1,000s)
abortions
(1,000s)
live
births
legal
abortions
live
births
legal
abortions
per 100 
live births
1950 288.1 23.3 103.4
1951 286.2 22.8 103.3
1952 281.0 22.2 102.2
1953 271.7 30.6 21.2 99.6
1954 266.7 2.8 30.6 33.4 20.6 0.2 98.5 1.0 1.0
1955 265.2 2.1 33.0 35.1 20.3 0.2 98.4 0.8 0.8
1956 262.0 3.1 31.0 34.1 19.8 0.2 97.4 1.1 1.2
1957 a 252.7 7.3 30.2 37.5 18.9 0.5 94.1 2.7 2.9
1958 235.0 61.4 27.7 89.1 17.4 4.6 87.4 22.8 26.1
1959 217.0 79.1 26.4 105.5 16.0 5.8 80.5 29.3 36.5
1960 217.3 88.3 26.3 114.6 15.9 6.5 79.9 32.5 40.6
1961 218.4 94.3 26.0 120.3 15.8 6.8 78.7 34.0 43.2
1962 b 217.5 89.8 26.1 115.9 15.7 6.5 76.3 31.5 41.3
1963 236.0 70.5 29.4 99.9 16.9 5.1 80.5 24.1 29.9
1964 241.3 70.7 28.5 99.2 17.2 5.0 80.7 23.6 29.3
1965 231.7 79.6 26.2 105.8 16.4 5.6 76.6 26.3 34.4
1966 c 222.6 90.3 25.5 115.8 15.6 6.3 73.0 29.6 40.5
1967 216.0 96.4 24.8 121.2 15.1 6.7 70.4 31.4 44.6
1968 d 213.8 99.9 24.2 124.1 14.9 7.0 69.3 32.4 46.7
1969 d 222.9 102.8 24.4 127.2 15.5 7.1 72.1 33.3 46.1
1970 d 228.5 99.8 25.3 125.1 15.9 7.0 74.0 32.3 43.7
1971 d 237.2 97.3 25.6 122.9 16.5 6.8 76.6 31.4 41.0
1972 d 251.5 91.3 28.3 119.6 17.4 6.3 80.7 29.3 36.3
1973 d,e 274.7 81.2 30.2 111.5 18.9 5.6 87.7 25.9 29.6
1974 291.8 83.1 30.3 113.4 19.9 5.7 92.8 26.4 28.5
1975 289.4 81.7 30.1 111.8 19.6 5.5 91.9 25.9 28.2
1976 287.2 84.6 30.6 115.1 19.3 5.7 91.0 26.8 29.5
1977 281.3 89.0 29.8 118.8 18.7 5.9 88.9 28.1 31.6
1978 279.1 92.5 29.8 122.3 18.4 6.1 87.8 29.1 33.2
1979 272.4 94.5 28.8 123.2 17.9 6.2 85.0 29.5 34.7
1980 248.9 100.2 27.0 127.2 16.3 6.5 77.1 31.0 40.2
1981 237.7 103.5 27.2 130.8 15.5 6.8 73.3 31.9 43.5
1982 234.4 107.6 26.4 134.1 15.2 7.0 71.8 33.0 45.9
1983 229.5 108.7 26.4 135.1 14.9 7.0 69.9 33.1 47.4
1984 227.8 113.8 26.4 140.2 14.7 7.4 69.0 34.5 50.0
1985 226.0 119.3 25.6 145.0 14.6 7.7 68.1 36.0 52.8
1986 f 220.5 124.2 25.4 149.6 14.2 8.0 66.1 37.3 56.3
1987 214.9 159.3 25.5 184.8 13.8 10.2 64.1 47.5 74.1
1988 215.9 164.7 24.0 188.7 13.8 10.6 63.9 48.7 76.3
1989 208.5 160.3 22.5 182.8 13.3 10.2 61.2 47.0 76.9
1990 210.6 159.7 22.5 182.2 13.4 10.2 61.2 46.4 75.9
Notes: a - abortion law liberalized (December 1957); b - restriction of abortion law (December 1962);
c - restrictions mildly relaxed (July 1966); d - pronatalist measures introduced (July 1968-April 
1973); e- availability of abortion restricted (June 1973); f - abortion committees abolished 
(November 1986)
Sources: Vojta (1961), FSO (1982, 1991).
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Table A5.4: Births and abortions, rates and ratios: East Germany, 1950-90
Year
Live
births
(1,000s)
Legally
induced
abortions
(1,000s)
Other
abortions
(1,000s)
Total
registered
abortions
(1,000s)
Rate per 1,000 
population 
live legal
births abortions
Rate per 1,000 
women (15-44) 
live legal
births abortions
Legal 
abortions 
per 100 
live births
1950 a 303.9 26.4 55.6 82.0 14.3 1.4 73.1 6.3 8.7
1951 310.8 5.0 59.0 64.0 16.5 1.4 76.1 1.2 1.6
1952 306.0 3.6 58.4 62.0 16.9 0.3 76.5 0.9 1.2
1953 298.9 2.4 61.6 64.0 16.7 0.2 75.9 0.6 0.8
1954 293.7 1.7 61.3 63.0 16.4 0.1 75.9 0.4 0.6
1955 293.3 1.2 49.1 50.3 16.3 0.1 77.1 0.3 0.4
1956 281.3 1.0 45.9 46.9 16.4 0.1 75.2 0.3 0.4
1957 273.3 0.9 43.3 44.2 16.8 0.1 73.8 0.2 0.3
1958 271.4 0.9 43.3 44.2 16.6 0.1 76.9 0.3 0.3
1959 292.0 0.8 43.5 44.3 15.7 0.1 83.2 0.2 0.3
1960 293.0 0.8 38.2 39.0 16.9 0.1 82.4 0.2 0.3
1961 300.8 0.8 39.7 40.5 17.0 0.1 88.6 0.2 0.3
1962 298.0 0.7 39.9 40.6 17.6 0.1 88.1 0.2 0.2
1963 301.5 0.7 17.4 0.1 88.4 0.2 0.2
1964 291.9 0.8 43.3 44.1 17.6 0.1 87.4 0.2 0.3
1965 b 281.1 11.4* 17.2 0.7* 84.3 3.6* 4.1*
1966 268.0 21.9* 16.5 1.3* 79.0 7.1* 8.2*
1967 252.8 22.5* 15.7 1.3* 74.5 7.2* 8.9*
1968 245.1 21.5* 14.8 1.3* 73.3 6.8* 8.8*
1969 239.3 19.6* 14.3 1.1* 71.0 6.1* 8.2*
1970 236.9 20.3* 14.0 1.2* 69.6 6.2* 8.6*
1971 235.0 18.7 32.0 50.7 13.9 1.1 69.2 5.2 8.0
1972 c 200.4 115.6 27.7 143.3 13.8 6.8 58.6 33.1 57.7
1973 180.3 110.8 22.1 132.9 11.8 6.5 52.4 32.2 61.5
1974 179.1 99.7 21.7 121.4 10.6 5.9 59.9 28.8 55.7
1975 181.8 87.8 21.6 109.4 10.8 5.2 52.3 25.2 48.3
1976 d 195.5 81.9 23.7 105.6 11.6 4.9 55.6 23.3 41.9
1977 223.1 78.9 25.0 103.9 13.3 4.7 62.8 22.2 35.4
1978 232.2 76.2 13.9 4.5 64.7 21.4 32.8
1979 235.3 86.5 14.1 5.2 64.9 23.9 36.8
1980 245.1 88.6 14.6 5.3 67.4 24.4 36.1
1981 237.5 90.3 14.2 5.4 65.3 24.8 38.0
1982 240.1 90.4 14.4 5.4 66.2 26.5 37.7
1983 233.8 92.5 14.0 5.5 64.6 25.6 39.6
1984 228.1 96.2 13.7 5.8 63.6 26.8 42.2
1985 227.6 90.5 13.5 5.4 64.1 25.5 39.8
1986 222.3 85.4 13.4 5.1 63.3 24.3 38.4
1987 226.0 82.2 13.6 4.9 64.6 23.5 36.4
1988 215.7 80.8 12.9 4.9 62.0 23.2 37.5
1989 198.9 73.9 12.0 4.4 57.8 21.5 37.1
1990
Notes: a - temporary liberal abortion regulations rescinded (September 1950); b - abortion law libera­
lized (March 1965); c - abortion available on request (March 1972); d - pronatalist incentives 
promulgated (May 1976); * estimates based on data from Rostock area 
Sources: Mehlan (1967, 1988), David and McIntyre (1981), Blayo (1991a), UN (1992c, 1993c).
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Table A5.5: Births and abortions, rates and ratios: Hungary, 1950-90
Legally Total Rate per 1,000 Rate per 1,000 Legal
Year
Live 
births 
(1,000s)
induced 
abortions 
(1,000s)
Other
abortions
(1,000s)
registered
abortions
(1,000s)
population 
live legal
births abortions
women
live
births
(15-44)
legal
abortions
abortions 
per 100 
live births
1950 195.6 1.7 34.3 36.0 20.9 0.2 89.1 0.8 0.9
1951 190.6 1.7 36.1 37.8 20.2 0.2 87.0 0.8 0.9
1952 185.8 1.7 42.0 43.7 19.6 0.2 84.8 0.8 0.9
1953 a 206.9 2.7 40.0 42.7 21.6 0.3 94.6 1.3 1.3
1954 223.3 16.3 42.0 58.3 23.0 1.7 102.3 7.5 7.3
1955 210.4 35.4 43.1 78.5 21.4 3.6 101.2 16.3 16.8
1956 b 192.8 82.5 41.1 123.6 19.5 8.4 89.5 38.3 42.8
1957 167.2 123.4 39.4 162.8 17.0 12.6 78.6 58.0 73.8
1958 158.4 145.6 37.4 183.0 16.0 14.8 74.8 68.7 91.9
1959 151.2 152.4 35.3 187.7 15.2 15.3 71.6 72.1 100.8
1960 146.5 162.2 33.8 196.0 14.7 16.3 69.3 76.7 110.7
1961 140.4 170.0 33.7 203.7 14.0 17.0 65.5 79.4 121.1
1962 130.1 163.7 33.9 197.6 12.9 16.3 59.8 75.3 125.8
1963 132.3 173.8 34.1 207.9 13.1 17.3 60.3 79.2 131.4
1964 132.1 184.4 34.4 218.7 13.1 18.2 58.9 82.2 139.6
1965 133.0 180.3 33.7 214.0 13.1 17.8 59.1 80.1 135.5
1966 138.5 186.8 33.6 220.4 13.6 18.4 61.4 82.8 134.9
1967 148.9 187.5 34.8 222.4 14.6 18.4 66.0 83.1 125.9
1968 154.4 201.1 33.7 234.8 15.1 19.6 68.2 88.8 130.2
1969 154.3 206.8 32.2 239.1 15.0 21.1 67.6 90.6 134.0
1970 151.8 192.3 29.8 222.1 14.7 18.6 66.1 83.5 126.7
1971 150.6 187.4 28.5 215.9 14.5 18.1 65.2 81.1 124.5
1972 153.3 179.0 28.2 207.2 14.7 17.2 66.4 77.5 116.8
1973 156.2 169.7 28.2 197.8 15.0 16.3 67.6 73.5 108.6
1974 c 186.3 102.0 30.7 132.7 17.8 9.7 80.8 44.3 54.8
1975 194.2 96.2 28.2 124.5 18.4 9.1 84.7 41.9 49.5
1976 185.4 94.7 26.3 121.0 17.5 8.9 81.1 41.5 51.1
1977 177.6 89.1 23.5 112.6 16.7 8.4 78.1 39.2 50.2
1978 168.2 83.5 21.7 105.2 15.8 7.8 74.4 37.0 49.7
1979 160.4 80.8 20.5 101.3 15.0 7.5 71.3 35.9 50.4
1980 148.7 80.9 20.0 100.9 13.9 7.6 66.8 36.3 54.4
1981 142.9 78.4 18.1 96.5 13.4 7.3 64.4 35.3 54.9
1982 133.6 78.7 17.5 96.2 12.5 7.3 60.3 35.5 58.9
1983 127.3 78.6 17.0 95.6 11.9 7.4 57.4 35.5 61.8
1984 125.4 82.2 17.9 100.1 11.8 7.7 56.5 37.0 65.6
1985 130.2 82.0 18.0 100.0 12.3 7.7 58.7 36.9 63.0
1986 128.2 83.6 18.3 101.9 12.2 7.9 57.8 37.7 65.2
1987 125.8 84.5 17.7 102.2 12.0 8.1 56.8 38.2 67.2
1988 d 124.3 87.1 18.0 105.1 11.9 8.3 56.1 39.3 70.1
1989 123.3 90.5 17.7 108.2 11.9 8.7 55.5 40.8 73.4
1990 125.7 90.4 17.6 108.0 12.1 8.7 57.3 41.2 71.9
Notes: a - medical boards established for abortions on medical and social indications (January 
1953): b - abortion liberalized (June 1956); c - restrictions on abortion imposed (January 
1974); d - abortion committees abolished (December 1988)
Sources: David and McIntyre (1981), Blayo (1991a, 1993a), CSO (1992).
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Table A5.6: Births and abortions, rates and ratios: Poland, 1950-90
Year
Live 
births 
(1,000s)
Legally
induced
abortions
(1,000s)
Other
abortions
(1,000s)
Total
registered
abortions
(1,000s)
Rate per 1,000 
population 
live legal
births abortions
Rate per 1,000 
women (15-44) 
live legal
births abortions
Legal 
abortions 
per 100 
live births
1950 763.1 30.7 124.0
1951 783.6 1.4 69.5 70.9 31.0 0.1 126.9 0.2 0.2
1952 779.0 1.2 71.9 73.1 30.2 0.0 125.4 0.2 0.2
1953 779.0 1.2 73.3 74.5 29.7 0.0 124.7 0.2 0.2
1954 778.1 29.1 123.8
1955 793.8 1.4 100.2 101.6 29.1 0.1 125.9 0.2 0.2
1956 a 779.8 18.9 85.4 104.3 28.0 0.7 124.0 3.0 2.4
1957 782.3 36.4 85.4 121.8 27.6 1.3 124.7 5.8 4.7
1958 755.5 44.2 82.2 126.4 26.2 1.5 120.7 7.1 5.9
1959 b 722.9 79.0 82.5 161.5 24.7 2.7 116.1 12.7 10.9
1960 669.5 150.4 73.4 223.8 22.6 5.1 107.8 24.2 22.5
1961 627.6 143.8 72.8 216.6 20.9 4.8 99.5 22.8 22.9
1962 599.5 140.4 70.3 210.7 19.8 4.6 92.9 21.8 23.4
1963 588.2 190.0 70.3 260.3 19.2 6.2 89.3 28.8 32.3
1964 562.9 177.5 69.3 246.8 18.1 5.7 83.0 26.2 31.5
1965 546.4 168.6 66.8 235.4 17.3 5.3 78.9 24.3 30.9
1966 530.3 158.0 68.0 226.0 16.7 4.9 75.3 22.4 29.8
1967 520.4 155.0 65.5 220.5 16.3 4.6 72.7 21.6 29.8
1968 524.2 153.6 66.1 219.7 16.2 4.8 71.5 21.0 29.3
1969 531.1 148.8 64.1 212.9 16.3 4.6 71.4 20.0 28.0
1970 546.0 148.3 54.7 203.0 16.6 4.6 73.1 19.9 27.2
1971 562.3 134.9 68.7 203.6 17.2 4.1 74.9 18.0 24.0
1972 575.7 136.6 68.0 204.6 17.4 4.1 75.4 17.9 23.7
1973 598.6 138.2 72.5 210.7 17.9 4.2 77.4 17.9 23.1
1974 621.1 142.4 72.0 214.4 18.4 4.2 79.3 18.2 22.9
1975 643.8 138.6 73.5 212.1 18.9 4.1 81.6 17.6 21.5
1976 670.1 140.9 74.5 215.4 19.5 4.1 84.4 17.8 21.0
1977 662.6 143.5 73.0 216.5 19.1 4.1 83.2 18.0 21.7
1978 666.3 145.6 77.7 223.3 19.0 4.2 83.3 18.2 21.9
1979 688.3 148.6 71.8 220.4 19.5 4.2 86.1 18.6 21.6
1980 c 692.8 133.8 19.5 3.8 86.6 16.7 19.3
1981 678.7 130.1 18.9 3.6 84.7 16.2 19.2
1982 702.4 141.2 19.4 3.9 87.5 17.6 20.1
1983 720.8 135.9 19.7 3.7 89.6 16.9 18.9
1984 699.0 132.8 18.9 3.6 86.7 16.5 19.0
1985 677.6 135.6 18.2 3.6 83.6 16.7 20.0
1986 634.7 129.7 16.9 3.5 77.9 15.9 20.4
1987 605.5 122.5 16.1 3.3 73.7 14.9 20.2
1988 587.7 105.3 80.1 185.4 15.5 2.8 70.8 12.7 17.9
1989 d 562.5 80.1 113.0 193.1 14.8 2.1 67.0 9.5 14.2
1990 545.8 59.4 132.9 192.3 14.3 1.6 64.3 7.0 10.9
Notes: a - abortion law liberalized (April 1956); b - more permissive abortion regulations issued 
(December 1959); c - administrative instructions on abortion slightly restricted (December 
1980); d - restrictive instructions on abortion implemented (March 1989)
Sources: David and McIntyre (1981), Wasilewska-Trenkner (1982), Okolski (1983), UN (1992c), 
Blayo (1993b).
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Table A5.7: Births and abortions, rates and ratios: Romania, 1950-90
Year
Live
births
(1,000s)
Legally
induced
abortions
(1,000s)
Other
abortions
(1,000s)
Total
registered
abortions
(1,000s)
Rate per 1,000 
population 
live legal
births abortions
Rate per 1,000 Legal
women (15-44) abortions
live legal per 100
births abortions live births
1950 426.8 26.2 106.5
1951 412.5 25.1 102.4
1952 413.2 24.8 101.5
1953 401.7 23.8 97.6
1954 422.3 24.8 101.5
1955 442.9 25.6 105.9
1956 425.7 24.2 102.5
1957 a 407.8 22.9 97.9
1958 390.5 112.1 17.4 129.5 21.6 7.2 93.5 31.0 33.2
1959 365.0 219.1 358.9 578.0 20.2 31.8 87.9 139.1 158.4
1960 352.2 769.8 19.1 42.1 83.7 186.1 218.6
1961 324.9 859.5 17.5 46.7 77.8 207.0 264.6
1962 302.0 961.7 16.2 51.8 71.3 226.9 318.4
1963 294.9 1035.0 15.7 55.2 68.5 240.4 351.0
1964 287.4 1097.9 15.2 58.2 65.7 251.6 382.0
1965 278.4 1112.7 14.6 58.6 63.0 252.2 399.7
1966 b 273.7 973.4 14.3 50.5 61.4 218.2 355.7
1967 527.8 51.7 154.1 205.8 27.4 10.6 117.9 46.0 39.0
1968 526.1 220.2 26.7 11.1 116.9 48.9 41.9
1969 465.8 257.5 23.3 12.9 102.8 56.8 55.3
1970 427.0 292.4 21.1 14.4 93.5 64.0 68.5
1971 400.1 341.7 19.5 16.1 86.9 71.7 85.4
1972 389.0 380.6 18.8 18.4 84.0 82.3 97.8
1973 c 378.7 375.8 18.2 18.1 81.3 80.8 99.2
1974 427.7 334.6 20.3 15.9 91.8 71.8 78.2
1975 418.0 359.4 19.7 16.9 89.7 77.1 86.0
1976 417.4 383.2 19.5 17.9 89.7 82.4 91.8
1977 424.0 379.0 19.6 17.5 91.6 81.7 89.4
1978 416.6 394.6 19.1 18.1 90.5 85.7 94.7
1979 410.6 403.8 18.6 18.3 87.7 87.9 98.3
1980 398.9 413.1 18.0 18.6 87.1 90.2 103.6
1981 381.1 427.1 17.0 19.1 83.9 94.0 112.1
1982 344.4 468.0 15.3 20.8 76.1 103.4 135.9
1983 321.5 421.4 14.3 18.7 69.7 91.4 131.1
1984 350.7 303.1 15.5 13.4 74.7 64.6 86.4
1985 d 358.8 302.8 15.8 13.3 75.7 63.9 84.4
1986 184.0 8.1 38.5
1987 383.2 182.4 16.7 8.0 79.3 37.8 47.6
1988 380.0 185.4 16.5 8.0 77.9 38.0 48.8
1989 e 369.5 193.1 16.0 8.3 75.0 39.2 52.2
1990 314.7 992.3 13.6 42.8 63.2 199.3 315.3
Notes: a - abortion legalized on request (September 1957); b - abortion sharply restricted (Septem­
ber 1966); c - slight liberalization of abortion (February 1973); d - further restriction of abortion 
(December 1985); e - first trimester abortion permitted on request (December 1989)
Sources: David and McIntyre (1981), Blayo (1991a), UN (1992c).
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Table A5.8: Births and abortions, rates and ratios: Yugoslavia, 1950-90
Year
Live 
births 
(1,000s)
Legally 
induced 
abortions 
(1,000s)
Other
abortions
(1,000s)
Total
registered
abortions
(1,000s)
Rate per 1,000 
population 
live legal
births abortions
Rate per 1,000 
women (15-44) 
live legal
births abortions
Legal 
abortions 
per 100 
live births
1950 494.2 30.2 127.0
1951 447.4 27.0 112.7
1952 499.3 29.7 124.0
1953 484.1 28.4 118.8
1954 493.6 28.5 122.4
1955 471.4 26.8 112.8
1956 460.2 25.9 110.3
1957 426.7 23.6 101.8
1958 432.4 23.8 103.0
1959 424.3 54.5 57.3 111.8 23.3 3.0 100.7 12.9 12.8
1960 a 432.6 76.7 56.6 133.3 23.5 4.1 103.1 18.3 17.7
1961 422.2 104.7 59.8 164.5 22.7 5.7 101.0 25.1 24.8
1962 413.1 150.0* 50.0* 200.0* 21.9 8.0* 96.0 34.9* 36.3*
1963 407.4 146.8 68.2 215.0 21.4 7.7 92.3 33.3 36.0
1964 401.1 158.6 69.0 227.6 20.8 8.2 88.8 35.1 39.5
1965 408.2 182.4 63.0 245.4 20.9 9.4 89.1 39.8 44.7
1966 399.8 195.5 69.7 265.2 20.3 9.9 86.2 42.2 48.9
1967 389.6 210.7 65.5 276.2 19.5 10.6 83.1 44.9 54.1
1968 382.5 245.8 19.0 80.6
1969 b 381.1 207.3 46.2 253.5 18.9 10.3 80.3 43.9 54.4
1970 361.6 205.0 49.4 254.4 17.8 10.1 75.2 42.6 56.7
1971 373.8 210.1 51.8 261.9 18.2 10.2 77.7 43.6 56.2
1972 380.7 215.8 51.9 267.7 18.3 10.4 78.6 44.6 56.7
1973 379.1 18.1 77.8
1974 382.9 18.1 78.2
1975 388.0 238.7 54.5 293.2 18.2 11.2 78.9 48.5 61.5
1976 392.4 18.2 79.4
1977 384.8 17.7 77.5
1978 380.8 268.7 56.5 325.2 17.3 12.2 76.5 54.0 70.6
1979 378.8 17.1 75.9
1980 382.1 297.3 59.1 356.4 17.1 13.3 76.5 59.5 77.8
1981 376.5 302.7 59.4 362.1 16.8 13.5 75.8 61.0 80.4
1982 377.5 16.7 75.7
1983 379.3 341.2 31.4 372.6 16.6 15.0 75.8 68.2 89.9
1984 377.4 358.3 26.6 384.9 16.4 15.6 75.1 71.3 94.9
1985 366.6 366.0 23.0 388.9 15.9 15.8 72.7 72.6 99.8
1986 359.6 359.1 29.7 388.9 15.5 15.4 70.9 70.8 99.9
1987 359.3 15.3 70.4
1988 356.3 15.1 69.2
1989 336.4 14.2 64.7
1990 333.7 14.0 63.9
Notes: a - liberalization of Abortion Law (February 1960); b - further liberalization of abortion regula­
tions (April 1969); * estimate
Sources: David and McIntyre (1981), Tietze and Henshaw (1986), Andolsek (1988), Rasevic (1990), 
UN (1992c).
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Table A5.9: Births and abortions, rates and ratios: Soviet Union, 1950-90
Year
Live
births
(1,000s)
Legally
induced
abortions
(1,000s)
Other
abortions
(1,000s)
Total 
registered 
abortions 
(1,000s)
Rate per 1,000 
population 
live legal
births abortions
Rate per 1,000 
women (15-44) 
live legal
births abortions
Legal 
abortions 
per 100 
live births
1950 4805.3 26.7 102.7
1951 4954.6 27.0
1952 4948.1 26.5
1953 4754.4 25.1
1954 5135.1 396.6 1576.7 1973.4 26.6 2.1 7.7
1955 a 5047.4 596.7 1986.4 2583.2 25.7 3.1 100.3 11.9 11.8
1956 5022.7 3296.7 1399.5 4696.2 25.2 16.7 65.6
1957 5163.7 3974.7 1332.0 5306.7 25.4 19.7 77.0
1958 5239.6 4812.7 1279.3 6092.1 25.3 23.5 91.9
1959 5264.5 5069.0 1291.1 6360.1 25.0 24.3 .. 96.3
1960 5341.0 5610.9 1385.2 6996.1 24.9 26.4 108.6 114.1 105.1
1961 5191.9 5971.2 1409.8 7380.9 23.8 27.6 115.0
1962 4959.1 6375.5 1352.4 7727.8 22.4 29.0 128.6
1963 4757.7 6627.3 1347.8 7975.1 21.1 29.7 139.3
1964 4456.8 6978.9 1379.1 8357.9 19.5 30.8 156.6
1965 4253.1 7148.5 1351.5 8500.0 18.4 31.1 82.0 137.9 168.1
1966 4241.6 6978.1 1309.4 8287.5 18.2 30.0 164.5
1967 4093.1 17.3
1968 4087.9 17.2 ..
1969 4087.0 17.0
1970 4225.6 17.4 76.4
1971 4371.5 6221.0 1046.5 7267.6 17.8 25.5 77.8 110.7 142.3
1972 4404.0 6143.2 1016.7 7159.9 17.8 24.9 139.5
1973 4386.2 6171.9 1004.7 7176.6 17.6 24.8 140.7
1974 4546.1 6132.2 981.7 7113.9 18.0 24.4 134.9
1975 4611.5 6164.6 970.4 7135.0 18.1 24.3 82.5 110.3 154.7
1976 4719.7 6315.7 977.3 7293.0 18.4 24.7 154.5
1977 4693.4 6282.6 955.4 7238.0 18.1 24.4 154.2
1978 4763.4 6229.2 930.8 7160.0 18.2 23.9 150.3
1979 4807.1 6111.8 897.2 7009.0 18.2 23.3 80.5 102.3 145.8
1980 4851.4 6120.6 882.4 7003.0 18.3 23.1 82.4 103.9 144.4
1981 b 4961.4 5986.6 847.4 6834.0 18.5 22.5 137.7
1982 5100.3 6068.7 843.3 6912.0 18.9 22.6 134.7
1983 5391.5 5953.2 811.8 6765.0 19.8 21.9 123.0
1984 5386.9 5980.0 800.0 6780.0 19.6 21.8 126.2
1985 5374.4 6218.1 815.9 7034.0 19.4 22.5 92.4 106.9 130.9
1986 5610.8 6293.4 822.6 7116.0 20.0 22.6 126.8
1987 5599.2 6033.9 784.1 6818.0 19.8 21.4 93.4 100.6 121.8
1988 5381.1 6790.9 737.1 7528.0 18.8 23.8 134.3
1989 5062.2 6306.7 667.7 6974.4 17.7 22.0 81.7 106.1 129.9
1990 c 4851.8 5334.2 601.0 5935.2 16.8 18.5 78.1 85.9 109.9
Notes: Statistics for 1954-66 on abortions are based on estimates; all other statistics are based on 
official data from the USSR Ministry of Public Health.
a - abortion on request legalized (November 1955); b - pronatalist policies introduced 
(March-September 1981); c - without data on abortions performed by vacuum-aspiration 
Sources: Sadvokasova (1969), Tietze and Henshaw (1986), Avdeev (1989, 1994), GOSKOMSTAT 
(1988, 1989, 1990), Avdeev and Troitskaya (1991), Popov (1991).
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Table A5.10: Trends in total fertility rates in first five years following 
liberalization of abortion legislation in selected 
Eastern European countries
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Bulgaria, 1956-60
(a) observed TFR 2.36 2.26 2.23 2.23 2.31
(b) expected TFR* 2.36 2.34 2.33 2.31 2.29
((a)-(b)) / (b) 0.0% -3.4% -4.3% -3.5% 0.9%
Czechoslovakia, 1958-62
(a) observed TFR 2.57 2.39 2.39 2.38 2.34
(b) expected TFR* 2.76 2.73 2.71 2.68 2.66
((a)-(b)) / (b) -6.9% -12.5% -11.8% -11.2% -12.0%
East Germany, 1972-76
(a) observed TFR 1.79 1.58 1.55 1.55 1.64
(b) expected TFR* 2.07 2.02 1.97 1.93 1.88
((a)-(b)) / (b) -13.5% -21.8% -21.3% -19.7% -12.8%
Hungary, 1956-60
(a) observed TFR 2.60 2.30 2.18 2.09 2.02
(b) expected TFR* 3.03 3.13 3.24 3.34 3.45
((a)-(b)) / (b) -14.2% -26.5% -32.7% -37.4% -41.4%
Poland, 1956-60
(a) observed TFR 3.50 3.49 3.36 3.22 2.99
(b) expected TFR* 3.55 3.52 3.49 3.46 3.43
((a)-(b)) / (b) -1.4% -0.9% -3.7% -6.9% -12.8%
Romania, 1956-60
(a) observed TFR 2.89 2.73 2.59 2.43 2.34
(b) expected TFR* 3.00 3.01 3.02 3.03 3.04
((a)-(b)) / (b) -3.7% -9.3% -14.2% -19.8% -23.0%
Yugoslavia, 1960-64
(a) observed TFR 2.75 2.72 2.69 2.67 2.64
(b) expected TFR* 2.57 2.47 2.37 2.27 2.17
((a)-(b)) / (b) 7.0% 10.1% 13.5% 17.6% 21.7%
Note: * TFRs are extrapolated by means of linear regression based on trend 
observed over five-year period before liberalization of abortion laws 
Sources: see Tables A5.1-A5.9.
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Table A6.1 Age-specific abortion rates for five-year age groups: 
Czech Republic, 1960-90
Year __________________________Age group
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
1960 12.66 45.50 56.35 48.00 33.57 13.80 0.84
1961 13.41 40.44 57.13 54.17 37.54 15.85 0.71
1962 12.60 38.80 53.39 50.19 35.26 14.82 0.53
1963 7.78 26.84 39.72 40.39 30.82 12.86 0.49
1964 8.89 30.36 39.62 38.18 28.72 11.22 0.62
1965 11.15 37.11 46.15 42.03 29.97 10.70 0.82
1966 13.12 44.23 52.32 46.36 30.47 10.42 0.86
1967 13.92 47.54 54.68 47.66 31.62 10.19 0.85
1968 14.13 49.95 55.48 47.77 31.94 10.39 0.82
1969 15.52 49.55 56.60 48.58 31.77 9.90 0.69
1970 16.24 47.64 52.56 46.56 32.02 10.40 0.58
1971 16.08 44.34 49.77 43.68 30.12 10.45 0.54
1972 15.74 40.07 46.80 40.39 29.12 9.94 0.54
1973 12.98 31.47 38.39 36.48 26.86 9.80 0.53
1974 13.31 33.02 38.82 35.84 26.36 9.27 0.55
1975 13.24 31.76 37.15 34.57 25.78 9.03 0.50
1976 12.59 32.86 37.94 35.18 26.00 9.19 0.63
1977 11.94 34.48 42.06 38.02 27.35 9.60 0.61
1978 11.54 36.08 43.85 40.38 27.65 10.05 0.59
1979 12.25 37.19 44.43 39.33 27.73 9.69 0.57
1980 13.33 41.31 48.21 40.87 28.50 10.19 0.50
1981 14.99 43.26 50.11 42.99 28.85 10.31 0.62
1982 15.86 44.87 52.85 44.70 30.21 10.91 0.65
1983 16.74 45.04 53.35 44.57 30.80 11.16 0.73
1984 18.98 49.00 56.11 47.35 31.62 11.75 0.80
1985 19.58 52.00 59.45 49.12 32.68 12.38 0.88
1986 19.76 54.20 58.86 49.48 33.14 12.45 1.01
1987 26.57 77.00 77.80 62.98 41.37 16.07 1.47
1988 26.92 79.86 81.77 66.54 43.44 16.34 1.44
1989 24.10 78.03 82.64 65.30 43.79 16.12 1.46
1990 24.80 77.42 82.90 64.83 43.53 15.25 1.39
Sources: FSO (1981,1991), IHS (1991).
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Table A6.2 Age-specific abortion rates for five-year age groups: 
Slovakia, 1960-90
Year __________________________Age group
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
1960 4.40 23.72 35.03 35.58 27.78 14.90 1.21
1961 4.14 22.38 40.19 43.56 33.80 18.59 0.93
1962 4.22 20.83 39.34 43.26 33.54 17.08 0.89
1963 2.53 14.94 29.82 35.40 28.60 14.56 0.82
1964 2.78 17.05 30.20 34.66 27.91 13.10 1.30
1965 3.28 21.39 35.45 36.25 28.99 12.87 1.41
1966 4.88 29.09 42.78 41.39 31.05 11.29 1.18
1967 5.70 33.22 47.97 43.98 31.32 10.78 0.90
1968 6.28 34.86 47.96 44.20 31.95 11.48 0.92
1969 6.95 35.72 49.55 45.73 32.17 11.46 0.91
1970 7.01 34.06 49.00 42.93 32.10 11.17 0.91
1971 7.64 36.41 48.94 44.53 30.67 11.72 0.76
1972 7.54 31.17 43.94 40.55 28.78 10.31 0.64
1973 7.37 29.04 40.62 38.69 27.34 10.87 0.64
1974 6.98 30.93 42.08 37.25 27.55 10.28 0.56
1975 7.35 28.78 40.85 37.43 28.58 10.02 0.71
1976 7.91 30.46 42.01 40.27 27.17 10.22 0.72
1977 5.84 27.69 42.33 41.07 28.96 11.37 0.90
1978 7.48 31.15 42.08 39.31 27.04 9.42 0.63
1979 7.56 31.60 44.32 39.67 27.88 9.97 0.65
1980 6.41 30.47 45.38 43.53 28.66 11.47 1.03
1981 6.36 31.27 45.78 42.94 30.15 11.11 0.80
1982 6.93 31.30 47.50 44.21 30.12 11.46 0.82
1983 7.71 33.28 47.41 43.26 29.68 10.98 0.86
1984 8.01 33.84 47.53 43.38 30.14 11.47 0.85
1985 8.31 37.39 50.97 44.27 30.83 11.40 1.02
1986 9.86 42.24 56.55 48.78 34.41 12.71 1.01
1987 15.67 59.07 68.64 57.27 36.46 12.98 1.00
1988 15.85 61.52 70.91 57.78 38.14 13.06 0.98
1989 14.75 58.77 69.28 53.90 36.48 12.12 0.96
1990 14.94 59.58 68.80 53.29 35.89 12.15 0.88
Sources: FSO (1981,1991), IHS (1991).
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Table A6.3: Estimated abortion rates specific for age and marital status: 
Czech Republic, selected years 1961-90
Period, _______________________ Age group
marit.status 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
1961
single 12.0 32.5 39.4 30.0 19.0 6.2 0.4
married
divorced
28.1 42.6 57.0 54.7 38.6 16.5 0.8
& widowed n.a. 117.9 105.8 75.6 40.4 16.0 0.5
1970
single 13.6 36.9 36.8 24.6 18.1 3.7 0.2
married
divorced
42.8 50.6 52.2 46.4 31.8 10.5 0.6
& widowed n.a. 110.8 85.7 65.7 40.7 12.2 0.5
1980
single 11.3 26.8 28.9 19.4 13.4 3.5 0.2
married
divorced
35.1 46.1 48.9 41.1 28.5 10.1 0.5
& widowed n.a. 79.8 67.6 51.6 34.1 12.4 0.6
1987
single 21.9 48.1 49.1 38.3 25.1 9.2 1.1
married
divorced
111.4 94.0 79.6 63.2 40.7 15.8 1.4
& widowed n.a. 154.8 102.5 75.0 51.4 19.2 1.7
1988
single 23.2 57.3 55.6 41.2 26.5 9.4 0.5
married
divorced
71.6 90.2 83.2 66.8 43.2 16.2 1.4
& widowed n.a. 126.0 102.6 77.2 50.3 18.8 1.6
1989
single 20.6 54.9 54.7 39.9 25.6 9.3 1.0
married
divorced
68.7 89.1 84.6 65.6 43.4 16.0 1.4
& widowed n.a. 119.8 103.0 75.9 52.1 18.2 1.8
1990
single 21.6 57.4 56.2 46.4 27.1 9.1 1.4
married 64.5 86.5 84.6 64.9 43.3 15.2 1.4
divorced 
& widowed n.a. 123.3 105.0 73.5 49.7 16.7 1.5
Sources: CCPCS (1965), FSO (1974, 1985, 1991), IHS (1991).
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Table A6.4: Estimated abortion rates specific for age and marital status: 
Slovakia, selected years 1961-90
Period, _______________________ Age group
marit.status 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
1961
single 4.1 19.8 23.5 17.2 10.6 4.7 0.3
married
divorced
4.9 23.3 42.1 46.0 36.2 20.6 1.1
& widowed n.a. 69.6 60.7 46.8 25.8 9.2 0.2
1970
single 6.0 25.3 32.3 19.4 14.0 2.4 0.0
married
divorced
20.0 39.0 50.2 43.8 32.9 12.0 1.0
& widowed n.a. 116.5 90.7 65.7 36.6 7.5 0.3
1980
single 5.5 22.8 26.6 22.4 12.3 5.0 0.6
married
divorced
17.0 34.7 48.0 44.8 29.4 11.8 1.1
& widowed n.a. 71.0 65.3 62.3 33.9 11.9 0.7
1987
single 12.7 34.8 32.6 26.5 14.5 6.9 0.5
married
divorced
56.5 75.4 74.9 60.8 38.5 13.7 1.1
& widowed n.a. 113.1 87.1 59.7 36.3 11.2 0.7
1988
single 12.7 35.9 34.2 24.4 17.7 6.5 0.3
married
divorced
60.3 78.8 77.6 61.7 40.0 13.6 1.0
& widowed n.a. 116.3 82.9 60.3 39.0 12.5 1.0
1989
single 12.2 34.4 36.0 25.2 16.9 6.3 1.1
married
divorced
52.9 75.6 75.1 57.3 38.6 12.9 1.0
& widowed n.a. 108.5 88.7 56.1 34.1 10.1 0.6
1990
single 12.6 36.0 33.2 24.6 18.0 5.6 1.6
married 49.7 76.1 75.2 56.6 38.0 12.8 0.9
divorced 
& widowed n.a. 102.0 86.8 56.5 33.3 11.3 0.7
Sources: CCPCS (1965), FSO (1974, 1985, 1991), IHS (1991).
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Table A6.5: Estimated abortion rates specific for age, marital status,
and parity: Czech Republic, 1970 and 1980
Period, Parity 
marital
Age group
status 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
1970
all women
0 12.7 24.1 20.6 12.1 10.0 2.2 0.2
1 80.5 53.1 34.7 28.0 18.0 6.2 0.3
2 168.1 108.8 68.2 46.3 29.5 9.2 0.5
3+ 186.7 165.9 116.7 83.0 52.3 17.1 0.9
married women
0 4.2 5.5 6.1 3.9 3.6 1.3 0.1
1 79.0 48.7 29.3 22.2 15.0 5.0 0.3
2 190.1 113.2 69.5 46.7 29.3 9.2 0.5
3+ n.a. 195.0 129.1 91.1 57.7 19.1 1.1
unmarried women
0 13.1 34.7 38.5 30.6 39.1 8.2 0.8
1 88.7 112.2 101.4 115.2 55.5 15.8 0.7
2 n.a. 66.6 52.4 41.2 31.7 9.2 0.4
3+ n.a. 77.0 53.0 38.8 26.7 8.4 0.2
1980
all women
0 10.4 17.6 15.8 10.0 8.6 3.1 0.2
1 59.7 35.6 28.3 24.9 18.9 6.8 0.2
2 145.4 88.1 58.5 41.9 28.0 10.1 0.6
3+ 83.9 124.6 87.4 63.6 42.2 14.3 0.6
married women
0 2.8 4.0 4.3 2.8 3.5 1.8 0.0
1 54.9 31.0 21.4 16.3 13.7 5.7 0.2
2 187.6 91.3 59.6 42.7 28.5 10.1 0.6
3+ n.a. 146.3 99.5 74.2 49.3 16.4 0.7
unmarried women
0 10.7 24.3 27.8 24.1 31.6 23.4 5.0
1 87.8 90.4 113.0 229.4 99.3 16.6 0.2
2 n.a. 50.2 46.0 34.4 24.3 10.5 0.6
3+ n.a. 41.6 30.3 21.6 17.7 7.5 0.4
Sources: FSO (1974, 1985, 1991), IHS (1991).
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Table A6.6: Estimated abortion rates specific for age, marital status,
and parity: Slovakia, 1970 and 1980
Period, Parity 
marital
Age group
status 15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
1970
all women
0 5.6 18.1 21.0 11.6 6.7 1.3 0.1
1 39.5 33.6 26.8 19.2 15.2 4.7 0.2
2 74.1 79.6 55.2 36.1 24.8 8.1 0.8
3+ 77.1 123.7 92.5 66.9 45.4 16.0 1.3
married women
0 1.7 2.3 5.8 2.7 1.9 1.0 0.1
1 37.1 31.5 22.8 14.8 12.5 4.3 0.2
2 99.4 80.5 54.7 35.3 24.3 8.1 0.8
3+ n.a. 135.6 96.1 68.7 46.7 17.0 1.5
unmarried women
0 5.7 24.1 30.1 18.5 12.0 1.7 0.0
1 49.2 77.1 103.1 78.2 44.3 7.7 0.0
2 n.a. 60.9 72.6 57.9 34.8 7.6 0.7
3+ n.a. 60.8 43.6 39.0 28.8 6.2 0.2
1980
all women
0 5.1 16.3 16.7 15.0 8.5 3.1 0.4
1 28.3 26.5 25.0 25.1 16.3 7.2 0.8
2 57.7 66.1 55.1 43.3 26.4 11.0 0.9
3+ 91.0 87.1 81.9 61.1 38.2 14.2 1.3
married women
0 1.0 1.7 2.3 2.6 2.8 0.8 0.3
1 26.1 23.5 19.5 17.8 12.0 6.3 0.7
2 75.4 67.2 55.2 42.8 26.0 11.0 0.9
3+ n.a. 96.3 87.1 64.5 40.1 14.7 1.4
unmarried women
0 5.2 21.2 23.9 22.7 13.0 5.5 0.5
1 37.1 68.1 82.8 80.9 46.4 13.2 1.2
2 n.a. 46.5 52.2 51.9 30.6 10.8 0.6
3+ n.a. 30.5 24.8 23.2 19.6 10.0 0.7
Sources: FSO (1974, 1985, 1991), IHS (1991).
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Table A7.1: Age-specific abortion rates for selected birth cohorts: 
Czech Republic
Age Birth cohort
1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
15 2.0 1.1 2.0 1.6 2.1 2.8
16 6.6 4.7 7.4 5.8 8.3 11.7
17 10.7 11.8 14.1 11.9 16.0 26.8
18 13.8 22.3 18.6 18.4 25.3 39.7
19 22.9 31.3 22.6 24.0 35.6 52.5
20 32.3 35.1 39.5 26.8 32.5 44.3
21 35.4 46.7 39.9 31.5 39.7 62.5
22 32.4 53.6 36.8 36.6 45.9 80.7
23 31.4 58.3 34.8 39.6 51.8 84.6
24 39.5 56.1 36.2 45.0 56.3 84.9
25 54.9 48.4 56.0 37.6 49.6 60.1
26 54.8 54.1 52.2 40.5 51.4 69.8
27 47.5 56.2 45.9 43.8 53.4 80.4
28 40.7 53.8 41.5 44.4 54.1 79.7
29 43.6 53.7 39.6 44.1 55.5 78.2
30 56.7 48.8 49.2 39.6 46.1 54.4
31 54.4 49.2 43.3 40.5 45.5 60.4
32 45.4 48.2 37.6 41.2 44.8 64.9
33 37.9 45.4 35.2 39.7 43.8 62.4
34 36.1 42.3 31.9 37.6 42.6 57.3
35 43.3 37.3 38.6 29.1 36.8 40.2
36 41.4 34.8 33.5 29.6 34.3 41.8
37 33.6 32.1 28.4 27.0 31.9 43.0
38 27.6 28.0 24.0 24.0 29.1 38.9
39 22.7 23.6 20.4 20.6 25.6 31.7
40 23.5 18.8 19.1 16.3 17.0 21.5
41 18.2 14.8 14.1 13.1 13.4 19.3
42 11.4 9.4 9.1 9.0 10.0 15.8
43 7.1 5.9 5.2 6.2 6.4 10.5
44 3.9 3.1 3.1 3.3 4.2 7.0
Sources: FSO (1981, 1991), IHS (1991).
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Table A7.2: Age-specific abortion rates for selected birth cohorts: 
Slovakia
Age Birth cohort
1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
15 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.9
16 1.8 1.7 3.1 2.5 2.6 4.9
17 3.0 4.6 6.5 5.5 5.8 14.3
18 4.0 9.8 11.1 11.6 11.6 23.3
19 8.2 16.5 15.1 15.1 17.3 34.3
20 14.1 16.8 25.6 23.3 19.1 26.1
21 16.8 27.8 30.0 24.5 25.8 44.5
22 18.1 35.8 31.2 29.9 32.8 62.5
23 19.5 42.9 34.6 35.8 39.8 66.5
24 25.7 45.6 37.2 39.7 47.2 70.2
25 32.1 35.4 50.9 39.8 43.9 53.9
26 38.4 44.7 47.2 40.6 45.3 63.3
27 35.0 47.2 42.8 42.2 46.2 70.9 ..
28 31.1 49.3 44.2 45.9 49.1 70.7
29 34.8 47.0 42.1 45.9 49.1 64.9
30 41.0 38.6 48.1 44.0 47.4 51.1
31 44.3 43.8 44.9 43.7 45.6 56.1
32 39.9 44.1 40.1 39.8 44.4 57.5
33 34.9 42.7 35.7 39.3 41.0 52.5
34 34.4 40.5 33.5 37.4 39.3 46.2
35 34.9 36.3 36.2 32.9 35.9 39.2
36 37.6 35.1 32.7 30.3 34.2 39.1
37 31.0 31.4 28.7 27.8 30.3 37.2
38 26.9 28.9 25.2 23.9 26.6 31.9
39 23.7 24.8 21.9 21.9 23.8 26.5 ..
40 23.6 20.0 20.4 17.5 17.7 21.2
41 20.3 15.6 14.8 14.0 14.8 16.7
42 15.5 10.4 10.4 10.7 11.1 11.9
43 9.3 6.5 6.2 6.5 6.9 7.5
44 6.1 3.8 3.5 3.9 4.6 4.8
Sources: FSO (1981, 1991), IHS (1991).
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Table A8.1: Total fertility, abortion, and conception rates*:
Czech Republic and Slovakia, 1950-90
Year Total fertility rate Total abortion rate Total conception rate
Czech R. 
(1)
Slovakia
(2)
Czech R. 
(3)
Slovakia
(4)
Czech R. 
(1)+(3)
Slovakia
(2)+(4)
Czech R. 
adj.**
Slovakia
adj.**
1950 2.792 3.541
1951 2.755 3.562
1952 2.694 3.557
1953 2.605 3.486
1954 2.576 3.435
1955 2.573 3.456
1956 2.564 3.454
1957 2.491 3.376
1958 2.303 3.237
1959 2.120 3.053
1960 2.112 3.065 1.048 0.701 3.160 3.766 3.180 3.744
1961 2.131 2.955 1.087 0.805 3.218 3.760 3.217 3.657
1962 2.139 2.829 1.022 0.785 3.161 3.614 3.270 3.653
1963 2.331 2.929 0.792 0.627 3.123 3.556 3.144 3.529
1964 2.355 2.906 0.788 0.629 3.143 3.535 3.031 3.456
1965 2.177 2.796 0.888 0.693 3.065 3.489 2.958 3.406
1966 2.006 2.668 0.986 0.806 2.992 3.474 2.919 3.346
1967 1.896 2.489 1.031 0.869 2.927 3.358 2.880 3.284
1968 1.826 2.393 1.051 0.889 2.877 3.282 2.903 3.308
1969 1.858 2.430 1.061 0.913 2.919 3.343 2.931 3.300
1970 1.912 2.396 1.026 0.885 2.938 3.281 2.973 3.277
1971 1.977 2.428 0.970 0.903 2.947 3.331 3.009 3.353
1972 2.073 2.486 0.909 0.814 2.982 3.300 3.118 3.339
1973 2.286 2.554 0.779 0.772 3.065 3.326 3.174 3.353
1974 2.431 2.595 0.781 0.777 3.212 3.372 3.186 3.312
1975 2.401 2.524 0.754 0.764 3.155 3.288 3.128 3.286
1976 2.361 2.522 0.765 0.790 3.126 3.312 3.104 3.265
1977 2.319 2.465 0.814 0.786 3.133 3.251 3.143 3.235
1978 2.323 2.450 0.845 0.781 3.168 3.231 3.144 3.216
1979 2.285 2.434 0.851 0.803 3.136 3.237 3.008 3.141
1980 2.095 2.306 0.909 0.826 3.004 3.132 2.947 3.100
1981 2.015 2.277 0.949 0.834 2.964 3.111 2.965 3.102
1982 2.006 2.270 0.991 0.853 2.997 3.123 2.969 3.116
1983 1.962 2.268 1.004 0.857 2.966 3.125 2.980 3.109
1984 1.966 2.251 1.071 0.868 3.037 3.119 3.043 3.121
1985 1.961 2.253 1.127 0.913 3.088 3.166 3.073 3.137
1986 1.935 2.199 1.141 1.021 3.076 3.220 3.117 3.209
1987 1.909 2.144 1.512 1.248 3.421 3.392 3.455 3.392
1988 1.940 2.144 1.579 1.284 3.519 3.428 3.467 3.367
1989 1.873 2.080 1.556 1.226 3.429 3.306 3.444 3.304
1990 1.893 2.085 1.555 1.225 3.448 3.310 ..
Notes: * calculated using age groups 15-44
** for definition of adjusted conception rates, see Chapter 8, Section 8.3. 
Sources: FSO (1991), IHS (1991).
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